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Abstract
Trucking replaced railroads as the primary link between rural producers and urban consumers
in the mid-twentieth century. With this technological change came a fundamental
transformation of the defining features of rural life after World War II. Trucking helped drive
the shift from a New Deal-era political economy-based on centralized political authority, a
highly regulated farm and food economy, and collective social values-to a postwar framework
of anti-statism, minimal market regulation, and fierce individualism. Trucking and rural truck
drivers were at the heart of what I call the "marketing machine," a new kind of food economy
that arose after World War II, characterized by decentralized food processors and supermarkets
seeking high volume, low prices, and consistent quality to eliminate uncertainties from the food
distribution chain. This marketing machine developed as a reaction against the statist food and
farm policies of the New Deal. Government agricultural experts-economists, engineers, and
policymakers-encouraged the growth of highway transportation in an effort to redefine the
"farm problem" as an industrial problem, an issue to be solved by rural food processors and
non-unionized "independent" truck drivers rather than price supports or acreage controls.
Thesis Supervisor: Deborah K. Fitzgerald
Title: Professor of the History of Technology
Trucking Country: Food Politics and the Transformation of
Rural Life in Postwar America
by
Shane L. Hamilton
B.A. History
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1998
SUBMIITED TO THE PROGRAM IN HISTORY AND SOCIAL STUDIES OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY AND SOCIAL STUDIES OF
TECHNOLOGY
AT THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
JUNE 2005
(c) 2005 Shane L. Hamilton. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce
and to distribute publicly paper and electronic
copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
SCIENCE AND
ii


Table of Contents
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .............................................................. VII
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................. IX
ACRONYMS USED IN THE TEXT .............................................................. XI
ABSTRACT .............................................................. XIII
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 1
Methodology and Historiography ........................................................ 15
CHAPTER 1: LONG-HAUL TRUCKING AND THE TECHNOPOLITICS OF
INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE ............................................................... 23
Trucking and Agriculture before World War II ........................................................ 24
Turning the Farm Problem into an Industrial Problem .................................................... 40
The Technopolitics of Flexible Transportation ......................................................... 51
Conclusion ......................................................... 79
CHAPTER 2: FROM THE MILK MAN TO THE MILK HAULER ...................................... 81
The New Deal and the "Milk Problem" ................................................................................81
The Milwaukee Milk Survey and the "Ideal Distribution System ".................................... 96
World War II and the Continuing Milk Problem ........................................................ 102
The Postwar "Ideal Distribution System" ......................................................... 112
The End of Hom e Delivery ....................................................................................................113
The Bulk Tank System ........................................................................................................... 121
The Modern Milk Hauler ................................................................. 130
C onclusion .............................................................................................................................138
CHAPTER 3: BEEF TRUSTS AND ASPHALT COWBOYS ................................................ 141
Beef Production and the Problem of Monopoly ......................................................... 142
Trucking and the Dismantled Monopoly, 1930s-1 950s .....................................................159
Direct M arketing ................................................................. 160
The Price of Beef ................................................................. 169
Rural M eatpacking ................................................................. 183
V
The Re-Emergent Monopoly, 1960S-1980 ........................................ ............................... 190
The Modern Feedlot .............................................................. 191
"Eat Beef, Stay Slim"-The Rise and Fall of Supermarket Monopoly Power .................... 202
The "Logic" of Boxed Beef ............................................................. 206
Asphalt Cowboys ............................................................. 219
CHAPTER 4: THE FLEXIBILITY OF FROZEN FOOD ...................................................... 229
"A Remarkably Perfect Piece of Merchandise" .......................................................... 230
An Essential Industry .......................................................... 249
Just-in-Time Distribution .......................................................... 255
The Political Economy of Convenience .......................................................... 279
Conclusion ........................................................... 308
CHAPTER 5: THE TRUCK DRIVING MAN IN THE RURAL INDUSTRIAL
LANDSCAPE .............................................................. 311
The Rural Industrial Landscape .........................................................................................312
Getting off the Farm, But Staying Country ........................................................................317
The Wandering Man .......................................................... 338
'"A Truck Does Not a Trucker Make" . .................................................................................351
"Truckers Ain't Organization People!" ........................................ .................. 360
C onclusion............................................................................................................................ 386
CONCLUSION .............................................................. 389
WORKS CITED ............................................................... 395
vi
List of Illustrations
FIGURE 1.1: A TYPICAL STRAIGHT TRUCK OF THE 1930S ....................................................... 58
FIGURE 1.2: A SEMI-TRAILER OF THE 1950S ........................................................ 59
FIGURE 1.3: GROCERY STORE IN DOWNTOWN KNOXVILLE, TN, 1959 ........................................................ 65
FIGURE 1.4: MODEL OF IDEAL FOOD DISTRIBUTION CENTER, 1959 ........................................................ 66
FIGURE 1.5: TRACTOR-TRAILER DELIVERY TO A SUPERMARKET, 1943 ........................................................ 67
MAP 2.1: WISCONSIN AND ILLINOIS MILKSHEDS, 1932 ....................................................... 87
FIGURE 2.1: BORDEN MILK COMPANY DELIVERYMEN ........................................................ 118
FIGURE 2.2: MILK HAULER UNLOADING CANS AT RECEIVING STATION ....................................................... 122
FIGURE 2.3: BULK MILK TRUCK ....................................................... 123
MAP 3.1: MEATPACKER BRANCH HOUSES IN 1916 ........................................................ 150
MAP 3.2: STOCKYARD LOCATIONS AND BEEF CATTLE ON FARMS IN 1916 ................................................. 152
MAP 3.3: MEATPACKER FACTORIES IN 1916 ....................................................... 153
MAP 3.4: MEATPACKER LOCATIONS AND BEEF CATTLE ON FARMS IN 1959 ............................................... 186
MAP 3.5: THE FEED)LOT BELT AND FEED GRAIN PRODUCTION IN 1965 ....................................................... 193
MAP 3.6: RURAL M EATPACKING IN THE 1970S ............................................................................................ 210
FIGURE 4.1: CLARENCE BIRDSEYE'S 20-TON BELT FREEZER ........................................................ 234
FIGURE 4.2: AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH OF SEABROOK FARMS .......................................................................... 242
MAP 4.1: BIRDS EYE FROZEN FOOD PLANTS, 1949 ........................................................ 265
FIGURE 4.3: SEABROOK FARMS TRUCK WITH REEFER ......................................................... 268
MAP 4.2: TRUCK TERMINALS FOR FROZEN FOOD, 1947 ........................................................ 269
FIGURE 4.4: THERMO KING MODEL R ......................................................... 273
MAP 4.3: MAJOR FROZEN FOOD FACTORIES, 1968 ....................................................... 302
FIGURE 5.1: A NEATLY DRESSED TRUCK DRIVER ....................................................... 326
FIGURE 5.2: JOE AND JESS JACA OF JACA TRUCK LINES ........................................................ 329
FIGURE 5.3: A TACHOGRAPH, OR "WATCHMAN IN THE CAB ..................................................................... 342
FIGURE 5.4: A "COMPANY DRIVER" RECEIVES A STEADY PAYCHECK ........................................................ 350
FIGURE 5.5: THE BANDIT ................................. ...................... 381
All images reproduced by permission.
Maps by Shane Hamilton (all rights reserved).
vii
viii
Acknowledgments
What a long old haul the writing of this dissertation has been, to paraphrase Red
Simpson. I had no idea how many people would keep me headed in the right direction as I
struggled to deliver the goods on time.
The librarians and archivists who suffered my endless requests for dusty books and
boxes deserve special thanks. Harry Miller at the Wisconsin Historical Society, Joe Schwartz at
the National Archives, Dawn Oberg at the Country Music Hall of Fame, the entire staff of the
Smithsonian Institution Archives Center, Bill Johnson at the American Truck Historical Society,
and Olga Montgomery at the Finney County Historical Society selflessly shared their time and
knowledge and pointed me to sources I never could have found on my own. Robert Vandivier
and Earl and Ty Brookover welcomed me and my tape recorder into their lives; I only hope I
have done their stories justice.
The students, faculty, and staff of the Department of Science, Technology, and Society at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology made my graduate school experience intellectually
stimulating and downright enjoyable. I was particularly lucky to discuss the intertwined
histories of agriculture, environment, and science and technology with David Lucsko, Leo Marx,
Jamie Pietruska, Sara Pritchard, Harriet Ritvo, Jennifer Leigh Smith, William J. Turkel, and
Anya Zilberstein,
I have been extremely fortunate to receive funding from a number of institutions. The
National Science Foundation provided an indispensable Dissertation Improvement Grant.
I)octoral fellowships from the Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology, the
Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of American History, and the American Political
I)evelopment Program at the Miller Center of Public Affairs not only provided me with time and
space to write, but also put me in touch with a host of scholars whose work has inspired me
more than they may realize. I particularly need to thank two of my mentors: Pete Daniel, who
presided over the weekly gathering of thirsty Smithsonian scholars, and Edmund P. Russell at
the Miller Center, whose sage advice on writing and presenting I will sorely miss. Brian Balogh,
Sid Milkis, Chi Lam, and my fellow Fellows at the Miller Center made the final year of
ix
dissertating as rewarding as anyone could hope. At a crucial juncture in the writing process, the
Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm welcomed me and provided me with a chance to
view U.S. history from an outsider's angle. I am especially grateful for the insights and
friendship offered by Arne Kaiser, Thomas Kaiserfeld, and Per Lundin, as well as everyone who
ran circles around me in innebandy and tried not to laugh at my Swedish pronunciation.
Merritt Roe Smith and Meg Jacobs have been two of my best teachers and role models.
From Roe I learned the importance of using careful research to tell an engaging narrative in
both writing and teaching, though I can only hope to someday emulate his ability to capture the
big picture of American history with just a simple artifact or anecdote. From Meg I learned
everything I know about twentieth-century American political history. Since the day Meg arrived
at MIT, she generously and relentlessly challenged me to think as broadly, as critically, and with
as much insight as she does.
Deborah K. Fitzgerald won the Best Graduate Advisor award from MIT while I was her
student, and if it had been up to me, she would have won it every year. Deborah is both the most
encouraging and the toughest scholar I have ever had the privilege to work with. She patiently
showed me how to rethink and reframe the way rural and agricultural history is done,
enthusiastically supporting my better ideas and firmly reining me in when I strayed too far. As a
mentor, as a colleague, and as a friend, Deborah Fitzgerald has given me more than I can ever
hope to repay.
Finally, I want to thank my two sisters, Sheri and Shamane, who have been my
inspiration all along, even if they never quite understood why I would move from rural
Wisconsin to the Big City on the East Coast only to write about the people and places that I
never really left behind.
x
Acronyms Used in the Text
AAA Agricultural Adjustment Administration
AHFA American Highway Freight Association
AMS Agricultural Marketing Service
ARS Agricultural Research Service
ATA American Trucking Associations, Inc.
BAE Bureau of Agricultural Economics
BPR Bureau of Public Roads
BW Business Week
CBC Consolidated Badger Cooperative
CMHF Country Music Hall of Fame
IBP Iowa Beef Packers
lBT International Brotherhood of Teamsters
KSHS Kansas State Historical Society
ITL Less-than-Truckload (shipping)
MCA Motor Carrier Act
NIRA National Industrial Recovery Act
NLRB National Labor Relations Board
NRA National Recovery Administration
NYT New York Times
ODT Office of Defense Transportation
OPA Office of Price Administration
OPS Office of Price Stabilization
QFF Quick Frozen Foods
RMA Research and Marketing Act
SECC Seabrook Educational and Cultural Center
TL Truckload (shipping)
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
WDC Wisconsin Dairies Cooperative
WMHA Wisconsin Milk Haulers Association
WRRL Western Regional Research Laboratory
WtSJ Wall Street Journal
xi
xii
Introduction
Ken Nelson had already produced a string of country music hits for Capitol Records
when he asked Joe Cecil "Red" Simpson to write an album of trucking songs in 1965. Nelson was
a Hollywood producer, though born in Minnesota, who helped create the "Bakersfield Sound"-
the chart-topping, hard-driving, rebel-rousing, explicitly working-class country music of the
:196os by artists like Buck Owens, Rose Maddox, and Merle Haggard. Red Simpson learned to
play guitar and fiddle during the Depression, living in a migrant settlement outside of
Bakersfield, California with his "Okie" farmworker family. By 1965 he was a highly respected
songwriter in the Bakersfield scene, having penned over 30 hit tunes for the Farmer Boys and
Buck Owens, including "King of Fools" and "Close up the Honky Tonks."
Ken Nelson had tapped Simpson's songwriting skills before, but his request of 1965 was
slightly different. The astounding 1963 chart success of "Six Days on the Road," a trucking song
by the previously obscure Wisconsin artist Dave Dudley, gave Nelson an idea. The time seemed
ripe to establish trucking songs as a full-fledged sub-genre of country music, thereby carving out
a new market segment for Capitol Records' expanding and increasingly popular country catalog.
Truck drivers, reasoned Nelson, spent hours "driving long and lonely miles with only their
radios for company," and might make an ideal audience for "a type and style of music and lyric
with which they could personally identify."2 The great market potential Nelson saw for trucking
music drove him to first ask his biggest talent, Merle Haggard, to write some hit highway songs.
Although Haggard would later record one of the most poetic songs of the genre-"White Line
1 "Profiles: Ken Nelson," CMA Close-Up (Oct. 1964): 1-2; Dave Hoekstra, "Major Nelson," Chicago Sun-Times, Nov.
30, 1997, Ken Nelson File, Country Music Hall of Fame Library, Nashville, TN; Jeremy Tepper, Liner notes to The
Best of Red Simpson.: Country Western Truck Drivin' Singer, [audio compact disc] (New York: Razor and Tie / Diesel
Only Records, 1999); Dixie Deen, "Six Days on the Road Puts Ravin' Dave Dudley on Country Music Map," Music City
Nrews 4 (July 1966): 11, 20; Bill C. Malone and Judith McCulloh, eds., Stars of Country Music: Uncle Dave Macon to
Johnny Rodriguez (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975), 326-39; Gerald W. Haslam, Workin'Man Blues:
Country Music in California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).
2 Kenneth W. Fitzgerald, "The Trucker's Balladeer," Open Road and the Professional Driver, Apr. 1977, 44. A recent
survey of truck drivers found that truck drivers' favorite music continues to be "Country/Western/Bluegrass," with
30% of respondents choosing it as their first preference and 20% choosing it as their second; the next highest category
was "Rock," with 18% and 12% respectively. Dale L. Belman, Kristen A. Monaco, and Taggert J. Brooks, Let It Be
Palletized: A Portrait of Truck Drivers' Work and Lives (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Trucking Industry
Program, 1998), 181.
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Fever"-he turned Nelson down in 1965, thinking that songs about truck-stop waitresses and
pinball machines might tarnish his reputation as a serious writer.3
It was up to Red Simpson then, to prove Haggard's reservations unwarranted with his
first hit record as a singer, the mid-tempo "Roll, Truck, Roll," released in 1966. With lyrics about
a trucker losing touch with his family, sung and spoken in Simpson' deep baritone and
complimented by a sadly shimmering pedal steel guitar, the song became an instant classic on
truck-stop jukeboxes and late-night AM radio. Though the only truck Red Simpson ever drove
was a Good Humor ice cream delivery van, he was suddenly a "homespun, country-boy folk hero
to the thousands of drivers who pilot the big transport rigs across the nation's highways." It was
a "funny thing," according to Red: "It used to be that no one thought much about trucks or the
people that keep them running. Now everyone-men, women, and kids all across the nation, are
truck song fans."'4 Simpson devoted two full-length albums to truckers, joining artists of the
1960os and '70s such as Red Sovine, Dave Dudley, Kay Adams, Del Reeves, the Willis Brothers,
and Dick Curless in making trucking songs into the "single largest category of modern work
songs."5
I recently asked Robert Vandivier, a retired livestock trucker with a passion for country
music, what he thought of songs like "Roll, Truck, Roll" and "Six Days on the Road." Without
hesitation he told me that the songs were popular with truckers because they successfully
captured the "cowboy thing"-a culture of hard, lonesome work that "truckers, just like those
cowboys, never should have got into," that nonetheless inspired romantic visions of masculine
independence for outsiders.6 Perhaps the "cowboy thing" does explain why trucking songs
became such an important part of the country music tradition. My impressions of the lyrics of
trucking songs, however-having a personal collection of several hundred of them-is that the
great majority have little or nothing to do with the idea of an "asphalt cowboy."7
3 Bill C. Malone, Country Music U.SA., rev. ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 292-98, 318-21; Bill C.
Malone, Don't Get above Your Raisin': Country Music and the Southern Working Class (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 2002), 137-9.
4 Tommy Collins, "Roll, Truck, Roll," performed by Red Simpson, Capitol single 5637 (Apr. 1966); Tepper, liner notes;
Fitzgerald, "The Trucker's Balladeer."
5 Malone, Country Music U.SA., 320. I will return to the economic and cultural history of these songs in Chapter 5.
6 Vandivier interview.
7 I will return to this question in Chapter 5. Country music historians have developed a variety of interpretations of
the phenomenon, among them Cecilia Tichi's contention that songs about trains and trucks are the product of
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Something Robert said in another context during our interview probably has more
bearing. "I would say about go percent of truckers were farmers to start with," he told me when I
asked him if he thought his path into trucking was typical. His first experience as a driver came
before he was tall enough to see over the steering wheel, hauling skim milk and grain to feed the
livestock on his parents' southern Indiana farm during the Great Depression. After serving
briefly in World War II, he was on the verge of making a downpayment on his own farm when,
by chance, a local trucker advertised a sale on four 11/2 ton Dodges with 20-foot livestock
trailers. Without any knowledge of the livestock hauling business, Robert soon found himself
running a lo-truck operation, hauling sheep, hogs, and cattle in 40- to 50-foot trailers from the
Midwest to New Jersey and West Virginia.8 Robert Vandivier became deeply enmeshed in
America's postwar agro-industrial economy, all the while maintaining an unquestioned sense of
rural identity. Robert represented the market demographic sought out by Ken Nelson of Capitol
Records, not because he was a "cowboy," but because he could appreciate music that combined a
"country" aesthetic with the realities of working-class modernity.9
This dissertation seeks to show that Robert Vandivier's life story is not only typical, but
that his story and others like it can illuminate the profound political, economic, and social
consequences of industrialized agriculture in postwar America. Although Robert's estimate that
9o percent of truckers come from a farming background seems a bit high, evidence abounds that
trucking and rural life became deeply intertwined in the years following World War II. Certainly
anyone who has driven on the interstate highway system has seen hundreds of trucks carrying
the products of America's farms to market. Perhaps more telling, if one were to take a detour off
the interstate-as I did after my discussion with Robert Vandivier, leaving Interstate 65 for the
broken blacktop of State Highway 39, on the way to Bloomington, Indiana-one is sure to see, in
the driveways and side yards of rural homesteads, where many of those big rigs get parked when
American restlessness, in which country musicians are born with a cultural "gene" predisposing them to "rambling."
Cecilia Tichi, High Lonesome: The American Culture of Country Music (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1994), 73-5.
8 Robert Vandivier, interview by the author, Nov. 22, 2003, Lebanon, IN.
9 The use of the term "working-class" may seem inappropriate to describe the owner of a medium-sized trucking firm.
As I will argue in more detail in Chapter 5, however, the concept of "class" in late-twentieth-century rural America is
about much more than whether or not an individual owns the means of production. In fact, ownership of a truck can
in some ways be an explicit marker of working-class identity, in my formulation.
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their drivers return home. A sociologist who interviewed dozens of truckers in 1973-74 reported
that "many have rural backgrounds," lived in rural or small-town areas, and had "never done
any type of work but farming or truck driving."lo The farming communities of the Midwest and
West, created in the nineteenth century by expanding railroad networks, now often have empty
train tracks running parallel to jam-packed highways. Why? Trucking clearly plays a major role
in the lives and landscapes of rural Americans, but what is the historical significance of this
observation? Did the connection between trucking and country emerge solely from the creative
minds of record producers like Ken Nelson, or did trucking become "country" as part of a larger
historical shift in rural American life?
This dissertation argues that the growth of long-haul trucking was both the product and
producer of new forms of industrial capitalism in the postwar countryside. More precisely, I
argue that trucking helped drive the shift from a New Deal-era political economy-based on
centralized political authority, a highly regulated farm and food economy, and collective social
values-to a postwar framework of anti-statism, minimal market regulation, and fierce
individualism. The argument is not that New Dealism disappeared, but that even as the state
became ever more deeply involved in structuring the agricultural economy in the twentieth
century, its presence moved from being an obvious and hotly contested feature of American
politics to a more subtle, hidden form of power. Key to this change was the growth of long-haul
trucking. Trucks replaced railroads as the primary link between rural producers and urban
consumers in the mid-twentieth century. With this technological shift came a fundamental
transformation of the defining features of agricultural politics and rural life after World War II.
The argument and organization of this dissertation is based on a simple premise: People
use technology to create value. In particular, technology produces three fundamental forms of
value: political values (ideologies and conceptions of the proper uses of state power), economic
value (subsistence and wealth), and social values (beliefs, attitudes, and meanings). Technology
does not by itself create these values, but people use technologies to negotiate the ways power,
'o Charles Bisanz, "The Anatomy of a Mass Public Protest Action: A Shutdown by Independent Truck Drivers,"
Human Organization 36, no. 1(1977): 63-9.
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wealth, and meanings are defined and distributed.,, This dissertation consequently has three
major sections, each focusing in turn on the ways long-haul trucking became a tool in the
postwar period for redefining the political values guiding industrial agriculture (Chapter i), the
economic geography of producing monetary value from the land (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), and the
social values of rural people (Chapter 5). Taken as a whole, the chapters explain how trucking
helped create and sustain explicitly anti-New Deal values regarding the workings of capitalism
in the rural industrial landscape.
The first four chapters of the dissertation argue that trucking helped reshape the political
and economic values encompassing rural production and urban food consumption. Trucks
became essential components of what I call the postwar "marketing machine." This machinery
emerged from a cooperative effort among government agricultural experts, food processors,
and supermarkets to reject New Dealism-namely, price supports, acreage controls, and
production quotas-as the defining political framework for American agriculture. The marketing
machine's primary elements were highly mechanized farms, intensively capitalized food
processors, and suburban supermarkets. Each of these elements, by practicing economies of
scale and by using the latest technologies-from bulk tanks on dairy farms to boxed beef in
meatpacking factories to forklifts in cold-storage warehouses-sought to reduce the costs of
moving perishable food from farms to consumers. The agricultural experts, food processing
firms, and supermarket managers who cooperatively constructed this postwar marketing
machine sought a rationalized food economy, one in which production and consumption
conformed to an ideology of efficiency. After all, growing and selling food has always been risky
business-with farming inherently based on seasonal and weather-related peaks and dips in
production, and with food marketing inescapably tied to the oft-changing fortunes and desires
of consumers. In the mid-twentieth century, industrial visions of efficiency guided the
construction of machinery intended to overcome these risks and uncertainties. Farmers, guided
by government research and policymaking, used industrial-style techniques and machines to
1 Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, 1963 [1934]); John M. Staudenmaier,
Technology's Storytellers: Reweaving the Human Fabric (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); Merritt Roe Smith and
Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History?: The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1994).
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intensify and expand their operations, seeking to subdue nature's whims through sheer volume
of specialized production. Tractors, hybrid seeds, pesticides, inorganic fertilizers, and giant
mono-cropped fields allowed America's farmers to increase their productivity ninefold between
1940 and the late 1980s.12 Food processors converted the raw materials farmers produced into
uniform packages of saleable commodities, pursuing stable profits by purchasing and selling in
volume. Brand names from Minute Maid to Wonder Bread to Perdue chicken were the end
products of a vertically integrated approach to food production, in which corporate
conglomerates sought control over supplies of produce, grains, and meats as well as control over
the profits to be gained from marketing those items.13 Supermarkets in turn brought those
packages to consumers, pricing them uniformly to assure constant turnover of stock. Mom-and-
pop grocery stores were replaced in the postwar period by chain stores operating on profit
margins so thin that only huge volumes of sales could justify the expense of the parking lot
acreage needed to attract waves of suburbanites seeking foods of consistent quality at low
prices.'4
These rationalized nodes in the food economy required some form of transportation to
tie them all together. After World War II, the movement of food from farm to consumer
increasingly relied on long-haul tractor-trailers rather than railroads. The shift to trucks came
not because trucking was somehow cheaper or inherently "better" than railroads, but because
trucks running on highways provided a flexible means of moving goods. The flexibility of
trucks-their unrestricted geographical reach, customized hauling capabilities, and their ability
to haul loads on short notice directly from one point to another-proved essential for the
rationalized marketing machine's operation. This was because, despite the best efforts of
farmers, processors, and supermarketers to rationalize the movement of food from farm to
consumer, uncertainties and risks could never be fully eliminated. Farmers could not, as a
general rule, transcend seasonal or regional variations in production; nature is not so easily
12 David Danbom, Born in the Country: A History ofRuralAmerica (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1995), 233-4.
'3 John L. Shover, First Majority, Last Minority: The Transforming of Rural Life in America (De Kalb: Northern
Illinois University Press, 1976), 176-89.
14 Daniel I. Padberg, The Economics of Food Retailing (Ithaca: Food Distribution Program, 1969), esp. 11-17; R. P. R.
Tilley and R. Hicks, "Economies of Scale in Supermarkets," Journal of Industrial Economics 19 (Nov. 1970): 1-5.
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controlled as a factory floor. Processors faced strikes from unionized workers, government
intervention in business practices, and resistance from both farmers and consumers over the
price and quality, of food. Supermarkets, as the final link in the food distribution chain,
confronted the sum total of all of these destabilizing factors, compounded by their business
model based on low-margin, steady-volume sales. Trucking helped to absorb some of these
uncertainties, proving adaptable to constantly changing patterns of production and
consumption and regulation. The builders of the marketing machine sought control in an
unpredictable world, and trucking helped provide that control.
The construction of the marketing machine entailed not only the creation of economic
values of rationalization and efficiency, but also the creation of a new set of political values.
From the end of World War I to the beginning of the Great Depression, science and technology
had made American farms incredibly productive, leaving farmers with "surpluses"-an
abundance of food that was difficult to sell at profitable prices. The core of the USDA's New Deal
farm policies aimed to solve this surplus problem by limiting farmers' production, but those
policies were both politically controversial and ineffective. Critics of the New Deal ridiculed
production controls for destroying crops and livestock while millions of Americans were starving
and poorly clothed, even as the scientific and technological bureaus of the USDA continued to
encourage farmers to use pesticides, fertilizers, hybrid crops, and tractors to increase their
production. During the 1930S and through World War II, the defining political framework for
American agriculture was characterized by a strongly statist regulatory approach to the surplus
problem. Policies such as price supports, acreage controls, and marketing orders were
controversial from the beginning, but throughout the long New Deal they were the primary
mode of negotiating the larger "farm problem"-the effort to keep commodity prices high for
farmers without unduly raising consumer food prices. In the postwar period, agricultural
policymakers came to see rationalized food distribution as a less obviously statist means of
dealing with the farm problem, and consequently worked closely with private industry to
construct the marketing machine.
The dissertation begins by exploring the ways in which the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) became interested in new forms of marketing machinery. Importantly, two
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related efforts of the USDA prior to World War II created the technological and political
framework from which the postwar marketing machine would emerge. Good rural highways
were the most basic component of the marketing machine. The Bureau of Public Roads, a
division of the USDA until 1949, was the federal agency responsible for coordinating the
construction of the nation's highway networks. Under the helm of "Chief' T. H. MacDonald, and
with support from an agriculture-oriented Congress, the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) focused
its energies on constructing farm-to-market highways rather than urban expressways. Chapter
One will integrate this history of rural road-building with the creation of the "agricultural
exemption" clause in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. The original intent of the Motor Carrier Act
(MCA) was to limit competition in the trucking industry, preventing small start-up firms from
taking business away from larger, more established companies. With pressure from the USDA
and farm congressmen, however, the MCA included a clause exempting truckers hauling farm
products from these regulations. The exemption was originally intended, like the BPR's farm-to-
market highways, to make it possible for farmers to haul unprocessed commodities to market in
their own small trucks, reducing their reliance on expensive railroad transportation.
As trucks became bigger and highways improved in the late 1940s, the agricultural
exemption came to serve a very different purpose. Relatively small trucking firms, shut out from
the lucrative freight hauling business by ICC market entry regulations, entered into farm
product hauling in increasing numbers. Generally non-unionized, these trucking companies
recruited rural men as drivers, seeing them as willing to work hard, long hours-
"independently." Consequently, the USDA's marketing economists increasingly saw trucking's
flexibility-couched in terms of small firms' lack of unionization and ability to undercut railroad
rates-as an opportunity to achieve lower food transportation costs. The Secretary of
Agriculture, relying on economists and legal experts in transportation policies, waged legal and
administrative battles in the 1940os and 1950S with the ICC, large trucking companies, and
railroads to keep the exemption intact despite the fact that few farmers hauled their own
products to market by that time. By essentially creating a separate economy for the
transportation of agricultural products, the "agricultural exemption" encouraged the growth of
long-haul trucking as an integral part of postwar industrial agriculture.
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The second half of Chapter One shows how the USDA's work on transportation policy
played into a larger political effort to dismantle the New Deal-era approach to farm policy. The
years immediately following the end of World War II saw bitter criticism of the highly regulatory
approach to agriculture, from all ranges of the political spectrum. Conservatives saw production
controls-such as acreage allotments-as an affront to free enterprise, while liberals viewed the
UJSDA's price support programs-aimed at raising the price of food-as directly at odds with the
Democrats' continuing efforts to increase the "purchasing power" of urban industrial laborers.
Three key events in postwar agricultural policymaking proved the difficulty of resolving these
tensions through traditional political means: the 1946 passage of the Agricultural Research and
Marketing Act, the 1949 effort of Secretary of Agriculture Charles Brannan to fit farm policy into
a broader postwar liberal agenda, and the intent of Eisenhower's Secretary of Agriculture Ezra
Taft Benson to completely dismantle New Deal farm policies. These three efforts, though they all
failed, demonstrated a shift within the USDA's highest policymaking structures from a New
I)eal-era focus on solving the problem of "overproduction" by restricting farm output, towards
postwar efforts to solve the problem of "underconsumption" by increasing consumer demand.
The marketing machine, with its focus on reducing transportation and distribution costs to
lower consumer food prices while keeping farm incomes high, played into the USDA's desire to
find an uncontroversial technological fix to the problematic legacies of the New Deal. This
chapter lays the groundwork for the chapters that follow, for the USDA's efforts not only helped
long-haul trucking to grow, but established an anti-regulatory framework based on close
cooperation between the state and private industry that proved essential for the development of
the new economic values that permeated the postwar countryside.
The heart of the dissertation comes in the next three chapters, where the focus shifts
firom policy disputes in Washington, D.C., to the on-the-ground building of the marketing
machine in rural America. This section of the dissertation uses case studies of milk, beef, and
frozen foods to show how long-haul trucking served as a tool used by both state and industry to
find non-regulatory solutions to three "problems" of political economy-"fair price," monopoly,
and surpluses. In these case studies we see the variety of ways in which profit-seeking industries
sometimes cooperated and sometimes clashed with the state over the means by which economic
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value was created in the countryside. Milk, the subject of Chapter Two, was at the center of a
broad-ranging debate over the "fair price" of a food widely recognized as essential to the
American diet. The price of milk created political and economic divisions between farmers,
consumers, organized labor, and private milk dealers, all of whom sought government help in
protecting their own definition of the fair price of milk during the 193os. The USDA devised
federal milk marketing orders as a regulatory solution to what its economists saw as the
essential cause of these debates over fair price-essentially, a lack of rationality in the
production and marketing of milk. The chapter traces the failure of this regulatory approach
through World War II and into the 1970s, by which time agricultural experts managed to
construct a technological alternative to the New Deal's approach. Tractor-trailers and highways
reframed the politics of milk's price on the consumers' end by replacing home delivery with
supermarket "dock delivery," and on the farmers' end by replacing milk cans with bulk tanks.
The deployment of these trucking technologies turned the issue of fair price into a matter of
marketplace negotiation rather than overtly political contention. At the same time, the new milk
economy depended more on rural "independent" milk haulers than on urban Teamster
deliverymen, demonstrating the powerful social consequences of the new marketing machine.
Since most of these events played out on the local and state level, this chapter will focus on the
relationship between Wisconsin dairy farmers and their two largest urban markets, Chicago and
Milwaukee.15
Chapter Three examines the problem of monopoly in the beef industry. The so-called
"Big Five" meatpackers (Armour, Swift, Morris, Wilson, and Cudahy) established monopolistic
control over the marketing and distribution of beef in the late 19th century, concentrating
capital investment in central railroad facilities, cold storage warehouses, and stockyards. In
1920 the Justice Department issued a Consent Decree, followed by Congress's passing of the
Packers and Stockyards Act, intended to loosen the Big Five's grip on beef marketing. The first
15 A good deal of this story could also apply to the situation in New York state, one of the three most important dairy
states along with Wisconsin and California in the twentieth century. It should be noted, however, that the California
situation was unique; the state of California developed its own approach to the "milk problem" in the 1930s,
encouraging the establishment of giant industrial dairy farms to produce milk at low cost. In other words, where
Wisconsin/Chicago and New York state/New York City approached the milk problem as a problem of marketing,
California treated it as a problem of production.
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New Deal Secretary of Agriculture, Henry A. Wallace, was sympathetic to these anti-monopoly
efforts and spent considerable effort enforcing the Packers and Stockyards Act to provide
livestock farmers with as many alternative buyers as possible for their cattle. In the 1950s,
however, the growth of long-haul trucking allowed for a decades-long reconfiguration of the
geography of beef production and marketing that had far more impact on the monopoly
problem than any government policies. By the late 1970s, trucking allowed certain upstart
beefpackers to orchestrate a strategy of rural industrialization that, despite creating a degree of
monopoly rivaling that of the old "Big Five," did not entail the political problems that had
(logged the old industry. In contrast to the problem of fair price in the milk industry, the
problem of monopoly in beefpacking brought a studied inaction on the part of agricultural
policymakers, who found the problem conveniently "solved" by tractor-trailers hauling grain-fed
steers and boxes of pre-cut beef. As a consequence, the beef industry became a standard bearer
for all that was considered "American" about industrial agriculture-free enterprise, high
productivity, and low consumer prices. The truck drivers who helped make this system work
were ideal representatives of this contradictory economic culture, which paid homage to a sense
of independence reminiscent of the open range of the Old West while practicing a winner-take-
all approach to the spoils of industrial capitalism.
The third in-depth case study looks at frozen food in relation to the surplus problem in
produce agriculture. Once frozen, food could be held in storage in freezer warehouses for up to a
year before being delivered to supermarkets. As agricultural economists of the 1940S and 1950s
saw it, the irregularity and unpredictability of weather-which they understood as the essential
causes of the surplus problem in the production of fruits and vegetables-could be surmounted
by harvesting produce in season, then distributing processed foods evenly throughout the year.
In an ideal world, the freezing of foods would turn organic matter into pure abstractions capable
of being transported, sold, and consumed at any time or place. Farmers would no longer be
caught with troublesome seasonal or perennial surpluses, and supermarkets would have a
steady supply of quality goods to sell throughout the year. Steady incomes and profits would be
the ultimate result. Turning this dream into reality proved rather difficult, however, requiring
significant cooperation among the USDA's agricultural engineers, frozen food farmer-processors
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like Seabrook Farms of New Jersey, and the trucking industry in building the complex
marketing machinery-from freezer warehouses to reliably refrigerated tractor-trailers-
necessary to make mass marketing of frozen food possible in the postwar period. In the 1950s,
frozen food seemed to be an ideal, non-statist solution to surplus problems in the fresh produce
economy. The technology needed to achieve both the political and economic promises of frozen
food, however, soon proved so complex and expensive that both goals could not be achieved
simultaneously. By the mid-196os, frozen food was no longer touted as an agro-industrial
revolution, becoming instead merely an ordinary product of profit-oriented corporate
capitalism.
All three of these case studies share an essential connection. Trucking, as it shifted from
local hauling in the 1930S to a full-fledged long-distance alternative to railroads after World War
II, created the conditions for agri-businesses and government agents to cooperate in
constructing a politically uncontroversial food mass-marketing system. The "flexibility" of
trucking proved instrumental in each case for providing agribusiness firms with two important
capabilities: 1) the ability to relocate food processing factories deep in the countryside, and 2)
the possibility of relying on non-unionized truck drivers to provide a form of social "flexibility"
that made just-in-time delivery possible without dramatically raising transportation costs.
But even though the three chapters share these common themes, each of the three cases
nonetheless demonstrates the unique historical contingencies that played out in the
construction of the postwar marketing machine. The chapters are arranged to trace the histories
of three distinct but interrelated varieties of the so-called "farm problem" of the New Deal era-
"fair price," monopoly, and surpluses-that led to a variety of political and technological
responses, in multiple geographical locations, and with varying degrees of regulatory
intervention at different government levels. In large measure, these different shades of the farm
problem arose from the characteristics of the commodities in question. Milk was, and still
remains, an extremely perishable food lacking any acceptable substitute; consequently, the
politics of milk have generally been highly localized-since milk could not travel far from its
point of production without spoiling-and also highly contentious, since the price of milk was
unaffected by economic competition from alternative products. Beef, on the other hand, could
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travel relatively far even before the days of mechanical refrigeration, since beef could be moved
either "on the hoof' or as "hanging quarters" with relatively little spoilage in cooled railroad
cars. Although beef has always been prized by consumers as a central component of the
"American standard of living," it has also faced significant competition from cheaper pork and
poultry products. The politics of beef were colored by an essential tension between beef as an
item of mass consumption or as a luxury food, making the question of "how much monopoly is
too much?" particularly problematic. The frozen-food industry, just an infant in 1930, did not
carry the historical and political baggage of either milk or beef, making possible two decades'
worth of credulous claims that food production and marketing would be rationalized according
to the dictates of science rather than politics. Despite these dreams of simplicity and stability,
the production and sale of frozen foods required, just like milk and beef, negotiations among
interest groups that could never be constrained merely to the realm of abstract economics.
The final chapter of the dissertation seeks to understand how these political and
economic changes helped reshape social values in the postwar countryside, as rural Americans
came to privilege the individual over the collective. Specifically, I ask how it was that rural men
became enrolled as the truck drivers who did much of the literal work of the marketing machine.
I)id rural men choose to become truck drivers of their own volition, or were they coerced into
the work by forces not of their choosing? Especially in the "exempt" agricultural and food
transportation sectors of the trucking industry, most truckers worked extremely irregular hours,
hauling for small, non-unionized companies. Competition in these sectors of the trucking
industry made work schedules, wage rates, and occupational demands almost completely
unpredictable for drivers. For a truck driver hauling farm products, the "flexibility" demanded
by agricultural economists, food processors, and supermarketers often meant being asked to
work for four or five straight days with almost no sleep, then being told to stay at home without
pay for a week. Given such conditions, one has to ask why anyone became a trucker in the first
place. For ethnographers who have studied the work lives of truckers, the answer is usually
"masculinity." Truck driving in the 1950s-1970s generally offered a man wages high enough to
support a family, but allowed him to think of himself as more independent and masculine than
the average blue-collar worker, whose work was always under supervision and tied to a
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disciplined time schedule. While this explanation has a great deal of merit, the historian has to
wonder whether deeper structural factors also played a role-that is, were ideas of manhood the
cause or the consequence of driving trucks through the countryside? Census reports and social
science surveys from the period show that a significant percentage of truckers were either
former farmers, sons of farmers, or part-time farmers. The final chapter of "Trucking Country"
will argue that, as the industrial marketing machinery of the new food economy spread through
the countryside-with the number of farms decreasing even as farms grew larger in size-
farmers were often forced to see off-farm work as more attractive than staying on the land.
Trucks made the marketing machine function, so there were plenty of them to drive, and driving
big rigs came readily to rural men accustomed to long hours and cantankerous machinery. In
this sense, the popular culture stereotype of truck drivers as "Bubbas" (i.e., Southern country
boys) has some basis in socioeconomic fact.
Furthermore, although rural America has never been "classless," the increasingly
industrial nature of the postwar rural economy encouraged a new kind of identity that combined
rural values with working-class sensibilities. Nowhere was this more evident than in the stream
of country songs about truckers that hit the airwaves in the 1950os, '6os, and '70s. Especially after
the astounding success of Dave Dudley's 1963 hit "Six Days on the Road," Nashville record
producers realized that an important market existed for songs that maintained a "country"
aesthetic but dealt lyrically with the reality of industrial labor. Marketing executives in the
country music industry sought to define and shape the identity of the emerging rural working
class, hoping to sell records to a distinctive marketing segment. As part of the 196os rise of
country music as a nationwide, explicitly working-class genre, trucking songs helped give
cultural coherence to a segment of the population that simultaneously held rural and industrial
identities. The masculine ideals surrounding trucking served as a particularly effective symbol
for songwriters and producers looking to identify this market segment. Trucking, both as
machine and symbol, knitted together the people and places of rural America in new ways,
becoming by the late 1970S a definitively "country" technology. Importantly, that symbolism fed
into an abortive neo-Populist political movement in the 1970s, as truck drivers who imagined
themselves to be the inheritors of the agrarian mythology of "independent" farming found their
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independence challenged by both the marketing machine they made run and by global energy
politics over which they had no control.
Methodology and Historiography
This dissertation emerged from an effort to unite the history of technology, the history of
agriculture, and American political history by focusing on the relationships among producers,
consumers, and the state. Much recent scholarship on postwar American political and social
history has been devoted to understanding suburbia and the era of full-fledged mass
consumption.'6 But while studies of the culture and politics of suburban middle-class America
abound, few scholars have explored the technological structures and political economy that
made those lifestyles possible. In this sense, "Trucking Country" serves as a sequel to William
Cronon's study of commodity flows (grain, meat, and lumber) in the political economy of late-
nineteenth-century urbanization.1 Furthermore, "Trucking Country" expands upon the
''consumption junction" methodology first proposed by Ruth Schwartz Cowan. Historians of
technology have successfully used this approach, studying relationships between producers and
consumers to address the larger social and political questions raised by "mainstream
historians."' 8 But while these studies often effectively highlight the ways in which producers and
consumers have shaped each others' decisions, they rarely study the actual infrastructures-the
artifacts, politics, and business practices-that connect consumers to producers.
'6 Lizabeth Cohen, "From Town Center to Shopping Center: The Reconfiguration of Community Marketplaces in
Postwar America," American Historical Review 1ol (Oct. 1996): 1050-81; Charles McGovern, "Consumption and
Citizenship in the United States, 1900-1940," in Getting and Spending: European and American Consumer Societies
in the Twentieth Century, ed. Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern, and Matthias Judt (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 37-58; Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New Right (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2001); Adam Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of
American Environmentalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound:
American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988); Samuel P. Hays and Barbara D. Hays,
Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955-1985 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987); Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
'7 William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991).
1& Ruth Schwarz Cowan, "The Consumption Junction: A Proposal for Research Strategies in the Sociology of
Technology," in The Social Construction of Technological Systems, ed. Wiebe Bijker, Thomas Hughes, and Trevor
Pinch (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 261-80o; Regina Lee Blaszczyk, Imagining Consumers: Design and
Innovation from Wedgwood to Corning (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Ronald R. Kline,
Consumers in the Country: Technology and Social Change in RuralAmerica (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 2000).
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The technological infrastructures connecting rural producers to suburban consumers in
the postwar period, I argue, drove a fundamental reordering of the nation's political economy
after World War II. Political historians have recently offered a number of excellent works tracing
the shift from the vigorous debates over political economy of the 1930s-with alternatives
ranging from anti-monopolism, full-scale socialistic economic planning, consumer-labor
alliances around the idea of purchasing power, and corporate-liberal efforts to make business
the guarantor of social welfare-to the unquestioned acceptance of Keynesianism and the
narrowly construed politics of growth of the postwar era.19 This dissertation is deeply indebted
to these histories, but also points to the significant failure of all of them to take into account
what historians of technology call "technopolitics."20 Rather than treating technologies as
autonomous devices that have unidirectional impacts on the rest of society, or as mere adjuncts
to the "high politics" of legislatures and executive actions, this dissertation examines how the
technology of trucking became firmly embedded into the political realm as a means of settling
otherwise intractable disputes. Trucking became "country" in the mid-twentieth century, I
argue, as state and industry cooperated to build a marketing machine that would create new
forms of political and economic value in the countryside. At the same time, this new form of
agricultural technopolitics contributed to the larger shift in the nation's political economy
towards a liberalism focused on the technical details of administratively maintaining economic
growth. Like other cases in the postwar period when policymakers turned to technical means to
"solve" political problems-nuclear power, smokestack pollution filters, tax policies-the result
was the creation of an highly interventionist, but narrowly construed, administrative role for the
19 Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: Vintage Books, 1995);
Meg Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2005); Steve Fraser, Labor Will Rule: Sidney Hillman and the Rise of American Labor (New York:
Free Press, 1991); Nelson Lichtenstein, Walter Reuther: The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1995); Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America
(New York: Knopf, 2003); Elizabeth A. Fones-Wolf, Selling Free Enterprise: The Business Assault on Labor and
Liberalism, 1945-1960 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994); Alan Wolfe, America's Impasse: The Rise and Fall
of the Politics of Growth (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981); Robert M. Collins, "The Emergence of Economic
Growthsmanship in the United States: Federal Policy and Economic Knowledge in the Truman Years," in The State
and Economic Knowledge: The American and British Experience, ed. Mary 0. Furner and Barry Supple (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 138-70.
20 Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1998), 15-17; Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Searchfor Limits in an Age of High
Technology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Michael Thad Allen and Gabrielle Hecht, eds., Technologies
of Power (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
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state in matters of political economy.2 Trucks were political technologies, used to define the
contours of public policy regarding foods and farmers; at the same time, trucks as technologies
shaped the economic and social structures underlying those political debates.
To extend this point, historians have explained the failure of America's postwar
consumer culture to sustain a New Deal-style "purchasing power" political economy, but I argue
that this failure was not only a result of fractures along lines of gender, class, and race.2 The
state, in this case the U.S. Department of Agriculture, had its own interests in subduing the
politics of food pricing in the postwar period. In arguing that "the state" had such an interest, I
draw upon the literature of "new institutionalism" or American Political Development, which
has shown that institutions of the state can and do have their own interests. Those institutional
interests are shaped on the one hand by the structures of the institutions themselves
(federalism, separation of powers, administrative capacity, and so forth), and on the other hand
by the institutions' interactions with the larger political economy, interest groups, political
parties, and social movements.2 3 But in acknowledging the importance of the "new
institutionalist" approach as a method for explaining the origins and impacts of policymaking, I
also hope to point out the importance of taking the political role of technology into account,
along with the usual suspects of administrative, regulatory, legislative, judiciary, and fiscal
policy. In the case of the USDA, this is particularly important, because this government
21 Brian Balogh, Chain Reaction: Expert Debate and Public Participation in American Commercial Nuclear Power,
1945-1975 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Lisa Rosner, ed., The Technological Fix: How People Use
Technology to Create and Solve Problems (New York: Routledge, 2004); Julian E. Zelizer, Taxing America: Wilbur
D. Mills, Congress, and the State, 1945-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
2:2 Cohen, Consumer's Republic; Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-
1980 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).
23 Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-
1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political
Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1992); Richard Franklin Bensel, The
Political Economy of'American Industrialization, 1877-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000);
Elizabeth Sanders, Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877-1917 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1999); Elizabeth S. Clemens, The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest
Group Politics in the United States, 1890-1925 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Richard R. John,
Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1995) and "Governmental Institutions as Agents of Change: Rethinking American Political Development in the
Early Republic, 1787-1835," Studies in American Political Development 11 (Fall 1997): 347-80; Edmund P. Russell
III, "The Strange Career of DDT: Experts, Federal Capacity, and 'Environmentalism' in World War II," Technology
and Culture 40 (Oct. 1999): 770-96; Zelizer, Taxing America; Sidney M. Milkis, Political Parties and Constitutional
Government: Remaking American Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Meg Jacobs,
William J. Novak, and Julian Zelizer, eds., The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political
History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Brian Balogh, "The State of the State among Historians,"
Social Science History 27 (Fall 2003): 455-63.
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institution, perhaps more than most administrative agencies, has consistently used science and
technology to put its interests into action. Specifically, I attribute the failure of purchasing-
power politics in the postwar era at least partially to the USDA's ability to successfully re-
engineer the politics of food pricing in the mid-195os, helping private industry to develop new
technologies of distribution that transformed the paired issues of farm and food prices into
economic, rather than political-economic, issues.
"Trucking Country" also challenges the organizational synthesis proposed by historians
who see order, rationalization, corporatization, and bureaucraticization as the defining features
of the American political economy in the twentieth century.2 4 The point is not to deny the
importance of the rise of corporate power, a highly regulatory and administrative state, and the
industrial ideal more generally in the twentieth-century economic and political landscape, but to
show that this search for order was coupled to a continuing chaos in capitalist society,
particularly in the context of agriculture and the rural economy. In making this point I draw
upon the work of political historians and historians of business and technology who have
emphasized regional diversity, constant competition, and disorganized and decentralized
political forms as concomitant with, and indeed fundamental to, the rise of bureaucratic politics
and economic centralization.25 Trucking, I show, helped create the conditions for both orderly
politics and orderly business practices in the postwar food economy, but that order emerged
from, and depended on, the chaotic "flexibility" of trucking. This explains my preference for the
word "machine" rather than "system" in describing the technologies of food distribution in the
24 Robert Wiebe, The Searchfor Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Scale
and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 199o); Thomas P. Hughes,
Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1983); John M. Jordan, Machine-Age Ideology: Social Engineering and American Liberalism, 1911-1939 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Louis Galambos, "Technology, Political Economy, and
Professionalization: Central Themes of the Organizational Synthesis," Business History Review 57 (Winter 1983):
471-93.
25 Colin Gordon, "Why No Corporatism in the United States?: Business Disorganization and Its Consequences"
Business and Economic History 27 (Oct. 1998): 29-46 and New Deals: Business, Labor, and Politics in America,
1920-1935 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Philip Scranton, Proprietary Capitalism: The Textile
Manufacture at Philadelphia, 1800-1885 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) and Endless Novelty:
Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865-1925 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997);
Stanley Vittoz, New Deal Labor Policy and the American Industrial Economy (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1987); James C. Cobb, The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusadefor Industrial Development,
1936-1990, 2d ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993); Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The Second
Industrial Divide: Possibilitiesfor Prosperity (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin,
eds., World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrialization (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997).
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postwar era, since the phrase "technological system" is generally taken to imply a highly
centralized set of artifacts created primarily by engineers, with the electric power grid as its
prime representation.26 Trucking, in contrast, was by its very nature decentralized, making
"system" an inappropriate metaphor implying order and rationality where little existed.
"Trucking Country" shows that the decentralized nature of trucking both contributed to
and helped mediate the continuing chaos of capitalism in the twentieth-century American
countryside. In making this point, I draw upon the work of geographers and historians who have
increasingly turned their attention to the relationship between rural places and
industrialization. Most important, these scholars have shown that the environmental constraints
of agricultural production have shaped unique forms of industrial activity. Unlike urban
factories where industrialists can exercise a great deal of control over the factors of production
(workers, machines, and inputs), agriculture always has to deal with the uncontrollable nature
of climate shifts, seasonal cycles, and biological indeterminacy. Using methods of economic
geography, historians have shown how the relationship between urban-industrial capitalism and
the non-human natural world quite literally shapes the places where agricultural resources are
extracted. The fickleness of nature creates unevenness in the industrial ordering of the rural
landscape, as the search for profit in agricultural production quite often trumps the search for
order.27
26i Hughes, Networks of Power. Recent studies of technological systems have increasingly recognized consumers,
laborers, political actors, and broad socio-cultural factors (such as gender, race, and class) as important forces
contending with engineers in the construction of systems. Wiebe E. Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward
a Theory of Sociotechnical Change (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); Arwen P. Mohun, Steam Laundries: Gender,
Technology, and Work in the United States and Great Britain, 1880-1940 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1999); Susan Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899-1922 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1997); Rayvon Fouche, Black Inventors in the Age of Segregation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2003); Roger Horowitz and Arwen Mohun, eds., His and Hers: Gender, Consumption, and Technology
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998); Roger Horowitz, ed., Boys and Their Toys?: Masculinity,
Technology, and Class in America (New York: Routledge, 2001).
27 Cronon, Nature's Metropolis; Brian Kirby Page, "Agro-Industrialization and Rural Transformation: The
Restructuring of Midwestern Meat Production," (Ph.D. diss., University of California-Berkeley, 1993); Brian Page and
Richard Walker, "From Settlement to Fordism: The Agro-Industrial Revolution in the American Midwest," Economic
Geography 67 (1991): 281-315; Brian Page, "Across the Great Divide: Agriculture and Industrial Geography,"
Economic Geography 72 (Oct 1996): 376-97; William Boyd and Michael Watts, "Agro-Industrial Just-in-Time: The
Chicken Industry and Postwar American Capitalism," in Globalising Food: Agrarian Questions and Global
Restructuring, ed. David Goodman and Michael Watts (London: Routledge, 1997), 192-223; Margaret FitzSimmons,
"The New Industrial Agriculture: The Regional Integration of Specialty Crop Production," Economic Geography 62
(Oct 1986): 334-53; Mike Davis, Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niiio Famines and the Making of the Third World
(New York: Verso, 2001); Lawrence S. Grossman, The Political Ecology of Bananas: Contract Farming, Peasants,
andAgrarian Change in the Eastern Caribbean (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); John Soluri,
"Accounting for Taste: Bananas, Mass Markets, and Panama Disease," Environmental History 7 (Jul. 2002): 386-
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Agricultural and rural historians have tended to treat technological change as a "black
box," an autonomous force that deterministically reconstructs rural life. There are informative
literatures on agricultural politics, economics, and rural social history, but only a handful of
scholars have probed into the unique nature of technological change in rural contexts.
Furthermore, while historians of technology generally seek to understand changes in technology
within a broad social context, historians of agricultural technology have generally focused only
on technologies of production on farms.28 "Trucking Country" opens up the "black box" of
agricultural technology while simultaneously pushing the history of technology further afield.
The field of agricultural history has traditionally been split into three rather distinct sub-fields:
political history, economic history, and rural social history. Each of these three sub-fields takes
technological change seriously, but generally treats technology as an autonomous, external
force. Political historians of American agriculture tend to focus either on the Populist movement
or on the rise of the New Deal system of price supports and production quotas. In both cases,
technological changes figure as inevitable forces that create political problems. Populism is
generally seen as a response to the economic upheavals caused by railroads, urban
industrialization, and the emergence of global markets in an age of inexpensive global shipping,
while New Deal commodity programs are seen as responses to the problem of overproduction
brought by highly mechanized farming.29 A few groundbreaking works have recently tried to
remedy this situation, arguing that agricultural politics in the United States have always been
tightly intertwined with technological change. In these works, technology figures as a lever of
power shaped by political actors (particularly in the U.S. Department of Agriculture), not simply
410; Shane Hamilton, "Cold Capitalism: The Political Ecology of Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice," Agricultural
History 77 (Fall 2003): 557-81.
28 Deborah K. Fitzergald, "Beyond Tractors: The History of Technology in American Agriculture," Technology and
Culture 32 (Jan. 1991): 114-26.
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Welfare State: Institutions and Interest Group Power in the United States, France, and Japan (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2001).
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as a force that politicians respond to when it gets out of control.30 Much of the impetus for this
reworking of the political history of agriculture comes from work in agrarian studies of non-U.S.
sites, where the use of new agricultural technologies to gain political power is often more
apparent and drastic in its application.31
Economic historians of agriculture have an even greater tendency to treat technology as
a "black box." Too often in economic histories, technology figures only as an abstract
independent variable that reworks the balance among labor, capital, and land resources.
Economic historians tend to be unconcerned about where a technology comes from or who
deploys it for what reasons; their questions are focused more on the impacts of the technology
once it is developed. Again, there are important exceptions to this generalization that have led to
the formulation of "Trucking Country." A few historians of agriculture have probed deeply into
the process of technological change in the business of farming, uncovering relationships of
power along lines of capitalist and state authority, gender, and race.3 2 (Significantly, none of
these authors would identify themselves primarily as economic historians.) Still, there is much
room for economic histories of agriculture that do not treat technology as a mere abstraction.
"Trucking Country" assumes that technological change is neither automatic nor autonomous.
Social historians of rural life have proven more willing than political or economic
historians to treat technological change as socially constructed. A number of historians have
recently argued that particular rural social patterns and cultural beliefs have determined the
30 Pete Daniel, Breaking the Land: The Transformation of Cotton, Tobacco, and Rice Cultures since 188o (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1985); Deborah K. Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American
Agriculture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Catherine McNicol Stock and Robert D. Johnston, eds., The
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University of California Press, 1998); Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr., First the Seed: The Political Economy of Plant
Biotechnology, 1492-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
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India (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); George Yaney, The Urge to Mobilize: Agrarian Reform in Russia,
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shape of technological change on farms.33 Even these valuable works, however, fall into a trap
similar to that of political and economic histories of agriculture. By treating "rural" and
"agriculture" as synonyms for "farming," rural historians generally neglect the technological
changes that occur in the countryside, but not on farms. Furthermore, the equation of "rural"
with "farming" leads most rural social historians to focus on time periods before 1945.34 Given
the fact that farmers have been a minority of the rural American population during the latter
twentieth century, this is a troublesome methodological problem. For instance, only a handful of
social histories of rural life look at such significant technological changes as the arrival of non-
farm industries in rural places.35 "Trucking Country" seeks to extend rural social history into the
period after 1945, arguing that the great social changes in the American countryside after World
War II have been tied more to industrial practice than to farming per se.
33 Kline, Consumers in the Country; Hal S. Barron, Mixed Harvest: The Second Great Transformation in the Rural
North, 1870-1930 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997);David B. Danbom, The Resisted Revolution:
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34 Anne B. W. Effland, "When Rural Does not Equal Agricultural," Agricultural History 74 (Spring 2000): 489-501.
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Chapter 1: Long-Haul Trucking and the Technopolitics of Industrial
Agriculture
In the mid-twentieth century, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
encouraged the growth of long-haul trucking as a uniquely flexible form of transportation. At the
same time, the USDA worked to harness that flexibility to reshape the politics of farm and food
pricing. Particularly in the 1940os and 1950s, when the state's intervention in the agricultural
economy came into serious question, agricultural policymakers and economists in the USDA
came to view trucking as a key to solving the decades-old "farm problem." This so-called farm
problem was simple in theory: agricultural policymakers in the USDA and in Congress wanted
to make sure farmers made enough money to keep them on the farm, while keeping food cheap
for urban consumers. Achieving this balance proved extremely difficult in practice. Since the
end of the Civil War, science and technology had made American farms incredibly productive,
reducing the average price of food for consumers. The unfortunate result for farmers was that
they often grew more food than they could sell at profitable prices. In the agricultural depression
of the 1920S and 193os, agricultural policymakers sought legislative solutions to the farm
problem, culminating in the highly controversial Agricultural Adjustment Acts of 1933 / 1938.
The overwhelming productivity of American agriculture after WWII, however, made the New
I)eal legislative solutions seem obsolete. In the postwar period, as farmers and Republicans
attacked statist economic planning while consumers fretted about the rising cost of living,
agricultural policymakers sought to find new, less controversial ways to solve the farm problem.
Depression-era agricultural policymakers had centered on ways to limit production, but post-
WWII agricultural policymakers sought primarily to rationalize the consumption of agricultural
products, essentially masking the statism of New Deal policies in the guise of more subtle
exercises of state intervention in the agricultural economy. Technologies for making food
distribution cheaper and more "flexible" were the key focus, and trucking was at the center of
this technological fix that converted the farm problem into an industrial problem.
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Trucking and Agriculture before World War II
In the mid- to late-nineteenth century, railroads opened up the prairies and plains of the
west for white settlement and intensive commercial agriculture on a grand scale. Any farmer
who wished to sow wheat on the Plains, grow fruit or vegetables in California, or raise cattle in
Texas was forced to depend on the railroads to get his commodities to distant urban markets.
This dependence on large-scale technological systems seemed directly at odds with the agrarian
ideology of farmers as independent republican producers, causing repeated outcries from
farmers and their representatives in Congress that the "octopus" railroads abused their
monopoly power to overcharge for transporting agricultural products.2 Though the farmers' ire
helped contribute to the formation of the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate the
railroads, the most effective long-term solution to high transportation rates began in the 1920S,
when the rails first faced significant competition from gasoline-powered trucks traveling on
improved rural roads. From that decade to the late 1940s, agricultural experts in the USDA
worked with leaders of farm organizations and farm state representatives in Congress to
encourage the growth of the trucking industry as a means of driving down railroad freight rates.
The USDA's Bureau of Public Roads, from its inception in 1918 until the late 1940s,
coordinated and encouraged the construction of an extensive network of paved rural highways
to serve farm interests. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the first proponents
of good rural roads were not farmers, but urban bicyclists seeking mud-free excursions into the
countryside along with, ironically, railroad executives seeking smoother farm-to-market roads to
boost the volume of agricultural goods brought to railheads.3 Until the later 1910s, rural road-
On early railroad development, see George Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (New York: Rinehart,
1951); Colleen A. Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). On railroads and agriculture, see William Cronon, Nature's
Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991); Paul W. Gates, The Illinois Central
Railroad and Its Colonization Work (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934).
2 George H. Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1971); Fred A.
Shannon, The Farmer's Last Frontier: Agriculture, 1860-1897 (New York: Farrar and Rhinehart, 1945); Frank
Norris, The Octopus: A Story of California (New York: Doubleday, 1901l).
3 Michael L. Berger, The Devil Wagon in God's Country: The Automobile and Social Change in Rural America, 1893-
1929 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1979), 13-35; Stephen Goddard, Getting There: The Epic Struggle between Road
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building remained the province of counties, who relied on farmers to voluntarily maintain the
roads abutting their property in lieu of taxation. Farmers resisted construction of stone and
macadam roads, seeing them as expensive and benefiting primarily "eastern bicycle fellers or
one-hoss lawyers with patent leather boots" (as declared in 1893 at an Iowa farmer's
convention), or the "devil wagons" of city slickers who frightened horses as they sped through
the countryside and drank from farmer's wells without permission.4 But farmers' resistance to
paved roads evaporated in the late 191os and 1920S after Henry Ford's low-cost Model T offered
farmers a machine that could be used not only to haul farm products to the railhead, but could
also take the kids to town for a moving picture while the parents bought supplies, as well as
provide an all-purpose engine for operating washing machines and hay elevators. In the 1920S,
when a farm woman was asked by a rural sociologist why her family had purchased a Ford
instead of indoor plumbing, she replied: "You can't go to town in a bathtub!"5
In response to farmers' increasing demand for paved roads, the USDA's Bureau of Public
Roads worked with state governments to get farmers "out of the mud" after World War I.
Congress passed the Federal-Aid Road Act in 1916, providing $75 million of federal funds to
encourage states to build paved rural roads. The task of coordinating the construction of a
nationwide network of rural highways fell to the Bureau of Public Roads, headed by "Chief'
Thomas H. MacDonald, who required states to build those roads according to exacting
engineering standards. After 1919, the states also relied heavily on gasoline taxes to fund this
construction, along with federal matching monies that came with the passage of the 1921
Federal-Aid Road Act, which mandated that forty percent of the federal funds be used to
construct farm-to-market roads. Rural roadbuilding expanded dramatically in the 1920S under
and Rail in the American Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 43-64. The bicycle craze of the 188os
and 189os was at least partially a result of the increased use of the "safety" bicycle, which had two equally sized wheels
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this arrangement; between 1921 and 1930, state rural highway systems increased from 203,000
miles to 324,000 miles.6
Even as rural roads improved, engineers and manufacturers worked to convert the truck
from an urban delivery vehicle based on the horse-and-wagon into a rural road machine. In the
191os, few trucks were capable of moving outside of cities, not only because rural roads were
inadequate, but because early trucks were designed and built to operate in cities, delivering
goods such as coal, ice, milk, and mail.7 In 1919, the U.S. Army Transport Corps sponsored a
transcontinental convoy of trucks, hoping to demonstrate the possibilities of long-haul trucking
in the countryside. The trip took two months, however, demonstrating the continued superiority
of railroads for long-distance freight shipment.8 The commercialization of the pneumatic
balloon tire in 1923, however, helped change that. Pneumatic balloon tires allowed
manufacturers to build larger trucks that could travel at high speeds with less vibration than the
solid rubber tires they replaced, causing less damage to truck bodies and roadbeds.9 Roy
Fruehaufs 1914 decision to turn his Detroit wagon-building shop into a factory for producing
custom-designed truck trailers helped make it possible for trucks of the 1930S to pull three times
the weight allowed by straight-truck designs.lo Large truck manufacturers such as Ford, General
Motors, and International Harvester, along with specialized firms such as Mack, White, and
Kenworth, increasingly built trucks that resembled neither horse-drawn wagons nor passenger
cars. Enclosed cabs, sleeper compartments, hydraulic brakes, "fifth wheels" to allow attachment
of separate trailers, and a host of other developments made trucks by the 1930S capable of
6 Bruce E. Seely, Building the American Highway System: Engineers as Policy Makers (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1987), 35-99; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times
to 1970, Part II (Washington: GPO, 1976), 710.
7 Gijs P. A. Mom and David A. Kirsch, "Technologies in Transition: Horses, Electric Trucks, and the Motorization of
American Cities, 1900-1925," Technology and Culture 42 (Jul 2001): 489-518; Robert F. Karolevitz, This Was
Trucking: A Pictorial History of the First Quarter Century of Commercial Motor Vehicles (Seattle: Superior
Publishing, 1966).
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traveling relatively long distances outside of cities." Even so, the vast majority of trucks in use in
:1930 were used for short hauls, primarily by the Post Office, grocers, general contractors,
bakeries, dairies, oil and gasoline stations, and meat-packing firms making urban deliveries.
Furthermore, most such trucks were relatively small by post-World War II standards, generally
weighing from 1 to 1 1/2 tons.'2
In the 1920os and 1930s, however, trucks increasingly competed with the railroads for
certain loads-particularly perishable agricultural goods such as milk, livestock, poultry, and
produce on their way to urban markets. For example, in 1913 only 91,ooo hogs arrived by truck
at an Indianapolis livestock market; by 1929 over 1,350,000 did so.'3 In 1932, 80 percent of
fruits and vegetables were transported by truck in southwestern Michigan.'4 Railroad managers
became increasingly worried that trucks would take over short-haul traffic; in 1933, a group of
railroad executives asked the federal government to be allowed to abandon unprofitable short
branch lines and replace them with rail-owned truck lines.l5 This fear was well-founded, since
truck transportation of highly perishable commodities often "skimmed" the most profitable
classes of freight from the railroads. In order to subsidize the very long and expensive hauls that
allowed railroads to build up their overall volume, the rails generally charged very high rates on
short-haul perishables. Trucks traveling only short distances, however, could easily undercut the
rates quoted by the rails, as well as provide faster, point-to-point service.'6
Most worrisome to the railroads was the rise of one particular kind of competitor: the
owner-operator trucker. Trucking at the time had relatively low barriers to entry, since all an
individual needed to get into the business was a truck, and truck manufacturers readily
" Earnest R. Sternberg, A History of Motor Truck Development (Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers,
1981); James Harold Thomas, The Long Haul: Truckers, Truck Stops, and Trucking (Memphis: Memphis State
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Station, Special Bulletin 227 (East Lansing, MI, 1932).
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16 Harold G. Moulton, The American Transportation Problem (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1933), 576-7,
61i-11.
27
extended credit to encourage individuals to join up. Approximately 150,000 individuals bought
or leased a truck in the 1920S and 1930s and began hauling any loads they could find to try to
pay off the loan.17 Many of these early truckers were farmers who saw the purchase of a truck as
a way to set up a small business that would help them escape the agricultural depression of the
1920S and 1930s.18 Railroad executives and operators of larger established trucking firms took to
calling these drivers "gypsies," "wildcatters," or "fly-by-night truckers," since the truckers would
take any load to any destination, generally undercutting the rates of larger carriers, and
supposedly evading police as they drove their unsafe equipment at high speeds on little sleep.19
Though the "gypsy" epithet emerged from a clearly biased economic self-interest on the part of
larger transportation firms, the railroads were correct in pointing out that owner-operator
truckers of the period destabilized the nation's transportation networks. Small trucking firms
rose quickly in the 1920S and 1930os due to the low capital costs of entry, but often fell just as
rapidly because inexperienced truckers did not know how to calculate the true costs involved in
their operations-such as the need to secure a "backhaul" load to cover the expense of returning
home, or to take depreciation and interest costs into account when quoting rates.2 0 In short,
trucking by the early 1930S was undeniably chaotic, characterized by intense, cut-throat
competition between small and large truckers, as well as between trucking firms and railroads.
A group of powerful interests coalesced in the 1930S to control that chaos by regulating
the emerging trucking industry. The upshot of this movement was the 1935 passage of the Motor
Carrier Act, one of the few examples of an industry using the increased regulatory power of the
federal government during the New Deal to successfully promote its own desire for monopoly.
The original impetus for federal regulation, however, emerged from a pattern set by individual
17 Childs, Trucking and the Public Interest, 35.
I8 See Chapter 5.
'9 Roy B. Thompson, "The Trucking Industry, 1930-1950," Interview Recorded with Corinne L. Gilb, June-August
1958 in Berkeley, California, Industrial Relations Interviews, Bancroft Library, Berkeley, CA, 52; Harry D. Woods,
Woods Highway Truck Library, New York Times Oral History Program (Glen Rock, NJ: Microfilming Corp. of
America, 1975-77).
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21 Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence (Princeton:
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state regulatory bodies in the 191os and 1920S, responding to railroads calling on state public
utilities commissions to extend to trucks the regulations they placed on trains. The Pennsylvania
Public Service Commission introduced the first trucking regulations in 1914, and was soon
followed by most of the other states. Though the state regulations were not uniform, most
shared some basic characteristics, empowering state commissions to administer licensing
requirements and fees for truckers, enforce speed limits and safety laws, and establish
maximum sizes and weights of trucks. Most important, the state commissions could prescribe
routes that truckers were allowed to travel, administer freight rates to prevent price competition
or secret rebates to favored shippers, and limit market entry by requiring a new trucking firm to
apply for a "certificate of public convenience and necessity." This last requirement meant that an
individual or corporation wishing to start a new trucking business had to prove to the
commission that such a business would make a needed contribution to the state's economy and
public welfare. In practice, state commissions generally acceded to railroad demands that such
certificates not be granted if a railroad already provided adequate service in the geographical
area that the new trucker hoped to serve. Regulation at the state level had proved by the 1930S
to be an effective tool for limiting competition between trucks and rails in intrastate
commerce. 22
The state regulations furthermore defined the contours of the trucking industry in ways
that would influence federal efforts at regulation in the 1930s. Spurred by a series of Supreme
Court decisions in the 1920S and 1930s (particularly Sproles v. Binford in 1932), state
commissions created clear categories of trucking firms that they had the power to regulate. The
first type to fall under state regulation was the common carrier-a transportation firm that
offered its services to the public at large, and, as established by English common law, was
required to take any load from any shipper able and willing to pay for the service. State
regulation of interstate common carriers in the United States had been applied to railroads since
the 1877 Munn v. Illinois decision of the Supreme Court, which granted states the right to
regulate businesses engaged in interstate commerce in the "public interest." With railroad
22 Donald V. Harper, Economic Regulation of the Motor Trucking Industry by the States (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1950), 26-7, 32-4; Childs, Trucking and the Public Interest, 47-64.
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regulation as precedent, the later application of rate and route regulations to common carrier
trucking firms was a relatively straightforward process. State authority over another kind of
trucking firm proved more complicated, however. This second category, called "contract
carriers," involved truckers who offered transportation services only to certain shippers. For
example, a trucking firm might specialize in hauling steel beams that required only flatbed
trailers, while another trucking company would invest in covered vans to haul only dry
groceries, while still another might specialize in carrying refrigerated foods such as meat or fruit.
Such contract carriers did not follow a business pattern at all like that of railroads, forcing state
regulatory bodies to come up with new justifications for applying the same rules applied to
common carriers. The unclear status of contract carriers provided multiple opportunities for
judicial contests of the states' police powers, an issue that was finally settled in the Sproles case,
which declared that states could regulate both common and contract trucking firms, considering
both to be "for-hire" forms of transportation, even when their vehicles crossed state lines. A
third group of truckers, however, did not and could not fall under the regulatory umbrella of the
states, and that was "private carriers," or trucking fleets operated by companies that carried only
their own goods and not those of other businesses. In the 1920S and '3os, large private fleets
were maintained by the Post Office, bakers, milk dealers, and oil companies, among others, but
the largest single group of private owners of trucks was farmers. By 1935, every state except
Delaware had statutes providing for regulation of for-hire truckers, though no state regulated
private trucking fleets or the trucks of farmers except in relation to safety.23
Even as the states tightened their grip on trucking, a number of interest groups
formulated strategies to institute regulation on the federal level. The two most important groups
were large common carrier trucking firms and the railroads, both of which unabashedly
promoted federal regulation as a means of reining in rampant competition from smaller
trucking firms. A key figure promoting the case of the large trucking firms was Jack Keeshin, a
Chicago trucker who transformed his Keeshin Southwest Motor Company from a one-truck
operation hauling Fig Newtons from Chicago to South Bend in 1917 into one of the nation's
23 Childs, Trucking and the Public Interest, 65-82; Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, To Amend the
Interstate Commerce Act, Part I: Motor Carrier Act of 1935, Hearings, 74th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 25-28, Mar. 1, 2, 4-
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largest trucking companies by 1932, with a fleet of 250 machines serving giant shippers such as
the Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company. In November of the latter year he and two other
commercial fleet owners created the American Highway Freight Association, intending to lobby
Congress to enact federal legislation modeled after the state codes to clamp down on "gypsy"
truckers. "It was a 'dog-eat-dog' business," Keeshin later remembered, "and would so continue
unless [federal] regulations were introduced."24 Keeshin's desire for federal regulation was not
at first shared by other large truckers, however, who preferred to use self-regulation to limit
competition in the industry. The opportunity to self-regulate came with the passage of the
National Industrial Recovery Act in June 1933, which established the National Recovery
Administration (NRA) as a mechanism for industry trade groups to write "codes of fair
competition."25 Although President Franklin Roosevelt and liberal Democrats such as Robert
Wagner intended the NRA to serve labor interests as much as business interests, in practice the
codes that emerged from the experiment served primarily to provide highly competitive
industries a chance to cartelize by creating price-fixing arrangements.
This was exactly the intent behind the formation of the American Trucking Associations,
Inc. Under the leadership of Ted V. Rogers, a contract trucking firm owner who preferred self-
regulation to government intervention, the American Trucking Associations absorbed Keeshin's
pro-regulation group in September 1933 in order to present a unified voice to the NRA
negotiator assigned to the trucking industry.26 Drafting the NRA trucking code proved extremely
difficult, as the interests of common and contract carriers often collided; some contract carriers
were convinced that the larger common carriers intended to use the code to drive them as well
as the "fly-by-nighters" out of business. Furthermore, the NRA negotiator insisted on using the
code to equalize drivers' working conditions and wage rates around the country and across the
industry, a provision that the trucking firms bitterly resisted and only ruefully accepted-
without instituting an 8-hour day, however-in order to gain the benefits of cartelization.27 The
24 John Lewis Keeshin, No Fears, Hidden Tears: A Memoir of Four Score Years (Chicago: Castle-Pierce Press, 1983),
19-20, 32-3.
25 Hawley, New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, 19-71.
26 The word "Associations" (plural) was used because it was a national collection of dozens of state- and regional-level
trucking associations that had sprung up in the 1920S to negotiate with state regulatory bodies. Childs, Trucking and
the Public Interest, 105-6.
27' Thompson, "The Trucking Industry," 100-176; Childs, Trucking and the Public Interest, 101-9.
31
code that finally emerged from the negotiations was signed by President Roosevelt in February
1934, and at first seemed successful as a means of limiting chaos in the industry. An Industrial
Relations Board was established to help unionized drivers improve working conditions, and
guidelines were established to prevent trucking firms from engaging in destructive price
competition. But as with many of the NRA codes, the difficulties of maintaining self-regulation
in a highly competitive industry quickly became apparent. Although 300,000 truckers signed on
to the code, at least 75,000 refused to abide by its rules. Furthermore, even many who did sign
the code simply did not comply, particularly with its labor provisions; once the Blue Eagle was
pasted in the truck window, the firm would cut wages or prices anyway. The NRA could offer
little help in the way of enforcement in such a decentralized, small-firm industry, where every
individual trucker had an incentive to try to shirk the code's provisions to gain a competitive
edge on those who followed the rules. By the fall of 1934, the trucking code was useless for
minimizing chaotic conditions in the trucking industry, a fact that was only affirmed when the
NRA's enabling legislation was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the 1935
Schechter v. U.S. case.28 The failure of the NRA code would push most of the members of the
ATA towards Jack Keeshin's view that only through strong federal regulation could chaos be
controlled.
Even before the NRA code was put in place, the nation's largest railroads pushed for
regulation of the trucking industry. Railroad revenues dropped rapidly at the onset of the Great
Depression, declining by half between 1929 and 1932, a situation that seemed at least partially
due to competition from owner-operator truckers.29 In 1932 the railroads asked Republican
Senator James Couzens of Michigan to introduce a bill that would have placed the trucking
industry under the regulatory oversight of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). The ICC
was created by Congress in 1887 to regulate the railroad industry, in response to protests from
shippers-particularly Midwestern and Western farmers-that the railroads abused their
monopoly over the nation's transportation to charge whatever the traffic would bear, even as
they provided secret rebates to favored Eastern industrialists. Intending to tame that monopoly
28 Childs, Trucking and the Public Interest, 112-4; Hawley, New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly, 127-9, 232-3.
29 Ari Hoogenboom and Olive Hoogenboom, A History of the ICC: From Panacea to Palliative (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1976), 119-20.
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power, Congress granted the ICC the power to police the rates charged by rails and forestall
price-fixing practices. Railroad executives, however, consistently chafed under federal
regulation, which they felt limited their profitability, and continuously found ways to circumvent
the ICC's regulation, even after Congress strengthened the "teeth" of the Commission in 1903,
:9o6, and again in 191o. In practice, then, the ICC's bureaucrats consistently found themselves
forced to forge cooperative alliances with railroad executives, resulting in an often unclear
distinction between the interests of the regulator and the regulated.30
By the time the railroads began agitating for regulation of the trucking industry to limit
competition, the ICC lent a somewhat sympathetic ear. In a 1932 report, the ICC declared that
trucking created chaotic competition in transportation, potentially forcing the railroads to
radically alter their rate structures upward in order to compensate for traffic lost to price-cutting
truckers.3 In testimony before Congress on the Couzens bill in 1932, then, the railroads pled for
legislation to shield them from trucking competition. Although the Couzens bill engendered four
weeks of Congressional hearings that produced over 700 pages of transcribed text, the bill did
not get reported out of committee. The percentage of trucks involved in interstate commerce at
the time was so small-less than two percent-that Congress saw no public need for federal
regulation in 1932, especially when that legislation was so patently written to serve the railroads'
interests.32 Furthermore, the ICC, which the railroads had assumed would side with them in
30 Historians and political scientists have engaged in lengthy debates about whether the ICC was "captured" by
railroad interests. The strongest argument for the "capture" theory comes in Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and
Regulation, 1877-1916 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), which argues that the railroads actually wanted
to be regulated to gain monopoly powers. Kolko's thesis has been most strongly disputed by Albro Martin, who sees
the ICC as a corrupt, railroad-hating regulatory body that did its best to strangle the railroads to death; Enterprise
Denied (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971). More tempered views have navigated between these two poles,
arguing that while the railroads learned to accept certain regulatory functions that limited competition and stabilized
freight rates, they only accepted regulation as a last resort in the face of widespread public dissatisfaction with the
laissez-faire "octopus." Furthermore, although the ICC took a pragmatic approach by maintaining close ties with
railroad managers, it also quite often acted in direct opposition to the industry's interests. See Elizabeth Sanders,
Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1999), 179-216; Ari Hoogenboom and Olive Hoogenboom, A History of the ICC: From Panacea to Palliative (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1976); Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National
Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).; Steven W. Usselman,
Regulating Railroad Innovation: Business, Technology, and Politics in America, 1840-1920 (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2002). If anything, over time the ICC was "captured" by large common carrier trucking firms to a
greater extent than by railroaders; see Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Regulation, Organizations, and Politics: Motor
Freight Policy at the Interstate Commerce Commission (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), esp. 121-62.
3] Interstate Commerce Commission, Coordination of Motor Transportation, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., 1932, S. Doc. 43.
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calling for regulation of trucks, proved ambivalent-until Franklin Roosevelt appointed Joseph
B. Eastman as Federal Coordinator of Transportation in 1933.
Joseph Eastman pulled together the coalition of interest groups that convinced Congress
to pass the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. A member of the ICC since 1919, Eastman became the
Federal Coordinator of Transportation in June 1933. This post was created by the passage of the
Emergency Railroad Transportation Act, signed at the same time as the National Industrial
Recovery Act, which Roosevelt intended to help pull the railroads out of near-bankruptcy.
Eastman was a Progressive public servant in the tradition of Louis D. Brandeis, having worked
with Brandeis on New England railroad cases in the 191os. Above all, Eastman believed in using
the regulatory power of the state to create efficiency in transportation. In fact, Eastman had
socialist leanings which led him to believe that the government should own and operate the
nation's transportation networks; short of that, he firmly believed in deep regulation of
transportation to minimize competition.33
Once he became Federal Coordinator, Eastman worked to bring together the interests of
the railroads and the large trucking firms (represented by the ATA, whose member Jack Keeshin
was a close friend of Eastman), proposing legislation to Congress in 1934 to regulate the
trucking industry in the interest of transportation stability.34 Achieving efficiency in
transportation, he believed, could not "be attained or even approached without public regulation
[of the trucking industry]."35 This was because, as he told the Senate Committee on Interstate
Commerce in 1935, the rapid rise of the trucking industry created "unnecessary and wasteful
competition" between trucks and railroads, leading to "an oversupply of transportation
facilities" that harmed the interests of railroad investors, shippers, and truck drivers alike.36
Eastman was fully aware that federal regulation of trucking would lead to the rise of large firms
who would use the ICC's regulatory mechanisms to raise their freight rates without fear of anti-
Organizations, and Politics: Motor Freight Policy at the Interstate Commerce Commission (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1994), 46.
33 Childs, Trucking and the Public Interest, 119-24. On Brandeis, see Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation:
Charles Francis Adams, Louis D. Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1984), 80-142.
34 Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Report of the Federal Coordinator of Transportation on Regulation of
Transportation Agencies, 73d Cong., 2d sess., Mar. 10, 1934, S. Doc. 152.
35 Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Amend the Interstate Commerce Act, 51.
36 Ibid., 50.
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trust prosecution, but convinced Congress that this granting of monopoly powers would serve
the public interest. Large-scale business would bring efficiency, argued Eastman, pointing to the
example of Ford Motor Company as a large firm that had used vertical integration to drive down
the cost of producing goods. "Gradually there will be a development of larger operations,"
admitted Eastman, but he believed those large trucking companies would "be more economical
when well organized."37
The Motor Carrier Act became law in the summer of 1935, authorizing the ICC to control
rampant competition in the trucking industry. The mechanisms for controlling chaos were based
on those developed by state regulations in the previous decade. In order to engage in interstate
commerce, a trucking firm had to apply to the ICC for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity. To get this certificate, a firm had to prove that the geographical routes to be served
were not already adequately served by existing carriers-whether railroads or other truckers-as
well as offer evidence that the firm was financially stable (primarily by carrying insurance).
Furthermore, the firm would have to periodically publish its freight rates, rates that were closely
watched by the ICC to prevent price-cutting. Although the ICC "grandfathered" in all existing
motor carriers in the first year after the passage of the Motor Carrier Act (MCA), over the next
45 years the effect of these regulations was to create significant barriers to entry in the industry.
That is, a new common carrier or contract trucking firm needed more than just a truck and
trailer to start in business; it needed to gain operating authority as well, authority which the ICC
granted only after lengthy and expensive proceedings meant to discourage competition.38
But even as large trucking companies, railroads, and the ICC gained the power to control
chaos in trucking, a very significant exception was made for agricultural trucking. A clause in the
MCA that came to be known as the "agricultural exemption" allowed truckers hauling certain
farm products to do so without first gaining a certificate of authority from the ICC. From the
37 Ibid., 61-2, quote on 66.
33 John Richard Felton and Dale G. Anderson, eds., Regulation and Deregulation of the Motor Carrier Industry(Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1989), 16-25. Occasionally the ICC's policies were contested as violations of anti-
trust, but the Supreme Court consistently upheld the Commission's authority to permit economic concentration in the
industry if it did so in "the public interest," under the guidelines set forth by Congress in the original and amended
Interstate Commerce Act. See McClean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944). Anti-trust became a moot
issue in 1948 with the passage of the Reed-Bullwinkle Act, which exempted the ICC"s rate-making bureaus from anti-
trust provisions. Statutes at Large 62 (1948): 472.
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very beginning of the drive to regulate trucking, farm groups such as the National Grange
applied pressure to Congress to allow farmers and farm cooperatives to truck their products to
market without ICC oversight. The anti-regulatory movement first emerged during the NRA
code hearings. The National Cooperative Milk Producers Association, for instance, declared that
the NRA trucking code would allow trucking firms "to increase the transportation charges on
farm products moving from the farm into the channels of commerce and trade [by seeking]
government recognition and assistance in the establishment of a gigantic trucking trust."39 Every
major farm group in the nation flooded farm bloc Congressmen and Secretary of Agriculture
Henry A. Wallace with "numerous telegrams" demanding the NRA code be stopped. 40 Wallace,
sympathetic to the organizations' pleas, asked his friend Donald Murphy, editor of the
influential farm journal Wallace's Farmer and Iowa Homestead, to "sound a warning, privately
or publicly, as you see fit, on the perils of the trucking code that is now before General
Johnston."4 Wallace further coordinated a strategy within the USDA to present Congress with
evidence that trucking had "mitigated the effect of the depression on farmers" by allowing them
to bypass middlemen, such as country elevators and produce commission merchants, whose
services had been necessary in a railroad-based agricultural economy but unnecessarily cut into
farmers' incomes in a highway-based economy.42
Opposition to regulation of agricultural trucking continued during the Congressional
hearings on the legislation that became the Motor Carrier Act. The National Grange, in
particular, fought Joseph Eastman's efforts to "destroy the existing competition in
transportation and to perpetuate the transportation monopoly which will be dominated by the
railroads."43 Testifying before the Senate in 1935, the national representative of the Grange
noted that federal trucking regulation "would result in serious handicaps to the farmer, the
39 Charles W. Holman (Secretary, National Cooperative Milk Producers Federation), "Statement ... with Relation to
the Proposed Code of Fair Competition for the Trucking Industry," Dec. 4, 1933, Secretary of Agriculture Records, RG
16, General Correspondence, Entry 17, National Archives II, College Park, MD (hereafter RG 16, Entry 17), Box 1913,
Folder 9. See also George Haas (Acting Governor, Farm Credit Administration) to Hugh S. Johnson, Dec. 12, 1933,
ibid.
40 Henry A. Wallace to Rep. John McDuffie, Nov. 1, 1933, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 1913, Folder 9.
41 Paul H. Appleby to Donald R. Murphy, Nov. 1, 1933, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 1913, Folder 9.
42 Henry A. Wallace, Memorandum for George N. Peek, "Proposed Code on Fair Competition for the Trucking
Industry," Nov. 2, 1933, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 1913, Folder 9.
43 Fred Brenckman (Washington Representative, The National Grange) to Henry A. Wallace, "Federal Regulation of
Motor Trucks," Mar. 28, 1934, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 2032, Folder 19.
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stockmen, and the horticulturists" by allowing trucking companies to peg their rates to those of
the railroads, creating an upward pressure on all freight rates for farm goods.44 Farm opposition
to Eastman's bill was especially strong during testimony in the House; organizations from the
Grange to the American National Livestock Association declared the legislation an effort by
railroads to "consolidate in one vast system all the transportation facilities of the country [that]
would amount to the same as creating one giant monopoly."45 Eastman, for his part, felt the
farm organizations misunderstood the intent of the legislation, pointing out to Henry Wallace
that farmers who hauled their own products to market, as well as farmer cooperatives who ran
their own fleets of trucks, would not fall under the ambit of the ICC, since they were "private
carriers ... not subject to the proposed regulation."46 Attempting to assuage the farm interests,
Eastman amended his original proposal to specifically exempt truckers hauling "unprocessed
agricultural commodities" from the ICC's regulations; as Eastman saw it, such phrasing would
allow any farmer or farm cooperative to haul products such as milk or livestock to a dairy or
meatpacker (from farm to "first market") without need for ICC authority. But Congressmen
from farm states were convinced that this exemption was not enough; as Walter Pierce,
I)emocratic Representative for Oregon, noted during debates on the Motor Carrier Act, "many
members will lose their seats on this very issue."47 Bowing to the pressure, Congress went
Eastman one step further and wrote into the MCA a clause exempting all "agricultural
commodities (not including manufactured products thereof)."48
With this phrasing, not only were farmers and farm cooperatives exempt from ICC
regulation, but so was any trucker who hauled agricultural goods that were not "manufactured."
Congress declined to state exactly what would count as an unmanufactured commodity, but
during the debates on the bill it became clear that the phrasing was meant to include such
products as pasteurized milk and ginned cotton which had undergone some processing-a firm
rebuke of Eastman's efforts to limit exempt agricultural hauling only to private farm-to-first-
44 Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Amend the Interstate Commerce Act, 504, 508.
45 House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Regulation of Interstate Motor Carriers, Hearings, 74th.
Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 19-22, 26-28, Mar. 1, 4, 5, 1935, 290-301, 327-39, 395-402, quote on 291.
46 Joseph B. Eastman to Henry A. Wallace, "Effect of the Proposed Motor Carrier Act on Farm Trucking," Mar. 16,
1934, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 2032, Folder 19.
4i' Congressional Record, 74th Cong., st sess., Jul. 31, 1935, vol. 79, pt. 11, p. 12217.
48 Ibid., 12221.
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market transportation.49 Without this amendment, the MCA would never have become law
under a Congress beholden to agricultural interests.5s Perhaps more importantly, the exemption
created an opening in the ICC's regulatory structure that, as we shall see below, would allow the
USDA after World War II to transform the chaos of unregulated trucking into "flexibility" in the
service of its efforts to solve the farm problem through technopolitical means.
In the first decade of federal trucking regulation, the agricultural exemption played only
a minor role in a much larger effort by the USDA to contest the economic power of the railroads.
Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, in particular, clung to an agrarian ideology that
viewed the nation's railroad executives as profiteers determined to swindle the American
farmer.51 Throughout his tenure as Secretary, from 1932 to 1940, Wallace repeatedly contested
railroads' efforts to raise their rates for shipping agricultural products. In 1934 Wallace testified
before the ICC during hearings to consider whether the rails should be allowed to raise freight
rates to improve their financial condition. Wallace opposed the increase, arguing that it would
raise the cost of food for consumers while placing a disproportionately high burden on farmers.
Railroads would do better for themselves and for the nation, Wallace insisted, if they would
lower their rates during the Depression to capture higher volumes of freight.52 The ICC
disagreed in this instance, granting the increase, but over the next few years Wallace would
continue his efforts. In 1937, farm organizations asked Wallace to contest an attempt by the
railroads to gain a 15 percent rate increase from the ICC; Wallace complied, making the same
argument he had made three years earlier, but this time won the argument. Pleased with the
49 Ibid., 12197-12227, esp. 12219-21. See also Celia Sperling, The Agricultural Exemption in Interstate Trucking: A
Legislative and Judicial History (Washington: USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service, 1957).
50 On the reasons for agricultural influence over Congress in this period, see John Mark Hansen, Gaining Access:
Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), and for a contrasting view,
Richard F. Bensel, Sectionalism and American Political Development, 1880-1980 (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1984).
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results, Wallace asked Congress to give him permanent authority to represent farmers' interests
(luring ICC hearings on freight rate increases. As a result, Congress wrote Section 201 of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, conferring on the Secretary of Agriculture broad powers to
file complaints with the ICC "against rates and charges on farm products."53 Little noticed at the
time, this aspect of the new agricultural program set, in the words of a Washington Post
editorialist, a "most unfortunate precedent," allowing "a member of the Cabinet ... to press the
demands of a special group of citizens before an independent agency of the Government."54 For
Wallace, however, the power and economic expertise of the USDA was required to confront the
hosts of lawyers, accountants, economists, and other "professional witnesses" employed by the
railroads to convince the ICC to increase their rates.5 5 To that end, Wallace created a
Transportation Rates and Services Division within the USDA, appointing transportation
economist Charles B. Bowling as its head. By 1945, Bowling claimed to have saved American
farmers over one billion dollars in shipping costs by fighting railroad efforts to raise rates on
agricultural goods.56
Prior to World War II, USDA involvement in transportation policy sowed the seeds for
the "flexibility" that would become central to postwar efforts to use trucking to "solve" the farm
problem. Rural roadbuilding, the insertion of an agricultural "exemption" clause in the 1935
Motor Carrier Act, and the 1938 Congressional charge to the Secretary of Agriculture to contest
railroad rate increases were all based in an agrarian politics rooted in the anti-monopoly
movements of the late 19th century. Until the late 194os, agricultural influence on
transportation policy framed the issue in terms of using the power of the state to allow farmers
to counter-organize as an economic interest group, fighting the "money powers" that ran the
railroads. In this formulation, trucking was simply a way for farmers to reduce the railroads'
monopoly power over agricultural shipping. After the war, however, USDA transportation
53 W. G. West (Secretary, Kansas Livestock Association) to Henry A. Wallace, Dec. 22, 1937, RG 16, Entry 17, Box
2789, Folder 8; Statutes at Large 52 (1938): 36-7
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experts sought a new direction-to encourage the growth of trucking as a means of converting
the farm problem into an industrial problem. Trucking would no longer be simply a competitor
to railroads, but central to the creation of a marketing machine bent on the minimization of
labor costs in food distribution and the maximization of the power of food processors and
supermarkets to reshape the geography of agricultural production and politics of food pricing.
Turning the Farm Problem into an Industrial Problem
To understand why USDA agricultural experts sought a technological fix to the farm
problem in the late 1940os and early 1950s, we have to understand just how tricky the problem
had become by that time. The problem of maintaining a balance between farmers' incomes and
consumer food expenses first appeared as a politically salient issue during the Populist
movements of the late nineteenth century. Southern farmers reacting to the credit squeeze of the
crop lien system, along with Northern Plains farmers struggling with the economic distress of
droughts and globalizing wheat markets, called on the federal government to protect farmers
from the nation's "money interests" (i.e., landlords, banks, and especially railroads). Although
the Populists failed to elect their presidential candidates in the 1892 and 1896 national elections,
they were successful in putting the farm problem on the nation's political agenda.57 Progressive
reformers of the early twentieth century adapted many of the Populists' ideas as new legislation
and policies, from the strengthening of the Interstate Commerce Commission to the
establishment of rural producers' cooperatives to improve the leverage of farmers in agricultural
markets.58 These policy efforts had some success in mitigating the farm problem, but even more
important were the rising prices for farm products (particularly wheat) that came in the 191os
57 Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1978); Sanders, Roots of Reform; Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F. D. R.
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York: Hill and Wang, 1993).
58 Daniel T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1998), 318-66; Hal S. Barron, Mixed Harvest: The Second Great Transformation in the Rural North, 1870-
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with expanding global demand. The period leading up to and through World War I witnessed a
"golden age of agriculture" that significantly defused political agitation by farmers.59
The farm problem returned to the nation's political consciousness with a vengeance in
the 1920S. Huge surpluses created by production for World War I led to a postwar drop in farm
prices and a consequent agricultural depression. Congressmen from rural states reacted by
forming a "farm bloc" devoted to increasing farmer's incomes, either by limiting agricultural
production or by guaranteeing farmers a "parity" price for their crops. Attempts to pass effective
legislation like the McNary-Haugen Bill foundered in the 1920S, as farm representatives from
different regions of the country could not reach consensus on the proper mechanism for
assuring steady farm incomes.6 o When the Great Depression struck in 1929, however, the farm
problem became especially acute, as impoverished and desperate farmers called on the federal
government for support. Herbert Hoover's Farm Board attempted to implement the least statist
proposals discussed in the McNary-Haugen debates-particularly voluntary marketing controls
to shore up farm prices-but with little success. Most farmers continued to act as self-interested
individuals, refusing to cooperatively reduce their production to increase prices. The agricultural
depression continued.6 '
When Franklin Roosevelt came into office, one of his administration's first acts during
the famous "First o100 Days" was to put together all of the ideas from the 1920 and Hoover's
farm program into the Agricultural Adjustment Act. The legislation, which created the
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), did eventually shore up some farmers' incomes
by creating price supports and production controls, but at the price of forcing thousands of small
farmers, tenants, and sharecroppers off the land.6 2 As a consequence, the AAA offended both
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conservatives who saw it as an affront to free enterprise, and liberals who saw the program as
harmful to the least privileged members of rural society. Furthermore, the goals of the AAA were
directly at odds with much of the rest of New Deal legislation, since raising farm prices only
served to increase the cost of food for other members of the New Deal coalition, particularly
urban industrial laborers. These aspects of the New Deal farm legislation were controversial, but
the programs became especially politically unpopular when Secretary of Agriculture Henry A.
Wallace ordered six million hogs culled and one-quarter of the Southern cotton crop plowed
under to increase market prices in 1933-34. Republican critics of the New Deal ridiculed the
Roosevelt administration for destroying livestock and crops when millions of Americans were
starving and poorly clothed.6 3
Underlying all of these political controversies was the simple fact that American farmers
produced too much food in the first half of the twentieth century. Even as the political wing of
the USDA was administering legislation to support farm prices and limit the amount of acreage
farmers could put into production, its scientific and technological bureaus were successfully
encouraging farmers to use pesticides, fertilizers, hybrid crops, and tractors to increase their
production. Secretary Wallace only very reluctantly ordered the culling of hogs in 1933, since his
fundamental philosophy regarding American agriculture was one of ever-increasing abundance,
not limits to production.6 4 The USDA's technological and scientific efforts from the late 1 9 th
century into the 1940s, encouraged by economists such as M. L. Wilson, focused on creating
huge, industrial farms where commodities could be produced factory-style.6 5 The AAA made for
good headlines and solid political support for the Democrats from large commercial farmers, but
the USDA's real efforts to solve the farm problem were, until the post-WWII era, focused
primarily on increasing big farmers' production and forcing small, "inefficient" farmers out of
the market.6 6
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This stance was useful during World War II, when American farmers were called upon to
feed the boys overseas. Wars are not won on empty stomachs, and America's highly productive
farmers profited from the chance to keep the Allied soldiers in prime fighting condition. The
devastation of European and Soviet agricultural fields sent demand for American agricultural
products soaring. Assured of high prices for their products, American farmers were able to
invest heavily in tractors, fertilizers, hybrid seeds, and other technologies for increasing crop
yields-without concern for overproduction.6 7 High demand for American agricultural products
pushed prices up, but at the same time, wartime price controls made sure the prices-if not the
availability-of food remained reasonable for civilian consumers.6 8 For a time at least, the farm
problem was solved, except that farmers had become accustomed to high prices and
unrestrained production, while consumers had been mobilized by the state to agitate for
government control of food prices.
At war's end it became clear to agricultural policymakers in Congress and the USDA that
surpluses and food prices were again going to be a problem.6 9 In 1947 and 1949, the National
Planning Association gathered together a group of agricultural economists, farm organization
leaders, and labor and consumers' representatives to discuss the future of food politics in
postwar America. The results of these meetings, published under the titles Dare Farmers Risk
Abundance? and Must We Have Food Surpluses?, came to the conclusion that farmers would
only continue to keep growing more and more food, no matter what Congress tried to do to limit
production. The only way to keep farmers from overproducing themselves into poverty, the
reports argued, was to allow farm prices to rise. The key to doing this without driving up the cost
of living for American consumers was, as the latter report put it, "increased efficiency in
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marketing to ... cut costs of distribution."70 Whereas the USDA had always focused on
rationalizing the production of food, now they should also, according to the National Planning
Association agricultural experts, use technology to rationalize the consumption of food.
These conferences held by the National Planning Association served mainly to bolster a
new direction in agricultural policy already being put in place by Congress and the USDA in the
mid-194os. In 1943, economist F. L. Thomsen of the USDA's Bureau of Agricultural Economics
(BAE) addressed a national gathering of agricultural policymakers, calling for a new kind of
technological solution to the farm problem: "For a century, the leaders of farmer and consumer
groups have been shouting from the rostrums ... for a more efficient marketing system. It is now
time to do something about it."7l That "something" turned out to be the Agricultural Research
and Marketing Act of 1946 (RMA), which explicitly ordered the USDA's economists and
engineers to come up with new technologies for rationalizing the marketing of America's
agricultural products. The bill's main sponsor, Representative Clifford R. Hope of Kansas,
described the central idea of the legislation to Congress in July of 1946: "The [Research and
Marketing Act] is based upon the idea of abundant production and efficient distribution and
utilization of food and other farm products."72 Efficient food distribution, according to Hope,
required technologies that lowered or eliminated the cost of labor, along with technical research
into the economics of mass consumption. With the optimism suggested by his surname,
Congressman Hope firmly believed that more machines and smarter marketing experts would
solve the farm problem that decades worth of political haggling over how to limit production
had never solved. Furthermore, that solution would come with the avowed acceptance of an
economic philosophy of abundance, rather than scarcity-a dramatic political statement in a
country seeking to pull itself out of two decades of depression and war. The RMA offered to
70 National Planning Association, Dare Farmers Risk Abundance? (Washington: National Planning Association,
1947); National Planning Association, Must We Have Food Surpluses? (Washington: National Planning Association,
1949), quote on 18.
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Examination of Marketing Research," Journal of Farm Economics 27 (Nov 1945): 947-62.
72 Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2d sess., Jul. 15, 1946, vol. 92, p. 9031.
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create a true consensus on agricultural policy, transcending partisan divisions and uniting the
interests of food producers and consumers.73
Three main factors led to the development of this new direction in agricultural policy.
First, Congress had been taken over by Republicans in 1946 for the first time since the beginning
of the Great Depression. Eager to erase the so-called "socialist" aspects of New Deal legislation,
Republican politicians from farm states (including Hope) sought to solve the farm problem
without the use of the centralized economic planning that lay at the heart of the AAA. As
postwar tensions with the Soviet Union increased, price supports and acreage controls were
increasingly painted as "socialistic" by opponents of the New Deal. This became especially clear
in 1948 and 1949, when Republican Congressmen, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and
western beef ranchers spectacularly shot down the efforts of Truman's Secretary of Agriculture,
Charles F. Brannan, to replace commodity price supports with direct payments to farmers based
on their annual income. Brannan had attempted to make the New Deal's agricultural policies
more fair to both small farmers and consumers. For small farmers, Brannan's plan would have
guaranteed minimum incomes rather than minimum crop prices, with large farmers receiving
proportionally less assistance. For consumers, Brannan offered food subsidies and a promise to
increase the supply of high-value, high-demand foods such as beef and milk to keep prices low.
Brannan effectively proposed to unite urban organized labor and small rural producers under
the banner of the Democratic Party, but Republican opponents of the plan smeared the plan as
expensive and "communistic" in its unabashed effort to redistribute farm wealth through
centralized economic planning.74 Second, agricultural economists, like other economists, had
7:3 Statutes at Large 60, 1082 (1946); House Committee on Agriculture, Agricultural Research, Hearings, 79th Cong.,
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become increasingly enamored of Keynesian theories that pointed towards steady consumption
as the key to a healthy economy. The new economics stressed mass consumption rather than
mass production as the key to steady growth and widespread abundance.75 Third, there was the
problem of inflation. Public opinion polls in the late 1940s and 1950 consistently ranked the
rising cost of living as one of the most pressing domestic concerns of middle-class consumers.76
Food, in particular, was constantly rising in price, and the New Deal system of guaranteeing
farmers a "parity" price for their commodities seemed to many to be the cause. As one woman
wrote to her senator in 1949, "I understand that the potato farmers in Aroostook County in
Maine are getting rich, and riding around in their Cadillacs, while poor people like us pay the
bills."77 A 1951 editorial in the New York Times expressed a common sentiment, attacking the
agricultural price support system as a drag on the entire economy: "Food is the No. 1 item in the
wage-earner's budget. If the price keeps rising, how can wages and the rest of the economy be
stabilized?"78 Given these pressures, even Democratic politicians from farm states became
increasingly uncomfortable with the New Deal program of raising farmers' incomes by using the
heavy hand of the state to raise the price of food for consumers. The new agricultural program,
Congressmen decided, should rely less on politically controversial economic regulations and
price supports, and more on technologies of distribution and marketing.79
It was one thing for the USDA's economists and engineers to receive a sharp rebuke from
Congress for their previous neglect of the consumption side of the agricultural economy. It was
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entirely another that they received significant funding to start research projects-upwards of
$30 million in the first 5 years after the RMA's passage. Agricultural engineers and economists
eagerly embarked on literally thousands of research projects, studying everything from turning
corn into automobile fuel to developing dehydro-frozen food to studying the economics of air
transport of grain. The majority of studies, however, focused on down-to-earth questions of how
to make it cheaper for farmers and food processors to get their products to market.80 For
instance, a 1953 economic study funded by the RMA found that the cost of loading and
unloading apples in warehouses could be reduced by up to 80% by the use of forklifts in place of
belt conveyors.8' Other RMA-funded economists sought similar technological methods for
reducing costs in the marketing of milk (milk should be hauled in bulk tanks, not cans);
perishable fruits and vegetables (retailers should demand careful handling in packing houses to
reduce spoilage); and livestock (beef packers should modernize their stockyards to maximize the
rate of feeding and slaughter).8 2 Engineers, meanwhile, focused on such activities as improving
corn and soybean drying and storage, using sorting machines to increase the efficiency of
tomato processing plants, and developing standardized containers and packages for retail
delivery of food products. 83
Even after Congress officially cancelled the Research and Marketing Act in 1955 due to
unclear results, such studies continued well into the 196os. This was largely because Dwight
E isenhower's Secretary of Agriculture, Ezra Taft Benson, created a permanently funded agency
within the USDA to work on the problem of efficiently marketing food. Benson claimed to be
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"above politics" due to his deep Mormon faith and his training as an economist, but his actions
as head of the USDA were quite explicitly aimed at defusing the socialistic tendencies of New
Deal agricultural policy. Brought on board by Eisenhower as part of a strategy to woo the farm
vote away from the Democrats after five straight Presidential losses for the Republicans, Benson
began a systematic effort to develop cooperative relationships between the federal government
and private industry to solve the farm problem from the demand side rather than through
centralized economic planning on the supply side. Immediately after taking office in 1953, he
eliminated the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE), claiming that too much of the BAE's
economic research had focused on maintaining statist New Deal price supports and acreage
allotments (that is, paying farmers to keep some lands out of production).8 4 In the BAE's stead,
Benson erected two agencies, the Agricultural Research Service and the Agricultural Marketing
Service. Through these agencies, he hoped to redirect the work of agricultural engineers and
economists toward what he considered more "objective" marketing research.8 5 Though Benson
summed up his approach to agricultural policy as the "freedom to farm," the term "agribusiness"
(coined by Benson's Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, Harvard economist John H. Davis, in
1954) was a more accurate descriptor, since the "objective" marketing research would prove
most beneficial to non-farm agricultural industries, especially food processors and
supermarkets. 86 Consequently, the cancellation of the Research and Marketing Act in 1955 did
not end its rationale of solving the farm problem through technological efforts to streamline
food marketing. In fact, projects similar to those funded by the Research and Marketing Act only
became more numerous under Benson's secretaryship. For example, RMA-funded work on bulk
milk hauling, begun in the early 1950S, expanded significantly when it was transferred to the
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Agricultural Marketing Service in the years after the RMA's cancellation.8 7 Other large-scale
projects of the late 1950os and 1960s studied the efficient marketing of frozen orange juice, ways
to reduce the need for skilled labor in food processing and retailing industries, and the proper
design of food storage warehouses.8 8 In hundreds of other studies, USDA economists and
engineers sought to improve efficiency in marketing and distribution, covering every major
agricultural commodity produced in the United States, always doing so in direct cooperation
with food processing and retailing firms.
The intent of Benson's "objective" approach was to convert the farm problem into an
industrial problem-to place in the hands of private industry, rather than the federal
government, the burden of assuring high prices for farmers while offering consumers abundance
at reasonable costs. As a sympathetic agricultural economist explained to Benson's Assistant
Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz in 1956, the Department's focus on marketing research was
"safe, sane, conservative [and] socially desirable [because] everybody, including farmers, stands
to gain from it."89 But the new approach to marketing research was not entirely without
controversy, as Harry C. Trelogan, Director of the USDA's Marketing Research Division, noted
in responding to Allin's letter. In particular, the applications of marketing research appeared to
be most directly beneficial to food processors and supermarkets rather than to either farmers or
consumers. The term "agribusiness," though still not in wide circulation, could hold negative as
well as positive connotations.9s Trelogan's note pointed to a tension within the USDA's ranks.
Secretary of Agriculture Benson touted "objective" marketing research that was intended to
influence and change practices in private food distribution, but some agricultural economists
8 7 Donald B. Agnew, How Bulk Assembly Changes Milk Marketing Costs (Washington: USDA, Agricultural
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whose work supported these activities preferred a "strong program of fundamental longer-run
research" rather than "being too closely associated with 'action' programs."9' But in the long run,
Benson's approach won out within the USDA, as he pushed the AMS and the ARS to work very
closely with private industry, particularly food processors and supermarkets, to develop lower-
cost marketing and distribution methods as a demand-side approach to increasing the farmer's
share of the consumer's dollar.92
In the twenty years following the end of World War II, the farm problem was thus
redefined. Before the war, agricultural experts-BAE economists, farm bloc Congressmen,
Henry A. Wallace-had seen the essential problem as one of overproduction. Now, in a political
culture focused on maintaining abundance without the use of "socialist" methods, the problem
seemed to be one of inefficient marketing. The key issue at stake in postwar agricultural politics
was what the role of the state should be, vis-A-vis private enterprise, in dealing with the problem
of maintaining high prices for farmers without unduly raising consumer food prices. This
formulation of the farm problem directly linked the politics of production with the politics of
consumption. Agricultural policymakers saw marketing-understood as "the link between
production and consumption ... assembly, transportation, packing, packaging, processing,
preservation, storing, wholesaling, and retailing-all the steps between producer and
consumer"-as the point of attack.93 Agricultural economists in the USDA's marketing divisions
consistently viewed all of the processes involved in transforming agricultural commodities into
consumable foods as part of an integrated machine, a machine that was at once technological
and political. For example, just before the end of World War II, economist Clarence W. Kitchen,
associate administrator of the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Administration, wrote a letter to a
farm journal editor explaining the importance of having "the marketing machinery function as
efficiently as possible" after the war. According to Kitchen, labor shortages during the war had
forced food processors and retailers to move more commodities into food markets with fewer
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workers, with the result that the farmer's share of the consumer's food dollar had increased.
Efficient marketing machinery, in this formulation, would simultaneously bring abundance to
consumers and high prices to farmers.94
To put it bluntly, an efficient marketing machine would be a system that moved food
from farms to consumers with the smallest number of intermediary firms-whether food
processors, wholesalers, or retailers-paying workers' wages and taking profits along the way.
Agricultural economists working with food industries under the RMA focused on decreasing the
cost of food distribution to raise the farmer's share of the consumer's dollar. Much of this
research involved improved packaging techniques, warehousing and retailing methods, and
reducing the need for skilled labor in the food marketing chain. The cost of transportation,
however, attracted the most attention from USDA economists. Although the cost of labor
contributed the greatest increase in the price of food between the farmer and the consumer,
transportation had always followed close behind labor in percentage of costs incurred in the
marketing of agricultural goods and food products.95 Unlike workers, though, transportation
technologies could be re-engineered with less need for political delicacy. If the cost of
transportation could only be kept down, argued a 1956 USDA pamphlet meant for wide
readership entitled "Food Transportation and What It Costs Us," farmers' incomes would
automatically rise even as consumer prices dropped.96
The Technopolitics of Flexible Transportation
One key word-flexibility-summed up all that agricultural experts in the USDA
imagined trucking would bring to the domestic marketing of crops, livestock, and food in the
postwar period. Agricultural engineers, economists, and policymakers all regarded trucking as a
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more flexible system of transportation than railroads, but each of these groups had a slightly
different idea of what flexibility entailed. For engineers, trucks could provide faster and more
reliable hauling than railroads mainly because truckers were better able to provide customized
hauling services. Trains hauled an incredibly diverse range of products, using a variety of
railcars and switching mechanisms to move goods over long distances; but even with specialized
railcars, each load was just one unit among many with widely varying needs and destinations.
Each semi-trailer, on the other hand, hauled only one commodity, directly from the point of
origin to its destination. The commodity itself, rather than the transporter's need to limit
investments in equipment, determined which type of hauling equipment would be used.
Mechanically refrigerated trailers, custom livestock hauling trailers, bulk tankers for milk and
oils, and grain hoppers could be designed and implemented for each specific commodity.
Furthermore, truckers could provide the specialized service needed to make sure that each load
arrived quickly at its destination with little damage. Truck trailers could be designed, for
example, to accept standardized bulk packages of potatoes that would keep handling to a
minimum during exchanges among farmers, potato processing facilities, warehouses, and retail
stores. In summer, potatoes could travel in ventilated trailers to prevent degradation, while in
winter they could be protected against freezing in enclosed trailers. Other commodities, from
grains to livestock to dairy products to fresh and frozen fruits and vegetables, had similarly
customized transportation requirements that, from an engineering standpoint, trucks often
seemed most capable of providing.97
Economists, meanwhile, tended to define trucking's flexibility in terms of systemic
marketing efficiency. Railroads, in order to operate profitably, needed months of advance notice
from shippers in order to allocate the appropriate number of cars to pick up a specific load at a
particular time. The fickleness of climate, weather, and biology, however, has always created
fluctuations in agricultural production. At the time of planting, a farmer could only make an
97 More on this point in Chapter 4. William J. Hudson and Don C. Leavens, "The Kinds and Uses of Carriers," in
USDA, Yearbook ofAgriculture (Washington: GPO, 1954), 96-7; Forrest S. Baker, Jr., "Efficiency in Transportation
Packaging," Journal of Farm Economics 46 (Dec 1964): 1292-4; E. P. Atrops and W. H. Redit, Protective Servicesfor
Shipments of Carton Loads of California Oranges and Lemons (Washington: USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service,
1962); H. D. Johnson and P. L. Breakiron, Protecting Perishable Foods during Transportation by Truck: Meats,
Fruits, Melons, Vegetables, Poultry, Dairy Products (Washington: USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service, 1956).
52
educated guess as to how big his crop would be come harvest time; if a grain farmer ordered
three railcars to arrive in the second week of October to take his grain to market, he might only
be able to fill one of those cars, or might have a bumper crop that required several more cars
than the railroad could provide on short notice. Truckers, on the other hand, could arrive to
collect a shipment of any size with only a few days' or even hours' notice; from an economist's
viewpoint, this "just-in-time" transportation was a much more efficient allocation of resources.
As one agricultural economist summed up the issue in 1969, "Nature determines to a very large
degree how much transportation will be needed, when it will be needed, and where it will be
needed.... In many cases, a saving of hours-not days or weeks-in transportation time can mean
better prices for the producer or distributor, longer shelf life for the product, and better satisfied
consumers."98 Furthermore, because truckers hauled relatively smaller loads of products at
greater speed than railroads, they provided food processors and supermarkets with the means to
increase the rate of turnover of their products during periods of high demand. This form of
flexibility was important because a high rate of turnover was one of the most effective ways to
assure secure profit levels for farmers and food distributors without the need to raise food prices
for consumers. Furthermore, as we shall see in later chapters, trucks and highways helped food
processors and supermarkets to upend the economic geography of food production and
distribution in the 1950s and 1960s, pushing food factories and supermarket warehouses deep
into the countryside to lower labor costs and eliminate competition from smaller firms such as
independent food distributors. Postwar agricultural economists tended to define trucking's
flexibility in terms of efficiency. Quick, on-demand movement of a variety of goods from
decentralized producers to suburban consumers would bring stability to an otherwise constantly
fluctuating food economy.99
Agricultural policymakers, meanwhile, tended to conceive of trucking's flexibility in
terms of competition with the railroads. For policymakers of the postwar period hoping to
93 Ivon W. Ulrey, The Economics of Farm Products Transportation (Washington: USDA, Economic Research Service,
1969), 1.
99 John C. Winter, "A Century of Progress," in USDA, Yearbook ofAgriculture (Washington: GPO, 1954), 1oo; Donald
E. Church and Margaret R. Purcell, "From Farms to First Market," in USDA, Yearbook ofAgriculture (Washington:
GPO, 1954), 87-92; David E. Moser and Wesley R. Kriebel, Transportation in Agriculture and Business (Columbia:
University of Missouri Extension, 1964); J. K. Samuels, "The Right Product; The Right Place," in USDA, Yearbook of
Agriculture (Washington: GPO, 1960), 276-81.
53
reduce the cost of transporting agricultural products, the very presence of trucks as significant
competitors to railroads promised lower freight rates for all shipments, whether by road or rail.
Policy debates consequently centered on how best to encourage trucking's growth, without
creating a new monopolistic transportation industry by pushing railroads into bankruptcy.loo
Federal highway building proved to be the single most important policy decision that gave
truckers incentives to compete with railroads in the postwar period. Agricultural policymakers,
however, had little direct influence on the development of national highway policy after the
Bureau of Public Roads moved from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of
Commerce in 1949. The Department of Agriculture did have significant influence on other facets
of transportation policy, however, particularly when it came to minimizing government
regulations on truckers' geographic reach and ability to compete with other carriers. Perhaps
most important, the USDA successfully reworked the "agricultural exemption" clause of the
Motor Carrier Act of 1935 into a method for harnessing the chaos of unregulated trucking to the
demands of rationalized food marketing systems. Ultimately, the anti-regulatory stance of the
USDA in relation to trucking policy served to maintain an atomistic structure in the industry,
preventing the rise of large unionized firms in agricultural transportation. Especially under the
direction of Ezra Taft Benson, agricultural policymakers saw non-union labor relations in
trucking as more flexible than that of railroading, and sought to keep it that way. From a policy
standpoint, then, trucks were more flexible than trains because they could more easily avoid
cumbersome interference from both government regulators and organized labor.
Trucks became true competitors with trains for long hauls of agricultural commodities
and processed foods following the war, a fact that became especially apparent after the
construction of the Interstate Highway System in the late 195os. Good highways and giant
trucks provided a new infrastructure for the postwar food economy, allowing food processors
and supermarkets to achieve greater control over the movement of food from farms to suburban
consumers, particularly by decentralizing the geography of their operations while
simultaneously centralizing their economic control in the food economy. The flexibility of
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trucking proved key to this shift, but that flexibility was at least partly the product of efforts by
IJSDA economists and policymakers to inject some chaos into the nation's transportation
structure to counter the ICC's regulatory impulse. These efforts came mainly in the form of legal
and administrative struggles to expand the "agricultural exemption," allowing truckers hauling
even processed foods to avoid the economic regulations of the ICC. The result, on one level, was
to make "independent" (non-union) truck drivers the backbone of much of the American food
economy. On another level, the transportation work of the USDA helped "solve" the farm
problem by the late 1970s, not by actually reducing the actual cost of distributing farm products
or increasing farmers' incomes, nor even by ending government involvement in the agricultural
economy, but by converting it from a farm problem to an industrial problem-the politics of
food pricing by the late 1970s were fought most directly in the marketplace rather than in the
electoral sphere.
The expansion of long-haul trucking in the postwar period depended on a shift in federal
highway policy, away from rural farm-to-market roads and towards a coordinated system of
high-speed interstate highways. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 set in motion the
construction of a 41,ooo-mile limited-access interstate highway system. The passage of that
legislation resulted from decades of agitation by various highway users, decades of agitation
characterized by a failure of the different groups to agree on anything other than their desire for
more roads. Automobile clubs such as the American Automobile Association had called for fast
intercity highways since the l91os, promoting their funding through either gasoline taxes or
tolls, which trucking companies refused to pay. Farmers wanted farm-to-market roads funded
by general tax revenues, while urban planners called for federal funding for expressways as tools
for urban renewal. In the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944, Congress responded to these
conflicting demands by appropriating $1.5 billion for road construction, but without designating
funds to build a planned interstate expressway system. Road construction consequently fell
mainly to the dictates of state engineers, who were committed to moving traffic efficiently over
existing highways rather than building an entirely new system. By 1950, the number of
registered passenger cars doubled from the 1940 figure of 27 million, while trucking freight
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increased one-third between 1949 and 1950. State-funded highway construction fell behind,
leading to congestion and deterioration of outdated roads.
The National Highway Users Conference (established in 1932 by General Motors
chairman Alfred Sloan) initiated Project Adequate Roads in 1951 to demand strict highway
rating standards to force federal financing of intercity expressways. Although backed by
powerful lobbyists-including the American Automobile Association, petroleum firms, road
contractors, and auto manufacturers-the project resulted only in publicity since truckers
continued to refuse to accept the higher gasoline taxes proposed to finance the plan. Serious
federal commitment to interstates did not come until 1954, when President Eisenhower,
influenced by his Council of Economic Advisers, sought dramatically increased highway
construction to create jobs and economic growth. In July 1954, the president established an
Advisory Committee on a National Highway Program to work with the groups represented in
Project Adequate Roads, along with state governors and congressional representatives, to
hammer out a compromise that would allow a dramatic increase in federal highway funding.
The solution came in June 1956 with the invention of the Highway Trust Fund, which tied
highway financing directly to federal taxes on fuel and tires. The more cars and trucks
Americans bought, the more highways they would get. With federal funding guaranteed at 90%
of cost through the target completion date of 1969, interstates rapidly expanded.o1
Along with a growing high-speed highway network came a dramatic increase in the size
of trucks, making long-haul trucking possible. Before the war, the great majority of trucks
traveling on America's highways were not big rigs traveling long distances. In 1940, for instance,
79 percent of the nation's trucks traveling on main roads were "straight trucks" (without a
separate trailer unit), averaging hauls of only 2 1/4 tons apiece (see Figure 1.a). Larger truck-
and-trailer combinations, either in the form of semi-trailers (a trailer supported at its front end
by the tractor's "fifth wheel" rather than by its own wheels) or a full tractor-trailer (with the
101 These two paragraphs summarize the work of the two best books on the history of the Interstate Highway System:
Mark H. Rose, Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989, 2d ed. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press,
199o) and Seely, Building the American Highway System, esp. 137-223. See also Tom Lewis, Divided Highways:
Building the Interstate Highways, Transforming American Life (New York: Viking Press, 1997); Thomas J.
Schlereth, Reading the Road: U. S. 40 and the American Landscape, rev. ed. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee
Press, 1997).
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front end of the trailer running on wheels), could carry significantly more freight-averaging
over 7 1/2 tons per load-but made up a minority of the vehicles in use on main rural roads (see
Figure 1.2). Furthermore, over two-thirds of the ton-miles traveled by trucks in 1940 occurred
in intrastate commerce, rather than interstate; in fact, fully 40 percent of this traffic moved only
within a single county.l0 2 By 1953, however, tractor-trailers, as opposed to straight trucks,
carried three-quarters of all highway ton-miles on main rural roads.'o3 Furthermore, the trailers
in use grew significantly longer; in 1946 most trailers measured from 22 to 30 feet in length,
while by 1966 the average trailer exceeded 40 feet.14 Many states relaxed their length and
weight laws restricting the size of trucks in the mid-195os, encouraging the trend toward larger
trucks; in 1954, trucks over 16,000 pounds gross vehicle weight made up only 11 percent of total
registrations; by 1958, their share was 22 percent.0 5 These bigger trucks traveled longer
distances, as well; whereas the average haul of a common carrier truck in 1944 covered 180
miles, by 1957 the average length traveled was 238 miles.'o6
1C12 John T. Lynch and Thomas B. Dimmick, "Amount and Characteristics of Trucking on Rural Roads," Public Roads
(Jul.-Sep. 1943): 216--7, 226, 228-9.
c103 Interstate Commerce Commission, Monthly Comment on Transportation Statistics (Apr. 18, 1955): 12; Thomas B.
Dimmick, "Trends in Traffic Volume, Vehicle Types, and Weights," Public Roads (Dec. 1953): 240.
1C'4 Harold M. Levinson, et al., Collective Bargaining and Technological Change in American Transportation(Evanston, IL: Transportation Center at Northwestern University, 1971), 39.
105 "Detroit Capitalizes on the Surge in Sales of Highway Giants," Business Week, May 23, 1959, 170; "Interstate
Trucking Grows with Liberalization," Power Wagon (May 1956): 4.
10,6 American Trucking Associations, American Trucking Trends (Washington: American Trucking Associations,
1959), 26.
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Figure 1.1: A typical straight truck of the 1930S
Straight trucks without a separate trailer unit, such as this one photographed by Harry M.
Rhoads in 1930, generally had a capacity in the range of 1 to 2 1/2 tons and were designed
primarily for local or regional hauling. Western History/Genealogy Department, Denver
Public Library Rh-1681.
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Figure 1.2: A semi-trailer of the 1950S
A semi-trailer combination, with the front end of the trailer attached to a fifth wheel on
the tractor's chassis, allowed truckers to haul much larger payloads for longer distances
than straight trucks. Full trailers that rested on their own front wheel assembly were less
common than semi-trailers. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division,
Theodor Horydczak Collection, LC-H814- 0725-114.
As trucking became increasingly long-haul, the nation's railroads found themselves
facing a new kind of competition. Prior to the war, trucks had competed with rails primarily for
short-haul traffic, but after the war truckers increasingly vied for transportation of goods over
distances of hundreds, even thousands of miles. Railroads in 1944 accounted for 69 percent of
intercity ton-miles, while truckers hauled about 5 percent; by 1958 the railroads carried 45
percent and truckers 21 percent of intercity ton-miles.107 Even more importantly, the rails
increasingly lost more valuable types of freight to truckers, so that railroads' share of gross
freight revenues dropped from 8o percent in 1944 to 52 percent in 1958, while truck revenues
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increased from 15 to 39 percent of total revenues in that period. o08 Initially, the railroads fought
back with advertising campaigns claiming that truckers did not pay their fair share of road and
gasoline taxes. The rails also flexed their muscle in state legislatures, as they did in 1953 to kill a
so-called "big truck bill" in Pennsylvania that would have allowed an increase in maximum truck
weights in the state from 45,000 to 60,000 pounds. The case gained national headlines when a
group of trucking firms sued thirty-one eastern railroad companies, claiming they had bribed
state officials and made secret payments to civic leaders to spread negative publicity about the
trucking industry.109 When such tactics proved ineffective, however, the rails began a long-term
change in business practice and technological development, focusing their efforts on long hauls
of heavy, non-perishable bulk commodities such as coal and grain. Trucks did not "replace"
trains by any means in the postwar era; they simply replaced trains as the nation's primary
general-purpose mode of freight transportation, while railroads became specialized freight
carriers and automobiles and planes became the main movers of passengers.'
Trucks did, however, largely replace trains in agricultural and food hauling in the
postwar period. By 1958, nearly go percent of all agricultural commodities traveled from farm to
first market by truck. This was especially the case for highly perishable commodities such as
fruits and vegetables, milk, and livestock."' Take the case of cattle: in 1945, a little more than
half-58 percent-of cattle arrived at livestock terminals by truck; by 1958, 88 percent did so,
and a decade later nearly all cattle traveled by truck to market.112 At the same time, trucks
became the primary transportation mode for foodstuffs; in 1964, half of all foods (by volume)
moved by truck.13 Trucks were especially important in moving meat, milk, cheese, and frozen
foods, though railroads continued to be the primary transporters of less perishable goods such
108 American Trucking Associations, American Trucking Trends (1960), 11.
109 "Truck Firms Will Ask U.S. to Sift 'Criminal' Aspects of Rail Suit," WSJ, Jan. 20, 1953; "Truckers Accuse Rails of
Undercover Attacks," Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 18, 1953; "37 Truck Firms Win Suit, Awarded Nominal Damages,"
Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 11, 1957, all in Pennsylvania Railroad Company Legal Department Records, Hagley
Museum and Library Archives, Wilmington, DE, Box 277, Folder 12.
110 John F. Stover, The Life and Decline of the American Railroad (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 234-71;
Albro Martin, Railroads Triumphant: The Growth, Rejection, and Rebirth of a Vital American Force (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992), 339-98.
"I See Chapters 2, 3, and 4.
112 American Trucking Associations, American Trucking Trends (1970-1), 15.
113 Moser and Kriebel, Transportation in Agriculture, 4.
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as grain mill products and canned foods.ll4 But the shift from trains to trucks in agricultural and
food hauling was not an automatic consequence of the availability of good roads and big trucks.
Long-haul trucking became central to the postwar food economy because trucks made
possible the construction of the marketing machine, a machine that reconstructed the
economics as well as the politics of industrial agriculture by streamlining the movement of food
from farms to consumers. For the marketing machine to operate efficiently required
transportation to link together the nodes of the agribusiness economy-large-scale farmers,
corporate food processors, and chain-store supermarkets. Railroads, of course, had provided the
linkages between producers and retailers for almost a century, but postwar agricultural
economists came to see the rail-based food marketing infrastructure as inefficient. The problem
was not that railroads themselves were necessarily inefficient in an economic sense; in fact,
railroad transportation had significant theoretical advantages over motor transport on a number
of levels. Rail transportation, unlike highway transport, involved very large capital investment in
the infrastructure of rights-of-way, rails and crossties, locomotives, railcars, switching and
signal systems, sidings, and so forth, while trucking required only a truck and trailer and a road
(which truckers helped pay for, but through use taxes and fees, rather than an up-front outlay of
capital). Even the largest, fanciest, chromed-out Peterbilt and all-aluminum trailer was always
far less expensive than a train locomotive. But the high fixed costs of railroad transportation
were counterbalanced by very low unit costs; once the infrastructure for a train was in place,
adding another railcar to the train increased the overall cost only marginally. In contrast, the
unit costs of trucking firms remained constant rather than decreasing with greater volume of
output; the addition of a new tractor-trailer to a trucking fleet did little to change a firm's cost
structure. Put simply, railroads could achieve economies of scale, but trucking firms essentially
could not. 15s But in order to achieve economies of scale, railroads had to dictate to shippers
where, when, and how quickly goods would move; any individual shipper's needs were forced to
14 According to the 1967 Census of Transportation, trucks hauled 72% of all meat, 97% of dressed poultry, 70% of all
dairy products, 78% of cheese, 98% of frozen seafood, 62% of frozen fruit, vegetables, and juice, but only 43% of grain
mill products and 51% of canned foods. United States Bureau of the Census, 1967 Census of Transportation, Vol. 3:
Commodity and Special Statistics (Washington: GPO, 1970).
"5 John R. Meyer, et al., The Economics of Competition in the Transportation Industries (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1959).
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conform to the overall needs of the transportation system. What agricultural economists wanted
was exactly the opposite-for transportation systems that conformed to the interests of shippers,
whether those shippers were farmers, food processors, wholesalers, or retailers.
The USDA's work on produce terminal markets in the postwar period provide a concrete
example of how these economic abstractions played out in the real world. In the early twentieth
century, railroads provided transportation that was cheap enough to allow southern and
California produce farmers to ship their lettuce, beans, asparagus, citrus fruits, and so forth to
northern centers of consumption such as New York and Boston, which had previously relied on
local farmers for their produce."6 But railroads could only bring crates of produce to a terminal
market; moving the fresh fruits and vegetables into the retail markets and produce stands in
consumers' communities required the services of a host of wholesalers, graders, jobbers,
commission merchants, and local deliverymen, each of whom took a slice of the economic pie. In
1950, Congress debated a bill that would provide federal funding for municipalities to work with
USDA marketing specialists to redesign their produce facilities, with the goal of eliminating as
many of these middlemen as possible. The hearings had emerged after USDA marketing
specialists asked a Congressional subcommittee to investigate wholesale markets around the
country in 1949; the subcommittee reported that "most of the country's wholesale markets ...
were developed when the horse and wagon, or even the two-wheel cart, comprised the standard
methods of transportation and 'when huge trailer trucks and refrigerated cars were unheard
of."'17 William C. Crow, director of the Marketing Facilities Branch of the USDA, testified to the
House Agriculture Committee that legislation was necessary to help his office "shorten the
distance between the farmer and the consumer by the elimination of unnecessary operations" in
wholesale produce markets that had been built in the years before modern highways.l8 Crow
offered New York City's Washington Street wholesale market as "an example of inadequate
116 James L. McCorkle, Jr., "Agricultural Experiment Stations and Southern Truck Farming," Agricultural History 62
(Spring 1988): 234-43; Marc Linder and Lawrence S. Zacharias, Of Cabbages and Kings County: Agriculture and the
Formation of Modern Brooklyn (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1999); Douglas C. Sackman, Orange Empire:
California and the Fruits of Eden (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Steven Stoll, The Fruits of Natural
Advantage: Making the Industrial Countryside in California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
17 "Food Depots Here 'Most Antiquated'," NYT, Dec. 11, 1949, 117, USDA History Collection, Box 1.3/16, Folder VI B4.
i8 House Committee on Agriculture, Development and Improvement of Terminal Marketing Facilities, Hearings,
81st Cong., 2d sess., Jun. 6-9, 1950, 12.
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facilities," since railroads brought produce only as far as the New Jersey side of the Hudson
River, at which point cars were unloaded, placed on ferries, and floated across the river to piers
at a cost of $45. At that point, the load was then trucked to the Washington Street market at an
additional cost of $50, but due to traffic congestion local cartage drivers usually had to employ
hand porters to carry crates of produce into the market area itself, adding another $15 to the bill
for each carload of goods. From there, produce would pass through the hands of various
commission merchants until reaching a buyer's truck, which would then cart the food to a retail
store elsewhere in the city. The result, according to Crow, was that approximately one-half of
what the "New York housewife paid for her produce at the retail grocers represented the cost of
handling the goods after they reached the city."9l As it turned out, Congress refused to pass the
bill that would have provided special funding for the USDA to rationalize such produce markets;
as Republican representative Thomas Curtis of Missouri put it, the legislation would put the
"Federal Government into the business of guaranteeing the cost of these markets."120
Even without special funding, however, the USDA's marketing specialists, led by William
C. Crow, used funding provided by the Research and Marketing Act to press forward with the
reconstruction of produce markets. The USDA's Marketing Facilities Branch provided expertise
to several dozen municipalities in the 195os, reconstructing wholesale produce markets to
eliminate "outmoded facilities, poor equipment, poor use of labor, and obsolete handling
techniques."121 The first step was to relocate the market from a crowded downtown area to a
large plot of land on a major highway outside the city, allowing tractor-trailers as well as
railroads to deliver crates of produce directly to the market without the need for multiple
unloadings or hand-cartage. For example, in 1959 the USDA sent two agricultural economists
and an architect to Knoxville, Tennessee, to construct an "ideal food distribution facility."122 The
119 Ibid., 12-15; "Market Facilities Inadequate in Big Cities for Fruits, Other Perishables, House Hears," NYT, Jun. 7,
1950, 48, USDA History Collection, Box 1.3/16, Folder VI B4.
1':o House Committee on Agriculture, Marketing Facilitiesfor Perishable Agricultural Commodities, 84th Cong., 1st
sess., Jul. 30, 1955, H. Rept. 1602; Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., Jul. 13, 1956, vol. 102, 12747. The bill
would have provided up to $50,000,000 in federally guaranteed loans to municipalities or sub-state regions for the
construction of new marketing facilities.
1:!' W. C. Crow, "Cutting Marketing Costs through Research," Marketing Activities (Nov. 1954): 6-9, USDA History
Collection, Box 1.3/16, Folder VI B4.
12.2 Kenneth L. Utter, Notes on proposed Knoxville wholesale food center, n.d. [1959]; Knoxville Chamber of
Commerce, Press Release, Jun. 18, 1959; "Food Mart Cost Put at $2 Million," Knoxville News-Sentinel, Jun. 18, 1959,
16, all in RG 136, Entry 43, Box 4.
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new market, constructed on a 276-acre paved lot outside of town, replaced multiple downtown
wholesale and farmers' markets, providing "one-stop" shopping for retailers-especially
supermarket buyers, who could purchase fresh produce, poultry, and eggs by the trailer-load
and truck it directly to their suburban stores. Centralizing and relocating wholesale markets on a
highway provided the greatest benefits to supermarket chain stores, whose "requirements for
uniformity, volume, and continuity of supply" on a railroad-based transportation system forced
them to maintain "heavy inventories" in their own warehouses to counteract the uncertainty of
rail shipments. With a highway-based wholesale market, supermarkets could send tractor-
trailers daily to pick up and deliver uniform loads, reducing their own warehouse inventories
and thereby lowering the cost of hiring warehouse workers and limiting the expense of spoilage
inherent in rail-based distribution networks (see Figures 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5).123 As we shall see
in the next three chapters, the reconstruction of produce markets was only one aspect of a much
broader effort by agricultural experts cooperating with private industries to move from a
centralized railroad-based food distribution network to a decentralized geography of direct
highway shipping between farms, food processors, and supermarkets.
123 Samuels, "The Right Product; The Right Place," 278, and John C. Winter, "Railroads, Trucks, and Ships," 305.
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Figure 1.3: Grocery store in downtown Knoxville, TN, 1959
Before the construction of a "one-stop shopping" wholesale produce market outside of town, grocers in
Knoxville, Tennessee used straight trucks to gather produce and poultry purchased at markets located
at multiple rail termini, then transport the goods through crowded city streets to downtown stores. RG
136, Entry 43, Box 4, National Archives II.
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Figure 1.4: Model of ideal food distribution center, 1959
Knoxville area businessmen admire a model of the food distribution center designed by USDA
marketing experts to allow space for tractor-trailers to assemble loads of perishable commodities for
direct delivery to suburban supermarket loading docks. RG 136, Entry 43, Box 4, National Archives II.
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Figure 1.5: Tractor-trailer delivery to a supermarket, 1943
Unlike railroads, tractor-trailers could make deliveries of fresh produce directly to a
supermarket loading dock, allowing retailers to keep only minimal warehouse inventories and
thereby reduce the expense of warehouse labor and spoilage. Photograph by John Vachon,
1943. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Farm Security Administration -
Office of War Information Collection, LC-USW3- 021807-E.
Trucks and highways provided technological flexibility, allowing for direct shipment of
foods to supermarket loading docks, but agricultural economists and policymakers also saw in
trucking a chance to create a form of social flexibility, where "independent" truck drivers
working for non-unionized small firms would minimize the labor costs of transporting farm and
food products. The key mechanism for maintaining this form of flexibility was the "agricultural
exemption" clause of the 1935 Motor Carrier Act, which Congress had included in the Act with
the intent of shielding farmers hauling their own products to market from ICC regulation. After
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the war, however, as long-haul for-hire trucking expanded and became the primary mode of
transporting agricultural goods to market, the USDA sought to expand the exemption's
applicability. The first opportunity for the USDA to do this came in 1947, when the ICC heard
the petition of one Norman E. Harwood, who owned a single refrigerated tractor-trailer, for
authority to transport washed salad packaged in cellophane bags by the Aunt Mid Company in
Detroit to grocers in Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana. In hearing the petition, the ICC's
chief examiner for motor carrier cases, Francis P. Lee, recommended that Harwood's request be
denied on the grounds that washed salad was an "agricultural commodity, not including
manufactured products thereof' and thus fell within the scope of the agricultural exemption.
The two other ICC commissioners, however, determined that placing the salad in cellophane
bags constituted a process of manufacturing, and required Harwood to be certified as a
regulated trucker, a certificate that the Commission granted.l24
Transportation economists in the USDA's Marketing Facilities Branch immediately
recognized the implications of this decision-if packaged salad counted as a manufactured
product, the ICC could expand its regulatory power to truckers hauling any packaged or
minimally processed agricultural product. This would effectively limit the agricultural
exemption to very few commodities, meaning that most shippers of food products would be
required to use the services of regulated truckers or railroads. In July of 1948, the USDA asked
the ICC to reconsider the case, developing in the meantime a plan to "obtain a reversal of the
[ICC's] decision in the 'Harwood Case' ... to obtain the maximum exemption for agricultural
commodities." Determined to "show that the exempt carrier provides a more flexible and
adequate service to the farm community than does the regular carrier," the USDA decided to
"line up witnesses" from farm groups, food processors, and the USDA's own economic divisions
to contest the ICC's interpretation of washed salad as a manufactured commodity.l25 A year's
worth of hearings ensued, in which the USDA's legal team argued that Congress had intended
the exemption to apply to "not only those agricultural commodities which are marketable in
124 Interstate Commerce Commission, Docket MC-lo7669, Norman E. Harwood Contract Carrier Application, 47
M.C.C. 597, Dec. 16, 1947.
125 Donald C. Leavens, "The Investigation Concerning Exempted Agricultural Commodities," Aug. 17, 1948, and
"Agenda for Exempted Agricultural Commodities Advisory Committee Meeting," Aug. 17, 1948, both in RG 136, Entry
42, Box 5, Folder 20.
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their natural state but those on which labor has been performed or mechanical skill applied,
without materially affecting the natural state of the articles."126 During the hearings, the USDA
indicated its intention to contest the issue before the Supreme Court if the ICC did not rule
appropriately; under such pressure, the ICC overturned the Harwoood decision in 1949, but
opened up a new set of hearings to lay out a clear policy for interpreting the agricultural
exemption clause. In 1951 the ICC issued its findings in a case known as Determinations, which
declared that in all future petitions from motor carriers seeking certificates to transport
agricultural commodities, the ICC would interpret a "manufactured" commodity as one which
was no longer in its "natural state." Determinations set out a list of commodities that the ICC
would consider non-manufactured, including, for instance, peeled apples and unshelled nuts;
"manufactured" commodities included such goods as smoked, canned, or cooked chickens. Even
l)eterminations opened up a window for the USDA to contest the ICC's interpretation of the
exemption clause, however, since the ruling defined, for instance, pasteurized and vitamin-
enriched milk as being in a "natural state," while milled grain was not. The upshot was that the
ICC could not set down a firm and common-sense definition of "agricultural commodities (not
including manufactured products thereof)" that would prevent the USDA from contesting a
ruling that limited the exemption's coverage in any particular trucking firm's application for
authority.127
The fight over the agricultural exemption, however, was not fundamentally about
whether a bag of washed salad or a bottle of pasteurized milk was manufactured or not, but was
instead a roundabout attack on unionized transportation firms. Understanding this requires a
brief review of the history of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT or Teamsters).128
fly the mid-195os, this union was the single largest and most powerful in the United States, but
it had first emerged in 1899 as a weak federation of strong craft-based locals of urban wagon
deliverymen, mainly in the milk, bread, coal, and ice industries. As late as the mid-193os the
126 Charles B. Bowling (Chief, PMA Transportation Rates and Services Division, Marketing Facilities Branch) to All
Parties of Our Record, "Determination of Exempted Agricultural Commodities," Aug. 10, 1949, RG 136, Entry 42, Box
5, Folder 20.
127 Interstate Commerce Commission, Docket MC-C-968, Determination of Exempted Agricultural Commodities, 52
M.C.C. 511, Apr. 13, 1951; Sperling, Agricultural Exemption, 27-9.
128 The official name of the union is International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and Warehousemen and
Helpers of America.
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Teamsters had shunned intercity truck drivers from membership; Daniel Tobin, the president of
the IBT from 1907 to 1952, called over-the-road drivers "trash" unworthy of membership in his
union in 1934.129 Some locals, however, particularly the Trotskyite Local 574 led by Farrell
Dobbs in Minneapolis, envisioned the future of Teamster power in the enrollment of long-haul
truckers as well as local drivers in contractual agreements covering all drivers within broad
regions, rather than single crafts within individual cities.130 Dave Beck, a Seattle Teamsters
organizer, took Dobbs's vision to an unprecedented level in 1935, when he initiated a "leapfrog"
strategy of organizing over-the-road drivers in locals in major cities up and down the West
Coast, then using that control over incoming and outgoing shipments to compel urban pickup,
delivery, and dock workers to join the union or have their freight refused by organized drivers.
Occasional use of clubs and bicycle chains, along with "sweetheart deals" in which the Teamsters
convinced trucking company managers that they were better off with the American Federation
of Labor-affiliated (and politically conservative) IBT rather than the Congress of Industrial
Organizations, also helped bring reluctant workers into the union's folds. Once the local
warehouse and delivery workers were signed up, a local's membership could swell to the point
where leverage could then be applied, through the over-the-road drivers heading into other
cities, to organize an entire city essentially from scratch. As Beck's most famous protege, James
R. Hoffa, would later explain the "leapfrog" strategy, "Once you have the road men, you can get
the local cartage, and once you have the local cartage, you can get anyone you want."''3 The
efforts of Dobbs, Beck, and Hoffa led to the creation in 1937 and 1938 of the Western States
Drivers Council and the Central States Drivers Council, both of which created multi-state, area-
wide master labor contracts that standardized wages and working conditions across hundreds of
trucking and warehouse firms at the same time.132
129 Ralph C. James and Estelle Dinerstein James, Hoffa and the Teamsters: A Study of Union Power (Princeton: Van
Nostrand, 1965), 91.
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As important as the "leapfrog" strategy was, however, the Teamsters' success in the late
1930s stemmed largely from the cartelization effects of the 1935 Motor Carrier Act. Because the
Act both limited competition from price-cutting entrants to the industry and required all
contract and common carriers to publish their rates, each regulated trucking firm had a
significant incentive to charge the same rates as every other firm. Thus, if one trucking firm
drew up a contract with the Teamsters and raised its rates to accommodate increased wage
demands, other firms had little incentive to resist unionization since they could just as easily
increase their rates. Essentially, the MCA created what political scientists call a "free rider
effect," allowing the Teamsters to monopolize the labor market in trucking as an unintended
consequence of regulated carriers' efforts to monopolize the transportation market.133 The
Teamsters also benefited greatly from the establishment of a Trucking Commission under the
National War Labor Board during World War II, which fostered a cooperative atmosphere
between trucking firms and the union in the name of achieving uniform wage rates and working
conditions among large trucking firms, seeking to prevent disruptive wildcat strikes by Teamster
locals. The Trucking Commission, a tripartite board with one representative each for business,
labor, and "the public," upheld the Western States and Central States area agreements as models
of stable labor relations. When disputes arose, the Commission would require the protesting
firm or union local to abide by the wage rates and labor provisions accepted by nearby firms
participating in these regional agreements.134 Throughout the war, the IBT consistently
demanded few, if any, fundamental changes in the wage structures or conditions of employment
in the trucking industry, accepting in return occasional cost-of-living wage increases and, more
importantly, a state-granted monopoly on the trucking labor market.135 Following the war, the
133 Rothenberg, Regulation, Organizations, and Politics, 76-8.
134 R. Thayne Robson, "The Trucking Industry," Monthly Labor Review 82 (May 1959): 548; "Trucking Commission
History," n.d. (1945?), National War Labor Board Records, RG 202, Trucking Commission Records, Entry 305,
Miscellaneous Records, 1942-45, National Archives II, College Park, MD, Box 2428, Folder 1; National War Labor
Board Trucking Commission, In the Matter of Southeastern Area Employers' Negotiating Committee and
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Nov. 26, 1943, ibid., Box 2423, Folder 1; Douglas Soutar to Lloyd K.
Garrison, memorandum, "Office Practice," Sep. 25, 1943, RG 202, Entry 304, Outgoing Correspondence, Box 2421,
Folder 5; Thomas E. Flynn (Acting President, IBT) to N. P. Feinsinger, Dec. 17, 1943, RG 202, Entry 303, General
Correspondence, 1943-45, Box 2413, Folder 6; James Hill to Carroll B. Daugherty, Dec. 10, 1943, RG 202, Entry 304,
Box 2421, Folder 2;American Trucking Associations, "Argument of the Trucking Industry to the War Labor Board
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Teamsters continued to expand their membership, using their dominance in the regulated
freight trucking sector to refuse deliveries or pickups at the docks and warehouses of businesses
that had not yet signed up with the Teamsters or another union affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor. This was particularly the case after Dave Beck replaced Dan Tobin as
president of the IBT in 1952. Beck, unlike Tobin, had no qualms about boosting the union's
member rolls by organizing non-drivers; as one of Beck's colleagues told a reporter in 1953,
"Dave will take anybody he can get his hands on, then he'll find some kind of justification for it.
A 'teamster' to him is anybody who sleeps on a bed with movable casters."'36 By 1957, the
Teamsters claimed the largest membership of any single union in the nation, with 1.5 million
members, of which only half a million were truck drivers.'37 Those half-million truck drivers,
employed primarily by large, regulated common-carrier trucking firms, earned very good wages
due to the Teamsters' power. In 1957, the average annual pay of a union driver at a large firm
was $6,886, significantly better than the average annual earnings of $4,242 for workers in
manufacturing or the $5,214 of workers in construction.l3
But the Teamsters had little luck organizing trucking firms hauling exempt agricultural
commodities. There were several reasons for this. First, most exempt haulers were small
businesses, most often owning only one or two trucks. As we shall explore in more detail in later
chapters, drivers at such firms tended to maintain a sense of "independence" as small
businessmen rather than wage workers, and so were hostile to labor unions. Furthermore,
exempt trucking firms were generally dispersed in rural areas, forestalling the Teamsters from
using the "leapfrog" organizing strategy that was so successful in urban contexts. Second,
because exempt trucking firms did not have to file their rates with the ICC, the pressures to
compete with other firms on price were much more intense than in the cartelized regulated
freight industry; whereas regulated common carriers had little incentive to resist unionization,
136 Joe Miller, "Dave Beck Comes out of the West," Reporter, Dec. 8, 1953, 21.
137 "Who Are the Teamsters? From Groceries to Girders, They Haul Everything," U.S. News and World Report, Mar.
8, 1957, 134.
138 Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Over-the-Road Truckdrivers," Occupational Outlook Handbook 1255, 4th Ed. (1959):
420; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part I
(Washington: GPO, 1976), 169, 173.
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exempt carriers had every incentive to do so.139 When the USDA and the ICC fought over what
exactly should count as a "manufactured" agricultural commodity, the USDA was ultimately
pushing to keep the Teamsters from organizing agricultural trucking firms and thereby driving
up the cost of labor involved in transporting food from farms to consumers.
An example of this strategy was a lengthy debate, beginning in 1948, between the USDA
and the ICC over a practice known as "trip-leasing."140 This practice allowed exempt haulers,
who did not have ICC authority to transport manufactured freight, to lease their equipment to a
regulated carrier with the appropriate authority in order to obtain a "backhaul" (a load that
would bring the trucker home and defray the cost of fuel). For example, an exempt trucker
might haul Florida citrus products north to Atlanta, but upon arrival be unable to find a load of
exempt commodities that would take him home, consequently facing an expensive return trip
hauling an empty trailer ("deadheading"). By contracting with a larger carrier to haul a load of
regulated freight back to the Florida home base, the trucker essentially gained temporary ICC
authority by leasing his equipment out for the trip.141 The ICC saw such trip-leasing practices
e roding its regulatory authority, since trip-leasing allowed unregulated truckers to gain
operating authorities without directly filing with the ICC. The Teamsters sided with the ICC,
since the union recognized that trip-leasing allowed regulated trucking firms to contract with
exempt truckers ("gypsies," according to the union) as independent businessmen, thereby
avoiding the need to pay union-scale wages or provide health or pension benefits.142 Teamster
representatives testified before the ICC that trip-leasing amounted to sweated labor, forcing
drivers to drive "from 16 to 76 hours without adequate rest," operating overloaded, unsafe
trucks, with "earnings so low as to preclude proper maintenance of the equipment."143 Some
139 Mildred R. DeWolfe, For-Hire Carriers Hauling ExemptAgricultural Commodities: Nature and Extent of
Operations (Washington: USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service, 1963); Walter Miklius, Comparison ofFor-Hire
IMotor Carriers Operating under the Agricultural Exemption with Regulated Carriers (Washington: USDA,
Agricultural Marketing Service, 1966); Ralph Blumenthal, "Those Truckers Love Their Chains," NYT, Jun. 13, 1976,
sec. 3, p. 4.
1'40 Interstate Commerce Commission, "Lease and Interchange of Vehicles: Motor Carriers: Ex parte No. MC-43,"
Federal Register, Jan. 27, 1948, 369-72.
14' Interstate Commerce Commission, Ex Parte MC-43, Lease and Interchange of Vehicles, 52 M.C.C. 675, May 8,
1951, 714-15.
142 Frank Tobin to Daniel J. Tobin, Dec. 18, 1951, International Brotherhood of Teamsters Records, Wisconsin
Historical Society, Madison, WI, Series V, Box 1, Folder 14.
143 Interstate Commerce Commission, Ex Parte MC-43 (1951), 691-92.
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regulated trucking firms also testified against trip-leasing, viewing the practice as placing
downward pressure on freight rates. Most regulated firms, however, represented by the
American Trucking Associations, argued that limits to trip-leasing would infringe on the rights
of management to choose for themselves whether they would use leased or purchased
equipment. As a consequence, the ICC issued a compromise ruling in 1951, allowing trip-leasing
to continue, but requiring all trip-lease contracts to last for a minimum of 30 days.144
The USDA responded to this ruling by taking the ICC to court. Under pressure from the
Farm Bureau and the National Grange as well as trade associations of agricultural shippers, the
USDA saw the 3o-day requirement as a backhanded attack on the agricultural exemption clause
of the Motor Carrier Act. This was because trip-leasing provided one of the only reliable ways for
exempt truckers to stay in business without greatly increasing their rates for hauling agricultural
goods, since without the backhauls available under trip-leasing exempt haulers would be forced
to travel many "deadhead" miles without cost-defraying loads.'45 Along with the American
Trucking Associations and a regulated trucking firm, the Secretary of Agriculture sued the ICC,
arguing before the Supreme Court in 1952 that the commission had overstepped its regulatory
authority by "tak[ing] away the advantages Congress intended to confer by the exemption from
regulation granted carriers of agricultural products."146 The Supreme Court, however, sided with
the ICC in its decision of January 1953, finding that the commission had the authority to limit
the "evils that had grown up in [trip-leasing] practice," particularly the "evil" of informal oral
contracts for leases performed on the spot that potentially endangered the interests of both the
lessors and the lessees.'47 Undaunted, the Department of Agriculture went to Congress in the
spring of 1953, requesting legislation to prohibit the ICC from requiring trip-leases to last at
least 30 days. After hearing testimony from farm organizations who protested that the 3o-day
requirement would put the vast majority of exempt haulers out of business, Congress
144 Ibid., 677.
145 Guy Black, "Agricultural Interest in the Regulation of Truck Transportation," Journal of Farm Economics 37 (Aug
1955): 439-51.
146 U. S. Supreme Court Reports, 97 Lawyers Ed., American Trucking Associations, Eastern Motor Express and
Secretary ofAgriculture vs. ICC, 344 U.S. 298 (1953), 338.
147 Ibid., 352.
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overwhelmingly passed the bill.148 The ICC refused to cave in its efforts to tighten its grip on
"gypsy" truckers, however, and amended the trip-leasing order in 1955 to allow trip-leasing by
agricultural haulers, but only for a return trip to a point from which the original exempt haul
had started. The USDA once again appealed to Congress to pass legislation to prevent the ICC
from placing any restrictions on trip-leasing by exempt truckers; the final result in August of
1956 was the passage of Public Law 957, which clearly and firmly exempted agricultural haulers
from the 3o-day limitation.49 Nearly a decade after the ICC had first attempted to clamp down
on trip-leasing exempt haulers, the USDA had used every judicial, administrative, and legislative
weapon at its command to prevent any restrictions on the exemption.
What the ICC interpreted as the chaotic nature of unregulated trucking was viewed by
the USDA as essential for allowing not only farmers, but all industries engaged in agribusiness
to keep their transportation costs low. Agricultural economist Ralph Dewey summed up the
I)epartment's attitude toward exempt trucking in 1954: "The truly competitive, small-scale
carriers should be regulated only as to abuses that cannot be corrected through free
competition," meaning that agricultural truckers should be subject only to safety regulations,
with all other issues dictated by the operations of the free market.'50 But in the later 1950s, the
USDA pushed an even more ambitious deregulatory agenda, seeking to expand the agricultural
exemption to cover processed foods as well as raw agricultural commodities. As we shall see in
more detail in Chapter 4, the efforts of the Department led in 1956 to a Supreme Court case that
defined frozen foods as exempt agricultural commodities, with the implication that nearly all
processed foods would fall under the exemption. In 1958, the ICC, the American Trucking
Associations, the Teamsters, and the nation's railroads asked Congress to pass legislation to
prevent the agricultural exemption from being applied to all foodstuffs. As ICC Commissioner
148 John H. Davis to Charles E. Jackson, Apr. 1, 1954, RG 136, Entry 18, Box 2, Folder 3; True D. Morse to Lee J.
Quasey, Apr. 6, 1954, ibid., Box 3, Folder 5; House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Trip Leasing
(Interstate Commerce Act), Hearings, 83d. Cong., st sess., Apr. 21-24, 30, May 7, 1953; Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Amendment to Interstate Commerce Act (Trip Leasing), Part 1, Hearings, 83d.
Cong., xst sess., Jul. 8-9, 1953, esp. 7-11, 52.
149 Senate Committee on. Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Amending Interstate Commerce Act with Respect to Trip
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Howard G. Freas testified before the House Interstate Commerce Committee, the USDA's
continuing efforts to expand the agricultural exemption threatened the stability of the
transportation industry. The exemption that Congress had originally intended to allow farmers
to truck their products to market with minimal oversight was becoming, according to Freas, a
free pass for agribusinesses to ship processed foods via "gypsy" truckers who would drive
regulated carriers out of business.151 The American Trucking Associations agreed, informing
William Crow at the USDA that the Department's transportation work, which had previously
served only farmers, was now "serving processors and manufacturers."152 The USDA, however,
informed Congress that "these arguments are unfounded.... There can be no question but that
efficiencies and economies which are injected into the marketing process at any point affect
producers [i.e., farmers]."53 Although admitting that food processors were among the industries
benefiting most from the agricultural exemption, the USDA argued that an efficient marketing
machine that kept the cost of distributing food to consumers low was also in the interest of
farmers. The Farm Bureau agreed, stating more explicitly that the exemption prevented unions
from instituting "the same featherbedding and make-work practices that add costs to rail and
truck common carrier operations," practices the Farm Bureau saw driving up the price of food
for consumers while depressing farm prices.154 In this particular instance, as we shall see in
Chapter 4, the USDA and the Farm Bureau lost their case when Congress, under pressure from
certain frozen food processing firms as well as regulated truckers and railroads, opted to
consider frozen foods as "manufactured products" and therefore not exempt from ICC
regulation.
Nonetheless, the USDA's efforts to apply the agricultural exemption to for-hire truckers
as well as farmers hauling their own products were largely successful in the postwar era. As a
result, the chaos that had characterized the trucking industry in the 1920os and early 1930s
151 House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Interstate Commerce Act: Agricultural Exemptions,
Hearings, 85th Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 23-25, 1958, 14. See also Owen Clarke, "The Motor Carrier Act," Power Wagon
(Sep. 1957): 14.
152 John V. Lawrence (Managing Director, American Trucking Associations) to William C. Crow, Jan. 29, 1957, RG
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Hearings, 24.
154 Ibid., 154.
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continued to apply to the agricultural trucking industry in the post-World War II era. It is
difficult to know the exact extent of exempt hauling operations, since statistics on transportation
were primarily a byproduct of government regulatory activities that by definition did not extend
to exempt truckers, but in 1961 the ICC took a stab, estimating that 37,515 exempt trucking
companies were in operation. If this estimate was correct, there were about twice as many
exempt as regulated trucking companies at the time, although the regulated firms owned four
times as many trucks.l5s But the importance of the exemption can be measured in another sense;
namely the repeated efforts of the ICC and the American Trucking Associations in the 196os to
crack down on what they considered "gypsy" truckers. For instance, in 1965 the American
Trucking Associations initiated a public-relations campaign meant to arouse opposition to the
"gray area" of "illegal truck transportation" by truckers who passed themselves off as exempt
farm haulers in order to evade ICC regulation. According to Forney Rankin, the ATA's farm
relations specialist, approximately 25 percent of regulated freight was moving in unregulated
channels, as truckers claiming to haul, say, fresh vegetables, were in fact hauling trailers full of
steel covered with sawdust, ice, and a single crate of lettuce. Such illicit practices cost regulated
truckers a half billion dollars a year, claimed Rankin, threatening the stability of the entire
industry.'5 6
This "gray area" became particularly problematic in 1966 following a Supreme Court
decision upholding the right of agricultural cooperatives to haul not only farm products but also
general freight under the exemption. Farmer cooperatives had established trucking fleets as
early as the 1920S to provide farmer members with non-profit transportation services to haul
their perishable products to market and return with fertilizer, farm machinery, feed, and seeds.
To encourage this practice, Congress had explicitly included cooperatives in the agricultural
155 Interstate Commerce Commission, 75th Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission (Washington:
GPO, 1961), 136. The lack of data on exempt agricultural haulers was a constant thorn in the side of USDA economists
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exemption clause of the 1935 Motor Carrier Act. '57 In the early 196os, the Northwest
Agricultural Cooperative in Idaho began taking advantage of the exemption to transport
regulated freight items such as air conditioners, furnaces, and water heaters for its members as
well as farm products. The ICC ordered the cooperative to cease and desist from hauling
manufactured goods, leading to a lawsuit that ended up in the Supreme Court in 1966, in which
the Court determined that Northwest's trucking operation was primarily agricultural in
character and so should remain exempt from ICC regulation.'58 The ICC turned to Congress for
help, seeing the ruling as an inroad for agricultural cooperatives to establish themselves as full-
fledged unregulated trucking firms competing directly with the regulated carriers who provided
the "fundamental basis" of "this Nation's transportation system."59 The American Trucking
Associations likewise saw the Supreme Court's action as a great threat. James F. Pinkney, the
chief counsel for the ATA, testified before the Senate Commerce Committee that the cooperative
exemption created economic disorder and unruly competition; in short, a veritable "cancerous
growth" on the body politic requiring "rather drastic surgery."'16 Farm organizations, including
the Farmers Union and the Farm Bureau as well as representatives of farmer cooperatives,
opposed the ICC and the ATA's attempts to rein in the exemption. Secretary of Agriculture
Orville Freeman supported the farm organizations, arguing that "to the extent that the motor
carrier operations of the cooperatives are efficient, the interests of the marketing system and of
consumers are served," once again promoting the flexibility of unregulated trucking as a direct
attack on the farm problem.l61 Ultimately Congress settled on a compromise solution, allowing
agricultural cooperatives to haul any freight they wished as long as such non-farm freight did
not exceed 15 percent of the operation's annual tonnage.162 The "gray area" despised by
regulated truckers continued in full force.
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Motortruck Operations of Farmer Cooperatives (Washington: USDA, Farmer Cooperative Service, 1963); T. H.
Camp, Motortruck Operating Costs of Farmer Cooperatives (Washington: USDA, Farmer Cooperative Service,
1964).
158 NorthwestAgricultural Cooperative Association v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 350 F. 2d 252 (1965), cert.
denied 382 U.S. loll (1966).
'59 Senate Committee on Commerce, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, Agricultural Cooperative
Transportation Exemption, Hearings, 9oth Cong., 1st sess., Jul. 24-26, 1967, 15.
160 Ibid., 55, 53.
161 Ibid., 152.
,62 Statutes at Large 82 (1968): 448-9.
78
Conclusion
By the early 1970s, the agricultural exemption effectively created an entire sector of the
long-haul trucking industry that was free from regulatory oversight by the ICC. The USDA,
supported by various farm organizations, had repeatedly convinced Congress and the Supreme
Court to expand the exemption's applicability, even in the postwar era when large for-hire rigs
traveling on interstate highways had essentially replaced the small, farmer- or cooperative-
owned trucks that Congress had in mind when it created the exemption in 1935. For promoters
of anti-statist approaches to national transportation policy, the agricultural exemption offered a
model of free markets operating in the public interest. Richard N. Farmer, a professor of
business administration at the University of California-Los Angeles, for instance, argued in 1964
that the exemption reduced shipping costs, benefiting both producers and consumers of
agricultural products. Furthermore, because unregulated truckers could serve any geographical
area without first applying to the ICC for the operating authority to do so, exempt carriers were
able to adjust rapidly to geographical shifts in production and constant swings in supply and
demand inherent: to the agricultural economy. As Farmer put it, "To regulate for the sake of
regulation, or to tidy up what seems to be a confusing, chaotic free market seems unsound."'6 3
Richard Farmer's views would take hold in policymaking circles as well as among "independent"
truck drivers in the mid-1970s, when, as we shall see below, a concerted push for deregulation of
the entire trucking industry led to the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.
The USDA's anti-regulatory approach to trucking policy was not, however, primarily a
product of a free-market ideology. Instead, the Department's efforts to keep trucking "flexible"
in the years following World War II were deeply embedded in its attempts to transform the farm
problem into an industrial problem. As we shall explore in the next three chapters, the USDA's
promotion of trucking encouraged the development of a geographically decentralized but
economically centralized food marketing machine that transformed raw agricultural
163 Richard N. Farmer, "The Case for Unregulated Truck Transportation," Journal of Farm Economics 46 (May 1964):
398-409, quote on 408; Richard N. Farmer to the Editor, Forbes, Dec. 15, 1964, 6, 52.
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commodities into foods for American consumers while simultaneously insulating the
Department from attacks on its statist efforts to raise farm incomes through price supports. In
1972, for example, Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz defended his Department's continued
commitment to administering price supports despite a recent spike in consumer food prices,
stating: "The rising costs that are really responsible for rising food prices are in the 62 cents of
each food dollar that go to the middlemen-they are the truckers, marketeers, packagers, and
retailers who operate between the American farmer and the American consumer."16 4 The
statement held great irony. Since the passage of the 1946 Research and Marketing Act, and to an
even greater extent after Ezra Taft Benson's creation of the Agricultural Marketing Service in
1953, the USDA had consistently pushed the politics of food pricing into the hands of those same
"truckers, marketeers, packagers, and retailers" who were now held up as the perpetrators of
high food prices. As the following case studies of the business and politics of milk, beef, and
frozen food marketing show, this was exactly the result agricultural policymakers had intended.
164 Earl L. Butz, "The Farmer as the Good Guy," NYT, Apr. 15, 1972, 31.
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Chapter 2: From the Milk Man to the Milk Hauler
The movement of milk from farm to consumer was one of the most hotly contested
political acts of the mid-twentieth century. Truck drivers-both those who hauled milk from
farms to dairies and those who delivered milk to urban consumers' homes-became implicated
in the politics of the price of milk beginning in the 1920s. By the early 1930s, both types of
drivers would be blamed by agricultural policymakers for bringing disorder to an economic
system that had seen relative peace in the previous decade. Circumstances during World War II
temporarily quieted the New Deal's political struggles over the price of milk. Soon after the war,
however, the so-called "milk problem" once again pressed upon agricultural policymakers.
Consumers, milkmen organized in the Teamsters union, and certain dairy farmers made
insistent but competing demands for a "fair price" for milk. Ultimately, the trucks that helped to
set this "milk problem" into motion would serve to halt it in the 1950os and 196os, as the
development of new technologies for distributing and marketing milk replaced the city
milkman-once the heart of the milk distribution system-with the rural milk hauler. These
technological changes were orchestrated and encouraged by state and federal agricultural
experts who, by the mid-1970s, successfully subdued the contentious politics surrounding the
price of milk.
The New Deal and the "Milk Problem"
For much of the twentieth century, and especially during the Great Depression, few
issues caused more bitter fights in local and state politics than the price of milk. As a U.S. Circuit
Court judge explained during a particularly acrimonious legal battle in 1941, "The city-dweller or
poet who regards the cow as a symbol of bucolic serenity is indeed naive. From the udders of
that placid animal flows a bland liquid, indispensable to human health, but often provoking as
much human strife and nastiness as strong alcoholic beverages."' Urban consumers, who had
1,Jerome Frank, Opinion in Queensboro Farm Products vs. Wickard, 137 F. 2d 969, (2d Cir. 1943), 974, quoted in
Thomas B. Gilmore (Associated Milk Dealers of Chicago), Address before Mid States-East Coast Dairy Conference of
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been taught by Progressive reformers that pure milk was necessary for good health, demanded
year-round, high quality milk at reasonable prices. Milk dealers offered to meet these needs by
pasteurizing, bottling, and delivering milk for a profit. To do so, however, dealers had to pay
premium prices to farmers willing to make major investments in disease-free cattle, quality feed,
and clean barns. Furthermore, the extreme perishability of milk, especially in the days before
most consumers owned refrigerators, required daily delivery services by milkmen whose craft
unions were among the most successful in the country in gaining wage and benefit concessions.
As long as these various interests felt they were paying or being paid a fair price for quality milk,
as generally was the case during the 1920S, milk did not cause particularly bitter political
disputes.2
Unfortunately, cows have never been particularly willing to cooperate with the rhythms
of industrial society, tending to produce far more milk during the spring-when they eat the
juiciest grass and would otherwise be feeding their calves. Milk dealers trying to supply city
consumers with year-round milk consequently had to pay farmers to overproduce in the spring
in order to get enough later in the year. This might have been fine, since surplus milk can always
be turned into European society's oldest convenience foods-cheese and butter-except for the
fact that farmers who lived farther away from cities already produced milk for cheese and butter.
These more distant dairy farmers did not need the expensive equipment required to meet city
health inspectors' standards. Nonetheless they had to accept a lower price for their milk than
city milk producers, and consequently despised the spring surpluses of city farmers that drove
down cheese prices. Dairymen located close to cities likewise despised more distant farmers for
attempting to sell their surplus lower-grade milk to city dwellers at cut-rate prices. Furthermore,
some farmers located somewhere between cheese and fluid milk dairymen would attempt to get
the highest price possible for their milk by selling either to cheese factories or to city milk
dealers, depending on the season. Milk dealers, for their part, would often rely on this market
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chicago, IL, Jan. 27, 1959, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local
695 (Madison, WI) Records, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI (hereafter IBT 695 Records), Box 4, Folder
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2 Daniel R. Block, "The Development of Regional Institutions in Agriculture: The Chicago Milk Marketing Order,"
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instability to force down the price they had to pay the rest of the year to nearby farmers.3 The
cow's refusal to produce evenly throughout the year led to constant power struggles among
various categories of farmers and urban milk dealers.4
The geographical divisiveness of milk production in the early twentieth century
corresponded with the "central place theory" of Johan Heinrich von Thiinen, first expounded in
1.826 in The Isolated State.5 Von Thiinen described an imaginary city surrounded by farmland.
What farmers decided to raise at any particular location, predicted von Thiinen, would depend
on two variables: the price city consumers were willing to pay for a particular food and the cost
of transporting those foods to market. Farmers located close to a city would profit most by
producing fruits, vegetables, and fresh milk, since consumers were willing to pay a premium for
these highly perishable foods, thereby offsetting the high costs of daily transportation. Farther
away from the city, where land rents were lower, farmers could make better profits producing
grains, meat, and manufactured dairy products like cheese and butter. Although they brought
lower prices in the market, these less perishable commodities had sufficiently lower
transportation costs to make up the difference. Von Thiinen's abstract model has been criticized
by geographers and historians for its lack of applicability to real-world situations where cities
are not perfectly isolated in the center of a featureless plain. Nonetheless, von Thiinen's rings
were remarkably accurate in predicting the geographical outlines of city "milksheds" that
developed in the United States in the late 19th and early 2oth centuries. As a general rule, dairy
3 As we shall see, when trucks and refrigeration came into general use for hauling milk in the mid-9g2os and 1930s,
this already unstable marketing situation became even more unstable, because even the "outer ring" farmers could
potentially ship relatively high quality milk into distant cities.
4 The seasonality of milk production had no easy solution. In wheat marketing, as William Cronon has described,
economic stability could be achieved through futures trading that turned seasonal fluctuations into opportunities for
profit (William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 97-147).
Unlike wheat, however, fresh milk cannot be safely stored for months at a time, making futures trading impossible.
Throughout the twentieth century, various attempts were made by food technologists to make fluid milk storable; if it
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prices could have been stabilized. "Plan to Solve Milk Problem," Science News Letter, Apr. 3, 1943, 218.
Unfortunately, neither milk nor consumers were particularly willing to participate in these projects-the flavor and
texture of fluid milk have been so strongly culturally constructed that no company has so far been able to convince
consumers that condensed or frozen milk is fresh or tasty enough to pass for the real thing. R. Anderson, "Frozen
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Pergamon Press, 1966 [1826]).
83
farmers close to cities like Chicago and New York proved more willing to invest in the
equipment and quality herds necessary for fluid milk production, while farmers deeper in the
hinterlands of northern Wisconsin and upstate New York focused on less intensive butter and
cheese production.6
Events of the early 1930S turned these related issues of seasonal surpluses and
geographical tensions into a dramatic issue of political economy in the New Deal-the so-called
"milk problem." Sustained droughts ravaged pastures in the Midwest and Northeast, reducing
the average milk production per cow by nine percent between 1929 and 1933. In order to regain
their production levels, dairy farmers increased their herd sizes-primarily by choosing not to
cull old or low-yielding cows. When pastures began to improve, farmers consequently faced
unprecedented surpluses. Meanwhile, consumers hit hard by the Depression cut back their
consumption of dairy products-especially cheese and butter, which lower-income Americans
tended not to see as staple foods (especially with the availability of lower cost oleomargarine).
Slack demand and oversupply drove down the prices paid to farmers for their milk by 51 percent
between 1929 and January 1933. Cheese and butter farmers saw their incomes drop especially
rapidly, with the wholesale price for butterfat dropping by 58 percent in the same period.7 In
early 1933, with the combination of low prices and large surpluses raising the stakes of
competition in dairying, the longstanding division between inner-ring and outer-ring farmers
set the stage for desperate action.
Impoverished farmers began to violently demand higher prices for their milk in 1933 and
1934. Farmers in New York, Illinois, Michigan and elsewhere withheld their milk from market,
often dramatically dumping it on the road, in efforts to drive up the price dealers paid for their
6 Cronon, Nature's Metropolis, 46-54; Daniel Block and E. Melanie DuPuis, "Making the Country Work for the City:
Von Thiinen's Ideas in Geography, Agricultural Economics and the Sociology of Agriculture," American Journal of
Economics and Sociology 60 (Jan. 2001): 79-98; Eric E. Lampard, The Rise of the Dairy Industry in Wisconsin: A
Study in Agricultural Change, 1820-1920 (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1963); Loyal Durand, Jr.,
"The Migration of Cheese Manufacture in the United States," Annals of the Association of American Geographers 42
(Dec. 1952): 263-82; Gordon R. Lewthwaite, "Wisconsin Cheese and Farm Type: A Locational Hypothesis," Economic
Geography 40 (Apr. 1964): 95-112; George Max Beal and Henry H. Bakken, Fluid Milk Marketing (Madison: Mimir
Publishers, 1956), 35-62.
7 John D. Black, The Dairy Industry and the AAA (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1935), 60-82, 463.
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milk.8 One of the first and most spirited of these episodes occurred in Wisconsin in February
1933, when a group of several thousand farmers organized under the banner of the Wisconsin
Cooperative Milk Pool.9 The leader of the Milk Pool was Walter M. Singler, a "firebrand" who
traveled around the state whipping farmers' rallies into a frenzy with his red blazer, two-gallon
cowboy hat, goatee, spats, and tirades against the Milwaukee and Chicago "milk trusts."10 Allied
with the politics of Milo Reno and his Farm Holiday Association, Singler argued that the only
way to raise farmers' incomes was for farmers to withhold their products from market until food
processors grew desperate enough to pay them a "fair price plus profit." On February 15, 1933,
Singler told his followers that a statewide strike would be necessary to achieve this. Singler first
proposed a five-day "peaceful strike," but his lieutenant in the Milk Pool, A. H. Christman,
recommended "literally knock[ing milk dealers] over the head with a club."" Within days,
Milwaukee area farmers took up Christman's call to arms, withholding their milk from market
and "swarming over the roads of Outagamie county [north of Milwaukee], dumping truckload
after truckload of milk and roughing up [truck] drivers."12 Farmers blocked roads with heavy
timbers, threatening milk factories with dynamite and diesel fuel in their storage vats. Sheriffs
hastily deputized locals to escort milk trucks to town with shotguns and tear gas to prevent a
"milk famine" in Milwaukee.l3
The violence of the Milk Pool strike dramatized one of the key conflicts at the heart of the
"milk problem"--the division between outer-ring cheese farmers and inner-ring fluid milk
farmers (see Map 2.1). The inner-ring farmers who provided milk for cities like Milwaukee and
Chicago were already organized into two strong cooperative associations, the Milwaukee
8 L. H. Robbins, "The Issues in the Milk Strike: Clash of Dealer and Producer," New York Times (hereafter NYT), Aug.
1:3, 1933, 2; "Chicago Dairymen Strike against Price Cuts," Newsweek, Jan. 13, 1934, lo; E. Wilson, "Milk Strike," New
Republic, Sep. 13, 1933, 122-5.
9 A. William Hoglund, "Wisconsin Dairy Farmers on Strike," Agricultural History 35 (Jan. 1961): 24-34.
l':' "Farm Strike up to Singler," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 7, 1933, 6; Lewis C. French, "Singler, Unknown a Year Ago, Is
'Spark' of Farm Revolt," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 19, 1933, 3.
11 "Pool Leaders Vote State Milk Strike," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 8, 1933, 1; "Milk Strike Moves Slowly on First Day,"
Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 15, 1933, 1, 2.
:12 "First Shot Fired, Milk Spilled in Strike," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 17, 1933, 1, 3; "Strike Growing, Milk Poured on
Roads," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 18, 1933, 1, 3.
'3 "Milk Strikers Surround Milwaukee," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 20, 1933, 1, 2; "Waukesha Drops Deputies; Roads
Left to Milk Strikers," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 21, 1933, 1, 2; Dr. Pilgrim, "Health Department Activities during the
Milk Strike," 1933, Agricultural Marketing Service Records, RG 136, Milk Marketing and Planning Studies or Surveys,
Entry 27, National Archives II, College Park, MD (hereafter cited as RG 136, Entry 26), Box 14, Folder 3.
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Cooperative Milk Producers and the Pure Milk Association, which had bargained satisfactory
price minimums with city dealers and thus held no animus towards the "milk trust." The inner-
ring farmers who belonged to these two associations tended to be larger farmers who were doing
relatively well and "despised" farmers who were "[Milk] Pool-minded."1 4 One dairy farmer,
whose father helped set up an important Milwaukee dairy plant, remembered in an oral history
that members of the Milwaukee Milk Producers were "pretty well satisfied" with milk prices
while Milk Pool members tended to be "the farmers that didn't run a good operation."15 In less
subtle words, there was a recognized class division between the well-off (though rarely wealthy)
city milk farmers and the sometimes desperately poor upstate cheese milk farmers.
14 Mr. Blatz to Rodger Crabtree, "Report on Trip to South Milwaukee Farmers," Apr. 13, 1934, RG 136, Entry 27, Box
46, Folder 6. See also Around 15,000 Dairy Farmers Welcome You into Chicagoland's Biggest Dairy Cooperative,
1956, Pure Milk Association Records, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI, Box 1, Folder 1; Walter E. Winn,
History of Pure Milk Association, 1966, ibid., Box 1, Folder 1. A similar cooperative spirit between inner-ring farmers
and large milk dealers existed in Madison. M. J. Heisman (C.P.A., State of Wisconsin Department of Agriculture and
Markets) to Board of Directors, Madison Cooperative Milk Producers, Nov. 30, 1932, Associated Milk Producers
Records, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI (hereafter cited as AMPI Records), Box 1, Folder lo; H. E. Thew
to H. A. Haring, Jul. 17, 1928, ibid., Box 1, Folder 12; Madison Milk Producers Cooperative Dairy, Press release, Dec.
9, 1967, ibid., Box 2, Folder lo.
15 Percy S. Hardiman, Interview by Dale Trelevan, Aug. 3, 1976, Percy Hardiman Oral History, Wisconsin Historical
Society, Madison, WI, Tape 3, Side 1.
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Map 2.1: Wisconsin and Illinois Milksheds, 1932
The cost of shipping milk by railroad created a radial geography of milk production. Fluid milk producers
located close to metropolitan centers, while cheese and butter producers located in the "outer rings."
Sources: Wisconsin Cartographer's Guild, Wisconsin's Past and Present, 48; Ross, Marketing ofMilk,
470.
The only immediate result of the Milk Pool strike was to highlight this division. The
Milwaukee Cooperative Milk Producers, who controlled the flow of milk to the city, refused to
join the strike, calling it a "farce" and arguing that it would raise prices to consumers and lead to
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lower quality standards.l6 As they pointed out, Wisconsin already had a law on the books-the
Caldwell Act of February 1933-that established a minimum price of $1.60 per hundredweight
for fluid milk. Walter Singler's strikers were demanding $1.40 per hundredweight for lower
quality milk that would otherwise be used for cheese production.l7 The Public Health
Commissioner of Wisconsin, concerned that city milk supplies would be contaminated by the
milk of farmers whose cows had not been tested for tuberculosis, advised governor Albert
Schmedeman to side with the Milk Producers. The governor agreed, convincing Singler to call
off the strike only a week after it began.'8 Singler, after conferring with Milo Reno of the Farm
Holiday Association, decided to halt the strike until May 1933 "to give the incoming national
administration [of Franklin Roosevelt] a fair chance to pass agricultural relief measures." 9
The Milk Pool strike and the other strikes of the early 1930os had little immediate
consequence, but they set the stage for federal regulation of the nation's milksheds. This
intervention in state and local milk economies was justified by the passage of one of the first
pieces of New Deal legislation, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. Intended primarily as a
means of stabilizing the nation's severely depressed cotton, tobacco, and grain economies
through the use of production controls, the original Agricultural Adjustment Act contained only
limited provisions for regulating the marketing of dairy products. Mordecai Ezekiel was
particularly convinced that milk marketing controls did not belong in the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration (AAA) program. An economist who played a key role in constructing
the AAA, Ezekiel believed that production controls rather than marketing regulations were the
key to increasing farm incomes. Production controls would not effectively raise farmers' milk
prices, Ezekiel believed, because demand for dairy products was elastic-if milk prices were
forced up by reduced supplies, consumers would simply choose to buy less dairy products.2 0
16 Advertisement by Milwaukee Co-operative Milk Producers Association, "Milk Strike a Farce," Milwaukee Journal,
Feb. 19, 1933, 11; Hardiman interview, Tape 3, Side 1.
17 "8-Cent Milk to Be Enforced," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 6, 1933, Sec. 2, p. 1; "Deadline Near on Milk Order,"
Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 7, 1933, 3; "State to Study Singler Deals," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 21, 1933, 1, 2.
i8 "Singler Agrees to Stop Strike, Report; Milk Trucking Stops; Railroads Supply City," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 22,
1933, 1-3.
19 Lewis C. French, "Roads Clear of Pickets as Strike Ends," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 23, 1933, 1, 3.
20 Mordecai Ezekiel to John D. Black, Jan. 15, 1935, John D. Black Papers, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI,
Box 6, Folder 2. See also Richard S. Kirkendall, Social Scientists and Farm Politics in the Age of Roosevelt (Columbia:
University of Missouri Press, 1966), 63-9; Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold, "State Capacity and Economic
Intervention in the Early New Deal," Political Science Quarterly 97 (Summer 1982): 255-78. On the tension within
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Organized dairy farmers and city milk dealers in Chicago, however, saw the passage of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act as an opportunity to prevent a recurrence of the Milk Pool strike.
One day after President Roosevelt signed the Act, representatives of the Pure Milk Association
and their allies, the large milk dealers of Chicago, petitioned Secretary of Agriculture Henry A.
Wallace to establish a system of regulating milk prices in the Chicago milkshed.21 Wallace
responded by establishing a Dairy Section of the AAA, headed by Wharton economist Clyde L.
King, and calling a series of regional hearings to negotiate an agreement among the dairy
farmers and milk distributors of the Chicago milkshed.2 2
The system of milk marketing orders that emerged from these hearings had one essential
goal: to drive a wedge between outer-ring cheese dairymen and inner-ring bottled milk farmers.
Future outbreaks like the Milk Pool strike would be prevented by establishing a firm price
difference, enforced by federal government administrators, between milk used to manufacture
cheese and butter and that sold to city consumers as bottled milk. The method for achieving this,
known as the "base-surplus plan," had been devised by Clyde L. King in 1920 and widely
implemented via collectively bargained contracts between organized dairy farmers and milk
dealers starting in the late 192s. 2 3 Under the base-surplus plan as administered by the AAA,
fluid milk farmers were guaranteed a minimum price for their milk during the "base," or low
production, period of the year, and much less for their flush season, or "surplus," milk. The
system sought to stabilize milk prices by preventing the farmers in either the outer or inner
rings from dumping their seasonal surpluses on each others' markets. Milk dealers agreed to
the AAA between advocates of production control and of marketing agreements, see David E. Hamilton, From New
Day to New Deal: American Farm Policy from Hoover to Roosevelt, 1928-1933 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1991).
21 Milk Council, Inc., Chicago Milk Dealers Association, and Pure Milk Association to Henry A. Wallace, May 26, 1933,
RG 136, Dossiers of Materials on Suspended or Abandoned Marketing Agreements, Entry 25, (hereafter Entry 25),
Box 41, Folder 9; Pure Milk Association to Henry A. Wallace and George N. Peek, Jul. 5, 1933, Secretary of Agriculture
Records, RG 16, General Correspondence, Entry 17, National Archives II, College Park, MD (hereafter RG 16, Entry
1;7), Box 1811, Folder 3.
22 Hearing on Proposed Marketing Agreement, Washington, DC, Jun. 5, 1933, RG 136, Entry 25, Box 42, Folder 1;
Block, "Development of Regional Institutions," 200-61.
2:3 Block, "Development of Regional Institutions," 208; Clyde L. King, The Price of Milk (Philadelphia: John C.
Winston, 1920); Madison Milk Producers' Association Board of Directors, Members' Newsletter, Apr. 10, 1928, AMPI
Records, Box 1, Folder 1; Madison Milk Producers' Association, "Madison Milk Producers Association Re-affirms
Sunday's Advertisement and Explains 'Base and Surplus' Program of Prices," typescript, n.d. (Nov. 23, 1933), ibid.,
Box 1, Folder 5. Events during World War I led King to develop the "base-surplus plan." See James Guth, "Herbert
Hoover, The U.S. Food Administration, and the Dairy Industry, 1917-1918," Business History Review 55 (Summer
1981): 170-87.
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cooperate in the milk marketing agreements even though it meant they had to buy from farmers
at higher prices, largely because the system guaranteed them a reliable source of Grade A milk at
stabilized prices.2 4 The first federal milk marketing agreement went into effect in Chicago in
1933, and although it quickly broke down due to lack of enforcement, it was copied in cities
around the country including Boston, Indianapolis, Detroit, New York, and Philadelphia. After
legislative amendments to the AAA in 1934 and the passage of the 1937 Agricultural Marketing
Act that bolstered the enforceability of the orders, USDA administration of prices in the nation's
milksheds became a permanent policy for dealing with the "milk problem."25
The USDA's development of milk marketing orders was initiated by Chicago's fluid milk
farmers and dealers, but the agency's long-term commitment to the program owed most to the
work of John D. Black. Born in a dairy region of southern Wisconsin in 1883, Black became one
of the nation's most influential agricultural economists, receiving his Ph.D. at the University of
Wisconsin in 1918, then teaching at the University of Minnesota until 1927, when he moved to
Harvard University to teach until his death in 1960. Although he never took a permanent
government position, many of his students became members of the New Deal and later
administrations, and Black frequently served as a consultant on farm policy boards.
Furthermore, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, with its focus on production controls, was largely
a product of Black's work in refining M. L. Wilson's concept of "domestic allotments."26 Firmly
committed to the use of production controls rather than marketing agreements to stabilize farm
incomes, Black was a somewhat unlikely candidate to be tapped by Edwin G. Nourse of the
Brookings Institution in 1934 to assess the early results of the AAA's milk marketing program.
Convinced of the importance of the project, however, Black was determined to ascertain whether
the milk marketing orders should be treated as only emergency measures or as permanent
24 Milwaukee Co-operative Milk Producers, "Why Should I Sign a Marketing Agreement?" Pamphlet, n.d. (1933?),
AMPI Records, Box 1, Folder 5; "Informal Conference on the Chicago Milk Agreement," Jul. 5, 1933, RG 136, Entry
25, Box 41, Folder 9; Block, "Development of Regional Institutions," 190-98; Black, Dairy Industry and the AAA, 83-
115.
25 Chicago came under Federal Milk Marketing Order No. 41 in 1937, continuing to this day with only a brief
interruption in 1966. California milksheds never took part in the federal milk marketing orders, developing instead
their own state-level approaches. Block, "Development of Regional Institutions," 245-61; E. Melanie DuPuis, Nature's
Perfect Food: How Milk Became America's Drink (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 201-6.
26 Biographical notes, John D. Black Papers, Box 32, Folder 1; Kirkendall, Social Scientists, passim; Hamilton, From
New Day to New Deal, 182.
90
solutions to the milk problem. In The Dairy Industry and the AAA, published in 1935, Black
offered both a comprehensive history of the orders and a sustained argument for the system's
continuation into the indefinite future. Most important, Black defined the milk problem in such
a way that the marketing orders would be seen by future USDA policymakers as the only
legitimate approach to stabilizing the milk economy.
The essence of the milk problem, according to Black, was a lack of order. More
specifically, Black saw the price wars and milk strikes of the early 1930s as undesirable
"'disturbances" of von Thiinen's ideal model, where dairy farmers made rational marketing
decisions based on their distance from the city. Dairymen located far from city centers should
stick to the production of milk for manufacturing purposes-cheese, butter, and evaporated
milk-and not try to encroach on the fluid markets of inner-ring farmers, thereby driving down
the price of milk for all farmers. Black was particularly disdainful of milk tank truck drivers who,
since the mid-192os, had begun dissolving the firm boundaries between inner-ring and outer-
ring farmers that had been created by the rigid freight structures of the railroads.2 7 After a set of
Interstate Commerce Commission rulings in 1916-1917, railroads developed a uniform rate
schedule based on geographical distance from urban markets, which effectively made shipment
of fluid milk from beyond approximately 100 miles too expensive for outer-ring farmers to
compete. Railroad transportation costs were directly tied to a farmer's distance from the city,
essentially enforcing compliance with von Thiinen's rings (see Map 2.1).28
Truckers, on the other hand, did not have to comply with ICC rate regulations. Paid by
milk distributors to bring milk from farms to country collecting stations, truckers were mainly
interested in filling their tanks fully and quickly. This could often be done more easily by
traveling on a highway straight out from the city, collecting from farms along the way, rather
than by traveling circumferentially within the inner ring of a city's milkshed where roads could
be unreliable. The "evil effect" of this, according to Black, was the recruitment of outer-ring
farmers into the fluid milk market, thereby creating a persistent problem of surplus and "serious
27 Ralph P. Hotis, Transporting and Handling Milk in Tanks (Washington: USDA, 1931); Beal and Bakken, Fluid
Milk Marketing, 165-6.
28 John M. Cassels, A Study of Fluid Milk Prices (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1937), 20-40, 123-32.
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economic waste."29 Black saw an "urgent ... need for introducing order into the business of
transporting milk from the farm to the city, especially by truck."30 The "confusion" that reigned
in the dairy industry deeply worried Black, who saw in the AAA milk marketing orders-with
their firm price differentials between manufactured milk and fluid milk-a chance to create a
system of "orderly marketing" that would end the political and economic strife between the
various classes of dairy farmers.31 The milk problem was thus narrowly defined as a problem of
disorder in the countryside. Truckers and farmers who refused to obey the theories of von
Thiinen were creating unnecessary competition in the dairy industry, and a federally
administered system of price differentials was the most effective solution.
Unfortunately, John D. Black's definition of the milk problem ignored the interests of
two very important groups-organized urban milk deliverymen and city consumers. The USDA's
milk marketing orders, with their single-minded focus on dividing farmers into the abstract
rings of von Thiinen, made no effort to effectively address the wage demands of labor unions. In
the early negotiations that established the Chicago milk marketing order, this issue had been
thoroughly discussed. In particular, Jerome Frank, the general counsel for the AAA during the
drafting of the orders, advocated adherence to section 7a of the National Recovery Act to include
workers' interests in the administrative structure of the marketing order system. The
negotiations for the original Chicago marketing order led milk dealers to agree to maintain the
relatively high wages prevailing for organized deliverymen in that city.32 Frank nonetheless
feared that without a written guarantee of the right of dairy employees to bargain collectively,
dairy workers in other cities' marketing orders would suffer wage cuts from milk dealers trying
to pass on the higher costs of their raw product without raising consumer prices.33 An "urban
29 Black, Dairy Industry and the AAA, 222.
30 Ibid., 302.
31 John D. Black to James E. Russell, Mar. 2, 1934, John D. Black Papers, Box 5, Folder 3. See also DuPuis, Nature's
Perfect Food, 170-6; Block, "Development of Regional Institutions," 60-9.
32 "Informal Conference on the Chicago Milk Agreement," Jul. 5, 1933, RG 136, Entry 25, Box 41, Folder 9; Hearing on
Proposed Marketing Agreement, Washington, DC, Jun. 5, 1933, ibid., Box 42, Folder 1; Block, "Development of
Regional Institutions," 227-8; Carroll Lawrence Christenson, "Employment and Earnings in Commercial Milk
Distribution, 1929-34," Monthly Labor Review 43 (Jul. 1936): 139-49.
33 Jerome Frank to Glenn McHugh, Jul. 10, 1933, RG 136, Entry 25, Box 42, Folder 2; Hearing before the Secretary of
Agriculture with Reference to Modification of Any Provisions of the Marketing Agreement for Milk-Chicago Milk
Shed (Agreement No. 1), Docket No. 1-C, Volume 2, Chicago, IL, Nov. 3o-Dec. 1, 1933, ibid., Box 41, Folder 1; Hendrik
Shipstead to Henry A. Wallace, Jul. 16, 1933, Secretary of Agriculture Records, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 1811, Folder 3.
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liberal" who viewed the AAA as a means of achieving a European-style social welfare state rather
than as a mere tool for raising farmers' incomes, Frank would be included in the famous "purge"
of liberals from the USDA in 1935.34 Without Frank, the USDA would administer all of its future
milk marketing orders with little consideration of organized labor's interests.
Chicago consumers, meanwhile, saw the milk marketing order as an undisguised effort
by milk dealers to raise the retail price of milk. Prior to the order's institution, chain grocery
stores and "cash-and-carry" stores had begun competing directly with milk dealers by selling
milk at prices several cents per quart lower than the home-delivery prices of dealers. By not
lelivering directly to consumers' doorsteps, the chain stores and cash-and-carry outfits were
able to sell a quart of milk for nine cents in 1932-two cents less than the home-delivered price.
Chicago's milk dealers, who essentially wrote the first milk marketing order on their own terms,
sought to limit this competition by requiring all retailers to sell milk at the price of a home-
delivered quart; the dealers claimed that stores were able to sell their milk cheaply only by using
it as a "loss leader" and by "sweating their labor."35 After the advent of the milk marketing
order, retail prices of milk immediately rose from 9 cents to 11 cents per quart.36 When the
IJSDA called a hearing in Chicago in November of 1933 to assess the order's strengths and
weaknesses, consumer representatives lodged bitter complaints against the minimum retail
price. The most succinct protest came from one Miss Sylvia Schmidt, who saw price fixing as an
unfair tax on consumers willing to drive or walk to stores to get cheaper milk: "People who want
the privilege of having their milk delivered should pay for that privilege and people who are
willing to take the inconvenience of getting their milk personally should be allowed the
difference in price."37 Rose Fourier agreed, noting that "consumers are quite angry" at being
"compelled by the Government" to pay higher prices for milk from powerful dealers such as
Borden.38 Robert S. Marx, representing the Kroger Grocery chain, pointed out that his company
34 Jess Gilbert, "Eastern Urban Intellectuals and Midwestern Agrarian Intellectuals: Two Group Portraits of
Progressives in the New Deal Department of Agriculture," Agricultural History 74 (Sep 2000): 162-80.
35 Jerome N. Frank to George Peek, Mr. Brand, Chester Davis, Aug. 28, 1933, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 1811, Folder 3.
36 Chicago City Council, Subcommittee on Milk, to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Nov. 2, 1933, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 1814,
Folder 2.
37 Hearing before the Secretary of Agriculture with Reference to Modification of Any Provisions of the Marketing
Agreement for Milk-Chicago Milk Shed (Agreement No. 1), Docket No. 1-C, Volume 1, Chicago, IL, Nov. 27-29, 1933,
RG 136, Entry 25, Box 40, Folder 9, pp. 29-30.
38 Ibid., 33, 31.
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was "forced to charge the consumer for a [home] delivery service that we don't give him, that he
does not want, that he cannot afford to pay for."39
Chicago consumers' protests against the injustice of the minimum retail price convinced
the USDA to eliminate the policy from future iterations of its milk marketing orders.40
However, the USDA's primary goal in the milk marketing orders was to stabilize farmers' prices,
a goal which economists such as John D. Black felt was best achieved by cooperating with the
largest milk dealers. This meant that when milk dealers in cities throughout the country
petitioned their city or state milk control boards to set minimum retail prices for milk, the USDA
made no effort to stop the de facto reinstitution of price-fixing that forced stores to sell at
artificially high prices. In 1939, Fortune magazine surveyed 129 cities and found that half of
them had retail price-fixing laws, forcing the average chain store to sell a quart of milk at four
cents over cost, even though most chains believed one cent would be a reasonable margin.4'
Consequently, most consumers had little choice but to pay an extra three or four cents to have
their milk delivered to their doorsteps. The policy of "orderly marketing" made no room for
lower-cost distribution methods.
This failure to address the broader issues at stake in the politics of the price of milk
meant that, in the long run, the milk marketing orders were not an effective solution to the milk
problem. The late 1930s saw numerous strikes by Teamsters organizing milk delivery drivers in
Chicago, Milwaukee, Detroit, New York, and Cleveland-all asking for, and gaining, a greater
portion of the milk dollar.42 Milk dealers generally responded to drivers' wage demands by
increasing the price of milk to consumers.43 Consumers, who had been encouraged to politicize
the price of food and other staples by the New Deal's focus on the problem of "purchasing
39 Ibid., 45.
40 House Committee on Agriculture, Regulation of Milk Production, Distribution, and Pricing, Unpublished hearings
on H.R. 8988, 73d Cong., 2d sess., May 3, 1934, 126-7.
41 "Let 'em Drink Grade A," Fortune, Nov. 1939, 82-4, 131-2.
42 John S. Picago to Thomas Hughes, Apr. 3, 1938, International Brotherhood of Teamsters Records, Wisconsin
Historical Society, Madison, WI (hereafter IBT Records), Reel 16; "Milk in Chicago," Fortune, Nov. 1939, 8o-1, 124-8;
"Milk War in Detroit," BW, May 1, 1937, 28; "Milk Strike," Newsweek, Aug. 28, 1939, 38; "History and Business of
Bowman Dairy Company," n.d. (1955?), Bowman Dairy Company Records, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, IL
(hereafter Bowman Records), Series I, Subseries 1, Box 1, Folder 1, 8-9; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Milk
and Ice Cream Drivers and Dairy Employees' Union, Local No. 225, Dairy and Ice Cream Agreement, April 1, 1938-
March 31, 1939; Percy S. Hardiman, Interview by Dale Trelevan, Aug. 17, 1976, Tape 5, Side 1.
43 "Chicago Milk Pact," BW, Sep. 2, 1939, 29.
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power," consequently began to demand investigations into the "milk trust."44 Consumers'
outrage at the prices charged by national dairy chains like Borden's and National Dairy Products
culminated in 1939 with vitriolic anti-monopoly hearings before the Senate's Temporary
National Economic Committee (TNEC), chaired by Senator Joseph O'Mahoney.45 The following
exchange between O'Mahoney and Frederic C. Howe, former Consumers Counsel of the AAA,
captures the gist of the hearings, which resulted in anti-trust actions against the national dairy
distributors:46
O'Mahoney: Is it your conclusion, after all your studies, that
distributors maintain the price of milk at an excessively high figure
which is not warranted by the cost of production?
Howe: It iS.47
The USDA's effort to achieve what John D. Black saw as "orderly marketing" in the dairy
industry satisfied only a powerful minority of those affected by the price of milk-that is,
organized inner-ring farmers and city milk dealers. Consumers, Teamsters, and outer-ring
farmers shut out from the marketing orders all continued through the late 1930 to agitate for a
"fair price."48 The milk problem remained fundamentally unsolved.
4411 "FTC Raps Big Dairies," BW, Jan. 9, 1937, 34, 37; "Hit Chicago Dairies," BW, Jul. 16, 1938, 15-6; John T. Flynn,
"The Milk Monopoly," New Republic, Apr. 5, 1939, 250;"The Milk Racket," Nation, May 6, 1939, 517-8.
4 i Temporary National Economic Committee, Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power, Part 7: Milk
Industry, Poulty Industry, Hearings, 76th Cong., st sess., Mar. 9-11, May 1-3, 1939.
4t, "Milk Chiefs Deny Monopoly," BW, May 6, 1939, 16; "Milk Bill Fits Anti-Trust Pattern," BW, May 27, 1939, 25-6.
47
' Temporary National Economic Committee, Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power, Part 7, 2778.
48 "Milk Spills into Politics," BW, Sep. 12, 1936, 15-6; Alan Barth, "Only the Cows Are Contented," Nation, Jan. ,
1938, 744-5; James Ernest Boyle, "Battle of Milk," Saturday Evening Post, Nov. 13, 1937, 18-9; "'Hold Your Milk!',"
Time, Sep. 14, 1936, 73; "Dairy Crackdown," BW, Jan. 25, 1941, 28-30; Robert A. Wilkinson, "Wanted: More Milk,"
Atlantic Monthly, Jan. 1941, 64-70.
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The Milwaukee Milk Survey and the "Ideal Distribution System"
Before the milk marketing orders became entrenched federal agricultural policy in 1937,
there were alternatives proffered to create a "fair price" for milk that farmers, consumers, and
labor could all agree upon. One of the more interesting episodes came in Milwaukee in the
spring of 1934, when a coalition of Socialist city councilmen initiated the Milwaukee Milk Survey
to investigate profits in the milk industry.49 Run by sociologists, economists, and industrial
engineers, the survey was designed to decide whether the city "shall ... acquire the existing milk
distributing and pasteurization plants, thus establishing a municipal monopoly."50 Inspired by
the municipally owned milk plant built in Wellington, New Zealand in 1919, the Milwaukee
Socialists sought to simultaneously satisfy farmers, consumers, and organized milk deliverymen
by buying out the mutually despised "milk trust."51
The centerpiece of the Milk Survey's recommendations was what its engineers termed an
"ideal distribution system." According to an unpublished draft of the Survey's report, the real
cause of high milk prices was not the greed of the milk dealers but their "wastefulness and
inefficiency in all of the major phases of handling."52 At a time when 86% of Milwaukee families
had their milk delivered to their doorsteps by 25 different milk plants, the major cost incurred in
milk marketing was in distribution.53 For a medium-sized plant, the survey's economists found,
the costs of owning and maintaining trucks and paying deliverymen's wages cost 26 cents of
each consumer dollar spent on milk-the greatest single cost other than the price paid to
farmers for the raw product.54 This was far from "ideal."
49 "Socialists Find Selves in Strike Mix-Up," Milwaukee Journal, Apr. 22, 1933, 3; "Council Votes Milk Survey,"
Milwaukee Journal, Jan. 22, 1934, evening ed., 1.
50 Frank Krawczak (City Clerk), Certified Copy of Resolution 52742, Mar. 15, 1934 (adopted Jan. 22, 1934), RG 136,
Entry 26, Box 13, Common Council Folder.
51 H. Bronson Cowan, "Municipally Owned and Operated Milk Plant," American City, Jan. 1940, 47-8; M. B.
MacMillan, "Status of the Milk Survey," n.d. (Apr. 1934?), RG 136, Entry 26, Box 13, Condition of Project Folder;
Mordecai Ezekiel to E. W. Gaumnitz and Frederic Howe, Oct. 20, 1933, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 1812, Folder 1; John L.
Grunwold (Asst. Secretary to Mayor of Milwaukee) to Henry A. Wallace, Nov. 25, 1933, ibid., Box 1814, Folder 2.
Other Wisconsin cities also heard calls in the 1930S for municipal ownership to bring a "fair price" by "putting the
babies above the Bordens." Glenn P. Turner, "Milk for Madison," 1933, AMPI Records, Box 1, Folder 12.
52 Rodger Crabtree, "Draft of Report on Milwaukee Milk Market," 1936, RG 136, Entry 26, Box 8, Folder 1.
53 Milwaukee Journal Consumer Analysis of the Greater Milwaukee Market, 1934, RG 136, Entry 26, Box lo, Folder 2,
P. 44
54 "Distribution of Consumers' Dairy Dollar," n.d. (1934), RG 136, Entry 26, Box 1.
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George H. Boyer, an unemployed industrial engineer who had designed chemical and
electrical plants before the Depression, was hired by the Survey to draw up plans for reducing
the cost of delivering milk to consumers.55 Boyer considered himself an "efficiency expert"
whose role in the Survey was to "correc[t] the present uneconomical distribution of milk with its
attendant injustice to the producer and consumer."56 Boyer's concern regarding this "injustice"
was apparently not motivated by adherence to Socialist politics; he was a proud member of the
American Legion, and his employer noted that he was "so far from being a Socialist that the only
paper he reads is the Chicago Tribune."57 But Boyer, committed to efficiency after his education
as an industrial engineer at the University of Missouri, saw the Survey "not merely [as] a fact
finding body" but as a means for solving Milwaukee's milk problem once and for all.58 Boyer was
convinced that delivery costs were the root of the problem, creating an unnecessary spread
between what farmers received and what consumers paid for milk. In his proposal for an "ideal
distribution system," Boyer argued that the farmer-consumer price spread on a 10-cent quart of
milk could be reduced from 7.5 cents to 3.1 cents.5 9
How would this ideal distribution system work? Unlike the existing system, there would
be no duplication of milk delivery routes. With 25 different dairies delivering to the homes of
750,000 residents, Milwaukee's competitive milkmen often drove over the same streets.6 0 The
largest milk dealer, Gridley Dairy, served 73,000 homes and was a subsidiary of the Borden
Company, the nation's largest milk distributor. Most of Gridley's competitors were much
smaller, including the upstart Golden Guernsey Dairy Cooperative, owned by local farmers who
advertised their Guernsey milk as higher in quality than Gridley's, serving 12,000 homes. With
their own bottling plant, the farmer-members of Golden Guernsey successfully eliminated the
55 C. Val. Baxter (Director, Skilled Labor, Milwaukee Milk Survey) and Fred Buenger (Director, Skilled Labor,
Milwaukee Milk Survey) to Edwin Knappe, n.d. (Mar. 1934), RG 136, Entry 26, Box 43, Folder 5; George Boyer, Job
Application, Mar. 26, 1934, RG 136, Entry 26, Box 44, Folder 9.
56 George H. Boyer to Rodger Crabtree, May 21, 1934, RG 136, Entry 26, Box 45, Folder 7.
57 Rodger Crabtree to E. W. Gaumnitz, Nov. 26, 1934, RG 136, Entry 26, Box 43, Folder 24; George Boyer, Job
Application.
58 Boyer to Crabtree, May 21, 1934.
59 George H. Boyer (Designing Engineer), "'Ideal' Dairy Plant," unpublished report, 1934, RG 136, Entry 26, Box 11,
Folder 1; Boyer, "Ideal Delivery System," draft report, n.d. (1934), RG 136, Entry 26, Box 11, Folder 2. See also
Gustave DeWald, "Story of Operation of Ideal Milk Plant," draft report, n.d. (1934), RG 136, Entry 26, Box 11, Folder
5.
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middleman to raise their own profits.61 Other dairies included the Blochowiak Dairy, serving
3,000 homes in the densely knit Polish neighborhoods of Milwaukee, and the consumer-owned
Milk Consumers' Association, with 2,500 customers.6 2 Each of these dairies served a unique
customer base with varying loyalties-whether to low price, high quality milk, or local or ethnic
ownership. None of this mattered to George Boyer, however. Such a cacophony of competitive
milk dealers-each with its own set of milkmen, wagons, and trucks-was to him a sign of gross
inefficiency.
Boyer consequently asked a friend at General Motors to lend the Survey a few of GM's
latest truck models to perform an "objective" delivery cost analysis. V. M. Babcock happily
offered GM's new 3-man T-33b 76-horsepower refrigerated truck, operated by one driver and a
deliveryman for each side of the street. The standard trucks in use at the time-if trucks were
used at all, since wagon delivery was not uncommon in 1934-would have had one driver who
had to not only drive, but walk milk bottles to doorsteps on either side of the street.6 3 For his
ideal deliverymen, Boyer selected clerks from the Survey's front offices who were "not in the best
of physical condition," and told them to deliver the test milk bottles to each customer's doorstep,
count to ten for a margin of safety, and return the empties to the truck before the driver moved
to the next stop. Meanwhile, a "competent industrial engineer ... who was also an official timer
for the American Amateur Athletic Union" performed time-motion studies to determine the
precise amount of time required to make an average delivery. The results of the experiment,
according to Boyer, showed that even with inexperienced milkmen the average cost per delivery
stop could be reduced from 41/4 cents under the existing competitive system to 11/2 cents. The
61 Milwaukee Journal Consumer Analysis, 44; Golden Guernsey Dairy Cooperative, Co-Operator, Sep.-Oct. 1935,
Golden Guernsey Dairy Cooperative Records, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Area Research Center, Milwaukee,
WI (hereafter Golden Guernsey Records), Box 1, Folder 1; Articles of Incorporation of Golden Guernsey Dairy
Cooperative, 1930, RG 136, Entry 26, Box 45, Folder 3; "Farmers Reap Dairy's Profit," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 18,
1934, sec. 2, p. 4; Herman H. Bruhns, Architectural Appraisal Report, Golden Guernsey Dairy Cooperative, May 1,
1934, RG 136, Entry 26, Box 4; "Dairy Co-op Has Big Year," Milwaukee Journal, Feb. 19, 1933, 17; Percy S.
Hardiman, Interview by Dale Trelevan, Aug. 3, 1976, Tape 1, Side 1. Milwaukee's Golden Guernsey dealership was one
of many nationwide that advertised yellowish Golden Guernsey milk as higher in butterfat than that of other cows,
therefore worth a higher price. See Advertisement for Golden Guernsey Milk, "Only the Wealthy Could Enjoy It,"
1937, N. W. Ayer Advertising Proofsheets, Smithsonian Institution, National Museum of American History, Archives
Center, Washington, DC, Series 2, Box 247, Folder 4.
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Save the Profit!" pamphlet, n.d. (1933?), RG 136, Entry 27, Box 13, Clippings Folder.
63 V. M. Babcock (General Motors Truck Co., Zone Manager) to George Boyer, "Transportation Cost Estimate," Oct.
24, 1934, RG 136, Entry 26, Box lo; Larry Aeilts, "The Milkman's Favorite Truck," Michigan History Magazine 82:2
(1998): 8-11.
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"ideal system" would require bigger trucks and fewer milkmen, but by cutting the mileage
traveled by a third, the remaining drivers could be paid wages above union-scale, farmers' milk
checks could remain the same, and yet the consumer price of milk would drop several cents per
quart. 64
The milk problem was, in this formulation, neither a result of the natural seasonality of
milk production nor of the irreconcilable interests of farmers, consumers, workers, and
capitalists. Instead, it was a problem of distribution, and as such, deserved a technological fix.
Municipal ownership of milk distribution would allow the replacement of inefficient, redundant
marketing machinery with the latest in delivery trucks, dispatched to milk drinkers' homes
according to the precepts of scientific management. But this "ideal distribution system" never
saw the light of day, even though the Wisconsin legislature passed a bill in 1935 allowing cities to
own and operate milk distribution plants as municipal monopolies.6 5 Why not?
First, despite the technocratic elegance of Boyer's proposal, the "ideal distribution
system" was never viable in the local political scene. Initiated by Socialists-even though they
were the popular and relatively conservative "sewer Socialists" running Milwaukee's city
government-the idea of municipally operated milk plants was easily attacked by private milk
d[ealers.66 Milk quality would suffer, claimed the dairies, if leftist city bureaucrats tried to learn
the intricacies of distributing pasteurized milk.6 7 Furthermore, although the "ideal system" was
meant to benefit farmers as well as consumers, Milwaukee's inner-ring farmers despised the
idea, calling it a "move by grafters" and "unscrupulous politicians" to "control [the milk]
market."68 Referring to the city's recent troubles in meeting its employee payrolls, a group of
farmers who belonged to the Milwaukee Cooperative Milk Producers confided with a Survey
64 George Boyer to Rodger Crabtree, "Memorandum on Saving to Be Made in Milk Delivery," May 25, 1934, RG 136,
Entry 26, Box 11, Folder 5; George H. Boyer, "Ideal Delivery System," draft report, n.d. (1934), RG 136, Entry 26, Box
11., Folder 2; Gustave DeWald, "Story of Operation of Ideal Milk Plant," draft report, n.d. (1934), RG 136, Entry 27,
Box 11, Folder 5.
65 "Passes Ownership Bill: Municipilization of Milk Provided in Badger Measure," Dairy Record, Jul. 3, 1935, 5, RG
136, Entry 26, Box 10, Publications Folder.
66 On "sewer socialism," see Douglas E. Booth, "Municipal Socialism and City Government Reform: The Milwaukee
Experience," Journal of Urban History 12 (Nov. 1985): 51-74.
67 Rex G. Conklin to Rodger Crabtree, "Pertaining to Conversation with I. H. Bernstein," Mar. 22, 1934, RG 136, Entry
26, Box 13, Reports on Conferences Folder.
68 "Municipal Owned Dairy Opposed by Producers" and "'Municipal' Cows," Milwaukee Milk Producer (Feb. 1934): 1-
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representative that "[private] dairies ... have always paid cash for their purchases.... If the City
doesn't pay its own employees ... what will they do to the farmers?"6 9
The second, longer-term reason for the Milk Survey's failure was that it was taken over
by the USDA, which was already implementing its own approach to the milk problem in the
form of federal milk marketing orders. In March 1934, with its work "obviously incomplete," the
Survey was forced to find new funding when President Roosevelt cancelled the Civil Works
Administration that had been supporting the Survey.70 Applications were sent to the new
Federal Emergency Relief Administration, which agreed to fund the project under the condition
that "the emphasis of the study ... be changed" from a plan for municipal ownership to an
"objective fact-finding commission." Most important, FERA demanded that the project be
headed by a "competent economist" in the USDA. J. M. Tinley, an agricultural economist in the
AAA's dairy section, agreed to take over the survey in May 1934 because he saw its accumulated
data on milk prices, gleaned from direct inspections of dairy distributors' "books," as too
valuable to remain unpublished.71
Significantly, John D. Black-the theoretician of "orderly marketing"-became an
academic consultant to the project. Both Tinley and Black were firmly opposed to public
ownership of milk plants. Black admired the "orderliness and unification" that a municipal
monopoly could provide, but feared that such a system would put milk pricing solidly in the
political realm rather than in the marketplace, allowing consumers to dictate the price of milk
through irrational demands on city politicians rather than through rational observation of the
laws of supply and demand.72 Taking an early look at the first draft of the Survey's report, John
D. Black informed its author that the "ghost of socialism still persist[ed]" in the report and that
George Boyer's distribution system, in particular, "len[t] body to the spirit."73 This was not
69 Mr. Blatz to Rodger Crabtree, "Report on Trip to South Milwaukee Farmers," Apr. 13, 1934, RG 136, Entry 27, Box
46, Folder 6.
70 D. S. Teter, "Report on Condition of Project 809," Apr. 19, 1934, RG 136, Entry 27, Box 13, Condition of Project
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1.
71 J. M. Tinley to Rodger Crabtree, Sep. 7, 1934, RG 136, Entry 26, Box 44, Folder 16; J. M. Tinley and Rodger C.
Crabtree to Distributors, June 21, 1934, RG 136, Entry 26, Box 13, Contributions by A.A.A. Experts Folder.
72 Black, Dairy Industry and the AAA, 246-68, quote on 253.
73 John D. Black to Rodger Crabtree, quoted in Crabtree to J. M. Tinley, Aug. 8, 1934, RG 136, Entry 26, Box 44,
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meant as a compliment, as indicated by the response to the final draft of the report by 0. M.
Reed-a dairy economist in the USDA and personal friend of Black. Aghast at the political
implications of a municipally owned "ideal distribution system," Reed told the chief of the AAA's
dairy marketing section that he "would be among, if not the last, to recommend publishing the
report as it now stands."74 Reed's letter was accompanied by a heavily edited version of the
report, which, after passing under the pens of agricultural economists L. H. Bean, Frederick V.
Waugh, John D. Black, and Paul E. Quintus, relegated the "ideal distribution system" to a purely
hypothetical exercise in idealistic fancy.75 George Boyer, meanwhile, was firmly told to hand
over any copies of the original report he had in his possession and agree never to mention the
technocratic recommendations of the Survey again.76
The Milwaukee Milk Survey's version of an "ideal distribution system" was effectively
swept under the rug. Price regulations that served only to guarantee inner-ring milk farmers and
city milk dealers a higher price for their product became the USDA's primary method for
preventing disputes over the price of milk, particularly after 1937 when Congress passed the
Agricultural Marketing Act, shoring up the constitutionality of federal milk marketing orders.77
The idea of regulating milk as a public utility never completely died out in academic circles, with
University of Wisconsin economist W. P. Mortenson articulating a defense of the concept in
1940.78 Mortenson did not benefit from the influence of a John D. Black, however, and his
recommendations were treated as merely intellectual exercises.79 In any case, events of World
which he was certain could be solved through price regulation administered by objective economists in the USDA.
Black, Dairy Industry and the AAA, 246-68, esp. 255.
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War II would temporarily bolster the milk marketing system established during the 1930s,
postponing such fundamental reconsiderations of the milk problem until the postwar period.
World War II and the Continuing Milk Problem
America's entry into World War II did not fundamentally change the politics of milk
pricing. Wartime purchases of dairy products, both for military and consumer uses, brought
higher prices to all dairy farmers. Debates over consumer prices and Teamsters' wages were
forestalled by federal policies designed to maintain existing arrangements in the milk industry.
The Office of Price Administration (OPA) instituted price controls and subsidies that might have
provided consumers with a state-supported voice in directing milk pricing policies, but such
efforts were stymied by opposition from milk dealers and the USDA. As a result, the OPA
consistently raised the price paid to inner-ring farmers for fluid milk through the war, thereby
reinforcing the USDA's system of milk marketing orders. Furthermore, actions by the National
War Labor Board and the Office of Defense Transportation effectively created a truce between
Teamster milk truck drivers and city milk dealers, limiting Teamster efforts to gain power in the
milk industry. Federal price control and labor policies prevented direct attacks on the milk
marketing orders, but set the stage for consumers and Teamsters to put pressure on the USDA
to rearrange the milk marketing structure in the postwar period.
America's dairy farmers prospered during the war. Inner-ring fluid milk farmers
achieved their best sales in over a decade as urban consumers' incomes rose due to wartime
employment. Per capita consumption of milk in 1941 reached 162 quarts; a year later
consumption was up to 172 quarts, and in 1943 the average American drank 186 quarts of
milk.80 At the same time, the U.S. armed forces supplied their training camps and military bases
with generous quantities of milk. Many of these bases were located in southern states without
1941, IBT 695 Records, Box 12, Folder 8. See also Wesley McCune, "Why Milk Costs So Much," Harper's, May 1942,
604-11. After developing his ideas on treating milk as a public utility, Mortenson would devote the rest of his career to
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80 Russell and Fantin, Studies in Food Rationing, 265.
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adequate local milk supplies, forcing the Army to import milk from the Chicago milkshed to
strengthen soldiers' bones.81 This domestic demand for bottled milk was further supplemented
by extraordinary demand for cheese, butter, and evaporated milk-particularly by the British
under lend-lease agreements. In 1942, for instance, the British imported the equivalent of more
than 2 billion quarts of manufactured milk products under lend-lease.82 Rising demand for fluid
and manufactured milk meant that both inner-ring and outer-ring dairy farmers gained their
highest prices in decades, especially in the early years of the war. By the end of 1941, even before
the United States had fully mobilized for war, milk had reached 106% of parity price-indicating
that dairy farmers were making even more money than they had during the prosperous years of
1.910-1914.83
Under such conditions, dairy farmers had little reason to contest the "fair price" of milk,
and consequently might have been willing to abandon the federal milk marketing orders. For the
USDA, however, the lend-lease demand for manufactured dairy products served only to further
justify the need to maintain a strict divide between inner-ring and outer-ring dairymen. In late
1941, for instance, some Midwestern fluid milk producers began shifting some of their surplus
milk to outer-ring manufacturing outlets, attracted by the high prices being paid by cheese and
butter factories struggling to meet the sudden increases in demand. As the USDA reported to
Congress in its annual report for 1941, such threats to "orderly marketing" required constant
vigilance by milk market administrators to keep dairy farmers "in line."8 4
The marketing order system faced its greatest potential challenge in 1942, when the
federal government launched an effort to suppress inflation by regulating the entire nation's
economy through rationing and price controls. When Congress passed the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942, it not only gave the Office of Price Administration independent status and
enforcement powers, but created an opportunity for consumers' interests to be directly
81 "Milk Rations Seen," BW, Jun. 12, 1943, 57.
8: "Commodity Letter; A Special Staff Report on Price and Production Trends Affecting Industry," Wall Street
Journal, Feb. 10, 1942, 1.
8i1 "Farm Price Index 143%," NYT, Dec. 31, 1941, 32. Parity price was a concept developed during the agricultural
depression of the 1920S, which compared the prices that farmers received for their commodities with the prices they
paid for industrial goods. The main proponent of the parity formula, George N. Peek, established the 1910-1914 period
as a time when farmers received a "fair" return on their commodities in relation to their expenditures. Gilbert C. Fite,
George N. Peek and the Fightfor Farm Parity (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954).
84 United States Department of Agriculture, Report of the Secretary ofAgriculture (Washington: GPO, 1941), 117.
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represented in the politics of regulating prices.8 5 In the case of milk, the rising prices gained by
dairy farmers at the beginning of the war might have made the OPA into the primary
government agency responsible for stabilizing milk prices, rather than the USDA. During the
Depression, the need to stabilize farm prices justified a marketing order system that favored
inner-ring dairymen and city milk dealers, but during wartime, the pressing issue was
inflation-and milk marketing orders were inherently and intentionally inflationary policies. As
journalist Wesley McCune pointed out in May 1942, "milk prices are higher than they have been
in twenty-one years," a situation "aggravated by pressing war needs" but essentially the result of
milk marketing orders, which he saw as "a plain conspiracy to raise prices." s8 6 But even though
the OPA instituted price ceilings on fluid milk beginning in May 1942, the federal milk
marketing orders survived the war; consumers' interests in a "fair price" for milk continued to
take second place to the interests of the inner-ring dairy coalition. Why?
The Office of Price Administration failed to capture control of fluid milk pricing because
it was never able to institute rationing on milk. Price ceilings without concomitant rationing
cannot effectively stabilize consumer prices, since ceilings cause producers to hold back their
production, leading to shortages which in turn create incentives to sell at higher prices on the
black market.87 City milk dealers and fluid milk farmers understood this, and so actively
opposed OPA efforts to institute rationing, hoping to prevent the agency's efforts to put firm lids
on consumer milk prices.88 The milk industry's opposition to the OPA succeeded because food
rationing during World War II was administered by the War Food Administration-an agency of
the USDA, headed by Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard.8 9 Under pressure from the
inner-ring milk coalition, the War Food Administration determined early on that any OPA
actions in the milk economy "should interfere as little as possible with existing distribution
practices."9 0 The Secretary of Agriculture insisted in 1943 that milk was highly perishable, and
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therefore moved only in localized markets; this would make any efforts to coordinate nationwide
rationing at the consumer level "extremely complex."9 This was certainly true, although
whether rationing would have required more administrative machinery than marketing orders is
debatable; but for the USDA to turn to consumer-oriented pricing policies rather than farmer-
oriented policies would have required a radical break with its own institutional history while
also infuriating the Congressional farm bloc.
Without effective rationing of milk, the OPA found itself forced throughout the war to
allow price rises to inner-ring dairy farmers to stave off milk shortages. The rise in demand by
both civilians and the military put a "squeeze" on milk dealers who could not sell milk at prices
higher than the maximums established by the OPA, yet had to pay farmers high enough prices to
encourage sufficient production to meet local demand.92 For instance, between October and
December 1942, milk dealers in Milwaukee increased the price they paid to area farmers from
$2.63 per hundredweight to $3.o00. Too many local farmers had begun diverting their milk to
the Chicago market where a hundredweight of fluid milk brought $3.22, thereby offsetting the
higher cost of transportation that normally precluded them from selling on that market.
Milwaukee's dealers petitioned the OPA to allow a retail price rise, arguing that without the
price increase "the milk supply for the Milwaukee area will be seriously curtailed" if they were
forced to deliver milk to consumers at a loss.93 In this case, the OPA granted a retail price
increase that pushed the price of milk in Milwaukee up to 13 cents per quart in February 1943.
Similar increases were granted in the Chicago, New York, and Duluth-Superior markets. The
CPA originally intended these increases to be only temporary means of avoiding shortages in
specific markets, but dealers continued to argue that they were "unable to absorb the further
91 United States Department of Agriculture, Report of the Secretary ofAgriculture (Washington: GPO, 1943), 149.
9: Office of Price Administration, Press Release OPA-1415, Jan. 1, 1942, USDA History Collection, National
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Feb. 1, 1943, Office of Price Administration Records, RG 188, Entry 476, Milk Orders, 1942-46, National Archives II,
College Park, MD, Box 4107.
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cost increases" of raw milk through the spring and summer of 1943. By November, the
maximum retail price of home-delivered milk in Chicago had reached 16 1/2 cents. 94
These constant increases in price might have led the OPA to force the War Food
Administration to dampen consumer demand with rationing, but such action was forestalled
when the two agencies reached a compromise. In August 1943 the War Food Administration
established dealer quotas in cities facing milk shortages, thereby limiting the amount of fluid
milk that dealers could sell in any given month-in other words, rationing. The quotas were
pegged to dealers' sales in June 1943, however-the month of heaviest production, when cows
were masticating juicy pasture grasses-which meant that the quotas would have little actual
effect on supply or demand. Nonetheless, the quota system appeased the OPA, allowing the War
Food Administration to proceed with an alternate strategy to put a lid on rising retail prices.95
This alternate strategy involved using subsidies to encourage dairy farmers to produce more
milk. OPA administrators understood that subsidy payments would do nothing to rein in the
rising cost of milk, merely making the federal government, rather than the consumer, pay
directly for the increase. Without effective rationing to dampen consumer demand, however, the
OPA was forced to side with the War Food Administration in October 1943, helping convince
Congress to enact the subsidy program.96 With subsidies and price controls in place, the
consumer's interest in stable milk prices was thus satisfied, without the need to permanently
involve consumer representatives in the politics of milk pricing.
The wartime emergency also limited the power of Teamster milk deliverymen to shape
federal milk policies. The establishment of the National War Labor Board in January 1942
created a means for organized milkmen and other unions to gain incremental wage increases,
pegged to the rising cost of living as determined by the "Little Steel" formula beginning in July
of that year. These concessions to organized labor came in exchange for a "no-strike" pledge that
94 Raymond S. McKeough (Chicago Regional Administrator, OPA), "Opinion Accompanying Amendment No. 1 to
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the nation's trade unions had signed immediately after Pearl Harbor.97 For organized milkmen,
the wartime labor truce meant that arguments over the "fair price" of milk would be carried out
in calm hearings before a tripartite board composed of representatives for Labor, Industry, and
the Public-rather than through violent strikes in city streets. As John S. Picago, the Teamsters
organizer in the Chicago milk market, informed his compatriots at the Mid-States Dairy
Conference in 1943, "the days of shouting and yelling for wage raises are definitely over."98
Milkmen gained the support of the federal government in achieving wage increases, but those
wage increases were tied to changes in the overall economy rather than to the price of milk in
the drivers' local economies.
The Teamsters' power to participate directly in the politics of milk pricing was further
constrained by the need to conserve rubber and gasoline during the war. Urban milk delivery at
the time relied almost entirely on trucks running on gasoline and pneumatic tires, rather than
horse-drawn wagons with steel-rimmed wheels. As a consequence, the milk industry was one of
the nation's largest users of two essential wartime commodities. The Office of Defense
Transportation (ODT), established in December 1941 to coordinate and conserve the nation's
transportation resources, called on transportation expert John L. Rogers of the Interstate
Commerce Commission to work with the milk industry to reduce its rubber usage. The
International Association of Milk Dealers quickly responded with a plan that some dealers had
been considering switching to long before Pearl Harbor: every-other-day delivery. The concept
was as simple as it sounds-milkmen would deliver two days' worth of milk to customers on
alternating days, allowing milk dealers to consolidate delivery routes and conserve
transportation resources. For dealers, daily delivery was a relic of the horse-and-wagon days
when pasteurization and bottling of milk had not yet been perfected. In the 1930s,
bacteriological research had increased the shelf life of milk, allowing dealers to sell milk in larger
containers, less often, thereby using fewer delivery drivers.99 John Rogers immediately
97 Melvyn Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994),
Chapter 7.
98 Labor Research Division, Mid-States Dairy Conference, Proceedings, Feb. 26, 1943, IBT Records, Series II, Box 119,
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understood that every-other-day delivery could easily reduce milk truck mileage by the 25%
percent requested by the ODT, but at the same time he understood that such a plan would
require "cooperative action by management and labor."loo That cooperation would be hard to
come by, because the Teamsters knew that every-other-day delivery threatened to cut their
membership in half, and so had successfully prevented its use throughout the 1930s.
The ODT's demand for reduced rubber usage provided a pretext for milk dealers to
initiate every-other-day delivery with the state's blessing and a proclamation of patriotic duty
that could trump labor's objections. Furthermore, dealers could rather truthfully claim that
every-other-day delivery would have little impact on driver employment during the war, since
consumers had higher incomes and therefore greater demand not only for more milk, but for
home-delivered milk rather than store-bought.1 01 But as Daniel Tobin, president of the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, realized, the institution of every-other-day delivery
during the war would likely extend into the postwar period, thereby limiting future enrollment
of new drivers or re-enrollment of drivers who had been called to serve in the war. Tobin
dictated an immediate response to John L. Rogers upon receiving word of the milk dealers'
plans to institute every-other-day delivery, making a thinly veiled threat to break the no-strike
pledge: "It may be [that the] fifty percent of the [milk]men who are laid off, without wages, may
prevail on the other fifty percent to cease work.... It isn't humanly possible for International
officials to prevent men from striking if they feel aggrieved."'02 The situation came to a head in
April 1942, when the ODT issued General Order Number 6, calling on milk dealers to reduce
monthly mileage in deliveries by 25%, although without dictating any specific method for
achieving the reduction. Desperate to prevent dealers from pushing forward with their plans for
alternate-day deliveries, the Teamsters passed a resolution at the Mid-West Dairy Conference in
May stating their desire to cooperate with General Order Number 6, but through "joint
cooperation between management and Labor within the industry itself."0 3 In other words,
100 John L. Rogers to International Association of Milk Dealers, Mar. 16, 1942, IBT Records, Reel 84. See also "Heat
on Milkmen," BW, Jan. 24, 1942, 41.
101 Sheifer, "Technological Change and Collective Bargaining," 317.
102 Daniel J. Tobin to John L. Rogers, Mar. 18, 1942, IBT Records, Reel 84, pp. 1-2.
103 H. G. Burger to Thomas Flynn, May 14, 1942, IBT Records, Series II, Box 119, Folder 8.
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Teamster locals wanted to preserve their power within local milk markets to bargain directly
with dealers, rather than have the conditions of work dictated by state policy.
The Teamsters failed to come up with an alternative to every-other-day delivery,
however, and the ODT quickly vetted the dealers' plan to comply with General Order Number 6
by consolidating routes in May 1942.104 Teamster locals in New York and Chicago announced
their intention to strike if necessary to prevent implementation of the plan.105 The issue was
resolved in November 1942 by the National War Labor Board, which mediated a compromise
solution. The milk dealers would be allowed to begin the shift to every-other-day deliveries, but
could not use the new method to justify laying off milk drivers. Dealers were furthermore
encouraged to work with the Teamsters to try alternate methods for reducing mileage, such as
eliminating special deliveries to unscheduled stops, limiting deliveries to daylight hours, and
using horse-drawn wagons "whenever possible."'06 But when these alternative methods did not
reduce milk delivery mileage by the necessary 25%, the ODT issued an amended General Order
in May 1943, prohibiting more than four home deliveries per week.107 New York's Teamsters
immediately objected and refused to comply with the order. Once again the issue came before
the National War Labor Board; this time, the Board ruled that the Teamsters must allow the
dealers to comply with the ODT order requiring every-other-day delivery, but dealers were to
maintain full employment of deliverymen. By June 1943, the Teamsters had grudgingly accepted
the shift to every-other-day delivery.los The federal government negotiated a truce between
labor and management in the milk industry, guaranteeing full employment and limited wage
increases to the nation's milkmen, but at the ultimate cost of constraining Teamster power
within local milk economies.
Federal price control and labor relations policies during the war thus served the interests
of the inner-ring milk coalition. Fluid milk farmers and city milk dealers continued to benefit
104 "Deliveries of Milk Face Cut on June 1," NYT, May 24, 1942, 1, 39.
105 "Strike Threatened by 14,000 Milkmen on Deliveries Cut," NYT, May 29, 1942, 1, 10; Labor Research Division,
Mid-States Dairy Conference, Proceedings, Feb. 26, 1943, IBT Records, Series II, Box 119, Folder 8.
o06 "Milk Route Peace?" BW, Nov. 21, 1942, 112-3.
107 Sheifer, "Technological Change and Collective Bargaining," 326-7.
103 Ibid., 329; Associated Milk Dealers, Petition for Review of National War Labor Board Case No. 111-5029-HO, May
18, 1944, National War Labor Board Records, RG 202, Trucking Commission Records, Entry 313, Petitions for
Review, 1943-45, National Archives II, College Park, MD, Box 2490, pp. 1-2.
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from the milk marketing orders, which essentially excluded cheese dairymen, consumers, and
labor from dictating the terms on which a "fair price" would be decided for milk.
The end of the war, however, unleashed all of the old issues of the milk problem with, if
anything, even greater intensity than during the days of the milk strikes of 1933-34. Friction
between outer- and inner-ring dairy farmers threatened to erupt at the end of the war. In
particular, northern and central Wisconsin farmers deep in the outer rings of the Milwaukee and
Chicago milksheds began a concerted effort to break into those cities' fluid milk markets, where
prices were up to twice as high. The year-long survival of the OPA following the war's end put a
temporary lid on this potential re-explosion of the Milk Pool situation of 1933. In February of
1946, the Milwaukee Cooperative Milk Producers, along with Milwaukee's milk dealers,
petitioned the OPA to raise the price of milk in the Milwaukee market to match the higher price
offered in Chicago. The inner-ring milk coalition had discovered that outer-ring Wisconsin
farmers were shipping their milk to Chicago rather than to local processors, with Chicago's high
prices offsetting the higher transport costs. The coalition demanded higher farm and retail
prices in Milwaukee on three fronts. First, using data requested from agricultural extension
agent W. P. Mortenson, the Milwaukee Milk Producers claimed that increases in farm wages and
feed costs had doubled the price of producing fluid milk. Second, the Milwaukee milk dealers
claimed that their costs had risen due to wage increases granted during the war. Finally, both
groups argued that Milwaukee consumers would suffer milk shortages without the increase. The
request was granted, ending the diversion of milk from northern Wisconsin to Chicago. Perhaps
more importantly, the decision cemented a cooperative relationship among Wisconsin's
extension economists, city milk dealers, and inner-ring milk producers-a relationship that
would play a key role in postwar efforts to restructure milk marketing.l09
109 W. P. Mortenson, W. E. Black, and R. K. Froker, Wisconsin Dairy Specialist Marketing Report, 1946, Federal
Extension Service Records, RG 33, Annual Narrative and Statistical Reports, Entry ool001 A, National Archives II,
College Park, MD (hereafter referred to as RG 33, Entry lool A), 1946, Box 420, Marketing Folder, Exhibit A. See also
"More Members, More Plants, More Money for Members in 1947," Pure Milk News (Mar. 1948): 6-7. The OPA
granted price increases to dairy farmers throughout the country. Paul A. Porter to All Regional Administrators, "Milk
and Dairy Product Problems for the Year Ahead," Jun. 4, 1946, Office of Price Administration Records, RG 188,
Records Relating to the Administration of the Fluid Milk Program, Entry R87, National Archives II, College Park,
MD, Box 736, Folder 2.
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Like the federal milk marketing orders, the OPA's actions in the year after the war
continued to appease the inner-ring milk coalition. Little regard was given to the interests of
outer-ring farmers denied the higher prices of fluid markets, consumers who had to pay more
for their milk, or Teamsters who demanded wage increases to match the higher prices gained by
the city milk dealers. When the OPA was effectively dismantled in July of 1946, however, the
cracks in the milk marketing order system widened. The OPA's wartime price controls had
allowed constant raises in prices to fluid milk farmers and in dealers' maximum wholesale
prices, but had nonetheless restrained the milk coalition from reaping extraordinary profits.
After price controls were removed, however, the consumer price of milk shot up rapidly. The
Bureau of Labor Statistics announced that milk prices rose by an average of 2.5 cents nationwide
after price controls were removed, with increases up to 4 cents occurring in certain cities. o10
Consumers became ever more voluble about the rising cost of living, causing accused "milk
trusters" such as National Dairy Products to take out advertising campaigns defending
themselves as making "far less profit than the public thinks.""'
The Teamsters, meanwhile, began a strike campaign in 1945 and 1946 to bounce back
from the restraints imposed during wartime, seeking to return to daily deliveries. Daily
deliveries did not return, however, partly because many rank-and-file milkmen had found that
every-other-day delivery brought them higher commissions from customers who ordered
greater volumes of milk. Nonetheless, the new round of strikes succeeded in gaining milk drivers
hefty wage increases in renegotiated contracts, allowing milkmen to join in the general success
enjoyed by organized labor in gaining wage increases immediately after the war.l12
'o "Dairy Prices," New Republic, Sep. 16, 1946, 309.
n,' Advertisement for National Dairy Products Corp., "How Would YOU Lick the High Cost of Living?" 1948, N. W.
Ayer Advertising Proofsheets, Smithsonian Institution, National Museum of American History, Archives Center,
Washington, DC, Series 2, Box 354, Folder 1; Dairy Prices," New Republic, Sep. 16, 1946, 309; "Milk Industry Turns
Cautious," BW, Nov. 30, 1946, 46-8; "Editorial Views and News," Milk Dealer (Oct. 1944): 42-3; C. G. McBride, "Can
We Hold War Time Marketing Gains in Post War Adjustments?" Milk Dealer (Jan. 1945): 33-4, 94-5; "'No Milk
Today'," New Republic, Aug. 2, 1948, 8; Paul L. Coates and Arnold Nicholson, "I Say Milk Costs Too Much," Saturday
Evening Post, Jan. 1, 1949, 16-7, 67-8.
11: National War Labor Board Trucking Commission, In the Matter of Associated Milk Dealers, Inc., and Milk Wagon
Drivers' Union, Local 753, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Case No. 111-15769-D, Jun. 18, 1945, Bowman
Records, Series II, Subseries 4, Box 29, Folder 4; "Milk Every Day?" BW, Sep. 22, 1945, 86; "Milk Showdown," BW,
Oct. 13, 1945, 89-93; "Milk Delivery, How Often?" BW, Nov. 3, 1945, 83; "Tripped on Wages," BW, Apr. 27, 1946, 98;
"Milwaukee Drivers Demand Daily Delivery, Settle for Pay Increase" and "Dairy Farmers, Labor Get Lion Share of
Sales Dollar, Survey Reveals," Milk Dealer (Jun. 1946): 118; "Labor Aspects of the Chicago Milk Industry," Monthly
Labor Review 54 (Jun. 1942): 1283-1309. On the general growth of the labor movement after the strikes of 1946-7,
see Nelson Lichtenstein, "From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized Labor and the Eclipse of Social
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Meanwhile, outer-ring dairy farmers in Wisconsin began a decades-long effort to
organize and break the fluid milk monopoly of the Milwaukee Cooperative Milk Producers and
the Pure Milk Association on city fluid milk markets. Manufactured-milk cooperatives such as
Badger Consolidated, Lake to Lake Dairy, Wisconsin Creamery, and Wisconsin Cooperative
Creameries Association began calling on their farmer members to increase their production of
fluid milk, hoping to use sheer volume of production to force their way into city milk markets.113
Faced with all of this explicit and implicit criticism of the New Deal milk marketing
orders in the late 1940s, agricultural economists and engineers in the USDA / land-grant
university complex set themselves to solving the milk problem once and for all. Ironically, they
helped to construct, over the next twenty years, a revised version of George Boyer's "ideal
distribution system." But this time, the system was not to be haunted by the "ghost of socialism."
The Postwar "Ideal Distribution System"
The 1950s and 196os brought a two-sided technological restructuring of the milk
industry. On the consumption end, paper cartons bought in supermarkets replaced the
milkman's doorstep glass bottle, effectively making the unionized milkman and his delivery
trucks into objects of mere nostalgia. On the production end, the advent and widespread
adoption of the bulk hauling system allowed outer-ring dairy farmers to erase the political and
economic distinction between manufactured milk and fluid milk. These changes in marketing,
encouraged by agricultural economists who sought to permanently solve the milk problem,
created, by the early 1970s, a milk economy that left little opportunity for the political disputes
that had previously offended John D. Black's sense of "orderly marketing."
Democracy in the Postwar Era," in The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980, ed. Steve Fraser and Gary
Gerstle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 122-52.
113 Minutes of Regular Directors' Meeting of Consolidated Badger Cooperative, Jan. 7, 1949, Feb. 4, 1949, Nov. 4,
1949, Jan. 6, 1950, Aug. 4, 1950, Dec. 30, 1952, Sep. 2, 1953, Consolidated Badger Cooperative Records, Wisconsin
Historical Society, Madison, WI (hereafter cited as CBC Records), Reel 2; Audit Report, Wisconsin Cooperative
Creameries Association, 1957, Wisconsin Dairies Cooperative Records, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI
(hereafter WDC Records), Box 5, Folder lo; "Resolution Regarding Grade A Milk Marketing Changes," Wisconsin
Cooperative Creamery Association, Mar. 9, 1955, ibid.; Truman Torgerson, Building Markets and People
Cooperatively: The Lake to Lake Story (Manitowoc, WI: Lake to Lake Division of Land O'Lakes Inc., 1990), 2-32;
"Creamery Grows into Grade A Plant," Milk Dealer (Apr. 1955): 54-5, 61-6.
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The End of Home Delivery
The Pure-Pak paper carton, introduced by the Ex-Cell-O Corporation in 1936, took
several decades to catch on with consumers. This was partly due to a desire by milk drinkers to
see the "cream line" that indicated the fat content of the milk held within a glass bottle, and
partly due to city and state health ordinances that outlawed paper containers on sanitary
grounds.1"4 In 1940, only 5% of milk was packaged in paper, but by 1952, over 40% came in
paper, with most of the shift to paper coming after 1948.115 By 1956, the makers of Pure-Pak felt
c onfident advertising their product on national television as the most convenient package in
history."6 Paper cartons were, according to Ex-Cell-O, light and easy for children to handle,
disposable (with no need for washing, deposits, or returns), and took up little space in the
refrigerator."7 Consumer surveys tended to verify these claims: "Among those families who
prefer paper containers [over glass] there is common agreement that the superiority of this milk
container stems principally from its greater all-round convenience and time-saving features." s8
But whether or not consumers found paper more convenient than glass is probably a
moot point, because the convenience of paper for milk distributors was overwhelming. First,
even though paper packaging was more expensive than glass, it required no system of returns.
(Consumers were notorious for holding on to glass bottles to use for watering plants, holding
114 "Container Conflict," BW, Mar. 21, 1936, 16, 19; "Can Paper Come In?" BW, Mar. 18, 1939, 14; Advertisement for
Thatcher Glass, "Glass Bottles are Best," Milk Dealer (Jun. 1953): 32.
1,5 Sheldon W. Williams, et al., Organization and Competition in the Midwest Dairy Industries (Ames: Iowa State
University Press, 1970), 40.
116 "How Fast Is the Trend to Paper Containers?" Milk Dealer (May 1953): 4-5; Advertisement for Ex-Cell-O Corp.,
"New Story of Milk: Our Most Perfect Food Now More Conveniently Available than Ever Before," Milk Dealer (Apr.
11956): 4-5.
117 "Comparison of Pure-Pak to Old Cans," Pure-Pak News (Sep. 1949): 1-2, Warshaw Collection of Business
Americana, Smithsonian Institution, National Museum of American History, Archives Center, Washington, DC, Dairy
Subject File, Box 3, Folder 12; Advertisement for Pure-Pak Milk Cartons, "The New Story of Milk: A Fresh New
Container with Every Quart," Milk Dealer (Jul. 1956): 4-5. Of course, all of these claims were also made by the
manufacturers of glass bottles, particularly the square ones developed in 1944 by the Thatcher Glass Company.
Advertisement for Thatcher Milk Bottles, "Now Is the Time to Ensure Your Postwar Business," Milk Dealer (Oct.
1944): 36; Advertisement for Liberty Glass Co., "The Swing is to Liberty's Econotainer," Milk Dealer (Oct. 1944): 89.
Furthermore, claimed glass bottle makers, milk packaged in glass tasted better and allowed sight of the cream line
and an easy way to know when to buy more milk. Advertisement for Duraglas Dairy Containers, "Milk's Delicate
Flavor Is Protected in Glass," Milk Dealer (Jul. 1946): 10; Advertisement for Duraglas, "Glass Packages for Dairy
Products," Milk Dealer (Jun. 1953): 16-7; Advertisement for Liberty Glass Co., "Only Glass Bottles Tell the Inside
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11s Clyde W. Park, ed., Milk Packaging for Retail Distribution: Report of a Controlled Experiment (Cincinnati: A. H.
Pugh, 1956), 62.
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flowers, and so on).119 Furthermore, paper did not need to be washed, would not break, and,
when flat, took up one-tenth as much valuable floor space in the milk plant.l20
But even more important than any of this was the fact that paper packaging helped
expand the marketing range of large milk dealers. Prior to the mid-195os, milk dealers tended to
be located in the heart of a city or town, with most of their customers residing within a few miles
from the milk plant. One important reason for this was that glass bottles would break in transit.
Dealers were willing to accept a certain amount of breakage as the cost of doing business, but a
generally accepted rule of thumb in the early 1950S was that any trip longer than 40 miles
caused too much breakage. The cost of replacing the bottles wiped out any potential profits to be
made on the unbroken containers. 121
Paper milk cartons were shatterproof, but expensive to assemble. The large amounts of
capital required to purchase paper packaging machinery meant that the companies who
converted to paper were also the largest. In Wisconsin in May of 1952, for instance, there were
41 milk dealers with paper packaging facilities (out of 459 total dealers in the state). For the
plants who did not package in paper, the average volume of milk bottled daily was 851 quarts;
but for those who did package in paper, the average was 21,350 quarts per day.122 With such
high volumes of milk, companies were forced to seek sales outlets far outside their own city or
town limits. In May of 1952, Wisconsin paper milk dealers shipped their packaged milk as far
away as 278 miles from the plant, with most dealers extending their sales routes 50 miles
outside city limits.123 Suburban and small-town milk dealerships either had to install their own
paper packaging machinery to compete, or simply drop out of the market.124 Those milk dealers
who were most successful in making the shift to paper packaging were those who relocated their
119 Gus Rothe, "Bottle Recovery Drive," Milk Dealer (Jan. 1945): 30-1, 68.
120 A. Maurice Davis, et al., "Packaging," Milk Dealer (Jul. 1962): 39-40.
121 Hugh L. Cook, Paper Packaged Milk in Wisconsin: Its Part in Expanding Distribution Areas (Madison: University
of Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station, 1953), 24. See also Outer-Market Distribution of Milk in Paper
Containers in the North Central Region (Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Agricultural Experiment Station, 1953).
122 Cook, Paper Packaged Milk, 3, 7, 10-11.
123 Ibid., 12.
124 "Meeting Competition with Paper," Milk Dealer (Jan. 1954): 68, 9o.
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plants from the high-rent downtown districts to small towns where taxes, workers, and land
costs were all much cheaper.125
The trend to paper accelerated in the late 1950s, encouraged by economists in the
UJSDA's Agricultural Marketing Service who realized its potential for diminishing the milk
problem. Like George Boyer of the Milwaukee Milk Survey twenty years before him, John C.
Winter of the Agricultural Marketing Service recognized the political and economic importance
of distribution costs. "In recent years," wrote Winter to his supervisor in 1957, "the marketing
margin has exceeded the farm value of milk. A large share of the marketing margin consists of
packaging and related costs."12 6 As an employee of the USDA, Winter's primary duty was to
devise and implement methods for raising farmers' incomes. However, as Winter recognized,
this would be impossible to achieve without raising the cost of milk to consumers if the cost of
distribution continued upward. Winter proposed to the Dairy Advisory Committee of the
Agricultural Marketing Service, in the fall of 1956, a project to develop "cheaper containers"-
paper cartons that would require less skilled handling, less expensive manufacturing, and less
transportation expense.l2 7 Importantly, the members of this committee included representatives
from national milk distributors, inner-ring dairy farmer cooperatives, and academic
economists-no consumers, Teamsters, or outer-ring dairy farmers present. This committee,
which had been given Congressional authority to approve, disapprove, or prioritize the milk
marketing projects of the USDA, pushed Winter's "cheaper containers" project to top priority in
1957.128 In other words, the most powerful actors in the milk economy agreed that cheaper
paper containers were a politically acceptable method for redistributing milk money to farmers.
One of the main reasons the paper carton project was so appealing to this milk coalition
was its implications for reducing the strength of the Teamsters in the milk industry.l2 9 After the
125 Cook, Paper Packaged Milk, 12-17; Faye Henle, "Diversified Dairies: The Search for Greener Pastures Is Paying
Off," Barron's, Apr. 22, 1957, 11-3; Golden Guernsey Dairy Cooperative, "The Heart of Golden Guernsey Dairy
Cooperative ... Let's Get Acquainted," n.d. (196os), Golden Guernsey Records, Box 1, Folder 1, p. 4.
126 J. C. Winter to B. A. Holt, "Submission of Progress Report and Proposal," Sep. 9, 1957, RG 136, Transportation and
Facilities Research Division Subject Files, Entry 42 (hereafter Entry 42), Box 1, Folder 8.
127 "Progress Report on Research and Related Services Applicable to Dairy," Oct. 1957, RG 136, Entry 42, Box 1, Folder
8, pp. 125-6.
128 Budd A. Holt to W. C. Crow, W. H. Elliott, R. W. Hoecker, and J. C. Winter, "Priorities on Branch Proposals by
Dairy Research and Marketing Advisory Committee," Feb. 13, 1957, RG 136, Entry 42, Box 1, Folder 8.
129 Sheifer, "Technological Change and Collective Bargaining," 104-19.
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successful organizing drives of the late 1930S and 1940s, the Teamsters essentially controlled the
delivery of bottled milk in every major city in the Midwest and Northeast. Within the dairy
industry, their greatest membership strength lay in the vast numbers of milkmen who delivered
milk door-to-door. A 1952 Bureau of Labor Statistics report, for instance, found that one-third of
the dairy employees in the country were strongly organized driver-salesmen.130 Dealers had
successfully retained the every-other-day delivery system begun during World War II, but after
the war sought to further limit the Teamsters' power to dictate business practices.3 1 By the early
195os, at least one major Chicago dairy had reduced deliveries further still, employing drivers
only during weekdays.132 Paper packages, particularly if they could be bought more cheaply,
offered dealers a chance to entirely eliminate Teamster control over the terms of milk delivery.
Since the vast majority of paper deliveries were to suburban supermarkets and convenience
stores, dealers could contract with independent over-the-road truckers to deliver their milk, or
allow the supermarkets to take care of the delivery themselves with non-union drivers.'33
This shift to "dock deliveries" or "drop shipments," as they were known in the industry,
was rightly interpreted by the Teamsters as an effort by supermarkets and large milk dealers to
diminish the union's core membership.13 4 Milkmen in trim white uniforms, the familiar public
faces of the milk industry since the late nineteenth century (see Figure 2.1), were being slowly
replaced by non-organized truckers hauling trailer loads of milk cartons to the rear docks of
supermarkets for straight hourly wages.135 The Teamsters Mid States-East Coast Dairy
130 A. N. Jarrell, "Milk-Dealer Industry: Earnings in Late 1951 and Early 1952," Monthly Labor Review 75 (Oct. 1952):
422-3; "Who Are the Teamsters? From Groceries to Girders, They Haul Everything," U.S. News and World Report,
Mar. 8, 1957, 134-7. One author estimated there were 170,000 milk deliverymen in 1941. Robert A. Wilkinson,
"Wanted: More Milk," Atlantic Monthly, Jan. 1941, 64.
131 C. G. McBride, "Can We Hold War Time Marketing Gains in Post War Adjustments?" Milk Dealer (Jan. 1945): 33-
4, 94-5.
132 Officers and Directors of the Bowman Dairy Company to Members of the Bowman Team, "The Five-Day Week in
the Milk Business," Oct. 4, 1951, Bowman Records, Series II, Subseries 4, Box 30, Folder 6. Week-long home delivery
in Milwaukee lasted slightly longer, into the mid 1960s. Golden Guernsey Dairy Cooperative, Annual Report, 1957,
and Annual Report, 1969, Gavin McKerrow, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI, Box 1, Folder 6; Golden
Guernsey Dairy Cooperative, Annual Report, 1969, Gavin McKerrow Records, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison,
WI, Box 1, Folder 6.
133 Williams, et al., Organization and Competition, 33; Wisconsin Division of Economic Practices, "Retail Store
Handling," Milk Dealer (Oct. 1963): 14.
134 Central Conference of Teamsters, Minutes of Dairy Division Meeting, Sep. 23, 1958, Chicago, IL, IBT 695 Records,
Box 4, Folder lo; "Editorial Views of the News: A 'John Lewis Philosophy'," Milk Dealer (Apr. 1955): 42-3.
135 Central Conference of Teamsters, Minutes of Dairy Division Meeting, Nov. 5, 1959, Detroit, MI, IBT 695 Records,
Box 4, Folder lo; Edward Thom, "What about Dock Delivery?" Milk Dealer (Apr. 1959): 46-7, 54-8; "Milkmen Reduce
Home Milk Price to Bolster Retail Deliveries," Milk Dealer (Sep. 1954): 98; "Trend toward Wholesale," Milk Dealer
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Conference, recognizing the implications of the trend in 1959, called upon Teamster President
Jimmy Hoffa to put the combined strength of the region's organized dairy, warehouse, and
chain store workers to the task of ending the "drop-load delivery system."136 There was little
hope for effective union resistance, however. All too often, the best the union could do was
bargain for a limit to the rate of expansion of the dock delivery system.1 37 Milk dealers in the
1 950s saw their profits being steadily squeezed by supermarket demands for large volumes of
milk at low prices, making home delivery routes seem increasingly expensive to maintain.138 To
rid themselves of the trouble, large milk dealers began offering their home delivery drivers
unbeatable deals on used trucks and exclusive rights to delivery routes, thereby turning
milkmen into independent salesmen-contractors rather than organized employees.139 Jimmy
Hoffa decried this maneuver as an effort to create a "phony faCade of small business enterprise"
among milk deliverymen, but milkmen often saw the chance to establish their own milk route at
low cost as irresistible.14o The only other option-to go on strike-risked alienating home
delivery customers. New York City Teamsters discovered this during a two-week strike in late
1961. Although the drivers won their wage concessions, ten percent of home delivery routes in
the city were permanently cancelled when angry customers decided it would be easier to deliver
the milk themselves from the store to the refrigerator.141
136 Frank J. Gillespie to James R. Hoffa, "Committee on Wholesale Fluid Milk Chain Store Warehouse Delivery," Feb.
20, 1959, IBT 695 Records, Box 12, Folder 8.
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Figure 2.1: Borden Milk Company Deliverymen
Milkmen, such as these drivers photographed in Milwaukee in 1948, were salesmen as well
teamsters; clean white uniforms were part of the job of being the public face of the milk industry as
well as a driver of a delivery vehicle. Wisconsin Historical Society, WHi 31172.
Paper cartons hastened the decline of home delivery not only by circumventing the
Teamsters but also by solidifying the role of supermarkets in selling milk. In Wisconsin in 1952,
only "a very few dealers" sold milk primarily to supermarkets or stores; well over half of the
volume of milk deliveries was still directly to homes.142 However, as the cost of installing paper
packaging equipment forced milk dealers to increase their sales volume and expand their
marketing range, supermarkets became increasingly attractive customers. By 1954, the
Milwaukee Journal's annual consumer survey reported that for the first time, more than half of
Milwaukee consumers bought their milk at grocery stores.143 This was largely due to the fact that
the store price of milk was rapidly dropping below that of home delivered milk.
142 Cook, Paper Packaged Milk, 6; "Survey Reveals Information on Store Distribution," Milk Dealer (Jul. 1946): 66.
143 "Skimmed from the News," Milk Dealer (May 1954): 30.
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The reasons for this comparative drop in store milk's price were multiple, but were
mostly rooted in an effort by supermarket managers to increase store traffic.l44 Finding that
customers made regular trips to the supermarket to stock up on low-cost staples like milk and
bread, store managers used cheap milk to lure customers into buying more expensive items
while in the store. Small milk dealers resisted supermarkets using milk as a "loss leader," and
were particularly unhappy about having to give supermarkets secret rebates in order to assure
shelf space and prominent display of their products.'45 Nonetheless, there was little that the
small milk dealers could do to stop this trend, particularly once they had invested in paper
packaging machinery.'46 As supermarkets strengthened their position in food marketing in the
1950s, keeping milk dealers in line could be accomplished by threatening to take over milk
distribution entirely, as Kroger, A & P, and Safeway all did at various times.l4 7
Those milk dealers who wanted to stay in business in the 1950s were forced to accept the
lower profit margins of store delivery. Surviving required further increases in sales volume, and
as a consequence, only the largest dairies were able to "ride the tiger" of the new milk
distribution system.'48 Bowman Dairy Company, for example, as one of the largest milk dealers
serving the Chicago area, decided in 1956 to increase its rebates to large chain stores such as A &
P' to 16%, keeping its discount for independent grocers at 11.5%. In 1960 Bowman outlined a
plan for a long-term commitment to providing chain stores with an increased volume of milk,
'44 Also contributing were the repeal by states of minimum price-fixing laws in the 1950s; see, e.g.: "Milk Hike
Rumpus," BW, Jan. 13, 1951, 52-4; "Milk Pricing: Housewives Pay for Outmoded Controls," Time, Dec. 13, 1954, 88;
"Milk Marketing," Consumer Reports, Aug. 1955, 381-3.
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that Rocks the Cradle," Milk Dealer (Dec. 1958): 41; A Wisconsin Milk Dealer to the Editor, "Unfair Competition,"
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"mechanical milkmen" neither asked for pay raises nor caused significant competition to supermarkets (since they
were primarily patronized by suburban commuters during evening hours when stores were closed). "Selling the
Suburbanite," Milk Dealer (Oct. 1954): 108, 115; "Outdoor Milk Vending on a Supermarket Parking Lot," Milk Dealer
(Nov. 1955): 82-3; Morris Auerbach, "Mechanical Milkmen," Milk Dealer (Oct. 1954): 104-6; Advertisement for Rowe
Outdoor Milk Merchandiser, "Dairies Everywhere Are Buying This 24 Hour Mechanical Milkman," Milk Dealer (Oct.
1954): 13; "Highest Vending Sales Ever," Milk Dealer (Oct. 1954): 62-3, 161-6.
14'7 Central Conference of Teamsters, Minutes of Dairy Division Meeting, Sep. 23, 1958, Chicago, IL, IBT 695 Records,
Box 4, Folder 10; Fred De Armond, "Will Route Selling Become Outmoded?" Milk Dealer (Apr. 1962): 44, 76-80;
Franklin C. Strong, "Wholesale Business-Where Is It Going?" Milk Dealer (Mar. 1964): 48-9, 56-8; D. I. Padberg,
"(Changes in Competition," Milk Dealer (May 1964): 41, 73-4.
143 Don Merlin, "The Milk Industry Rides a Tiger," Milk Dealer (Dec. 1960): 24-5, 69; Hugh L. Cook, Harlow W.
Halvorson, and R. Wayne Robinson, Costs and Efficiency of Wholesale Milk Distribution in Milwaukee (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station, 1956).
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with dock delivery costs to be split between the dealer and the chains.149 Small milk distributors
had little power to resist this collusion between supermarkets and large dealers. Between 1950
and 1962, the number of milk dealers serving city markets declined by half in the United States
and by over 6o% in the North Central region. Most dealers going out of business were small
firms.150
By the early 196os, then, a new form of "orderly marketing" had taken firm shape on the
distribution end of the milk industry. With the low retail prices offered by supermarkets,
consumer resistance to the price of milk essentially disappeared.151 The Teamsters, who had
briefly posed the most serious threat to the stability of milk marketing achieved by the USDA in
the late 1930s, were increasingly becoming non-players in the milk pricing game. The
desperation of the Teamsters' position was illustrated in October 1960, when 40 Indianapolis
milkmen invaded a supermarket, commandeering shopping carts and jamming aisles to protest
the store's policy of underselling home-delivered milk by 28 cents per gallon.152 For an
organization that had achieved its strength in the dairy industry through hard-headed
organizational drives, the episode was a sad commentary on the Teamsters' growing inability to
gain sympathy from consumers, management, or government arbitrators.153
The only major fault line left in the decades-old milk problem was that between outer-
ring and inner-ring dairy farmers. The widespread adoption of the bulk tank, vigorously
encouraged by agricultural extension agents and economists, would help to eliminate this final
point of contention.
149 "Bowman Chain Store Marketing Organization," Feb. 1, 1960, Bowman Records, Series II, Subseries 4, Box 30,
Folder 6. See also "Borden Wholesale," notes for contract negotiation meeting, n.d. (Apr. 1962?), IBT 695 Records,
Box 70, Folder 8; Borden Company, Wisconsin Milk and Ice Cream Division, "Memo on Institutional Rebate System,"
Oct. 1, 1958, ibid., Box 70, Folder 8.
150 "News Report: The Number of Dealers Serving City Milk Markets," Milk Dealer (Apr. 1965): 24; Williams, et al.,
Organization and Competition, 92.
151 "Milk Marketing," Consumer Reports, Aug. 1955, 381-3.
152 "Indianapolis Milkmen 'Mass-Shopped'," Milk Dealer (Oct. 1960): lo.
153 Thaddeus Russell, Out of the Jungle: Jimmy Hoffa and the Remaking of the American Working Class (New York:
Knopf, 2001).
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The Bulk Tank System
Well into the 1950s, most farmers in the Midwest and Northeast stored their raw milk in
.o-gallon cans before a milk hauler arrived to transfer it to a tank truck. Since the late 19th
century, cans had effectively and inexpensively kept milk free from dirt and other foreign
matter. However, full milk cans weighed about 115 pounds, requiring time-consuming, back-
breaking labor to be transferred to a truck for hauling to the dairy plant (see Figure 2.2).154 As
a consequence, milk truck drivers were limited in the number of farms they could visit on any
given day, and were also limited in the distance they could travel to pick up milk. Furthermore,
because the glass-lined milk cans provided only minimal thermal insulation, they required daily
pick-ups, further increasing the cost of transportation.155 The cost of transporting milk to the
plant, as John D. Black had correctly pointed out in 1935, created a spread between the prices
that dairy plants paid to inner-ring and outer-ring dairy farmers. Bulk tanks offered a means of
breaking down this barrier.156
Bulk tanks, first used on California dairy farms in the late 1930s, were not a particularly
complex technology. Via the milking machine pumps attached to cows' udders, they simply
gathered raw milk and brought it down to a bacteria-discouraging temperature of 400 F. The
term "bulk" was apt, since the stainless steel tanks could hold anywhere from several hundred to
several thousand gallons-generally the equivalent of two or more days' worth of milkings.l57
Tlhe great advantage of the system was its simplification of the farm-to-plant transportation
process. A milk hauler need only attach a suction hose between the truck tank and the farm
tank, making for quick and easy milk transfers. Bulk tanks allowed bigger trucks operated by
fewer drivers to visit more farms spread out over longer distances (see Figure 2.3).
154 Charles E. Miller, "Hauling Memories Recalled," Modern Milk Hauler (Jul. 1968): 14-5; Douglas Harper,
Changing Works: Visions of a LostAgriculture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 236-7.
155 E. J. Finneran, "From Cow to Kitchen," Nation's Business, Jun. 1937, 24-6, 169-72; John Schultz, Milk Hauling
Contract, Feb. 25, 1931, AMPI Records, Box 1, Folder 5.
156 Donald B. Agnew, How Bulk Assembly Changes Milk Marketing Costs (Washington: USDA, Agricultural
Marketing Service, 1957).
157 Minutes, Board of Directors Meeting, Consolidated Badger Cooperative, May 2, 1958, CBC Records, Reel 2; F. J.
Keilholz, "Put Down that Milk Can!," Country Gentleman, Dec. 1954, 36-7, 58.
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Figure 2.2: Milk hauler unloading cans at receiving
station
A farmer in the early 1930s drove his own truck filled with milk
cans to a local dairy plant's receiving station. This backbreaking
task was a daily feature of dairying at the time. Wisconsin
Historical Society, WHi 31171.
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Figure 2.3: Bulk milk truck
Bulk milk trucks, such as this one parked in a farm yard near Madison, Wisconsin in the late 1950s,
replaced milk cans and fundamentally altered the geography of dairying. Wisconsin Historical
Society, MJS-31170.
The system was consequently touted by both dairy plant managers and agricultural
economists as a way to reduce transport costs.158 Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, an
economist trained at Iowa State, hailed the system in 1953 as a "direct pipe line" from the cow to
the dairy that would markedly "reduce the cost of marketing dairy products."159 Economists,
dairy plant managers, and farm journalists envisioned the system increasing the volume of milk
158 Donald E. Hirsch, "Ways of Lowering Milk Distribution Costs," Milk Dealer (Jul. 1953): 65-72; Joseph M. Cowden,
Farm-to-Plant Milk Hauling Practices of Dairy Cooperatives (Washington: Farm Credit Administration, USDA,
1952); Joseph M. Cowden, Comparing Bulk and Can Milk Hauling Costs (Washington: USDA, Farmer Cooperative
Service, 1956).
159 Kenneth Sanders, "What's the Outlook for the Bulk Tank Pick-Up System?" Milk Dealer (Aug. 1953): 38;
"Challenge for Dairymen," Time, Mar. 30, 1953, 15. On Ezra Taft Benson, see Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick
H. Schapsmeier, Ezra Taft Benson and the Politics ofAgriculture: The Eisenhower Years, 1953-1961 (Danville, IL:
Interstate Printers and Publishers, 1975).
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produced, thereby increasing farm incomes without a corresponding rise in consumer price.16 °
For milk plants needing large volumes of cheap but sanitary milk to satisfy their supermarket
contracts, the bulk tank system eventually became a necessity. Major milk processors, such as
Consolidated Badger in Wisconsin (bottlers of "Morning Glory" milk products), began to require
farmers to install bulk tanks on their farms in the mid-195os.16 1
At first, many farmers were unconvinced that installing a bulk tank would help them
earn more money without raising the price of milk to consumers. For one thing, bulk tanks were
expensive. In 1956, a 200 gallon tank that would hold only one day's worth of milkings during
the flush season cost from $18oo to $2500.162 Not only were the stainless steel tanks expensive
in themselves, but their operation required extensive remodeling and rewiring of barns.
Especially in the outer rings of milksheds, farmers had never needed to make major investments
in cooling equipment, usually placing their cans in spring water to keep milk cool until the milk
hauler arrived. Thus, their barns usually lacked the separate milkhouse needed to house the
giant electric cooling tanks.16 3 Even more importantly, justifying the expense of the bulk tank
system required investment in larger cattle herds to boost production enough to fill the tank
regularly.6 4 This was a major cost, since dairy cattle of the 1950s were more expensive than ever
before, having recently been subjected to scientific breeding programs that dramatically
increased yields.16 5 Consequently, as late as 1956, only 45% of Milwaukee area milk producers
had converted, and only 40% of Chicago producers had done so. 166 Those who did make the
switch were the bigger farmers who could more easily secure loans from a bank.
160 "Progress Report on Research and Related Services Applicable to Dairy," Oct. 1957, RG 136, Entry 42, Box 1,
Folder 8, pp. 120-1; D. Hanson, "Less Work, More Profits with Milk Tanks," Successful Farming, Aug. 1952, 46-7, 76,
78, 80-1; C. W. Gifford, "Bulk Milk Tanks, Dairymen Like 'Em," Farm Journal, Jun. 1953, 36-7, 127.
161 Advertisement for Mojonnier Bulk Milk System, "All about Bulk Milk," Milk Dealer (Jun. 1953): 35; Ronald J.
Carson, "Farm Bulk Cooling Tanks for the Small Producer," Milk Dealer (Apr. 1959): 44, 78-80; Minutes, Board of
Directors Meeting, Consolidated Badger Cooperative, Dec. 14, 1956, CBC Records, Reel 2; Madison Milk Producers'
Association Board of Directors, Newsletter, May-Jun., 1955, AMPI Records, Box 1, Folder 3; Minutes, Board of
Directors Meeting, Wisconsin Cooperative Creamery Association, Nov. 3, 1955, WDC Records, Box 5, Folder 2;
Minutes, Board of Directors Meeting, Wisconsin Creamery Company Cooperative, Sep. 4, 1957, WDC Records, Box 4,
Folder 5.
162 Dennis H. Murphy, "Around Chicago, Milk's Going Bulk," Milk Dealer (Aug. 1956): 44-5, 57-8; Jacque V. Hopkins,
"Too Much Milk," Nation, Sep. 8, 1956, 198-200.
163 "Selling Producers on the Farm Bulk Tank System," Milk Dealer (Jan. 1954): 58-61, 86.
164 "Will a Bulk Tank Pay?" Farm Journal, Oct. 1955, 60-2.
165 Harper, Changing Works, 216-9.
166 "Bulk Tank Milk Now 45% of Milwaukee Market," Milk Dealer (Jun. 1956): 148.
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But the dream of a "direct pipeline" would only come true if every farmer shipping to a
dairy installed the system. Otherwise dairies would have to send out both bulk and can hauling
trucks, making a partial conversion even more expensive than maintaining the old can system
alone.'6 7 To encourage complete conversion, dairy cooperatives such as Consolidated Badger
turned to extension agents at the University of Wisconsin to help them convince farmers of the
need to increase milk volumes.168 The most effective method, extension agents argued, was to
offer low- or no-interest loans and a premium payment to farmers who made the conversion.l69
Dairy farmers who wanted to continue shipping their milk to a dairy were offered an irresistibly
higher price for their product, if only they would put themselves in debt to dramatically boost
their herd size and install expensive marketing machinery on their own farms. By 1958, over
11,ooo Wisconsin farmers had installed tanks, up from only 30 farmers in 1952 and up from
3,500 in 1956.170
This ramp-up in the volume and expense of milk production led to a dramatic shift in the
geography of Midwestern dairy farming. In the first half of the twentieth century, thousands of
outer-ring dairy cooperatives populated the Wisconsin countryside, with small plants processing
farmer-members' raw milk and cream into cheese, butter, and evaporated milk. Fundamentally
different from large inner-ring fluid milk cooperatives such as the Milwaukee Cooperative Milk
Producers and the Pure Milk Association, these cooperatives were rural, local institutions, often
having no more than a few dozen members. Mottoes such as "Co-Operatives are the Small Man's
Means of Doing Big Things" indicated the rooting of these enterprises in the agrarian
167 Minutes, Special Board of Directors Meeting, Wisconsin Cooperative Creamery Association, Jul. 22, 1954, WDC
Records, Box 5, Folder 1.
168 Karl Shoemaker, Wisconsin Dairy Marketing Specialist Annual Report, 1953, Federal Extension Service Records,
RG 33, Entry ool001 A, Box 454, Marketing Folder; Karl Shoemaker, Wisconsin Dairy Marketing Specialist Annual
Report, 1955, ibid., Box 429, Marketing Folder; Hugh Moore, Wisconsin Dairy Marketing Specialist Annual Report,
1957, ibid., 1957, Box 427, Marketing Folder; Minutes, Board of Directors Meeting, Consolidated Badger Cooperative,
Sep. 7, 1954, CBC Records, Reel 2.
169 Minutes, Board of Directors Meeting, Consolidated Badger Cooperative, Apr. 2, 1954, CBC Records, Reel 2;
Minutes, Board of Directors Meeting, Wisconsin Creamery Company Cooperative, Oct. 2, 1957, WDC Records, Box 4,
Folder 5; Minutes, Special Board of Directors Meeting, Wisconsin Creamery Company Cooperative, Jan. 7, 1959,
WDC Records, Box 4, Folder 5; Minutes, Board of Directors Meeting, Pure Milk Association District 2, Nov. 26, 1956,
PMA Records, Box 1, Folder 2.
170 "Farm Bulk Tanks Featured at Wisconsin State Fair," Milk Dealer (Aug. 1956): 112; "Farm Bulk Milk Tank Cooling
Expanding Fast, Survey Shows," Milk Dealer (May 1956): 164-5; "Farm Tank Installations up 30% over 1958," Milk
Dealer (Aug. 1959): 44. The conversion to bulk tanks would not become universal until the late 1960s. See "Bulk
Handling: Unfinished Revolution," Milk Dealer (May 1962): 38-9; Chris Anastos, "A Second Look at Bulk Handling,"
Milk Dealer (Mar. 1964): 30, 65.
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cooperative movement of the early twentieth century.171 For example, the Hillpoint Cooperative
Creamery Association was established in 1904 in the village of Hillpoint, Wisconsin,
approximately 150 miles west-northwest of Milwaukee. Begun by seven farmers looking for a
market for their milk, the Hillpoint Cooperative served only twenty-five farmers in its first
decade of operation, processing their cream into butter and skim milk into powder. The
members made only conservative capital investments in the plant, with the democratic setup of
the cooperative's decision-making structure encouraging each member to keep his share of the
profits for himself. As the cooperative grew through the 1940s, it expanded its operations
slightly, buying an evaporated milk plant from the Nestle Company in the larger town of
Reedsburg in 1946. Even with this expansion, the cooperative shared in only a minute fraction of
the market for manufactured dairy products, competing with thousands of similar cooperatives
in the state.172
With the arrival of the bulk tank system in the 1950s, agricultural extension economists
began to view small cooperatives like Hillpoint as unnecessary contributors to the continuing
milk problem. Extension agents such as Truman F. Graf, a marketing economist at the
University of Wisconsin, began to advocate a wholesale "dairy reorganization" to help outer-ring
farmers "[do] a better job of marketing their milk and aid them in obtaining a higher price for
their products."'7 3 The aim of this "dairy reorganization" plan was the consolidation of small
outer-ring cooperatives into much larger cooperatives, with all farmers upgrading their herds
and barns to meet public health standards, allowing them to produce milk for both
manufacturing and fluid use.174 Small farmers who had been producing only Grade B milk now
171 Hillpoint Co-Operative Dairies, Financial and Operating Statement, 1959, WDC Records, Box 3, Folder 3. On the
rural cooperative movement of the early 20th century, see Hal S. Barron, Mixed Harvest: The Second Great
Transformation in the Rural North, 1870-1930 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 107-52.
172 "History of Hillpoint Co-Operative Dairies," in Hillpoint Co-Operative Dairies, Financial and Operating Statement,
1953, WDC Records, Box 3, Folder 3.
173 Truman Graf, Wisconsin Dairy Marketing Specialist Annual Report, 1956, RG 33, Entry 1oo1 A, 1956, Box 423,
Marketing Folder, pp. 2-3. See also Hugh L. Cook, "Reorganization of Cooperatives and Facilities in the Chicago Milk
Shed," in Proceedings of Proposalsfor Reorganization of Dairy Cooperatives, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI,
Feb. 11, 1967, AMPI Records, Box 2, Folder 9.
174 Truman Graf, "Bulk Tanks Bring Long Term Benefits," Wisconsin Agriculturist and Farmer (Mar. 7, 1959); Karl
Shoemaker, Wisconsin Dairy Marketing Specialist Annual Report, 1954, RG 33, Entry 1oo1 A, 1954, Box 539,
Marketing Folder.
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had to join with inner-ring farmers in producing Grade A milk, or give up farming entirely.l75 To
implement this consolidation, Graf and his extension colleagues offered legal services and
marketing studies to the three most powerful outer-ring cooperatives in the state-Lake to Lake,
Badger Consolidated, and Wisconsin Dairies.176
These large cooperatives began aggressively absorbing their smaller competitors in the
1950s and 1960s. Most commonly, cooperatives like Wisconsin Dairies would lure away a
smaller organization's best producers by offering a higher price for their milk. Directors of small
cooperatives like Hillpoint, seeing their most productive members flocking to the larger
organizations, faced a "choice" between losing the majority of their milk supply or merging with
the larger coop.17 7 Hillpoint held onto its independence slightly longer than many small coops,
lasting into the mid-196os by shutting down its low-volume plants and expanding its sales of
fluid milk in Chicago, Milwaukee, and Madison.178 By the mid-196os, however, Wisconsin
Dairies had swallowed 21 smaller cooperatives, giving it almost complete control over central
Wisconsin milk supplies. Hillpoint's directors felt forced to throw in the towel in April of 1967
and convinced their stockholders to vote for merger with Wisconsin Dairies.l79 Some small
cooperatives proved more uncooperative in the consolidation scheme, particularly when farmer-
members realized that a merger would lead to the closing of the "little farmer factory in [their]
175 Truman F. Graf, "Implications of Milk Supply Situation in the Chicago Milk Shed on Organization of Dairy
Cooperatives," in Proceedings of Proposalsfor Reorganization of Dairy Cooperatives, University of Wisconsin,
Madison, WI, Feb. 11, 1967, AMPI Records, Box 2, Folder 9; Minutes, Membership Meeting, Wisconsin Cooperative
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WDC Records, Box 3, Folder 5.
178 Minutes, Special Stockholders Meeting, Hillpoint Cooperative Dairies, Oct. 18, 1950, WDC Records, Box 2, Folder
2; Minutes, Board of Directors Meeting, Hillpoint Cooperative Dairies, May 8, 1958, WDC Records, Box 2, Folder 8;
"Southwest Wisconsin Marketing Agreement," 1966, AMPI Records, Box 2, Folder 9.
179 "History behind W. D. C," Wisconsin Dairies Co-op News, May 1963, p. 3, WDC Records, Box 1, Folder 1; Minutes,
Board of Directors Meeting, Hillpoint Cooperative Dairies, Apr. 15, 1967, WDC Records, Box 3, Folder 1. In fact,
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127
neighborhood."' 8 In these situations, cooperatives such as Lake to Lake and Badger
Consolidated pursued the more aggressive strategy of hostile takeover through stock
purchase. 18l By 1967, this merger wave led to a decrease in the number of outer-ring dairy
cooperatives in the Midwest by more than one-third since the end of World War II, even as their
sales more than doubled.l82
Economists like Truman Graf phrased this consolidation process in terms of
"efficiencies," a word which subtly masked the new power relationships at hand. The old class
division between outer ring farmers and inner ring farmers began to dissolve as all Wisconsin
farmers-at least those able to stay in the business-began producing Grade A milk. The giant
cooperatives could then sell the milk on either fluid or manufactured milk markets, whichever
gained the highest price.'8 3 Furthermore, because bulk milk tanks and bulk milk tank trucks
made it possible to cheaply collect and ship milk long distances, outer-ring cooperatives could
successfully send their milk to high-priced city markets like Chicago, or even further if the price
warranted. In 1965, Wisconsin dairies shipped 119 million pounds of fluid milk out of state; just
one year before, out-of-state shipments totaled only 70 million.l8 4 Much of this milk headed to
Chicago, but some truckers hauled bulk loads as far as Indianapolis, Oklahoma, and even Texas
when shortages developed in those areas.'8 5
The USDA's federal milk marketing orders, predicated on the distribution of milk within
100- to 15o-mile zones, were consequently becoming increasingly obsolete in the late 196os.
Wisconsin's outer-ring cooperatives banded together with other states' cooperatives in
organizations such as Chicagoland Dairy Sales and Associated Dairymen to create "superpools"
o80 Minutes of Social Meeting of Consolidated Badger Cooperative, Sep. 7, 1950, CBC Records, Reel 2.
181 Torgerson, Building Markets, 102-3; Minutes of Resolutions Committee Meeting of Consolidated Badger
Cooperative, Apr. 15, 1958, CBC Records, Reel 2.
182 Williams, et al., Organization and Competition, 31-2. See also Gavin McKerrow, "The Role of Cooperatives in
Dairy Marketing," address before American Farm Bureau Federation Dairy Conference, Dec. 9, 1963, Gavin
McKerrow Records, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI, Box 1, Folder 1.
183 In 1950, the Wisconsin Cooperative Creameries made only 1% of its sales as fluid milk; in 1973 its successor
cooperative, Wisconsin Dairies, had 40% of its sales in fluid milk. Audit Report, Wisconsin Cooperative Creameries
Association, 1950, WDC Records, Box 5, Folder o; Wisconsin Dairies Cooperative, Annual Report, 1973-74.
184 "Wisconsin Ships Record Milk Volume," Milk Dealer (Apr. 1966): 30.
185 "Milk Transfer Station Dedicated," Modern Milk Hauler (Sep. 1966): 8-9; "The Move to Tank-to-Tank Transfer,"
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of milk for sale in Chicago.186 Associated Dairymen, Inc., created in 1964 as a marketing
organization for farmers previously excluded from federal milk orders, included members in a
giant swath from Texas west to Colorado and north to Wisconsin and Minnesota.l87 Its leaders
hailed the mega-merger as an opportunity to garner higher prices for outer-ring farmers without
driving up consumer price of milk, since the cost of fluid milk production was generally lower on
outer-ring farms able to grow their own hay for cattle feed.188 The merger trend went one step
even further in 1969 with the creation of Associated Milk Producers, Inc. (AMPI) out of 21
cooperatives. 8 9 With the encouragement and help of Wisconsin extension agents, particularly
economist Hugh L. Cook, AMPI developed a "unified marketing program" by coordinating the
milk sales of 45,000 farmers-one-tenth of the nation's dairy farmers.19o Known as a "super-
coop," AMPI proved "undeniably effective against [inner-ring] milk distribution giants" in
gaining control over the sale of fluid milk in the early 197os.'9'
Ironically, these developments essentially achieved the goals of the 1933 Wisconsin
Cooperative Milk Pool strike. The reorganization of dairy marketing set in motion by the bulk
tank system made it possible for outer-ring farmers to sell their lower-priced milk to city
consumers, breaking the federally enforced monopoly on fluid milk markets, established to
preclude exactly such a situation. It was, in effect, a permanent solution to the farm strife at the
heart of the "milk problem." Percy S. Hardiman, the son of the founder of Milwaukee's Golden
Guernsey Cooperative, appreciated the irony of this situation in a 1976 oral history. By merging
the interests of agricultural economists, large dairy cooperatives, and outer-ring farmers, AMPI
had achieved, without violence or significant public outcry, "pretty much what the Milk Pool was
i86 "New Era in Chicago Milk Marketing," Milk Dealer (Jun. 1966): 22.
187 Madison Milk Producers Cooperative Dairy, Press release, Nov. 1o, 1967, AMPI Records, Box 2, Folder lo; Harold
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thinking about." 192 John D. Black would also likely have approved of the outcome, since the
number one objective of AMPI as stated during its formation embraced one of his most revered
phrases: "To provide for better prices to dairy farmers through more orderly marketing."93
The Modern Milk Hauler
The operation of the postwar milk marketing machine depended upon a new kind of
rural industrial worker: the modern milk hauler. The difficulties milk haulers experienced in
becoming integrated into the new order of the 1950os and 196os illustrate some of the political
and economic consequences of that order. These truckers were not the long-haul or over-the-
road drivers that have inspired popular culture references to "kings of the open road." Neither,
as we shall see, was their situation similar to that of the Teamsters whose control of city milk
delivery had begun to wane in the 196os. The modern milk hauler was an integral, if industrial,
member of his rural community, and-in his own mind at least-"independent."
The occupation of milk hauling first emerged in the late 191os and 1920s, when
enterprising farmers began loading wagons and Model Ts with neighboring farmers' milk to
haul to local processing plants. In those days of heavy milk cans and poor roads, haulers rarely
traveled more than 50 miles a day, stopping at fewer than two dozen farms. Hauling was often
just a part-time job, "a sideline to his farming activities." In the 1930os and 1940s, as roads
improved, hauling became somewhat bigger business. Drivers often bought a larger truck or
two, sometimes equipped with a tank to allow cans to be unloaded directly on the patron's farm.
With larger equipment, they began expanding their routes into the 75 mile range, causing the
"evil effect" noted by John D. Black of haulers encouraging outer-ring farmers to ship their milk
to town.l9 4 When bulk handling appeared in Wisconsin in the 1950s, many of the approximately
192 Percy S. Hardiman, Interview by Dale Trelevan, Aug. 3, 1976, Tape 3, Side 1.
193 "Objectives and Purposes of Suggested Reorganization," n.d. (1969?), AMPI Records, Box 2, Folder 9.
194 "Can You Beat This 41 Year Record?" Modern Milk Hauler (Nov. 1960): 23; "37 Years of Milk Hauling," Modern
Milk Hauler (Oct. 1960): 18-9, 23; "Milk Hauling Has Come a Long Way," Modern Milk Hauler (Feb. 1961): 6-7;
"Wisconsin Hauler on the Job 49 Years," Milk Hauler and Food Transporter (Apr. 1973): 18; "Wisconsin Man in
'Haul of Fame'," Milk Hauler and Food Transporter (May 1973): 16.
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:',500 milk haulers in the state were the sons of the men who had established these can
routes.19 5
In one of its early issues, the trade journal Modern Milk Hauler (first published in
October, 1960) reported the results of a survey intended to describe its target audience. The
''average bulk milk hauler," the journal found, was 34.5 years of age, married, with 2.5 children.
He had entered the business because "he likes to be independent" and preferred working
outdoors; his wife, meanwhile, stayed indoors keeping the company's books or dispatching
drivers. The average bulk hauler owned a truck and a half, each machine fitted with an 1800-
gallon tank. The average haul had by this time expanded to go miles a day, although with fewer,
larger farms to visit, the number of stops averaged just over 12.196 A flesh-and-blood version of
these statistics was Archie Lawrence of Brooklyn, Wisconsin (1965 population: approximately
;oo). Although owning a slightly larger tank than average (2200 gallons) and running a longer
daily route (125 miles), Lawrence and his bookkeeping wife considered their business to be
relatively small. Neighborliness lay at the core of the enterprise, as the Lawrences offered their
farmer-customers low-cost milkhouse paint jobs.l97 Some haulers had little time for milkhouse
painting, running significantly larger operations with hired drivers. Nonetheless, a hauler like
Spencer Findlay of Whitewater, the owner of 6 trucks, likely represented the upper end of the
size spectrum.'98 Most milk hauling businesses were small, family enterprises, and like many of
the farms they served, relied on unpaid women's work in order to stay afloat.l99
The individual hauler may not have run a large operation, but his work was essential
for creating the enormous volumes of milk needed by super-coops of the 196os. As an
editorialist in the haulers' trade journal put it in 1973: "Milk transportation or hauling, if you
195 John J. Keller, "On the Firing Line," Modern Milk Hauler (Jul. 1962): 10.
1516 "Average Bulk Milk Hauler," Modern Milk Hauler (Apr. 1963): 13. See also "Survey Gives Lowdown on Haulers,"
Modern Milk Hauler (Sep. 1961): 4.
'97 Fred F. Schwenn, "Wisconsin Hauler Likes His Work," Modern Milk Hauler (May 1965): 5.
198 "Good Way of Life Based on Modern Hauling Business," Modern Milk Hauler (Aug. 1961): 3-4.
199 Fred Schwenn, "Pick Ups," Milk Hauler and Food Transporter (Sep. 1973): 3. On the role of unpaid women's work
masking the labor costs of postwar dairy farming in Wisconsin, see Jess Gilbert and Raymond Akor, "Increasing
Structural Divergence in United States Dairying: California and Wisconsin since 1950," Rural Sociology 53 (Spring
1988): 56-72. For a comparison with New Mexico, see Joan M. Jensen, "Dairying and Changing Patterns of Family
Labor in Rural New Mexico," New Mexico Historical Review 75 (Apr. 2000): 157-94. On the changes in gendered
divisions of dairying labor in the nineteenth century, see Sally McMurry, Transforming Rural Life: Dairying
Families and Agricultural Change, 1820-1885 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
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please, has given a big boost to milk marketing. Selling of milk by co-ops isn't on a provincial
basis anymore. Milk is now transported and sold where it is needed."20 0 Bulk haulers not only
made high-volume marketing possible, but they served as indispensable intermediaries between
producers and processors.2 01 Haulers were responsible for maintaining milk quality in the new
all-Grade A system. Besides being expected to "have clean and tidy personal habits and ... wear
clean clothing," the hauler had to be able "by sight or smell ... to distinguish non-conforming
[i.e., off-flavor or dirt-contaminated] milk, since with him rests the decision to reject or accept
the milk"2 02 Furthermore, the milk hauler was required to take samples of milk at each farm.
Butterfat samples would help determine the amount of the farmer's paycheck for a particular
load, while bacteria samples would guarantee a processor's adherence to public health
standards. Bulk haulers were thus widely recognized as highly skilled workers. Extension agents
could write distribute circulars describing the steps involved, but only years of on-the-job
experience could create the necessary skills.203
Despite-or perhaps because of-this acknowledged importance and skill, many bulk
haulers in Wisconsin felt unfairly treated by dairies in the 196os. In the bulk system's "scramble
to gain volume," cooperatives set their haulers' rates as low as possible in order to offer farmers
a higher price for their milk.2 0 4 In order to pay the significant expenses of a bulk tank truck,
gasoline, insurance, and taxes, haulers were forced to increase the length of their routes.
According to one haulers' advocate, this "creates a substantial problem for the milk hauler. Such
a hauler, affected by high daily mileage and resulting high variable costs ... is presently
subsidizing the processor in his desire to obtain far-out product."20 5 The aggressive quest for
200 Fred Schwenn, "Pick Ups," Milk Hauler and Food Transporter (May 1973): 3.
201 "Take Time To Do the Job," Modern Milk Hauler (Nov. 1960): 11; "This Modern Milk Hauling Business," Modern
Milk Hauler (Oct. 1960): 6-7.
202 J. E. Edmonson and J. H. Gholson, "Bulk Pick-Up and the Hauler," Milk Plant Monthly (May 1955): 26-7; "We
Salute You, Modern Milk Haulers of America," Modern Milk Hauler (Oct. 1960): 5.
203 Myron P. Dean, lo Steps in Bulk Milk Pick-Up, Circular 597 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Extension Service,
August 1961), RG 33, Entry lool A, 1961, Box 60, Marketing-Dairy Folder; "Milk Hauler Key to Quality Control," Milk
Hauler and Food Transporter (Jul. 1973): 17.
204 "Commission Says 'No' to Regulation of Hauling Rates," Modern Milk Hauler (Mar. 1964): 6.
205 Jim McKee, "Milk Hauler Group Favors Rate Rules," Modern Milk Hauler (May 1961): 7. Emphasis in original.
Haulers also had to shoulder the financial responsibility for the milk in their tanks while in transit between farm and
plant, which could lead to bankruptcy in event of a highway collision. John J. Keller, "On the Firing Line," Modern
Milk Hauler (Dec. 1963): lo-1; "High Court Spells out Legal Responsibility of Hauler," Modern Milk Hauler (Jul.
1964): 2-3.
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volume reinforced itself and increased tensions in the industry, as bulk haulers seeking to fill
their ever-larger tanks repeatedly urged farmers on their routes to boost their yields and install
bigger bulk tanks of their own.206 Haulers who did not sufficiently expand their volume faced
canceling of their contracts. Wisconsin Dairies, for instance, helped finance their contracted
haulers' truck tanks, but craftily maintained half ownership of the equipment in order to easily
buy out, if necessary, low-yielding haulers.207
Haulers concerned with these problems formed a unique organization in 1957 to
negotiate with dairies for higher pay and standardized work conditions. Despite the nature of its
demands, the Wisconsin Milk Haulers Association (WMHA) did not consider itself a labor
union, but a trade association representing the interests of small businessmen.208 The essence of
the problem, argued leaders recruiting members for the WMHA, was that the bulk hauling
business was too small within the "economic jungle" of the dairy industry. Truckers spread out
over great distances had little opportunity to learn what other haulers charged for their services,
and so had to fend for themselves in setting rates that would justify their investments in trucks
and tanks.209 Haulers, as independent businessmen, theoretically "negotiated" with processors
on pay scales, but "since the hauler is dealt with individually he has little or nothing to say about
the hauling rates."210 The WMHA likened this situation to the feudal manors of medieval
Europe, with haulers as the vassals "of their overlords, the operating dairies." Dairies
encouraged haulers to act as "independent" owner-operators, but controlled their incomes
through arbitrary rate manipulation.1 If an individual trucker asked for higher rates, as one
206 "No Exceptions-Every Producer on Every-Other-Day Pickup," Milk Hauler and Food Transporter (Feb. 1973): 4-
5; "Producers Say Most Haulers Are Neat, Prompt, Accurate," Milk Hauler and Food Transporter (Mar. 1973): 9.
207 Minutes, Board of Directors Meeting, Consolidated Badger Cooperative, Nov. 2, 1951, CBC Records, Reel 2;
Minutes, Special Board of Directors Meeting, Wisconsin Creamery Company Cooperative, Jan. 15, 1959, WDC
Records, Box 4, Folder 5; Minutes, Board of Directors Meeting, Wisconsin Creamery Company Cooperative, Feb. 5,
1958, WDC Records, Box 4, Folder 5; Minutes, Special Board of Directors Meeting, Wisconsin Creamery Company
Cooperative, Feb. 3, 1958, WDC Records, Box 4, Folder 5; Minutes, Board of Directors Meeting, Wisconsin
Cooperative Creamery Association, Aug. 8, 1956, WDC Records, Box 5, Folder 2; Minutes, Board of Directors
Meeting, Wisconsin Cooperative Creamery Association, Jun. 9, 1959, WDC Records, Box 5, Folder 3.
208 James R. McKee, "Why Our Milk Haulers Association Asks for Rate Regulations," Modern Milk Hauler (Mar.
1961): 4-5.
209 John J. Keller, "On the Firing Line," Modern Milk Hauler (Jun. 1962): 10-1; W. M. Roberts, "Technology
Department: Hauling Charges," Milk Dealer (Oct. 1959): 144-6.
210 Dan E. Sauve, "Why Hauling Regulations?" Modern Milk Hauler (Nov. 1962): 10-1.
211 John J. Keller, "On the Firing Line," Modern Milk Hauler (Jul. 1962): 10.
133
Mr. Heding did at a meeting of the board of directors of Wisconsin Cooperative Creameries in
1955, the cooperative would simply threaten to do its own hauling.212
Joining the International Brotherhood of Teamsters might have seemed an appropriate
solution to these "feudal" conditions. In fact, the Teamsters made an effort to organize bulk
hauling in the 1950s, gaining some success with larger private companies such as Bowman and
Borden, where the union already had strong representation among "inside" plant workers.2 13
The Wisconsin Teamsters gained a significant achievement in 1953 when they signed a number
of dairy processors and larger trucking firms to a Statewide Milk Tank Agreement, establishing a
minimum milk hauler's wage of $1.65 per hour with overtime and seniority provisions.21 4 The
firms that agreed to the contract did so as a means of stabilizing wages across the industry,
preventing individual firms from gaining a competitive foothold by slashing their labor costs.21 5
Unfortunately, the "statewide" agreement covered relatively few firms or employees; Teamsters
Local 695 of Madison signed up only 6 companies, with 49 drivers, in the 195os.216 Although it
is impossible to know the exact number of milk haulers in the state who came under the
contract, a very generous estimate would put the number at around 700-less than one quarter
of the haulers in Wisconsin at the time.21 7
Even if this many drivers were signed to the agreement, the contract proved hard to
enforce in the hyper-competitive atmosphere of postwar milk marketing, where individual firms
had significant incentives to disregard the contract to undercut their competitors on labor
212 Minutes, Board of Directors Meeting, Wisconsin Cooperative Creamery Association, Mar. 3, 1955, WDC Records,
Box 5, Folder 1; John J. Keller, "On the Firing Line," Modern Milk Hauler (May 1963): 10; John J. Keller, "On the
Firing Line," Modern Milk Hauler (Jun. 1963): 17; John J. Keller, "On the Firing Line," Modern Milk Hauler (Jul.
1964): 17; John J. Keller, "On the Firing Line," Modern Milk Hauler (Sep. 1964): 13.
213 International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 695, Milk Tank Tank Truck Surveys, 1954, IBT 695 Records, Box 14,
Folder 12; David Gourlie (Teamsters Local 695), Complaint to Wisconsin Joint State Milk Tank Area Committee, Oct.
11, 1956, IBT 695 Records, Box 32, Folder 3.
214 International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 695, Milk Tank Agreement, Apr. 1953, IBT 695 Records, Box 14,
Folder 12.
215 The Agreement was drafted in response to a 1945 request from the owner of a mid-sized trucking firm, Quality
Milk Service, who saw his smaller competitors undercutting his firm's wages. Allan Torhorst (Quality Milk Service) to
John Picago, Aug. 8, 1945, IBT 695 Records, Box 14, Folder 12; Minutes, Milk Tank Meeting, Madison, WI, May 8,
1953, IBT 695 Records, Box 18, Folder 5.
216 "Employers Signed to the State Milk Tank Agreement by Local 695," Sep. 9, 1954, IBT 695 Records, Box 14, Folder
12.
217 Fourteen Teamster locals were parties to the tank agreement. If Local 695's numbers are taken as average, which
seems reasonable, since Madison's jurisdiction would have been smaller than Milwaukee's but larger than the more
rural areas of the state, then 50 drivers times 14 equals 700. More than likely, this is a gross overestimate, since
Madison was a particularly friendly climate for union organizers in the 1950s.
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costs.21 8 Teamsters locals repeatedly complained to their state officers that dairies were
breaking the agreement by using out-of-state drivers and non-union "wildcat" haulers.219 The
Teamsters' difficulty enforcing the agreement was compounded in 1958 when the National
Labor Relations Board instructed the union to cease and desist from using its power within
larger private dairies-in this case, Bowman-to coerce the dairies not to accept milk from non-
union trucking firms. The three largest private dairies in Wisconsin took the ruling as a cue to
ignore the Milk Tank Agreement for the next three years.220
An even more fundamental problem was the aversion of the "average milk hauler" to
labor unions. The Teamsters, in particular, conjured up images of boss unionism and coercive
tactics.22' A 1974 editorial in the bulk haulers' trade journal explained this attitude as a
consequence of the average hauler's "farm heritage" that encouraged an "independent spirit"
like that of "farmers, who have been traditionally opposed to unionism."222 Haulers preferred to
think of themselves as businessmen-or rather, "skilled, qualified, licensed professional[s]"223-
not laborers. This attitude was not confined to Wisconsin. William I. Miller, who ran a three-
truck milk hauling operation in Fisherville, Kentucky, felt that haulers did not receive fair pay
for their skilled work, but asserted that he was "definitely opposed to unions."224 The New York
State Teamsters Council complained in the early 196os that bulk haulers who refused to
unionize were mere "farmers who have quit farming" and thus not "legitimate truckers." Milk
haulers retorted that they were "individual owners and not subject to union jurisdiction."225
2L8 Minutes, Milk Tank Meeting, Madison, WI, May 8, 1953, IBT 695 Records, Box 18, Folder 5; David Gourlie
(Teamsters Local 695), Complaint to Wisconsin Joint State Milk Tank Area Committee, Oct. 11, 1956, IBT 695
Records, Box 32, Folder 3; Minutes, Wisconsin Teamsters Joint Council No. 39, Milk Tank Negotiations, Milwaukee,
WI, Sep. 7, 1961, IBT 695 Records, Box 79, Folder 7.
219 Minutes, Wisconsin Teamsters Joint Council, Milk Tank Committee Meeting, Jul. 24, 1959, IBT 695 Records, Box
21, Folder 6; Minutes, Wisconsin Teamsters Joint Council No. 39, Milk Tank Negotiations, Milwaukee, WI, Aug. 23,
1961, IBT 695 Records, Box 79, Folder 7; Minutes, Meeting between Local Unions and Milk Tank Operators,
Milwaukee, WI, Aug. 7, 1957, IBT 695 Records, Box 79, Folder 7.
2:0 National Labor Relations Board, International Brotherhood of Teamsters et al. and Rudolph Schroeder and Randy
Schroeder, Case No. 13-CB-518, Decision and Order, May 16, 1958, IBT 695 Records, Box 79, Folder 7; Ross M.
Madden (Regional Director, Thirteenth Region, National Labor Relations Board) to Lester M. White, "Schroeder and
Son," Sep. 4, 1957, ibid., Box 79, Folder 7; Minutes, Chicago Milk Shed Tank Truck Meeting, Chicago, IL, Mar. 16,
1i96o, ibid., Box 18, Folder 5; Clem Gerstner (Teamsters Local 75) to Frank Gillespie, Thomas Hagerty, and Stanley
Baumann, Mar. 8, 1960, ibid., Box 21, Folder 6.
2:'1 The negative public image of the Teamsters will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
2:2 Fred Schwenn, "Pick Ups," Milk Hauler and Food Transporter (Jan. 1974): 3. See also Fred Schwenn, "Strong
Leadership Is Basic Need," Modern Milk Hauler (Oct. 1967): 4.
2:23 Jim McKee, "Milk Hauler Group Favors Rate Rules," Modern Milk Hauler (May 1961): 7.
2:24 "Milk Haulers' Round Table," Modern Milk Hauler (May 1961): 12-3, 23.
2:!5 "Teamsters, Farmers Feuding," Milk Dealer (Feb. 1963): 24.
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Compounding the anti-union sentiments of most milk haulers, the Teamsters faced the
challenge of a 1960 National Labor Relations Board ruling that "bulk milk drivers are
independent contractors and not employees within the meaning of the Taft-Hartley Act."226
This was the setting for an effort by the Wisconsin Milk Haulers Association to gain
regulation of haulers' rates in their state. In February of 1961 the WMHA filed a petition with the
Wisconsin Public Service Commission requesting an investigation into the problems of bulk
milk hauling.227 The Public Service Commission was the state equivalent of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, in that it required new trucking firms to obtain a certificate of public
convenience and necessity. In other words, if an individual wanted to start a new trucking
business for hauling within the state of Wisconsin, he had to prove to the Commission that the
new firm would not create unnecessary competition for existing firms. The Commission also
administered Wisconsin's bulk hauling licensing exam, written by the state's Department of
Agriculture and the Board of Health to assure milk quality in the bulk handling system.228
Despite these layers of regulations, however, the Commission treated milk truckers as farm-to-
market haulers. Since 1931, the Commission had exempted truckers hauling farm products to
market from rate control and some forms of taxation.22 9 When the WMHA requested an
investigation into hauling rates in 1961, they were essentially attempting to "counter-organize, in
the phrase of historian Ellis Hawley, using the power of the state to intervene on behalf of the
interests of weakly organized milk haulers.230
The WMHA argued before the Public Service Commission that the exemption for milk
haulers created unfair conditions for the independent businessman. Without regulation
requiring dairy cooperatives to pay uniform and "fair rates," bulk milk haulers faced bankruptcy;
226 "Driver Labor Standards," Modern Milk Hauler (Oct. 1960): 8; Minutes, Wisconsin Teamsters Joint Council, Milk
Tank Committee Meeting, Jul. 24, 1959, IBT 695 Records, Box 21, Folder 6.
227 Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, "Petition of the Wisconsin Milk Haulers Association, Inc., for an
Investigation of Rates and Charges for Milk Haulers and the Establishment of Minimum Rates: Hearing," Feb. 17,
1961, IBT 695 Records, Box 18, Folder 5.
228 Myron P. Dean, Wisconsin Dairy Marketing Specialists' Annual Report, 1961, RG 33, Entry ool001 A, 1961, Box 60,
Marketing-Dairy Folder.
229 Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, "In the Matter of Enforcement of Chapter 454, Laws of Wisconsin of
1931, Relating to the Taxation of Motor Vehicle Hauling Companies," Dec. 23, 1931, AMPI Records, Box 1, Folder 5;
John J. Keller, "On the Firing Line," Modern Milk Hauler (Dec. 1963): 10-1.
230 Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966).
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as a consequence, the stability of the entire bulk handling system was threatened.231 The Public
Service Commission agreed in February 1961 that this was legitimate grounds for consideration
of the WMHA's request, but requested data from the trade association to back up the assertion
that haulers did not receive fair rates.2 32 After a year of consultation with their lawyers and the
dairy cooperatives, the WMHA came up with the desired numbers. With the goal of
guaranteeing the average hauler $450 in monthly earnings, the trade association asserted that
the cost of equipment, taxes, and insurance required a rate of 16.8 cents per hundredweight of
milk. Remarkably, the dairies agreed that this number was fair, even though this seems to have
been almost two cents higher than the generally prevailing rate at the time.2 33 But if the dairies
proved willing to accept the haulers' definition of a fair price in non-binding negotiations, it
soon became apparent to the WMHA that the dairies did not intend to put the higher rates into
effect. 2 34 Declaring that "the time for pussy footing is over," the haulers returned to the Public
Service Commission in 1964, demanding state intervention to assure a "fair return" on truckers'
investments. The dairies, however, were supported in the hearings by the Wisconsin
Department of Agriculture, the state Farm Bureau, and agricultural extension agents-a far
more strongly organized set of interest groups than the small, recently established haulers
association. The Public Service Commission denied the WMHA's request in February 1964,
asserting that evidence was insufficient to prove that haulers as a group were "not realizing
satisfactory profits." The state's milk haulers would continue to be exempt from rate regulation,
and therefore forced to continue to "negotiate" rates with dairies as individual contractors.2 35
Wisconsin's independent milk haulers had failed to counter-organize against the
powerful interests running the postwar milk marketing machine. This episode illustrates more
231 James R. McKee, "Why Our Milk Haulers Association Asks for Rate Regulations," Modern Milk Hauler (Mar.
1961): 4-5; "Difference in Hauling Rates," Modern Milk Hauler (May 1962): 6-10.
232 Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, "Petition of the Wisconsin Milk Haulers Association"; "When Milk
Haulers Meet," Modern Milk Hauler (Jul. 1961): 4-5.
233 "Rate Hearing Is Hot Issue," Modern Milk Hauler (Mar. 1962): 6, 12; Minutes, Board of Directors Meeting,
Consolidated Badger Cooperative, Aug. 7, 1959, CBC Records, Reel 2; C. T. McCleery, "Madison, Wisconsin Milk
Marketing Area, Federal Order No. 51, Annual Report," 1963, RG 136, Annual Reports on Federal Milk Orders, Entry
26, National Archives II, College Park, MD, Box 30, p. 38.
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23.5 John J. Keller, "On the Firing Line," Modern Milk Hauler (Jun. 1963): 17, "Commission Says 'No' to Regulation of
Hlauling Rates," Modern Milk Hauler (Mar. 1964): 6; "Farm Bureau States Policy," Modern Milk Hauler (Jan. 1963):
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than just the problems faced by a relatively small group of rural workers. Milk haulers became
essential to maintaining the postwar system of "orderly marketing," but did not feel that their
central role in the system was sufficiently rewarded. Like the consumers, Teamsters, and Milk
Pool strikers of the 1930os and 1940s, modern milk haulers felt that the price of milk was unfair.
Unlike those earlier episodes, however, their definition of the "milk problem" gained little public
attention or policy response. Haulers were the only interest group remaining to significantly
question the milk marketing order, but had become just a small cog in the postwar marketing
machine.
Conclusion
In 1970, a group of economists investigating the price of milk in the United States
declared that the interests of consumers were satisfactorily met by the dominance of
supermarkets in the industry, since milk had become a low-cost "staple grocery item."236 Outer-
ring dairy farmers were also satisfied, having successfully taken control of the marketing of
much of the nation's fluid milk supply. Small private dairies, organized milk deliverymen, local
rural cooperatives, farmers bankrupted by the bulk system, and milk haulers were less pleased
with the new order, but for the USDA's economists and extension agents, the system provided a
permanent and effective solution to the New Deal's "milk problem." The milk marketing
machine would encounter some brief resistance in the early 1970s, including a lawsuit filed by
Ralph Nader against the USDA, after a scandal involving questionable political donations by
AMPI to Richard Nixon's 1972 campaign fund.2 37 Nader was little match for the bureaucratic
power of the USDA, however, and the issue lost resonance when AMPI split itself into three
smaller regional divisions.238
236 Williams, et al., Organization and Competition, 8.
237 "Milk Money," New Republic, Feb. 12, 1972, 7; "Milk: Why Is the Price So High?" Consumer Reports, Jan. 1974,
77-80; Frank Wright, "Land of Milk and Money," Nation, Dec. 20, 1971, 657-9; Brooks Jackson, "Still Flowing: Milk
Money," New Republic, Aug. 10, 1974, 11-12.
238 James L. Guth, "Consumer Organizations and Federal Dairy Policy," Policy Studies Journal 6 (Summer 1978):
499-503; Robert C. Bjorklund, "Prof Denies Farmers Fix Milk Prices," Wisconsin State Journal, Dec. 14, 1975, Faculty
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Postwar technological developments in milk distribution and collection, encouraged by
agricultural experts, had effectively reframed the politics of the price of milk. The price of milk
was now primarily a matter for negotiation in the marketplace-not on the bargaining table, not
on the front pages of newspapers, not in anti-trust hearings before Congress, and not in violent
milk-dumping actions by farmers.239 Milk moved from farms to markets in giant thermally
insulated tanks, then to consumers' refrigerators via tightly sealed paper cartons and plastic
jugs, effectively insulating the liquid, in terms of price, from the political-economic disputes of
the old "milk problem." It was, at least for the agricultural experts of the USDA, an "ideal
distribution system."
239 The one exception to this last statement, the milk withholding actions of the National Farmers Organization in
March 1967, proves the rule. Rather than fundamentally altering the power relations of the new milk marketing order,
the decision of several thousand farmers in 25 states to dump or hold their milk to achieve higher prices succeeded
only in creating another large cooperative to compete with AMPI on essentially the same terms. "When Dairy Farmers
Went on Strike," U.S. News and World Report, Apr. 3, 1967, 53; N. Reeder, "NFO Milk Contracts Worry Big Co-Ops,"
Farm Journal, Feb. 1970, 71; "Truckers Provide 'Market on Wheels' for NFO Milk," Milk Hauler and Food
Transporter (Dec. 1973): 6.
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Chapter 3: Beef Trusts and Asphalt Cowboys
Technologies for moving meat from farmers to consumers fundamentally structured the
politics and economics of the beef industry in the twentieth century. Railroads first made a
large-scale beef industry possible in the late nineteenth century, but also helped introduce the
problem of monopoly to cattle raisers, meat consumers, and government officials. By the 1930s,
trucks and highways helped to redefine the geography, economics, and politics of beef
production and marketing. For a relatively brief period from the 1930os through the 1950s, an
uneasy alliance of farmers, consumers, businessmen, and government officials relied on
trucking to disaggregate and decentralize the "Beef Trust" created in the age of railroads.
Ultimately, however, trucking would become a tool in the 196os for the re-assembly of a new, if
less controversial, form of monopoly in beef production.
But if this chapter assumes the importance of transportation technologies in shaping the
structure of the beef industry, it does not argue that this was a case of "hard" technological
determinism.' Trucks were used by people with power to gain more power over the methods of
beef production and marketing in the twentieth century. Cattle producers wanted more control
over the prices they received for their animals; consumers wanted inexpensive, quality meat;
meatpackers wanted steady profits; and government agents wanted all of these things to occur
in a competitive atmosphere. Trucking played an important role in the efforts of these groups to
achieve their interests, so that, as in the case of milk, trucks were deeply implicated in the
political economy of the industry. Unlike the case of milk, however, agricultural policymakers
never attempted to use trucking to implement a system of "orderly marketing" in beef. Instead,
the politics of beef in the twentieth century were marked by a deep ambivalence. On the one
hand, agricultural policymakers consistently found monopoly power to be a "problem" because
of pressure from cattle producers and meat consumers, but on the other hand, did not feel that
strong regulatory or technopolitical action was needed to solve the problem. Instead, through
purposeful inaction, agricultural policymakers helped to uphold a strong culture of economic
'Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History?: The Dilemma of Technological
Determinism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994).
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independence in the American beef industry. As a consequence, the problem of monopoly went
from being an issue of intense political discussion without action in the first half of the century
to an accepted, even encouraged, fact by the end of the 1970s. The beef industry became a
standard bearer for all that was considered "American" about industrial agriculture-free
enterprise, high productivity, and low consumer prices. The truck drivers who helped make this
system work were ideal representatives of this contradictory economic culture, which paid
homage to a sense of independence reminiscent of the open range of the Old West while
practicing a winner-take-all approach to the spoils of industrial capitalism.
Beef Production and the Problem of Monopoly
To understand how trucking and highways reconfigured the beef industry in the mid-
twentieth century, we must first understand the system that was replaced. Railroads made it
possible to mass market fresh beef in the late 19th century. The refrigerated railcar, introduced
in the 1870s, provided a means of sending relatively inexpensive dressed beef from the cattle-
producing regions of the Midwest to the beef-consuming Northeast. However, the rapid
perishability of fresh beef required a distribution system of unprecedented scale and
technological integration that laid the foundations for what came to be known as the "Beef
Trust." From the 1870os until the early 1930s, a handful of giant firms dominated every aspect of
converting western cattle into eastern steaks and roasts, from the buying and selling of cattle in
stockyards to the slaughtering of the animals to the distribution of carcasses to retail butchers.
Consequently, the "Big Five" meatpackers drew repeated attacks from farmers, consumers,
small businessmen, and politicians concerned about the degree of monopoly power exercised in
the meat industry. By World War I, the federal government initiated action to break up the "Beef
Trust," but with little effect. The monopoly problem in beef marketing would require a
technological fix-trucking-that did not prove its power until the 1930s.
The beef steer is a remarkably uncooperative animal when it comes to being cut into
roasts for urban consumers. The problem is not that beef cattle are obstinate or untrusting of
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men with sharp objects, but that they take a long time to produce edible meat, and furthermore,
once they have been slaughtered, their meat immediately begins to putrefy. This latter problem
of perishability has always made transportation the single most important factor structuring the
business of meat production and marketing.2 Before an extensive and reliable system of
railroads arrived in the late 19th century, it simply was not possible to mass market beef. The
hog, on the other hand, proved quite amenable to being mass marketed before the Civil War.
Pork was the first mass-produced and mass-marketed meat in the United States. The
industrialization of porkpacking came earlier and more easily than it would for beefpacking for
several reasons. Unlike beef cattle, hogs are extremely efficient converters of raw feed into edible
meat. Willing and able to eat nearly anything from garbage to wild nuts, pigs proved especially
useful in the early 19th century as "condensed corn," allowing farmers on the Midwestern
prairies to convert their abundant low-value grains into high-value meat with little effort.3 As
farmers dramatically expanded their production of hogs in the 182os and 183os, entrepreneurs
established factories in the Ohio River valley to rationalize the slaughter of the suddenly over-
abundant animal. Many features of the modern assembly line system of manufacturing began in
the porkpacking houses of Cincinnati, although "disassembly" was a more apt name for the
process that, by 1837, allowed 20 men to kill and clean 620 pigs in 8 hours.4
Mass production depended on mass distribution to justify the expense of large-scale
slaughter, and again unlike the beef steer, the hog complied. Long before the rise of the
Midwestern porkpackers, Americans had become accustomed to the taste of cured pork
products, such as bacon, sausage, and ham. These compact food products with long shelf lives
were relatively easy to transport in an era of expensive refrigeration, making it possible for
packers in the Ohio River valley-particularly in "Porkopolis" (Cincinnati)-to ship cured meats
long distances via the relatively slow steamboats of the era.5 Beginning in the 185os, railroads
2 Mary Yeager, Competition and Regulation: The Development of Oligopoly in the Meat Packing Industry
(Greenwich, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), xxiv.
3 William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 225-30; Eric
B. Ross, "Patterns of Diet and Forces of Production: An Economic and Ecological History of the Ascendancy of Beef in
the United States Diet," in Beyond the Myths of Culture, ed. Eric Ross (New York: Academic Press, 1980), 187.
4 Sigfried Giedion, Mechanization Takes Command: A Contribution to Anonymous History (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1948), 214-8, 90.
5 Cronon, Nature's Metropolis, 228-9; Louis C. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers: An Economic and
Technological History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949), 31; Ross, "Patterns of Diet," 192-3.
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provided several advantages over steamboats for porkpackers, especially the ability to ship
during winters when rivers were frozen over, allowing the great railroad city of the Midwest-
Chicago-to supplant Cincinnati as the nation's pork capital. By the end of the Civil War,
Chicago's meatpackers had perfected the "disassembly line" for hogs and were able to ship cured
pork products to all major cities, year-round. The hog had been fully industrialized, its death
mechanized and its distribution made independent of the seasons and defiant of geography.6
No similar industrialization of beef production or marketing occurred during this period.
Whereas bacon and ham had been staple foods since colonial days, Americans had long refused
to eat anything but fresh beef-especially in the 19th century, when techniques for salting,
smoking, or otherwise curing beef produced only tough and unpalatable meat.7 Because uncured
beef begins to rot so quickly after slaughter, achieving a tasty steak required that a cow be kept
alive until just before it was distributed to consumers. No form of transportation was speedy
enough to allow a mid-19th-century Midwestern meatpacker to mass-slaughter cattle and get
beef to Eastern consumers in edible form at a reasonable price. As a consequence, the slaughter
and distribution of beef in urban centers was a highly atomistic, small-scale industry carried on
mainly by neighborhood butchers who slaughtered cattle only as needed.8 Furthermore,
whereas the hog is a squat animal with an impressive ratio of meat to bone, the cow is a long-
legged beast with about 45 percent of its weight taken up by inedible hide, bones, gristle,
entrails, horns, and hooves. Carrying such a low proportion of saleable meat, the bulky beef cow
did not make for transport economics efficient enough to justify long-distance shipping,
especially since cattle were apt to die or be injured in railroad cars and needed repeated
watering and resting on a lengthy trip. On the other hand, unlike hogs, cattle didn't mind
walking for long distances, feeding and watering themselves along the way. While the railroad
network made Chicago into the new "Porkopolis" in the 1850s, most cattle still came to the big
6 Margaret Walsh, The Rise of the Midwestern Meat Packing Industry (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky,
1982), 39-54; Yeager, Competition and Regulation, 16-7; Cronon, Nature's Metropolis, 230-2; Giedion,
Mechanization Takes Command, 229-46. The rest of this chapter will focus on beef rather than pork, but the
consequent divergent developments of the two industries over the twentieth century are highly instructive; see Brian
Kirby Page, "Agro-Industrialization and Rural Transformation: The Restructuring of Midwestern Meat Production,"
(Ph.D. diss., University of California-Berkeley, 1993), esp. Chapters 4, 6, and 7.
7 Ross, "Patterns of Diet," 192.
8 Cronon, Nature's Metropolis, 205-9, 225-8, Yeager, Competition and Regulation, 17.
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cities of the Northeast via their own power, driven on the hoof over hundreds of miles from
states like Virginia, Kentucky, and Ohio.9 The beef industry was barely impacted by the first
waves of industrialization in the United States, making beef an expensive luxury for most
consumers.
This situation would begin to change during the Civil War, when a surplus of cattle arose
in the state of Texas. Cattle ranchers in that state were cut off from their Southern markets by
Union blockades during the war, leaving the herds free to multiply. So many cattle were roaming
the Texas plains by the end of the war that they had become nearly worthless in regional
markets. In the East, however, the price of beef was high due partly to the inefficient marketing
methods described above, but also because high wartime demand by Union soldiers had driven
up the price of all foods. Suddenly it made economic sense to send Texas range cattle to Chicago,
where they would bring ten times as much as in the South. As always, the cost of transportation
remained a limiting factor, and certainly cattle that might be willing to walk from Virginia to
Philadelphia would not fare so well on a trip from southern Texas to northern Illinois.
Enterprising individuals like Joseph G. McCoy established trails and stockyards for cowboys to
drive the cattle on hoof to railheads in Kansas towns like Abilene and Dodge City, allowing the
cattle to be shipped by rail to Chicago without losing too much weight to make the trip
unprofitable. For a quarter of a century, the "Old West" of cowboys and dogies on the open
range captured the nation's imagination, but also transformed the city of Chicago into a major
cattle depot where western livestock drovers and merchants met with eastern distributors,
exchanging Texas longhorns for eastern dollars.1o
The railroads connecting the cattle-producing regions of the West to Chicago sought to
capture as many of those dollars as possible in the post-Civil War years. The high fixed costs of
operating an extensive network required railroaders to seek as much traffic volume as they could
to achieve lower unit costs. The burgeoning cattle industry of the late 19th century likewise
depended on the attractive rates and special accommodations provided to livestock merchants
by the railroads, and also needed the giant stockyards built by the railroads in cities like Chicago
9 Cronon, Nature's Metropolis, 225-6; Yeager, Competition and Regulation, 49-50; Ross, "Patterns of Diet," 197.
xo Cronon, Nature's Metropolis, 218-24; Jimmy M. Skaggs, Prime Cut: Livestock Raising and Meatpacking in the
United States, 1607-1983 (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1986), 50o-61.
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and Omaha." But while railroads helped cattle production to increase in scale and scope in the
186os and 1870s, beef slaughtering and distribution remained essentially pre-industrial.
Chicago was poised to become the beefpacking center of the nation, but as late as 1871 less than
four percent of beef animals arriving in the city were packed there, the rest being shipped as live
animals via railcar to butchers in the urban centers of the East.12
The development of the refrigerated railroad car made mass distribution possible for the
first time in the 188os. Beef slaughter began a geographical shift from the small butcher shops of
the East to the enormous meatpacking factories of Chicago. Gustavus Swift was the key figure in
this technological revolution. A New England farm boy, Swift moved to Chicago in 1875
intending to find a cheaper source of beef animals for his family's butcher shops back East. After
shipping a number of loads of live cattle at a loss, Swift tried shipping carcasses-or "dressed
beef'-via open-sided railroad cars during winter months to prevent putrefaction. The
experiment proved so profitable that Swift determined to find a way to ship only dressed beef,
thereby eliminating the cost of transporting the 55 to 60 percent of a cow's weight that could not
be eaten. Building on the work of earlier inventors and entrepreneurs such as George
Hammond, Swift hired engineer Andrew Chase to perfect the refrigerated railcar. Designed in
1878, Swift's railcar used an innovative combination of insulation and ventilation to send a blast
of cold air over an ice bunker and into the car, providing cool, dry air that reliably kept beef
carcasses fresh between Chicago and New York, even during summer. By 1884, Swift was the
largest shipper of dressed beef in the country, with a host of competitors-particularly giant
Chicago porkpackers George Hammond, Nelson Morris, and Philip Armour-recognizing the
profit potential of the new beef distribution method.13
Dressed beef was cheap beef. In 1882, Harper's Weekly celebrated the erection of a
dressed beef warehouse in the West Washington Market in Manhattan, declaring that the "era of
" Yeager, Competition and Regulation, 27-47; Steven W. Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation: Business,
Technology, and Politics in America, 1840-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 283-4.
12 Yeager, Competition and Regulation, 17; Cronon, Nature's Metropolis, 232.
13 Yeager, Competition and Regulation, 49-59; Cronon, Nature's Metropolis, 233-4; John H. White, Jr., The
American Railroad Freight Car: From the Wood-Car Era to the Coming of Steel (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1995), 270-283.
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cheap beef has begun for New York."'4 Indeed, the reduced transportation costs of dressed beef
allowed the Chicago packers to sell beef in New York at prices approximately 5 to 10 percent
lower than local slaughterers.'s But the mass distribution of cheap dressed beef was no simple
task. Refrigerator cars required constant supervision and re-icing along the four-day journey to
the East. In an age before cost-effective mechanical ice-making machinery, Swift and the other
dressed beef shippers were compelled to purchase ice harvesting rights on the Great Lakes and
build icing stations along the route.'6 Upon arrival, the dressed beef had to be distributed
immediately to avoid spoilage. Swift's solution to this problem was the branch house system-by
building or purchasing cold storage stations in eastern cities and towns, Swift created a
guaranteed internal market for his dressed beef. Branch houses received carloads of dressed
beef, then immediately distributed the meat to local retailers before spoilage set in. For instance,
a man named Marcel Weill worked for a major meatpacker's branch house in Kansas City in the
910os; his job consisted of calling every retail butcher in his region of the city each day at 6am,
then delivering the carcasses with a Ford Model T.17 In 1900oo, Swift owned 193 such branch
houses, located primarily in towns and cities throughout the Midwest and Northeast.l8
The success of dressed beef marketing relied on a scale of production and distribution
unprecedented in the fresh food business. Only through large-scale technological systems could
the dressed beef packers achieve the low prices needed to overcome resistance to the new
product. Eastern consumers saw dressed beef from Chicago as an inferior product, delivered
over a thousand miles by an unseen butcher and touched by an unknown number of filthy
railroad men; only a very low price was enough to convince them it was worth the risk of food
poisoning. Eastern butchers, meanwhile, saw dressed beef as a direct threat to their livelihood,
and not only helped to promote the idea that dressed beef was tainted, but often refused to carry
it: in their wholesale meat markets. Railroads were also uncooperative in helping dressed beef to
14 "Cheaper Beef," Harper's Weekly, Oct. 21, 1882, 663, quoted in Lewis Corey, Meat and Man: A Study of Monopoly,
Unionism, and Food Policy (New York: Viking Press, 1950), 40.
5is Cronon, Nature's Metropolis, 235.
i6 Oscar Edward Anderson, Jr., Refrigeration in America: A History of a New Technology and Its Impact (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1953), 145-6, 148-9; Cronon, Nature's Metropolis, 235; Yeager, Competition and
Regulation, 61.
17 Mrs. Sam Ray, "Postcard from Old Kansas City," Kansas City Times, Oct. 5, 1984, A14. Prior to automobiles the
meat would have been delivered by horse and wagon.
'8 Yeager, Competition and Regulation, 60.
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succeed. In their effort to increase traffic volume in the West during the 186os and 1870s,
railroads had made large investments in the infrastructure of livestock movement-livestock
cars and urban stockyards-and rightfully saw the dressed beef system making this equipment
obsolete while taking away half of their western routes' most voluminous cargo.
Facing such resistance, the Chicago packers were forced to erect their own infrastructure
to bypass the wholesale butchers and railroads. Branch houses not only solved the problem of
quick distribution of fresh beef as noted above, but also helped the packers avoid reliance on
wholesale butchers. To deal with the railroads who refused to provide refrigerated railcars,
Swift and his competitors built their own. Swift also found an ally in the Canadian Grand Trunk
Railroad, which unlike the New York Central or the Pennsylvania Railroad had no significant
investments in the livestock business, to get its dressed beef through to New York. But building a
tightly integrated technological system for fresh beef distribution was not enough on its own.
Because dressed beef could only compete with locally slaughtered beef on the basis of price, the
technological system had to be enormous to achieve the economies of scale that would allow low
consumer prices. Only then could dressed beef become a widely accepted food product that was
also profitable for the packers. 19 The introduction of the refrigerated railcar sowed the seeds of
monopoly2o in beefpacking.
From the beginnings of dressed beef in the 188os to World War I, a handful of Chicago
meatpackers sought to dominate the entire trade. This handful of companies-known as the "Big
Five"21 and represented most impressively by Swift and Armour-consistently chose to invest
their profits in expanding the infrastructure of mass distribution. By 1917, Swift had a branch
house system of 367 units; the Big Five together operated 1,120 branch houses.22 As Map 3.1
illustrates, the Big Five dominated the wholesale distribution of beef not only in major cities
19 Corey, Meat and Man, 46-9; Yeager, Competition and Regulation, 61-77; Cronon, Nature's Metropolis, 236-47.
20 I should make it clear that when using the term "monopoly," I actually mean "oligopoly," since there were several
firms involved in controlling the beef market, not just one. However, the Oxford English Dictionary shows that the
term "oligopoly" did not receive widespread usage until at least 1933, so to avoid anachronism and improve
readability for non-economists, I will use "monopoly." The same applies for the term "monopsony," introduced below.
21 I will use the phrase "Big Five" through the rest of this section to avoid confusion. Originally, there existed only a
"Big Four" of companies-Swift, Armour, Hammond, and Morris-that successfully mass marketed dressed beef.
Sulzberger & Sulzberger joined the field in 1897; it was renamed Wilson in 1916. Hammond was acquired by Armour
in 1901, but the entrance of the Cudahy company to the field in 1900oo kept the number at five. Later the "Big Five"
would become the "Big Four" when Morris merged with Armour in 1923.
22 Yeager, Competition and Regulation, 260-1.
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such as New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, but also in the smaller cities located on railroad
lines throughout the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic. Independent meatpackers were not entirely
shut out from the branch house system, but their footholds were limited primarily to the largest
cities, where their branch houses were little more than nearby extensions of their packing
plants. This was because the Big Five also owned most of the railroad car routes connecting
packing houses to distant branch houses-in 1918, the Big Five owned 90% of such routes,
making it nearly impossible for smaller packers in either big Eastern cities or deep in the
Midwest to market their product over a long distance.23 By maintaining this stranglehold on the
infrastructure of distribution, the Big Five achieved control of 73 percent of the nation's
interstate meat trade by 1916, allowing the packers to maintain steady prices of retail cuts of
meat across several states at a time.24 Significantly, most of the profits gained by the big packers
through their monopoly power were immediately reinvested in their distribution systems-
building more branch houses and refrigerator cars-in order to gain economies of scale and
increase their control over marketing.25 Beef marketing required, by 1916, "an enormous
organization with very large overhead expenses."26
2:3 Richard J. Arnould, "Changing Patterns of Concentration in American Meat Packing, 1880-1963," Business History
Review 45 (Spring 1971): 20. The Big Five also used their refrigerator cars to run "peddler routes" into the rural West,
selling dressed beef to compete directly with the independent packers in the only areas where independents had any
significant branch house systems. Federal Trade Commission, Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Meat-
Packing Industry, part III (Washington: GPO, 1919), 122-5.
24 Federal Trade Commission, Report, part III, 116; Cronon, Nature's Metropolis, 245.
25 Corey, Meat and Man, 75.
26 Federal Trade Commission, Report, part III, 117.
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Map 3.1: Meatpacker Branch Houses in 1916
The Big Five maintained monopoly control over beef distribution in both large and small eastern and
midwestern cities by strategically locating branch houses along major rail lines. Source: FTC, Report on
the Meat Packing Industry, part III, 129.
Profitable dressed beef marketing also demanded a steady supply of cattle. The large
capital investments required to make mass distribution cost effective made it necessary for the
packers to slaughter unprecedented numbers of cattle. Unfortunately, cattle slaughter, unlike
hog slaughter, was not very technologically advanced in the late 19th and early 20oth century.
While the disassembly line allowed for an impressive division of labor in the mass production of
pork products, cattle slaughter required significant skilled manual labor-particularly to remove
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the animal's hide without damaging valuable meat, a time-consuming process which required
the carcass to be taken off the otherwise continuously moving production line.27 The key factor
in industrializing beef production was increasing the scale of production, not improving
efficiency in productivity. To achieve such scale, the Big Five needed cattle, and to get cattle,
they needed stockyards.
This was the reason for Chicago's dominance of the beef trade by the 189os. With its
giant Union Stock Yard, built in 1865, Chicago had a reliable source of cattle from the range
country of the west. To further assure the reliability of supply, the Big Five packers began
investing in stockyards, not only in Chicago, but also in other major cattle marketing cities such
as Kansas City, St. Louis, and Omaha.28 These investments did not always require the packers to
lay out any significant cash payment to gain capital stock in the yards. Because the arrival of a
packing plant adjacent to a stockyard was likely to increase the business of the yard, packers
often received shares in the yard at no cost as an incentive to build a plant there.29 By 1916, the
Big Five owned a majority of shares in twenty-two of the fifty largest central stockyards, with
more than eight of every ten cattle passing through yards in which the big packers held an
interest.3 Particularly, the Big Five maintained significant control of the four largest yards in
Chicago, Kansas City, St. Louis, and Omaha, where they slaughtered over half of all animals
sold.31 As Maps 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate, the Big Five located their slaughtering plants
strategically in the railroad centers that connected the marketing channels of the populated East
with the livestock production areas of the West.
27 Roger Horowitz, Negro and White, Unite and Fight!: A Social History of Industrial Unionism in Meatpacking,
1930-9o (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997), 17-20, 250.
28 Corey, Meat and Man, 43.
29 Armour, for instance, received a $500,000 stock bonus in the Kansas City Stockyards for locating a packing plant in
that city in the early 189os. Charles L. Wood, The Kansas Beef Industry (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
180), 164.
3C Federal Trade Commission, Report, part III, 11; Arnould, "Changing Patterns," 22.
31 Federal Trade Commission, Report, part III, 15.
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Map 3.2: Stockyard Locations and Beef Cattle on Farms in 1916
The Big Five maintained monopsony control over cattle buying by locating stockyards in Midwestern
cities connected by rail to the major cattle-feeding states of Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, and Texas. Sources:
FTC, Report on the Meat Packing Industry, part III, 14-15; USDA, National Agricultural Statistics
Database.
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Map 3.3: Meatpacker Factories in 1916
The Big Five owned the largest meatpacking factories in 1916, locating them strategically in cities such as
Chicago and Kansas City which lay on rail lines connecting the beef ranges of the West with the
consuming centers of the East. Independent packers continued to dominate in states such as Ohio where
porkpacking took precedence over beef. Sources: FTC, Report on the Meat Packing Industry, part III, 26.
The Big Five's control of stockyards allowed a relatively small number of cattle buyers to
have a disproportionate control over the price of livestock offered for sale. Economists call this
situation of control by the few over buying prices "monopsony," and it became clear by 1916 that
the Big Five had established monopsony power over livestock buying that rivaled their
monopoly power over selling prices in beef marketing. The geographic concentration of the
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packers and stockyards contributed to this monopsony power, because after cattle prices were
established each morning at the four major terminal markets in Chicago, Kansas City, Omaha,
and St. Louis, those prices were immediately telegraphed to all the smaller yards in the rest of
the country.32 Livestock sellers repeatedly complained that packer buyers at the major urban
stockyards used short weights, excessive yardage fees, and wild swings in price from one day to
the next to manipulate the price of cattle.33 For instance, a Kansas livestock feeder in 1918
received a call from the yards in St. Joseph, Missouri, to ship as many cattle as possible for
immediate slaughter. Sorting and loading a large cattle shipment took time, so the livestock
feeder only managed to send four railcars on the first day, for which he received $14.85 per
hundredweight. The next day he shipped the remaining 33 carloads, but received only $13.00
per hundredweight for the same quality of cattle-a price drop of $20 per head that made him
regret the shipment.34
In popular discourse, the moniker "Beef Trust" represented all that was despised about
this combination of monopoly and monopsony power. Most of the opposition came from
economic interest groups whose livelihoods suffered from the dressed beef trade-railroad
managers who lost livestock traffic, eastern butchers who were undersold, livestock producers
who felt cheated at the central markets. The ire of these interest groups was one factor leading
Congress to pass the Sherman Antitrust Act in 189o, intended to prevent firms such as the Big
Five from colluding to administer prices.35 Like other businesses, however, the meatpackers
responded to the Sherman Act by attempting to formalize their price-fixing agreements by
forming a holding company.36 Although the meatpackers were never as successful as Standard
Oil or U.S. Steel in their efforts to reduce competition amongst themselves, their unquestioned
dominance of the meatpacking trade made them a constant target of antimonopoly efforts by the
32 Federal Trade Commission, Report, part III, 15.
33 Ibid., 85-116; Wood, Kansas Beef Industry, 165. Yardage fees were the charges assessed for unloading, feeding,
watering, and holding cattle in the stock pens until slaughter.
34 Wood, Kansas Beef Industry, 178-9.
35 Arnould, "Changing Patterns," 23-4; Yeager, Competition and Regulation, 111-33.
36 On the merger movement that followed the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act, see Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The
Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977),
319-44.
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federal government.3 7 The Justice Department filed an antitrust suit against the meatpackers in
1902, and then again in 1911 after an investigation ordered by President Theodore Roosevelt.38
Formal antitrust efforts by the federal government in this period were complemented by
a widespread popular unrest with the power of the Big Five to control cattle and beef prices. In a
best-selling 1905 book, journalist Charles Edward Russell famously labeled the meatpackers the
"Greatest Trust in the World" for their "great brute strength."39 Consumer meat boycotts were a
regular feature of the period. Even though dressed beef was generally cheap beef, the apparent
ability of the "Beef Trust" to set prices based on their costs rather than according to the laws of
supply and demand led consumers in cities throughout the country to blame the trust for any
rise in price.40 Organizations such as the Ladies' Anti-Beef Trust Association, formed in New
York in 1902 to protest a fifty-percent rise in meat prices, pointed an accusing finger at "the
Trust" for "taking meat from the bones of your women and children."4l Many consumers felt
they simply could not trust the Beef Trust, located hundreds or thousands of miles away from
the neighborhood meat shop. This was most famously illustrated by the public response to
Upton Sinclair's 1906 expos6 of the Chicago meatpackers in his novel The Jungle. Intending to
illustrate the plight of immigrant workers in the packinghouses, Sinclair instead disgusted his
middle-class readers with images of rats scampering about the kill floors and below vats of
adulterated sausages. The book consequently helped lead to the 1906 passage of the Pure Food
and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act, but did not inspire the socialist political movement
Sinclair had hoped for; as he later quipped, "I aimed at the public's heart and by accident I hit it
in the stomach."42 Nonetheless, Sinclair's work added to the growing consumer displeasure with
3' The packers created a series of pools, the two most important being the Veeder Pool (1893-96, 1898-1902) and the
National Packing Company (1903-1912), but cooperation from each of the major packers was difficult to maintain;
each packer always had an incentive to try to undercut his competitors who were attempting to sustain higher prices.
Yeager, Competition and Regulation, 135-95.
38 Arnould, "Changing Patterns," 24. The result of the 1902 suit was a U.S. Supreme Court injunction against the
Veeder Pool in 1903; the 1911 charge led to a "not guilty" verdict, but the Justice Department convinced the packers to
voluntarily dissolve the National Packing Company.
39 Charles Edward Russell, The Greatest Trust in the World (New York: Ridgway-Thayer, 1905), 5, quoted in Skaggs,
Prime Cut, lo01.
40 Meg Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics: Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2005), Chapter 1.
41 Paula E. Hyman, "Immigrant Women and Consumer Protest: The New York City Kosher Meat Boycott of 1902,"
American Jewish History 70 (Sep. 1980): 94, quoting New York Daily Tribune, May 17, 1902, 1.
42 Upton Sinclair, The Jungle (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988 [1906]); quote from Upton Sinclair,
Autobiography (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1962), 126. See also Skaggs, Prime Cut, 118-29.
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the distant, unseen meatpackers and their power to affect daily food choices in nearly every city
in America.
The Big Five achieved the height of their unpopularity during World War I. Consumer
concern over the rising cost of living dominated the domestic politics of the war, with inflated
food prices inflicting painful sacrifices for working-class and middle-class consumers alike.
Attacks on the Beef Trust shifted from concerns about food adulteration to the problem of
monopoly control over prices. President Woodrow Wilson created a Food Administration,
headed by future President Herbert Hoover, to try to reign in the skyrocketing costs of foods,
primarily through voluntary conservation efforts such as "Meatless Tuesdays."43 When voluntary
conservation proved relatively ineffective at slowing the rise in meat prices, Hoover ordered
meatpackers to take no more than nine percent profit. Even so, meat prices doubled through the
war, and for many consumers the Beef Trust appeared at fault.44 Added to this consumer unrest
was the anger of western cattle producers fed up with the packers' control of stockyards and
cattle prices. Major livestock associations, including the Kansas Livestock Association and the
American National Cattlemen's Association, held meetings in 1916 demanding that President
Wilson direct the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to investigate the profits of the packing
industry.45 At first fearful that such investigations would lead to lower meat production,
impairing the war effort, Wilson finally caved to the pressure from consumers and farmers,
directing the FTC in 1917 to open the books of the packers and determine whether the Big Five
had unduly profited from wartime conditions.46
The FTC report on the meatpacking industry, published in five thick volumes from 1918
to 1920, confirmed the worst suspicions of consumers and cattlemen alike. The Big Five had
gained "enormous" profits during the war, averaging 4.6 percent return on each dollar invested,
or 350 percent more than prewar earnings.47 In terms of net profit on sales, this translated to 15
percent, in direct defiance of the Food Administration's 9 percent limit. The packers responded
43 Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics, Chapter 2.
44 Skaggs, Prime Cut, 87.
45 Wood, Kansas Beef Industry, 174-5.
46 Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics, Chapter 2; Wood, Kansas Beef Industry, 175.
47 Federal Trade Commission, Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Meat-Packing Industry, part I
(Washington: GPO, 1919), 72.
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by running nationwide advertising campaigns claiming that their profits represented only a
couple of cents on each consumer dollar, but as the FTC pointed out, the enormity of the
packers' operations allowed them to transform what seemed like "a very small element of value"
into huge profits.48 The FTC also supported the cattle raiser's belief that packers manipulated
the price of livestock, employing "a vicious system of ... price cutting" to prevent farmers from
receiving their fair share of the consumer's dollar.49 The FTC recommended sweeping
government action to restore competition to cattle buying and beef marketing-outright public
ownership of railroad livestock and refrigerator cars, terminal stockyards, and branch houses.50
Congress opted not to undertake this potentially expensive populist solution, and instead the
Justice Department began antitrust proceedings against the Big Five in 1919. Facing both
popular anger and the strongest government threat to date, the meatpackers capitulated in
1920, signing the famous Consent Decree. Under this agreement, the packers would not be
prosecuted for violations of antitrust laws if they divested of their holdings in terminal
stockyards, pulled out of the retail meat business, and ended any other efforts to conspire to
restrain interstate trade.51
Over the next several decades, the Consent Decree would prove to be a paper tiger with
no teeth. The big packers continued to expand their ownership of refrigerated railcars and
branch houses in an effort to maintain market share. This effort was generally successful, since
in 1921 the major packers' share of meat sales was 64 percent, in 1929 it was 55 percent, and in
the 1930s it hovered around 60 percent-meaning that even as the population grew and meat
consumption rose, the big packers raised their volume of sales proportionally.52 Despite the
Consent Decree's prohibition of mergers, the packers also continued to absorb their
competitors; in 1923, the Big Five became the Big Four when Armour bought out Morris.53 The
48 Federal Trade Commission, Report of the Federal Trade Commission on the Meat-Packing Industry, part V(Washington: GPO, 1920), 12-3.
49 Federal Trade Commission, Report, part I, 68-70.
5c Federal Trade Commission, Report, part I, 26.
51 Skaggs, Prime Cut, 106-7.
52 Corey, Meat and Man, 89.
53 Arnould, "Changing Patterns," 25; Skaggs, Prime Cut, 152.
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packers also proved loath to dispose of their holdings in the public stockyards that provided
them with their cattle supplies; by 1925, they had only sloughed one-quarter of their yards.54
The packers' defiance pushed livestock producers to petition Congress for additional
regulations. Seeking to "restore public confidence" in the federal government's ability to restrain
the Beef Trust, Congress passed the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921.55 The Act was intended
to supplement the Consent Decree by conferring broad antitrust powers to the Secretary of
Agriculture to prevent packers from abusing either farmers or consumers. The intent of the Act
became further clarified in 1922 when the Supreme Court affirmed its constitutionality, with
Chief Justice William Howard Taft arguing that the "chief evil feared is the monopoly of the
packers, enabling them unduly and arbitrarily to lower prices to the shipper who sells, and
unduly and arbitrarily to increase the price to the consumer who buys."56 In practice, however,
the Packers and Stockyards Act proved rather friendly to both the packers and the stockyards.
Secretary of Agriculture Henry C. Wallace publicly declared in 1922 that his Department would
"not assume that men are rascals until they have been proved to be such. We take it for granted
that the various people who are under the supervision of this law will be glad to co-operate with
us."57 Significant action was also hampered by the design of the Act, which required tedious
case-by-case legal-style examination of alleged infractions by packers, without specifying the
actual infractions. Meatpacking firms could not be sure if a practice would be considered illegal
until they got caught using it.58 The USDA did effectively implement the sections of the Act
requiring stockyards to register as quasi-public utilities, maintain proper weights and measures,
and publicly post rates for yardage fees after consultation with the Secretary.59 But for the next
54 Skaggs, Prime Cut, 152.
55 Wood, Kansas Beef Industry, 266.
56 Stafford v Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922), 514-6.
57 "Expects Packers to Help," New York Times (hereafter NYT), May 15, 1922, 8. For a list of the relatively few major
indictments of the meatpackers by the USDA under the Packers and Stockyards Act from 1921 to 1958, see Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Regulation of the Meat Industry: Hearings, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., Apr. 17,
1958,15-24.
58 Department of Justice, Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedures, Administrative Procedure in
Government Agencies: Part 11, Administration of the Packers and Stockyards Act, Department ofAgriculture, 76th
Cong., 3rd sess., 1940, S. Doc. 186, pp. 6-7, 17-18.
59 Department of Justice, Administrative Procedure, Part 11, 2-5, 18; Skaggs, Prime Cut, 157. In 1923, the Act was
further amended to require livestock dealers at public stockyards to be bonded by the USDA to assure producers that
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decade, livestock producers continued to complain bitterly that packer buyers used their
monopsony power to manipulate cattle prices. A livestock commission merchant wrote to
Senator Burt K. Wheeler in 1933 describing the methods used by packers to hold down prices at
the terminal stockyards: "They compare notes daily, and it is common knowledge that the
buyers all come out with the same kind of orders of a morning as to whether or not they are to
try to make their purchases lower, and the exact amount they are to take off if they can break
prices."6 ° The problem of monopoly had become a significant state concern, but had not yet
produced any effective state action.
Trucking and the Dismantled Monopoly, 1930s- 1 950s
The failure of the antitrust efforts of the early twentieth century stemmed not so much
from a lack of state power, but from the fundamental technological and economic structures of
the new beef industry. The economics of distributing highly perishable fresh beef demanded
enormous capital investment to maintain a tightly integrated technological system. Only giant
firms could achieve the economies of scale necessary to make the system work.6 l Consequently,
the problem of monopoly was an acknowledged but intractable political problem by the early
1930s. The onset of the Great Depression brought a renewed urgency to the problem of
monopoly, however. Consumers experienced high meat prices at a time of low incomes, while
livestock raisers saw cattle values drop below the cost of raising the animals. Both groups
blamed the Beef Trust, and called for the federal government to carry out the intent of the
Consent Decree of 1920 and the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921. Ironically, while livestock
producers called for increased government efforts to dismantle the Beef Trust, they made no
corresponding calls for a system of "orderly marketing" like that used to regulate milk
production during the New Deal. Agricultural policymakers-especially Secretary of Agriculture
60 S. McKenna (President, Union Bank and Trust Company) to Senator B. K. Wheeler, Nov. 7, 1933, Secretary of
Agriculture Records, RG 16, General Correspondence, Entry 17, National Archives II, College Park, MD (hereafter
cited as RG 16, Entry 17), Box 1826, Folder 6.
61 The beef industry in this respect was not unlike railroads or electric utilities. See Colleen A. Dunlavy, Politics and
Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994);
Thomas Parker Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1983).
159
Henry A. Wallace (the son of Henry C.)-were caught between a rock and a hard place. On the
one hand, consumers and farmers demanded that the USDA dismantle the meatpacking
monopoly; but on the other hand, the agency was prevented from using state power to prevent
the packers from being the only arbiters of beef prices. As it turned out, the growth of trucking
helped to achieve the desired policy results. By the mid-195os, the locus of marketing power in
the beef industry had shifted from the packers to livestock producers, while the rise of
thousands of small, independent meatpackers realigned the geography and politics of beef
pricing.
Direct Marketing
Dust and depressed prices dominated livestock raising in the early 1930s. Unlike many
farmers, cattlemen had done relatively well during the agricultural depression of the 1920s.6 2
Disaster struck from 1929 to 1933, however, when livestock raisers saw their incomes drop by
more than half. Particularly in the Dust Bowl of the southern Plains, cattle died of starvation and
thirst, while those that survived were often so underfed they brought almost no money at
market.6 3 But unlike organized dairy farmers producing bottled milk, western cattle raisers were
almost universally opposed to gaining higher prices through government regulation of
marketing or planning of production under the AAA. This did not mean they were opposed to
government help, of course; ranchers certainly appreciated federal land subsidies, generous
credit terms, tariffs on imported livestock, and efforts to eradicate tick fever, foot-and-mouth
disease, and wolves.6 4 As one historian has referred to ranchers' ideas about the New Deal,
"They wanted help, but not controls; they hankered after a handout without regulation."6 5
Some livestock raisers had doubts, however, when they realized the AAA policy of
supporting grain prices meant the cost of feeding cattle would rise. A livestock raiser in Boise
City, Oklahoma, wrote to Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace in July of 1933, asking why
62 Skaggs, Prime Cut, 131-7. On the depression of the '20os, see James Shideler, Farm Crisis, 1919-1923 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1957).
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64 Skaggs, Prime Cut, 134-5; Corey, Meat and Man, 131.
65 John T. Schlebecker, Cattle Raising on the Plains, 1900-1961 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1963), 136.
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the AAA surplus reduction programs had to "go the limit" on grains, driving up the price of feeds
for livestock raisers like himself who grew "neither grain nor grass."66 In response to such pleas,
Congress passed the Jones-Connally Act of 1934 to make cattle a basic commodity under the
AAA, and therefore eligible-like milk-to be included in marketing agreements that would raise
prices for farmers. This Act was never put into effect, however, partly because funds from the
Federal Emergency Relief Administration and the Drought Relief Service were used from 1933
to 1936 to buy up sick and dying cattle to provide free meat for unemployed workers on relief.
The relief purchases reduced cattle numbers and improved farmers' prices, but even by 1940
cattlemen received incomes 20 percent lower than they had in 1929.67
Despite the difficulties cattlemen experienced during the early 1930s, there was no New
I)eal for beef raisers. But two fundamental factors of political economy provide more likely
explanations for livestock producers' lack of support for state economic planning.6 8 First, the
vast majority of cattlemen in the United States from the late 19th century to the late 1960s were
not ranchers on vast tracts of the western and southern plains. Most cattle producers were
instead Corn Belt producers, on relatively small plots of land, who generally fed less than 200
head of cattle as part of a mixed farming operation. In the late 19th century, after Euro-
American pioneers had broken the prairies of the Mississippi River valley and replaced native
grasses with corn and wheat, many farmers found livestock raising to be a convenient adjunct to
grain farming.6 9 Corn Belt cattle feeders would buy young "stocker" cattle from ranchers on
grasslands farther west, then confine them in small feedlots to eat corn until they reached a
profitable weight. These grain-fed "fattened" or "finished" steers generally brought good prices
6t6 L. K. Bangerter to Henry A. Wallace, Jul. 29, 1933, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 1826, Folder 6.
67 Henry A. Wallace to Harry Hopkins, Dec. 20, 1933, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 1771, Folder 14; Agricultural Adjustment
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Murphy to Chester C. Davis, May 17, 1934, ibid.; Franklin D. Roosevelt, Executive Order 6747, "Allocating Funds to
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from certain customers, especially managers of upper-crust hotels, who happily paid extra for
the highly marbled, tender beef.70 But even if cattle prices were not high, feeding one's own grain
to one's own cattle was often an effective economic safety net. The cattle provided a "home
market" for grains when prices dropped too low to justify the cost of shipping to grain elevators,
and besides, feeder cattle provided piles of rich manure to fertilize fields.71 This was a crucial
factor shaping the political economy of livestock feeding through most of the twentieth century.
Midwestern cattlemen relied on fluctuations in the prices of grains and cattle in order to make
their profits; the last thing they wanted from government policymakers was regulation or
subsidy of prices that would disturb the game of supply-and-demand.
The second fundamental factor of the political economy of beef production was the
"cattle cycle." The biology and ecology of beef cattle production have created continuous boom-
and-bust cycles that have posed (and continue to pose) fundamental challenges to any state
efforts to stabilize prices over the long run. The biology of the beef cow has defied most efforts to
significantly speed up the process of turning a newborn calf into a fattened steer; the process has
always taken at least two years, often several more. The ecology of cattle raising requires much
of this time to be spent on large expanses of grassland. Cattle ranchers must invest in giant plots
of range land that can serve no economically useful purpose other than providing grass for meat
animals. As a consequence, all ranchers attempt to fill their land with as many cattle as they can
until disastrous price drops force them to cull their herds. But because several years lapse before
a rancher's decision to reduce production results in fewer fattened cattle, price changes
consistently lag behind changes in cattle supplies. The result is a never-ending cattle cycle of lo0
to 12 years, in which the first 6 to 7 years see livestock raisers expanding production as prices
rise, then 4 to 5 years of declining production when prices fall due to oversupply.72 The cattle
70 Cronon, Nature's Metropolis, 222, 236.
71 J. S. Cotton, Edmund Thompson, and Jay Whitson, "Cost of Fattening Cattle," in Report of the Federal Trade
Commission on the Meat-Packing Industry, part VI (Washington: GPO, 1920), 64, 55-132.
72 This phenomenon has been known for at least a century, but it was agricultural economist Mordecai Ezekiel who
first provided a coherent theory to explain its persistence. The theory is called the "cobweb theorem" because when
production decisions are plotted through time, superimposed over a graph of supply and demand curves, an image
resembling a spider's cobweb appears. Mordecai Ezekiel, "The Cobweb Theorem," Quarterly Journal of Economics
52 (Feb. 1938): 255-80. For a more recent review of the concept, see Kenneth H. Mathews, Jr., et al., U.S. Beef
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1999).
162
cycle has been a permanent feature of beef production throughout the twentieth century.
Successful Farming, noting the regularity of the phenomenon up to 1975, advised its readers to
"'buy a 1o-year calendar."73 Regulating such lengthy price cycles would require a degree of
foreknowledge beyond the capacity of most government bureaucrats; and in any case, political
cycles tend to be several years shorter than cattle cycles.
Henry A. Wallace's Department of Agriculture was thus under pressure to help livestock
raisers, but not through price supports, production controls, or marketing agreements. The Beef
Trust's power to control cattle prices became the logical target for state action. In particular, the
USDA focused its efforts on the public stockyards or terminal markets where cattlemen
continued to complain of unfair trade practices by the big packers. Using the authority granted
by the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, Wallace took a somewhat indirect, though ultimately
effective, route to limit the monopsony power of the packers in the buying of cattle. This was
done primarily by encouraging decentralization, made possible by trucks, of the cattle marketing
infrastructure.
Farmers first began significant use of trucks to haul livestock to markets in the 192oS.
Farmers began loading up their own or their neighbors' animals on pickup trucks, often Ford
Model Ts, and driving them to the nearest public market. Rarely traveling more than 50 miles in
t hose days of relatively inadequate country roads, farmers fortunate enough to be located close
to a market such as Chicago, St. Paul, or St. Louis could often gain significant savings by
avoiding rail shipping costs and by taking animals to market only on days when prices were
high. Using trucks, farmers could counteract the monopsony power of cattle buyers by simply
refusing to sell until the price was right.74 At first, many terminal stockyards proved resistant to
trucked-in livestock. Because yards often had tight financial relationships with railroad
73 The magazine described the first half of the cycle thus: "Characteristics are high cattle prices, glittering outlook
reports, optimistic speeches, stories about meat shortages, high pasture rent and an upswing in sales of cowboy
boots." The second half of the cycle was characterized by "bankers who wouldn't be caught dead in cowboy boots." Lee
Searle, "Cattle Marketing: Cycles Still Control the Booms and Busts," Successful Farming, Aug. 1975, 22-3.
741 R. C. Ashby, Livestock Truckage Rates in Illinois with a Comparison of Marketing Expense by Truck and by Rail,
Bulletin 342 (Urbana: Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station, 1930); E. C. Johnson and E. A. Johnson, Trucking
Livestock to South St. Paul, Bulletin 278 (St. Paul: Minnesota Agricultural Experiment Station, 1931); G. F. Henning,
The Truck and Its Relationship to Livestock Marketing in Ohio, Bulletin 440 (Wooster: Ohio Agricultural Experiment
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companies as well as significant investments in railheads and unloading platforms, they charged
sellers of trucked-in livestock higher yardage and commission fees.7s
In 1935 Secretary of Agriculture Wallace, realizing the potential power of trucking to
shift the balance of power in cattle marketing, initiated a number of efforts under the Packers
and Stockyards Act to equalize railroad and trucking rates. The Union Stock Yard at Chicago was
the primary target. When Chicago petitioned the Secretary to be allowed to raise its fees from 40
cents to 50 cents per head of cattle trucked in, Wallace denied the application, noting that it
would place "an undue burden on the shippers of livestock arriving by truck."76 After denying
the petition, Wallace drove the point home by ordering an investigation of the reasonableness of
trucking rates at Chicago.77 Chicago quickly learned its lesson, as stockyards deeper in cattle
supply areas-especially Omaha, St. Joseph, and Kansas City-began building improved truck
unloading facilities in the mid-193os to try to attract livestock producers to their facilities.78 In
1936, trucks hauled 55 percent of cattle shipped to public stock yards.79 The proportion of cattle
moving to public stockyards via truck rather than rail steadily increased over the next few
decades. In 1939 three of every five cattle arrived by truck; in 1949, nearly three-quarters did so,
and by 1960, nine of ten cattle came to public stockyards in truck trailers.8o
A more fundamental shift in cattle marketing power relations came with the advent of
"direct" or "country" buying in the 1930s. Rather than ship livestock all the way to urban
stockyards to be sold by a commission merchant, farmers found that they could reduce shipping
costs and yardage fees by simply selling their stock at smaller yards or concentration points in
the countryside. Packer buyers came to these yards to buy directly from the farmers rather than
through city commission merchants. The packers would consequently be responsible, rather
than the farmers, for most of the costs of shipping the cattle to slaughtering plants. Since the
shipping of the animal to the plant was generally done via rail, these concentration points were
75 Ashby, Livestock Truckage Rates in Illinois, 148.
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usually built by railroads close to highways to encourage farmers to truck their animals to
country railheads.81 For instance, the Southern Railroad built an auction yard in Knoxville,
Tennessee in 1928, where farmers trucked in cattle from within a 75- to oo-mile radius and
sold them directly to Swift and Armour buyers for their slaughtering plants in neighboring
states.82 The Illinois Central Railroad initiated a similar plan in 1934, hoping to recapture
livestock shipments from truckers by providing twenty-two country buying stations on their
lines west of Chicago; the railroad even paid truckers to travel to farms within a ten mile radius
of each station to collect livestock.8 3 The Santa Fe likewise built country buying stations in the
southern plains of Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico in the 1930s.8 4 At first, direct buying
posed only a relatively small threat to the business of the big urban yards. In 1933, only about 17
percent of cattle were direct marketed. By 1939, about a quarter of cattle were sold outside the
central terminal markets.8 5
As early as 1934, however, stockyard managers foresaw the potential for direct buying to
render their urban facilities obsolete. The American Stock Yards Association, which represented
t he 50 largest central markets in the country, consequently proposed to Secretary Wallace that a
code of fair competition be drawn up under the auspices of the National Recovery
Administration to prevent packers from buying livestock outside the traditional marketing
channels. Claiming that direct buying "seriously depresses the price of livestock," the stockyards
argued that a code of fair competition was necessary to prevent packers from taking advantage
of farmers who did not have the help of an experienced commission agent to negotiate higher
prices. The stockyards received some backing from livestock organizations in this effort; the
president of the Kansas Farmers' Union testified before Secretary Wallace that "the universal
sentiment in Kansas is against the direct marketing evil."86 But if such sentiment was universal
81 George L. Schein (Counsel for a Group of Interior Packers), "Index and Abstract of Transcript of Hearing on
Proposed Code of Fair Competition Submitted by the American Stockyards Association to the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration and the National Recovery Administration for Approval," Mar. 2, 3, 5, 6, 1934, RG 16,
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82 Notes on Knoxville, Tenn. Union Livestock Yards, Mar. 1959, RG 136, Transportation and Facilities Research
Division, Project Files and Research Studies, 1947-1963, Entry 43, National Archives II, College Park, MD, Box 4.
8:3 "Livestock Lure," Business Week (hereafter BW), Dec. 1, 1934, 21.
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in Kansas, most of the producers who testified at the hearings thought otherwise. A livestock
feeder from northwest Iowa swore that "when the packer came along to purchase livestock from
the farmer for cash it was to the farmer's great advantage." No longer did the farmer have to pay
shipping costs or extortionate yardage fees, and he was furthermore guaranteed an instant cash
payment.8 7 A cattle feeder from eastern Iowa agreed, calling the urban stockyard companies
"autocratic and dictatorial" and blaming the Chicago Union Stock Yard in particular for "greatly
overcharging in feeding charges."88 In combination with vociferous objections from railroad
managers and packing company representatives, producers' protests led the Secretary of
Agriculture to offer no support to the proposed NRA code, and it was never enacted.8 9
Over time Secretary Wallace and his advisors became increasingly convinced that direct
buying offered a politically painless solution to the problem of monopsony. When stockyards
first began complaining to Wallace of the "direct marketing evil" in 1933, Wallace ordered a
preliminary investigation by the Packers and Stockyards Division. Finding no evidence of unfair
practices by packers in direct buying, the economists at the division were nonetheless
ambivalent at first as to whether the long-term effect would be beneficial or harmful to
producers.9s Following the NRA code hearings, the Packers and Stockyards Division made a
more thorough investigation, once again finding no evidence of collusive behavior on the part of
direct packer buyers.91 Livestock producers, meanwhile, increasingly adopted the new sales
method through the 1930s, prompting agricultural economist Albert G. Black (a former student
of John D. Black) to state in 1938 that "a movement such as direct marketing must have
tremendous popular appeal to livestock producers and to livestock processors, otherwise it
would hardly have grown as rapidly as it has."92 The rise of hundreds of country buying stations
and local auction markets led to an increasingly decentralized marketing structure, allowing a
87 Ibid., 74-5.
88 Ibid., 79.
89 Ibid., passim; J. D. LeCron (Assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture) to J. E. Renner (Renner Livestock
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Box 1848, Folder 4.
91 M. L. Wilson to C. A. Lyndon (Alberta Agriculture Department), Feb. 1, 1939, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 3048D, Folder
11.
92 A. G. Black to N. K. Carnes (General Manager, Central Co-Operative Association), Dec. 28, 1938, RG 16, Entry 17,
Box 2821, Folder 13.
166
farmer to load cattle on a truck trailer and sell his stock at a place and time of his choosing. This
produced a new economic geography in which, although the number of firms buying slaughter
cattle still remained relatively small, the number of possible points of sale had multiplied
dramatically, thereby decreasing the ability of buyers to collusively set prices.9s3
The power of trucking to reconfigure cattle marketing in favor of producers was almost
c ertainly not due to lower costs or simple economic efficiency. As late as 1947, when decent
highways began making trucking generally more cost effective than in the 1930s, the Kansas
Agricultural Experiment Station reported that trucking livestock cost from 12 to 14 cents more
per hundred pounds than shipping by railroad at distances of 150 to 250 miles.4 The efficiency
of highway livestock transport was further hindered by the difficulty cattle truckers experienced
finding suitable loads for the return trip, or "backhaul," home. This became most evident during
World War II, when the Office of Defense Transportation required all truckers to carry a
rninimum of 75 percent of loaded capacity on all backhauls in order to conserve rubber and fuel.
Unfortunately, cattle trailers proved difficult to load for backhauls. An Indiana livestock trader
asked his congressional representatives to consider exempting cattle haulers from the ODT
requirement, since "live stock trucks being unroofed, and slatted, and filthy with dirt, are not
suitable for many kinds of hauling jobs."95 A livestock trucker might be able to return with coal,
cattle feed, straw:, or some other non-edible general freight, but would generally have to do so at
rates that might not even pay for the fuel to get back, since every other livestock trucker heading
back competed for the same loads.96 The problem was compounded in sparsely populated cattle
raising areas that sent out great volumes of animals but imported relatively little general
freight.97 By any standard measure of transportation efficiency, trucks could not compete with
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the lower costs of railroads or their ability to subsidize empty backhaul cars with loaded box cars
in the same train.98
It was the convenience and flexibility of livestock trucking, not rational calculations of
costs, that led farmers to increasingly abandon the rail-based terminal market system. Oscar
Mayer, a leading independent meatpacker, argued at the 1934 NRA fair competition hearings
that the shift to country buying was not only beneficial for farmers, but was an inescapable
product of technological change, the "result of good roads, motor transportation and radio."99
Though his determinism was perhaps a bit strong, Mayer was quite right to note the possibilities
opened up by these three technologies. Radio allowed the farmers to maximize the power of
trucking, because farmers would listen to early morning livestock market reports to decide
whether they might be able to get a good price that day at the local auction or cattle buying
station. As Ernest Kellenberger, a cattle feeder from Algona, Iowa, would recall 30 years later, it
was very convenient to "turn my radio on early in the morning and back the old truck up to the
chute and put the cattle on and take them [to market], if the [price] seem[ed] desirable." ° °
Producers with access to trucks could exercise more freedom in choosing when and where to
market their livestock. Most notably, farmers could haul their animals to either a country
market or to an urban market, and if the price wasn't right that day, either take the cattle to
another market with higher prices or simply take them home. This had been impossible in the
days when railroads controlled cattle shipments according to their strict schedules, and big
packers and their stockyard allies controlled the daily prices at all major markets via
telegraph.l° ' By the beginning of World War II, trucking brought cattlemen a newfound power in
the livestock marketplace. The Packers and Stockyards Division of the USDA had achieved part
of its original mission without having to flex much state muscle.
98 Of course, railroad stock cars were just as unadaptable as truck cattle trailers for alternate cargoes, but railroads
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The Price of Beef
The problem of packer monopoly in distribution was not so easily solved. While farmers
received disastrously low prices for their cattle in the early 1930s, consumers found prices of
fresh beef increasingly out of reach. The prices of sirloin steak and round steak increased 5
percent just in the month from June to July 1933.1o2 From August 1933 to August 1935, the
average price of sirloin increased by more than a third, with round steak up 40 percent.'0 3 At a
time when up to one-quarter of the workforce was unemployed, such price rises forced many
families to buy less meat. In 1929 Americans consumed 85 pounds of red meat per capita, but in
:1935 each person consumed only 77 pounds.'04 Purchasing less meat was one form of resistance
to high prices, but in a nation where beef had been transformed from a luxury to a prerogative of
the American way of life, many consumers sought more active political solutions.los In 1935,
activists in cities like New York, Detroit, and Boston organized extensive meat boycotts.
Picketing housewives shut down butcher shops, demanded lower prices, and above all called for
thorough investigations of the Beef Trust. 106 The Women's Auxiliary of the United Auto Workers
mounted further protests against beef prices in 1937-38 in a nationwide campaign known as "No
Meat Weeks."'07 Livestock raisers generally sympathized with the consumers' outrage, since high
retail prices reduced demand. An Iowa cattle feeder, bewildered by rock-bottom cattle prices at a
time when consumers could not afford to buy beef, wrote Secretary of Agriculture Henry A.
Wallace in 1933 to offer his take on the problem: "I do not blame any one but the packing
industry."0o8
Wallace's Department of Agriculture came under constant pressure in the 1930s to use
the power bestowed by the Packers and Stockyards Act to deal with the Beef Trust's apparent
control of retail meat pricing. The Packers and Stockyards Act (P&SA) of 1921 provided
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sweeping antitrust powers to the Secretary of Agriculture, but had lain essentially dormant for a
decade. The P&SA was administered by the Bureau of Animal Industry, which was in charge of
gathering data on slaughter volumes and cattle prices from the packers and also performed
federally mandated meat inspections. Both of these activities required a degree of friendly
cooperation between the private firms and the USDA's agents that previous Secretaries of
Agriculture, including Henry A. Wallace's own father, Henry C., were not willing to sacrifice.109
Nonetheless, with both consumer and producer anger mounting over the monopoly power of the
big meatpackers in direct defiance of the Justice Department's Consent Decree, the P&SA
seemed to offer the only strong legal support for state intervention.
Ironically, the first approach of the New Deal USDA to the meatpacker monopoly
problem was to consider relaxing antitrust efforts rather than strengthen them. With the milk
marketing agreements as a model, agricultural policymakers gave significant thought to creating
a legalized monopoly in beef marketing, providing the big packers with immunity from antitrust
actions in exchange for a guarantee of higher prices to farmers and reduced prices for
consumers. Economists believed this might be possible to achieve, since the big packers would
have incentives to increase capital investments in their operations without fear of state
intervention, thereby achieving greater economies of scale that would benefit farmers and
consumers while still allowing a "reasonable profit" for the packers.llo Perhaps the most
surprising advocate of this approach in 1933 was the liberal Jerome Frank, legal counsel for the
AAA who was also active in crafting the milk marketing agreements. [See Chapter 2.] Writing to
sympathetic agricultural economists Rexford Tugwell, Mordecai Ezekiel, and Frederic C. Howe,
Frank recommended in June of 1933 that the whole concept of antitrust be reexamined. Rather
than consider the profit structures of the big meatpackers, Frank suggested a more appropriate
strategy was to "restrict our attention to precisely computable savings effected by [economies of
scale] and require that some portion of these savings be given to the farmer and some to the
109 "Expects Packers to Help," op cit.; Senate Committee on Agriculture, Regulation of the Meat Industry, Hearings,
85th Cong., 2nd sess., Apr. 17, 1958, 7, 10, 11.
110 Frederic C. Howe, Memorandum for Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, "Working Arrangement with Meat
Packing Companies," Jan. 24, 1934, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 1995, Folder 6.
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consuming public.""' For a year, the USDA actively courted the meatpackers' opinions on this
approach through private negotiations led by Frank.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the packers proved quite receptive to the idea. Frederick H.
Prince, a major stockholder in the Armour company and the Chicago Union Stock Yard, argued
that "the most complete monopoly power that could possibly be granted" was necessary to
achieve the New Deal goals of "fair profit on manufacturing" while still maintaining high farm
prices and low consumer costs.l 2 Prince drafted a detailed proposal for this "most complete
monopoly," to be known as the Union Purchasing and Distributing Company. This company was
to be owned by the Big Four packers and would "do all of the purchasing for the packers, fix the
price to be paid for all commodities purchased, and have complete control of all shipments....
The company is also to fix the prices to be charged for all products sold." According to Prince,
retail prices of meat would plummet with the savings in transportation and distribution costs
achieved by shared facilities.l13
Prince's dream of a state-sanctioned mega-trust would never come to fruition. Henry
Wallace's top economic advisor Mordecai Ezekiel was particularly horrified at the idea of
providing "a blank check of tremendous magnitude signed by the Secretary [of Agriculture],
made out to the packers, and payable by farmers and consumers." The proposed agreement,
Ezekiel angrily wrote to Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Rexford Tugwell, would give the
packers "unlimited monopoly power to fix prices" and would lead to a "national scandal" for the
USDA.14 Livestock organizations privy to the terms of the proposed meatpacker agreement
concurred; it appeared to the president of the Nebraska Live Stock Breeders and Feeders
Association in 1933, for instance, that the USDA was "dominated and surrounded by men that
are known to be closely allied and connected with the packing industry.""5 In response to such
1L Jerome Frank to Rexford Tugwell, Mordecai Ezekiel, Frederic Howe, et al., "In Re: Packers," Jun. 29, 1933, RG 16,
Entry 17, Box 1826, Folder 5. Emphasis in original.
11:2 Mordecai Ezekiel to Chester Davis, Jun. 11, 1934, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 1995, Folder 6.
11:3 Robert E. Sher (Chief Attorney, Legal Division), Memorandum to Mr. Pressman, "Plan Proposed by Mr. F. H.
Prince for Organization of Union Purchasing and Distribution Company," Jan. 26, 1934, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 1995,
Folder 6.
-'1 Mordecai Ezekiel to Rexford Tugwell, "Re: Packers' Agreement," Aug. 8, 1933, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 1826, Folder 5.
See also Paul H. Appleby, Memorandum for Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, "Packers' Agreement," Feb.
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criticism, Jerome Frank redrafted the proposed agreement in August 1933 to authorize the
Secretary of Agriculture to examine packers' books to insure that their profits remained
reasonable, but the packers resisted what they called "fishing expeditions" into their company
records."6 Gustavus Swift wrote Secretary Wallace in January 1934 to argue that his company
made only "moderate profit," most of which went to the company's 55,000 stockholders-"a
collection of small people." Reduction of those moderate packer profits, Swift asserted, would
not only be unfair to the "small people" but would have only an insignificant impact on either
farmers' prices or consumers' costs."7 By May 1934, it had become clear that the meatpackers
and the USDA's liberal economists would never reconcile their ideas of what counted as
reasonable monopoly power in terms of the public interest. The agreement was scrapped when
the packers flatly refused to provide the Secretary with unlimited access to their books."8
Meanwhile, pressure mounted from consumer activists and livestock raisers for the
USDA to confront the Beef Trust. The pressure was exacerbated in 1934 when the AAA's new
programs to support farm incomes appeared to be partially at fault for rising food prices. Bad
press became particularly painful for Secretary Wallace after he ordered reductions in hog
numbers in late 1933 to restore pre-Depression farm prices; the so-called "slaughter of six
million baby pigs," along with grain price supports and cotton acreage control programs, would
haunt his Department for years afterwards. The implication that New Deal agricultural
programs were promoting inflated food costs for urban workers at a time of crisis would not
easily dissipate.s In this context, Wallace felt compelled to defend the Packers and Stockyards
Division as doing the best it could to keep a watchful eye on the pricing activities of the major
meatpackers. Secretary Wallace received hundreds of letters from citizens demanding USDA
investigations of the meatpackers through the 1930s. For instance, Massachusetts Governor
Charles F. Hurley reported in 1937 that his state's Labor and Industries Department had found
retail meat prices to be "exorbitant," and requested a formal investigation into the matter by the
16 Jerome N. Frank, "In Re: Marketing Agreement with Packers," Aug. 11, 1933, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 1826, Folder 5.
"7 G. F. Swift (President, Swift & Company) to Henry A. Wallace, Jan. 11, 1934, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 1995, Folder 6.
i18 Mordecai Ezekiel, Memorandum for Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, "Status of Negotiations with
Packers," Jan. 17, 1934, RG 16, Entry 17, Box 1995, Folder 6; Fred Krey (President, Krey Packing Company) to Rep.
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RG 16, Entry 17, Box 2380, Folder 4.
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USDA.2 0 Wallace replied that drought-induced feed shortages were the primary cause of high
meat prices, and besides, the P&SA did not grant the USDA "authority or power to regulate or
supervise the activities of retail meat dealers."121
The P&SA did, however, provide authority to order wholesale meatpackers to cease and
lesist from price-fixing and other collusive behaviors. In the spring of 1934, as the proposed
meatpacker marketing agreement fell apart, Wallace initiated hearings to investigate eleven
major packing firms for colluding to set retail prices and apportion sales of fresh meat to prevent
sales competition across regional territories. In 1936 Wallace formally ordered the packers to
end such practices; unfortunately, by the time the ruling came out, the packers had voluntarily
stopped the illicit activities.l22 Wallace was further humiliated in 1938 when Swift & Company
retaliated by filing a lawsuit in federal court charging the Department of Agriculture with
overstepping its authority under the P&SA.123 Although this lawsuit went nowhere, it symbolized
the uncertain status of the USDA as a trust-buster. Even when the Department had widespread
political backing and an internal commitment to enforce antitrust provisions, its efforts were
always one step behind the evasive packers. This left only the Federal Trade Commission and
the Justice Department to cajole the packers into observing the antitrust provisions of the 1920
Consent Decree. Like the Department of Agriculture, these federal agencies found effective
action difficult to achieve through the 1930s, even after the Supreme Court ordered the packers
to comply fully with the terms of the original Consent Decree in 1932. Part of this failure was
due to the fact that the Consent Decree allowed the packers to retain their fleets of refrigerated
railcars and their branch houses, the two key elements allowing them to maintain monopoly
power in meat marketing.124
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Strong government involvement in the meat economy did not come until World War II,
with the creation of the Office of Price Administration (OPA). Established to prevent runaway
inflation like that experienced during World War I, the OPA proved surprisingly successful at
keeping a lid on consumer prices of meat through World War II. While meat prices had risen by
60 percent during World War I, prices only rose about 30 percent under the watch of the
OPA.125 This was remarkable, since the armed forces purchased huge quantities of meat for
soldiers even as good-paying wartime jobs allowed consumers to put meat back on the table;
producers could barely keep up with the demand.126 The OPA's achievement relied on a
combination of extensive state action, instituted in the form of price controls and rationing,
enforced by thousands of committed staff members and volunteers at the community level,
"reaching down into the kitchens and closets of every home."127 The OPA's efforts to hold the
line on beef prices effectively quieted concerns over the Beef Trust during the war, as consumers
enjoyed reasonable prices and livestock raisers experienced record profits. Furthermore, the
activities of the OPA created a window of opportunity for independent meatpackers to make a
dent in the Big Four's monopoly power in the beef industry.
The lessons of World War I led the OPA to freeze retail and wholesale food prices as part
of the General Maximum Price Regulation of April 1942. Price controls on meat were further
strengthened in December of the same year when beef prices were pegged at actual dollars-and-
cents levels based on federally mandated grades, making it possible for consumers to check
printed price lists to know whether they were being overcharged for a particular cut of meat.28
Price controls gained their most significant support in March, 1943, when rationing was
introduced, thereby limiting consumer demand for meat without the need for higher prices to
discourage consumption.l29 Importantly, however, the prices of livestock were not so effectively
controlled. Livestock raisers knew that wartime demand for meat offered an unprecedented
opportunity to recoup losses incurred during the Depression. Powerful lobbyists from the Farm
125 Corey, Meat and Man, 185.
126 Marshall B. Clinard, The Black Market: A Study of White Collar Crime (New York: Rinehart, 1952), 124.
127 Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics, Chapter 5; quote from Meg Jacobs, "'How About Some Meat?': The Office of Price
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History 84 (Dec 1997): 918.
128 "Peg Beef Prices," BW, Dec. 19, 1942, 70; Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics, Chapter 5.
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174
Bureau and livestock organizations descended on Congress during the deliberations establishing
the OPA, successfully convincing Farm Bloc representatives to tie price ceilings for cattle to
parity rather than fix them at a certain amount. Since the formula for parity fluctuated with the
cost of living, the price of live cattle was essentially allowed to creep upward.130 Combined with
record-high numbers of cattle available for slaughter and low feed costs, it appeared to Business
Week in May of 1.942 that livestock producers would "be in the money up to their saddle horns"
throughout the war. 131 Certainly, livestock producers had little reason to complain about the
Beef Trust under such conditions.
Lax control of cattle prices also provided a unique opportunity for independent
rneatpackers to compete directly with the Big Four. With the price of live cattle essentially
uncontrolled, illicit entrepreneurs had a tremendous incentive to buy cattle at prices well above
those offered by the major packers, then sell carcasses at above-ceiling prices to black market
dealers. These "fly-by-night" operators developed a number of ingenious methods for avoiding
price controls. For instance, each slaughterer was allowed by law to slaughter 50 cattle for his
own personal use; quite often, these animals would make their way to retailers who would pay
an artificially inflated price by "hiring" an employee of the slaughterer to receive the extra
cash.132 Smaller meatpackers and wholesalers found it much easier than the Big Four to engage
in such illicit practices, since only the largest packers were federally inspected by the USDA.
Staff members of the OPA soon realized that such black market operations threatened the entire
meat price control program, and demanded the USDA determine how many nonfederally
inspected plants were in operation and begin tracking their production.'33 Although the USDA
never did compile reliable data on non-federally inspected packers, later estimates put the
volume of slaughter by such packers at one-half of wartime meat production.l34
130 Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics, Chapter 5; Schlebecker, Cattle Raising, 171.
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The Big Four packers chafed under the OPA, blaming price controls for allowing
independent packers to make ill-gotten inroads into their business. In 1944 the big packers
convinced the OPA that price controls without effective livestock price ceilings were putting
them in a "squeeze" that would force them to cut back production, resulting in meat shortages.135
In January of 1945, the OPA responded by instituting enforceable price ceilings on live cattle.
Packers could now be charged with price violations for paying too much for their livestock.
Packers were also given a direct subsidy which would be withheld if the OPA determined the
packer was overpaying for cattle.l36 Even so, the ceilings on live cattle proved nearly impossible
to enforce; small packers could earn far more from selling overpriced carcasses on the black
market than they could by taking the government subsidy. OPA administrator Paul Porter
realized in March 1946 that packers who complied with the cattle ceiling prices were finding it
difficult to get a sufficient supply of animals, making them "extremely antagonistic" to the
continuation of price regulations.137 Ultimately, this antagonism would lead the meatpackers to
organize a "strike," refusing to ship meat to stores in the summer and fall of 1946 until the OPA
was killed.138
Livestock raisers and their allies in the Congressional Farm Bloc and in the USDA aided
the meatpackers in their efforts to break the OPA in 1946. The Farm Bureau mounted a strong
campaign against the livestock price ceilings, arguing that only increased production could
achieve lower consumer prices; livestock raisers would simply withhold their animals from
market, the Farm Bureau argued, unless ceilings were lifted.139 Secretary of Agriculture Clinton
Anderson agreed with this logic, opposing price ceilings on live cattle from the very beginning of
the war, and also refusing to help the OPA enforce the ceilings once they were instituted in
1945.140 When Congress gave Anderson the power to raise live cattle ceilings independently of
135 "Prices Assailed," BW, Jul. 15, 1944, 28, 31; "Beef in Trouble," BW, Dec. 23, 1944, 17-8; Clinard, Black Market, 145.
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the OPA in the fall of 1946, he immediately did so.'41 Unsatisfied with even this significant
weakening of the OPA, cattlemen saw an opportunity to destroy all price controls by staging an
unofficial "strike" in coordination with the meatpackers' efforts to create a meat shortage in
October 1946.142 One Iowa cattle feeder wrote to Secretary Anderson that he had once been an
''ardent supporter of OPA" but felt that it had lost "popular support," and thus had also lost his.
lie would keep his cattle on feed until all government interference in the cattle market was
removed.43 With both meatpackers and livestock raisers on "strike," the OPA was doomed as
angry consumers demanded pot roasts, whatever the price. President Truman cancelled all price
controls and rationing in mid-October, but was widely ridiculed for "bungling" the entire
program.l44 The once-despised Beef Trust had successfully deflected consumers' anger away
from itself and towards the government, although its independent competitors in cattle
slaughter had gained market share along the way. Livestock raisers, meanwhile, had proven that
the easing of monopsony in cattle marketing had given them enough market power to influence
the politics of meat prices to an unprecedented extent.
But if the big packers had successfully courted consumer opinion at the end of the war,
skyrocketing meat prices over the next few years would soon bring the Beef Trust back into
disrepute. The packers' main argument against the OPA had been that price controls created an
unfair "squeeze" situation which prevented them from producing enough meat to satisfy
consumer demand at low prices. But for two years after the end of controls, meat prices
skyrocketed.145 In 1947 the Mayor of New York declared that "housewives in this city" saw prices
rising from 6 to 16 cents per pound, a "shocking" development that belied the packers' promise
of "plenty of meat at reasonable prices."146 Newsweek found that retail meat prices rose ten
percent from May to June 1947, leading to a "spirited game of find-the-culprit at all levels of the
'41 J. B. Hasselman (Assistant to the Secretary of Agriculture) to Paul A. Porter, Aug. 24, 1946, RG 16, Entry 17, Box
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meat industry." 1'47 Consumer activists once again organized meat boycotts in 1947 and 1948,
blaming the Beef Trust for taking unreasonable profits; some even called for a return to price
controls to rein in spiraling prices of meat.148 The Justice Department filed a new anti-trust suit
against the Big Four packers in 1948, but the packers defended themselves by pointing to
record-high consumer demand at a time of cattle shortages as the source of the problem.149
Eventually the Justice Department dropped the suit in 1954, merely insisting that the packers
follow the original Consent Decree.l50
With antitrust sentiment building up again from the late 1940S to the early 1950s, the
Justice Department's failure to cope with the Beef Trust put increased pressure on the USDA to
do something about packer control of the price of meat. This was something the Department
proved reluctant to do directly by administering the antitrust provisions of the Packers and
Stockyards Act. Instead, agricultural policymakers took an indirect route to reduce the
marketing power of the big packers by redoubling efforts to increase the producing power of
livestock raisers. Part of the reason for this indirect attack on the problem was due to the
creation of the Livestock Advisory Committee under the Research and Marketing Act (RMA) of
1946. This committee was explicitly created by Congress to search for ways to reduce the cost of
marketing meat products. From the beginning, however, the Committee was uninterested in any
work by agricultural economists or engineers that might lower retail meat prices by reducing
marketing costs, instead approving only those projects that increased cattle production
capacities.'5s This was because, unlike other committees under the RMA, the Livestock Advisory
Committee was dominated almost solely by representatives of farmers, rather than packers,
wholesalers, or retailers.152 Rather than work on issues of marketing, the Livestock Advisory
Committee encouraged research into "production ... defined to include improvement in grass
and forage for feed; breeding and genetics, with emphasis on the dissemination of methods of
147 "Beefs about Beef," Newsweek, Jun. 23, 1947, 68-9.
148 Skaggs, Prime Cut, 167; Jacobs, Pocketbook Politics, Chapter 6.
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producing improved animals; disease and parasite control; and improved feeding and
management practices."53 The USDA's postwar productionist approach to the beef industry was
also shaped by President Truman's appointment of Charles F. Brannan as his Secretary of
Agriculture as part of an effort to prevent farm voters from deserting the Democratic Party. 154
As detailed in Chapter One, Brannan was a firm believer in raising beef cattle production to
decrease the nation's grain surpluses, while also boosting meat supplies to allow lower consumer
prices. The USDA focused on strengthening beef farmers' positions in the industry, rather than
try to squelch the power of the big packers.
These efforts, when combined with the ongoing trend toward decentralization of cattle
marketing noted above, brought the power of livestock producers to a peak by the beginning of
the Korean War in 1950. At the onset of the war, the federal government once again established
price control mechanisms under the Office of Price Stabilization (OPS) to dampen inflation,
particularly of food prices. Although consumer organizations and liberal politicians supported
renewed price controls, memories of the disastrous defeat of the OPA by meatpackers and
cattlemen led Congress to insert a clause requiring a "reasonable margin of profit" for these
producers under the OPS. Furthermore, the OPS set price ceilings without instituting rationing.
Having seen the OPA go from a broadly supported to a broadly despised program due to
artificial beef shortages, Congress wanted to control retail beef prices without having cattlemen
derail the program by withholding animals, or by having consumers lose confidence because
they could not buy a roast without resorting to the black market.l55 In January 1951, the OPS
froze wholesale and retail meat prices, but once again made no effort to control livestock prices,
hoping to provide incentives for cattlemen to keep packers supplied with a steady flow of
animals. Cattle raisers and feeders responded by rushing animals to market at less than
15:3 H. W. Marston to 13. T. Shaw and P. E. Williams, "Report and Recommendations of the Livestock Advisory
Committee," Apr. 4, 1952, RG 136, Entry 42, Box 2, Folder 2.
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"finished" weights to cash in before livestock ceilings might be imposed.l56 The result was a
temporary flood of beef that made rationing seem unnecessary.
Demand for beef continued to rise, however, fueled especially by Army purchases.
Without livestock ceilings, the price of cattle rose to a record high of 152 percent of parity. Since
wholesale and retail prices were controlled, packers and butchers once again found themselves
in a "squeeze." Packers responded to the new squeeze by simultaneously trying to exploit
loopholes in the regulations to allow them to raise consumer prices while also demanding relief
on cattle prices from OPS director Michael V. DiSalle.'57 In April 1951 DiSalle responded by
rolling back all live cattle prices by 10 percent, "in order to restore the meat situation to where it
was at the time when everybody else [packers and retailers] was caught."158 The American
National Cattlemen's Association immediately objected, calling the rollback "rank
discrimination" against livestock raisers and blaming it for causing a "psychological effect"
among cattlemen, "the result of which will be to discourage production."'59 With the price of beef
rapidly rising, President Truman faced pressure from consumers and liberal Democrats to make
the OPS succeed in controlling meat prices, but he faced a House Agriculture Committee that
refused to cooperate.160 Headed by Representative Harold D. Cooley of North Carolina, the
Agriculture Committee called hearings in May to scold DiSalle for the cattle rollbacks: "Most of
us believe that the best thing for the meat industry, to prevent skyrocketing prices, would be a
more abundant production. '6 1 Representative W. R. Poage of Texas agreed, telling DiSalle that
"no roll-back that you can establish is going to produce cattle."'6 2 And in fact, cattle producers
responded to the rollbacks by going on a new "undeclared strike," keeping their animals on grass
156 House Committee on Agriculture, Beef Ceiling Price Regulations: Hearings, 82nd Cong., st sess., May 7, 16-19,
23-25, 1951, 8-9.
157 Clayton Knowles, "Brannan Defends Beef Price Order," NYT, May 15, 1951, 14; Will Lissner, "Wholesale Meat
Prices Jump Despite 'Rollback' at Retail," NYT, May 17, 1951, 1, 27.
158 House Committee on Agriculture, Beef Ceiling Price Regulations, 12; "lo% Price Rollback for Cattle Today Starts
Beef Plan," NYT, May 21, 1951, 1, 35.
'59 House Committee on Agriculture, Beef Ceiling Price Regulations, 80, 78.
16o Charles E Egan, "DiSalle, Backed by Truman, Says Meat Rollbacks Stand," NYT, Jun. 8, 1951, 1; "Truman Hints
Beef Compromise after Warning by Congressmen," NYT, Jun. 9, 1951, 11.
161 House Committee on Agriculture, Beef Ceiling Price Regulation, 1.
162 House Committee on Agriculture, Beef Ceiling Price Regulation, 5. See also Clayton Knowles, "Future Price Cuts
for Beef Opposed," NYT, May 24, 1951, 21.
18o
pasture until prices rose again. Stock receipts at terminal stockyards dropped by as much as 25
percent.'6 3 Congress caved to the cattlemen's pressure, canceling cattle price rollbacks in June.'64
But despite the cattlemen's strike, no meat shortages resulted. As Business Week
reported in November of 1951, "when it comes to beef on the hoof, we have more of it than we've
ever had."'65 But the impressive supply of beef came at a price; the only beef cuts that did not
become more expensive during 1951 were luxury cuts such as T-bones and porterhouse steaks.l66
Livestock raisers benefited handsomely from the lack of livestock price ceilings; for the year of
1951, cattlemen received an all-time high price of $29.69 a hundredweight, or 146 percent of
parity.6 7 Consumer groups were not pleased with the actions of the cattlemen and their
Congressional allies in weakening the beef price control program.l6 8 Nonetheless, consumer
buying power reached record highs during the Korean War, so that even with higher livestock
and retail meat prices, consumers continued to buy beef with only sporadic complaints about
the cost.'6 9 Price controls once again increased the power of cattle raisers in the marketplace
while deflecting consumer and government ire away from the big meatpackers, who could
somewhat justifiably complain of being "squeezed" between uncontrolled supply costs and
frozen selling prices.
Everything changed for the Beef Trust in 1953, when the price of cattle plummeted while
retail beef prices skyrocketed.'70 The new Secretary of Agriculture in the Eisenhower
administration, Ezra Taft Benson, suddenly came under pressure from both cattle raisers and
consumers to uncover the cause. Benson received letters from citizens putting the onus of high
meat prices directly on the Secretary: "Men who work for a living can't pay such prices.... What
can you do between the cattle men and the Butchers? Get busy or get out."' 71 Benson responded
by ordering economists in the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) to commence an
investigation into the beef price spread. As the study progressed, both farmers and consumer
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advocates encouraged the USDA to look into the Beef Trust as the likely source of the problem.
As a Georgia cattle producer explained to Benson, "There is too much spread between the price
paid for live cattle and the price of steak and roast in grocery stores. Somebody is getting a heck
of a profit! Didn't Swift show a 12 million dollar gain in NET profits this year over last?"172 The
Milwaukee Mayor's Committee on the Cost of Living informed Benson that the study would only
succeed if it paid close attention to the "excessive profit margins" of packers.l73 The Brooklyn
Tenant Welfare and Consumer Councils saw the high cost of meat as a case of "obvious price
fixing" and demanded a "thorough investigation" of meatpackers.l74 But Secretary Benson
refused to blame the high price of meat on packers' profits, which AMS economists assured him
had not been obtained by "improper actions."175 Instead the economists pointed to
unprecedented consumer demand at a time when the cattle cycle was nearing the end of its
expansion phase; an imbalance in supply and demand had widened the beef price spread.176
Benson furthermore pointed to high wages and strong labor unions as the fundamental cause of
increased consumer demand. In particular, he believed the 1955 successes of unionized
meatpacking workers in gaining a $50 million wage boost had pushed up the cost of processing
meat while forcing cattlemen to "tak[e] lower prices for meat animals."l77 Consequently,
although the Beef Trust was as unpopular as it had ever been, Benson's Department of
Agriculture made no significant effort to enforce the antimonopoly provisions of the Packers and
Stockyards Act.
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Rural Meatpacking
This period of finger-pointing over the problem of monopoly in beef marketing lasted
only briefly. Trucking and improved highways allowed a new breed of meatpackers to arise in
the 1950s, markedly reducing the Big Four's monopoly position in beef marketing. Most
important, reliable mechanically refrigerated truck trailers made it possible for independent
mneatpackers to erect a new form of marketing machinery, bypassing the integrated rail-based
system that had allowed the big packers to maintain their monopoly power since the beginning
of the dressed beef trade. This new marketing machine not only led to a remarkable
diecentralization of meatpacking, but also helped lower beef costs. As a consequence, agricultural
policymakers at the USDA would be sheltered for several decades from political pressure to take
on the Beef Trust; in effect, the Beef Trust disappeared. Although some agricultural economists
saw the new marketing machine as less efficient than that of the Big Four, its flexibility created
the conditions for a politically uncontroversial form of beef marketing. This led the USDA's
policymakers and engineers to help smooth the system's operations.
Mechanically refrigerated trailers, or "reefers," made it possible for independent packers
to completely bypass the Big Four's rail-based distribution system. Refrigerated trailers for
motor transportation first became available in the 1920S, when both small and large
meatpackers began using them to ship meat in areas lacking significant branch house facilities,
primarily the southern plains. In 1925, for instance, the Merchants Fast Motor Lines in Fort
Worth, Texas, hauled 8 million pounds of fresh meat from Swift and Armour plants directly to
wholesale butchers.l78 Luper Transportation Company of Wichita, Kansas, began hauling reefer
loads of fresh meat in the 1930s for independent meatpackers in that city who wanted the ability
to deliver directly to butchers in smaller towns and cities in Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico, and
Arkansas.179 But despite the advantages of direct shipping via reefer trucks in the 1920o and
178 "Motor Trucks, Meat and Refrigeration," Mack Bulldog 4:8 (1925): 9, Warshaw Collection of Business Americana,
Smithsonian Institution, National Museum of American History, Archives Center, Washington, DC, Automobile
Industry Subject File, Box 8, Folder 5.
179 "Fresh Meat on the Dinner Table a New Delicacy since Truck Transportation," Kansas Transporter (Nov. 1950):
14-5.
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1930s, the technology of mechanical refrigeration for truck transportation remained unreliable
until after World War II.l80
Once reliable reefer units came into widespread use in the postwar period, it became
possible for meatpackers to ship fresh beef carcasses directly to a new breed of wholesalers on a
large scale. The distribution of beef increasingly relied on independent firms called "breakers,"
"boners," and "peddlers," rather than packer-owned branch houses. Although each of these
types of firms performed slightly different functions, all of them bought meat carcasses in small
lots from any number of packers and transformed them into smaller cuts that could be used by
institutional buyers-restaurants, schools, hospitals, and supermarkets-who wanted specific
cuts in quantity, rather than entire carcasses.'8' Independent wholesalers increasingly replaced
branch houses from the late 19305 through the early 1950s. As the number of meatpacker
branch houses declined by 43 percent between 1929 and 1954, the number of independent
wholesalers almost doubled.,82 Importantly, this allowed small meatpackers who did not own
branch houses to effectively compete with the Big Four in interstate trade without having to
invest in expensive capital equipment.'8 3 The need to purchase expensive distribution facilities
was further reduced by the cooperation of trucking firms in providing reefers to move the
carcasses from plants to wholesalers. Unlike the railroads of the late 19th century who had
refused to provide refrigerated railcars for dressed beef packers, truckers in the postwar period
readily purchased the necessary equipment. In 1946, over 66,ooo mechanically refrigerated
truck trailers were in use by the meatpacking industry. As many as one-third of these were
180 See Chapter 4.
i81 Willard F. Williams, "Structural Changes in the Meat Wholesaling Industry," Journal of Farm Economics 40 (May
1958): 325-7; "Who Gets the Money for Beef," U.S. News and World Report, Feb. 17, 1956, 36-40. "Breakers" focused
on turning whole carcasses into primal cuts-i.e., wholesale cuts of meat that required some further trimming and
cutting by retail butchers before being ready for the plate. "Boners" also worked with whole carcasses, but focused on
removing bones and sinew from poorer quality carcasses that most often ended up as hamburger. "Peddlers," also
known as "jobbers" or "purveyors," distributed primal and sub-primal cuts to restaurants and other high-volume
buyers.
182 Williams, "Structural Changes," 322-3; Dale E. Butz and George L. Baker, Jr., The Changing Structure of the Meat
Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School, 1960), 51-2.
183 Arnould, "Changing Patterns," 26.
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owned by firms other than the packers.l84 Reefer fleets rapidly expanded over the next two
decades; by 1963, trucks hauled 60% of the nation's refrigerated meat.185
Direct shipping without the need for branch houses made it possible in the 1950 for
small independent packers to locate plants nearer to rural cattle-producing regions. This new
breed of packers built single-story plants, derided by the big Chicago packers as "cinder-blocks,"
in smaller cities and towns of the rural Midwest, West, and South (see Map 3.4).186 One of the
goals of locating deeper in the countryside was to prevent shrinkage of livestock during
shipping; if a beef steer had less distance to travel on the way to slaughter, it would lose less
muscle and water weight, meaning that, on an equal sized carcass, packers near cattle supply
areas could gain greater profits than those further away.l8 7 Thousands of firms adopted this
relocation strategy in the late 1940s and 1950s, with one of the most successful companies being
Hygrade Food Products, which built or acquired slaughtering plants in the 1940s and 1950s in
places like Vernon, Texas; Storm Lake, Iowa; Omaha, Nebraska; Mishawaka, Indiana;
Orangeburg, South Carolina; and Hialeah, Florida. Many of the facilities that companies like
Hygrade purchased were former plants of the "little slaughterers" who had grown during the
price control efforts of World War II and the Korean War.188
184 Skaggs, Prime Cut, 153.
185 Milton D. Ratner, "The Role of Truck Transportation in Marketing Pre-Packaged Meats," Refrigerated
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Map 3.4: Meatpacker Locations and Beef Cattle on Farms in 1959
Beefpacking decentralized both economically and geographically in the 1950s, as small "cinder-block"
factories moved into rural cattle-feeding areas, particularly in the Midwest. Sources: Bureau of the
Census, County Business Patterns 1959; USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Database.
Unlike the big packers, the cinder-block operators generally focused on slaughtering only
one animal species, usually either cattle or sheep, leaving the processing of branded pork
products to the majors. Species specialization allowed for construction of much less expensive
slaughtering facilities, lowering the barriers to entry of firms with little capital.l8 9 Furthermore,
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slaughtering facilities, lowering the barriers to entry of firms with little capital.'8 9 Furthermore,
the new packers found rural workers willing to work for much lower wages than the employees
of the big urban packers, most of whom had been successfully organized by labor unions such as
the CIO Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee in the 1930os and 1940s.1 90 A 1966
government study found that average hourly wages at rural single-plant firms were seventy-five
cents lower than those of workers at multi-plant urban firms.9ls All of these factors combined to
make beef production both much more decentralized and far less expensive than it had ever
been. In 1959, the USDA's Packers and Stockyards Division knew of at least 2,261 interstate
rneatpackers in operation, and there may have been even more. 192
The USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service provided two significant forms of assistance
to small meatpackers to encourage the development of this decentralized beef marketing
machine. First, the AMS promulgated official beef grading standards in 1939. These federal
standards, which became compulsory during World War II and the Korean War to facilitate
price control programs, categorized both live cattle and dressed beef. Cattle were graded based
on their overall shape and on the quantity and distribution of fat (this was an era when a squat,
fat beast was considered a good producer of tender beef). The lowest grades, destined to become
hamburger or frankfurters, were Canner, Cutter, Inferior, Common, and Medium; the better
cattle were classed as Good, Choice, and Fancy. Dressed beef was similarly classed, from low to
high, as Canner, Cutter, Utility, Commercial, Good, Choice, and Prime.l93 Importantly, these
federal grades allowed independent meatpackers, who unlike the Big Four did not have large
sums of capital tied up in nationally advertised brand names and private grading systems, to sell
meat as Good, Choice, or Prime. Consumers could buy unbranded beef with confidence; the
189 Arnould, "Changing Patterns," 28.
190 Horowitz, Negro and White, 1-141, 250-3.
19l National Commission on Food Marketing, Organization and Competition in the Livestock and Meat Industry
(Washington: GPO, 1966), 17.
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federal grades proved at least as trustworthy as those of the big packers.194 In fact, the Big Four
recognized that USDA meat grading gave significant aid to independent packers and demanded
at the end of the Korean War that federal standards be made voluntary rather than
compulsory.ls5 But smaller packers continued to rely on the federal grades, which helped them
improve their competitive positions in beef marketing. The amount of beef graded according the
federal standards in 1955 totaled six billion pounds; five years later it was seven billion pounds,
and by 1965 the total had reached over ten billion pounds.l96 In 1960 the Vice-President of the
American Meat Institute-the Big Four's public relations organization-railed against the federal
standards at an industry meeting, stating that "scientific research" had shown that only private
brands helped to alleviate "insecurity on the part of housewives as they shop in retail meat
stores."'97 Despite the big packers' hostility to federal grading, the standards remained popular
with independent packers and consumers. Supermarkets and other institutional buyers also
found that USDA grades helped them achieve uniform meat supplies without having to be tied
to just a few packers.'98
The second major effort by the Agricultural Marketing Service to smooth the operations
of the new beef marketing machine involved work on improving refrigerated truck
transportation. Recognizing that the cinder-block packers relied almost solely on reliable reefers
to market their products, Harold D. Johnson of the AMS headed a series of research projects in
the mid-5os, in cooperation with the Truck Trailers Manufacturers Association, to develop
design standards for improved meat reefers. Among other things, Johnson compared various
forms of refrigeration, such as dry ice, to available mechanical refrigerators such as Thermo
Kings to determine cost effectiveness. Perhaps more importantly, Johnson tested a variety of
commercial reefers under varying temperature conditions and over different travel distances,
finding that aluminum floor racks placed lengthwise-rather than crosswise wooden racks, the
standard at the time-provided more efficient air circulation, thereby preventing shrinkage and
'94 Arnould, "Changing Patterns," 29.
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allowing packers to make greater profits without increasing retail prices. Significantly,
Johnson's work was one of the only projects on improving beef marketing technologies to
receive funding from the Livestock Advisory Committee under the 1946 Research and Marketing
Act. Its importance for allowing cattle producers to receive higher prices from rural meatpackers
without driving up the cost of retail beef was clear.199 Johnson's work led truck trailer
manufacturers to adopt his recommendations as standard practice by the late 1950s. Also in the
late 1950s, the USDA's Agricultural Research Service supplemented Johnson's work by regularly
inspecting truck reefer units at meatpacking plants to assure that they maintained low
temperatures.200 This technical work, though relatively invisible to consumers or livestock
producers concerned about the price of meat, played an important role in helping small rural
meatpackers to compete on a more even level with the big meatpackers who had for so long
controlled the technologies of fresh beef distribution. Defining aluminum as more efficient than
wood was every bit as political as the antitrust work of the Packers and Stockyards Division, and
probably more effective.
The Big Four meatpackers realized in the 1950s that the new beef marketing machine
directly threatened their monopoly position, as their profits and market share greatly declined.
In 1956, the Big Four slaughtered only 30 percent of the nation's cattle, down from 50 percent in
1920. This decline in slaughter came even while the nation's demand for beef increased,
meaning that the Big Four became increasingly unable even to maintain their original share of
business.201 In 1955 Business Week reported on the dour state of the big packers, pointing out
that none of them had earned a net return of more than one percent on sales after taxes in the
previous three years; most American companies at the time counted on five or six percent to
remain in business.202 Desperate to regain market share, Swift tried using price-cutting to
attract new retail customers in the late 195os, but the USDA's Packers and Stockyards Division
199 "Progress Report for Livestock Advisory Committee," n.d. (1954), RG 136, Entry 42, Box 2, Folder 2; Martin V.
Gerrity and Harold D. Johnson, Motortruck Transportation of Freshly Killed Beef (Washington: USDA, Agricultural
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quickly put a stop to these "unfair trade practices."203 Meanwhile, Swift petitioned a federal
district court in 1956 to be allowed to violate the original Consent Decree by selling meat at the
retail level. This effort also failed when Judge Julius Hoffman declared that although the Big
Four had lost significant market share, they were still "huge" enough to warrant continued
compliance with the Decree.20 4 But if Judge Hoffman believed that a monopoly still existed in
meat marketing, the Big Four and the administrators of the Packers and Stockyards Act could
not have disagreed more. The growth of trucking over the previous three decades had made it
possible for smaller competitors to steadily erode the power of the big packers to control either
the price of cattle in stockyards or the retail cost of beef. The Beef Trust had effectively dissolved
as a material fact and as a matter of concern for cattlemen, consumers, or the USDA. Over the
next several decades, however, trucking would ironically play a central role in developments that
eventually led to a re-emergent monopoly in the beef industry.
The Re-Emergent Monopoly, 1960s- 1 980s
Almost as soon as highway-based beef distribution had allowed a dismantling of the
monopoly first set in motion by Gustavus Swift's refrigerated railcar, new forms of economic
concentration began to emerge in the 196os. For a brief time, supermarkets appeared poised to
dominate pricing policies in beef marketing, but by the end of the 196os a new breed of rural
meatpackers led by Iowa Beef Packers (IBP) established a dominance that was solidified by the
early 1980s. Both of these developments depended on an increasingly industrialized system of
raising beef cattle-the modern feedlot-that was made possible by long-haul trucking. Although
the USDA had made significant technopolitical efforts to encourage the deconcentration of cattle
marketing and meatpacking through the 1950s, agricultural policymakers of the late twentieth
century made little effort to prevent the agro-industrial beef complex from becoming
increasingly economically concentrated. IBP and the other new breed of meatpackers
203 "Two Complaints Filed against Swift & Co.," NYT, May 22, 1958, 49; "Swift Is Accused of Price Cutting," NYT, Mar.
31, 1959, 38.
204 Aduddell and Cain, "Consent Decree," 359-61, 369-72. Furthermore, Congress reacted to Swift's attempt to
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introduced technologies of production and distribution that so thoroughly revolutionized the
beef industry that agricultural economists and policymakers saw efficiency where they might
have otherwise seen monopoly. Although representatives of the USDA publicly acknowledged
the existence of a new beef monopoly in the 1970s, they did not consider the issue to be a
significant problem.
The Modern Feedlot
The first stage in the re-emergent beef monopoly was the transformation of the beef steer
into an efficient meat producer in factory-style feedlots on the southern Plains in the mid-195os.
These modern beef factories, holding tens of thousands of cattle in confined pens, were
inherently unlike the Corn Belt feedlots that had dominated beef cattle feeding since the late
19th century. Corn Belt feedlots rarely held more than 1,ooo head at a time and were operated
b:y farmers who used beef feeding primarily to supplement income from crop sales.205 The
methods for beef feeding in the early twentieth century also relied on a complex relationship
between ecological conditions and commodity markets that determined where and how a beef
cow would spend its days before slaughter. For instance, the bluestem pastures of the Flint Hills
of eastern Kansas provided succulent grazing for cattle who could either enjoy several unhurried
years of grass feeding before slaughter, or be shipped off to spend their final months on the rich-
soiled corn farms of Iowa or Nebraska to be "finished" at a higher weight with more impressive
fat marbling.2o6 These ecological niches allowed cattle raisers to decide which fate would bring
the most profit from a steer in any given year, depending on the relative price of grain feeds
versus the price that could be had for a grass-fed steer.20 7 Cattle feeding up to the early 196os
was a highly unsystematic business, with relatively small and widely dispersed individual
operators comprising the vast majority of feeders. The state of Kansas, which would become by
205 Skaggs, Prime Cut, 178. See also James Whitaker, Feedlot Empire: Beef Cattle Feeding in Illinois and Iowa, 1840-
19oo (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1975).
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the 1980S the nation's leader in large-scale commercial cattle feeding, had less than two dozen
commercial lots in the year 196o, with more than three-quarters of the state's fat cattle coming
from individual farmers' feedlots or pastures. This situation would rapidly change. By 1965
nearly 60 percent of the state's cattle were fed in large commercial lots; in 1975 the number was
nearly go percent.208 Successful Farming informed its readers in the late 1960s that "the Corn
Belt is giving way to a new area-the Feedlot Belt," and recommended that Midwestern cattle
feeders "get big (at least 500 head a year) and adopt a business approach" to compete with the
large-scale commercial feeders of the Plains.209 Cattle feeding was becoming big business.
This growth was the result of an industrial approach to cattle feeding that appeared in
the 1950os and became widespread by the mid-6os. Whereas Corn Belt feeders had treated beef
cattle as supplemental income (and manure) producers, the modern commercial lots focused
solely on getting cattle up to slaughter weight as quickly and efficiently as possible. Their only
source of income came through "custom feeding," that is, charging cattle producers or investors
a daily fee for yardage plus the cost of the feed required to "finish" the animals. Perhaps most
important, the concept of industrial feeding was premised on abstract ideas of transportation
economics rather than lived experiences of ecological niches in relation to seasonal grain market
conditions. Grain could be transported in far more compact form than a live animal.
Consequently, modern feedlot operators reconceived cattle feeding by moving the cow to the
feed, rather than the feed to the cow, much as Henry Ford's assembly line had moved the
product to the worker rather than vice versa.2 0 Ideally, feedlot builders realized, the cow would
not have to move very far to get to the feed. As a consequence, the modern feedlot system arose
in the High Plains of Kansas, Texas, Oklahoma, Nebraska, and Colorado, in the middle of both
the nation's great grain-producing region-the Breadbasket-and yet not far from the range
208 John H. McCoy and Robert H. Wuhrman, Some Economic Aspects of Commercial Cattle Feeding in Kansas,
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lands of the northern Plains and Texas where most beef cattle continued to be born and
weaned.l [See Map 3.5]
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Map 3.5: The Feedlot Belt and Feed Grain Production in 1965
The giant cattle feedlots of the 196os moved into the heart of feed grain production in the southern Plains
atop the Ogallala aquifer, reducing transport costs. Source: Krause, Cattle Feeding, 9, 11.
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2.1: Krause, Cattle Feeding, 4-9.
Many agricultural businessmen helped conceive and realize this industrial feeding
approach, but one of the most important was Earl C. Brookover. As the man who brought the
modern feedlot to southwestern Kansas-currently the nation's leading region of commercial
cattle feeding-Brookover possessed a unique mix of farming experience, business acumen, and
engineering skills. Born in 19o6 in Scott County, Kansas, he worked as a young man for a
neighbor who was one of the first to practice irrigated agriculture in that region of the state.
Brookover became intrigued by the possibilities of irrigated agriculture, and traveled to Peru to
drill wells and install water pumps on sugar cane plantations. This experience prompted him to
return to Kansas to gain a degree in civil engineering-which he later recalled "was about as
close as you could come to irrigation engineering at the time"-from Kansas State University in
1934.212
Upon graduation, Brookover bought a potato farm in southwestern Kansas and began
installing irrigation systems on his and his neighbors' farms. It was sometime in the 1940os that
he happened to travel with a bachelor buddy out to California, where he witnessed the operation
of a few pioneer commercial cattle feedlots near Bakersfield. Impressed by the scale of the
Bakersfield operations, Brookover was less impressed by their location. Bakersfield was a long
distance from both feed grain supplies and from the major cattle-producing ranges of the Plains,
making transportation costs a serious drain on profits. Brookover realized that with the help of
irrigation his home state of Kansas was poised to become one of the nation's largest producers of
feed grains; if he were to establish a giant feedlot back in Kansas, he would have a convenient
"home market" of cattle-customers who could turn all that grain into handsome profits. In 1951,
Brookover convinced an old friend with deep pockets and faith in Earl's vision to fund the
construction of the first commercial feedlot in Kansas, just outside Garden City. Brookover
opened this first feedlot with just a few hundred "four-legged customers" driven by hoof from
nearby farms, but within a decade the scale of operations had increased in steady increments of
2 12 Tom Carlin, "The Man with a Different Point of View," K-Stater, Jul. 1982, Feedlots Subject File, Finney County
Historical Society, Garden City, KS (hereafter FCHS).
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lo,ooo head every few years. As of 2004 the Brookover Feed Yards maintains three separate
facilities with a total one-time capacity of 120,000 head.213
Brookover rightly understood irrigation to be essential for cattle feeding on the southern
Plains. The area of western Kansas that Brookover helped develop into a major producer of feed
grain was also a place so arid that "oldtimers once believed nothing would grow but wheat and
sagebrush."214 But Brookover realized that the bone-dry soils of southwestern Kansas lay atop
one of the largest aquifers in the United States. The mighty Ogallala, a subterranean formation
of thick calcareous sands, gravels, and sandy clays, trapped waters that had run off from the
formation of the Rocky Mountains in the Tertiary Period.215 More than 800 miles long and 400
miles broad at its widest point, the Ogallala aquifer lay beneath parts of Texas, Oklahoma, New
Mexico, Colorado, and Nebraska, as well as Kansas. [See Map 3.5] Although state and federal
geologists had since the 1930S undertaken major hydrological explorations to determine the
feasibility of using the Ogallala's waters, no large-scale tapping of the water resources began
until the early 1950s, when center-pivot irrigation systems powered by natural gas made it
possible to cheaply draw enormous quantities of water to the surface.216 In just five years
between 1962 and 1967, western Kansas farmers filed more than 3,200 applications to install
irrigation systems on their lands, certain that they could "grow virtually anything" if they had
the water.2 17 Western Kansas was transformed in the 1950os and 196os from a land of dry-farmed
wheat fields to a patchwork of circular plots of green grain sorghums and roughage, such as hay,
for cattle feed.218 As Brookover had understood as early as 1951, it would be much less expensive
to feed cattle in the heart of feed grain country, and he was proven correct in the mid-1960s
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when feedlot managers located above the Ogallala were able to buy feed grain for $12 to $15
more cheaply per ton than could California feedlots.219
Much of this irrigated feed grain crop was hybrid grain sorghum, or milo. Sorghum had
proven itself highly drought resistant on the southern Plains during the Dust Bowl of the 1930s,
but was considered far inferior to corn as a cattle feed due to its lower protein content. 2 The
development of hybrid varieties of grain sorghum in the 1950S significantly changed cattlemen's'
views of the crop. After several decades of research at the Texas Agricultural Experiment
Station, plant breeders developed a commercially viable hybrid milo seed in the mid-195os; by
1959 nearly all plantings of milo were of hybrid varieties. Although still not as efficient as corn as
a cattle feed, hybrid milo was so much cheaper to produce in the irrigated lands of the High
Plains that it became a standard cattle feed. In 1944, High Plains farmers harvested 60 million
bushels of grain sorghum, but two decades later the crop yielded 124 million bushels.221
Irrigation and feed grains were central to Earl C. Brookover's original vision for the
modern feedlot primarily because he thought of cattle feeding in engineering terms. The
essential problem, as he understood it, was how to efficiently transform a set of inputs (feed
grains) into a high-value product (beef), all the while keeping in mind environmental constraints
and opportunities as well as the economics of transporting supplies and finished products. As
his son has recalled, Earl Brookover believed "engineering was the basis for everything." Having
grown to adulthood in the era of Henry Ford's greatest successes in mass production, Brookover
sought to develop a complex of technology, science, and traditional farming skills that would
allow the mass production of beef cattle.222 And in fact, modern feedlots like the one Brookover
219 "To Build Big Feed Lot Near Leoti," Hutchinson (Kansas) News, Aug. 11, 1966, Cattle Industry Clippings, KSHS;
Charles Pratt, "Beefing up on a Kansas Runway," Topeka (Kansas) Capital-Journal, Feb. 18, 1968, ibid. Ironically,
although feed grains needed a great deal of water to grow successfully, cattle feedlots benefited from the aridity of the
southwestern Plains, since cattle could be kept in the open, reducing the need for expensive confinement barns. See
Dave Malena and Richard Krumme, "Beef Confinement: The Controversy," Successful Farming, May 1970, 41-5.
220 Schlebecker, Cattle Raising, 163-4.
221 J. Roy Quinby, "Hybrid Sorghum: A Triumph of Research," in Southwestern Agriculture, ed. Henry C. Dethloff
and Irvin M. May, Jr. (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1982), 93-105; Garry L. Nall, "The Cattle-
Feeding Industry on the Texas High Plains," ibid., 107. Unlike corn, which was commercially hybridized by the 1920s,
sorghum has both male and female reproductive organs on the same spikelet, making cross-pollination a difficult task
that was only achieved when the Texas agronomists induced male sterility into a strain of the plant. On hybrid corn,
see Deborah K. Fitzgerald, The Business of Breeding: Hybrid Corn in Illinois, 189o-1940 (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1990).
222 Earl Brookover, Jr., interview. It should be noted that mass production of beef has always been a difficult task to
achieve; as ruminants, cattle are extremely inefficient converters of grains into meat. See Allen Trenkle and R. L.
Willham, "Beef Production Efficiency," Science 198 (Dec. 1977): loo009-15.
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built outside Garden City, Kansas, increasingly came to resemble outdoor factories in the 196os.
At the heart of this factory floor was an automatic feed mill, erected to transform raw grains into
efficient meat-producing proteins. First the raw grain, whether milo or corn, would be pressure-
cooked by steam to improve its digestibility, allowing cattle to gain more weight from less eating.
Next, the grain would travel from giant storage elevators via gravity chutes to the automated
mixing mill. There, on-site nutritionists pulled levers and punched buttons to arrive at an
appropriate ration for each group of cattle in the lot. This was important, because young cattle
fresh off grass pastures needed to be broken into the life of eating as much as they could in the
shortest amount of time, and so would be fed higher ratios of roughage for a time before they
were ready for "hot rations."223 Besides steam-flaked grains and hay for roughage, these "hot
rations" would generally contain urea or soy or cottonseed meal as protein supplements, along
with a dash of molasses for palatability. Additional weight gain could be achieved by adding
growth hormones such as diethylstilbestrol, antibiotics like aureomycin, and manufactured
protein supplements, especially the amino acid lysine.224 This scientific feeding allowed feedlot
managers to reduce the amount of feed required to produce a pound of beef from nine pounds in
the mid-195os to around seven pounds in 1968; since then, even greater efficiency has been
achieved.225
Once the rations were mixed, they moved via constant-flow gravity feeds into the beds of
parked feed trucks. These trucks, equipped with self-unloading augers, would then be driven
around acres of cattle pens, delivering the meals directly to concrete feed bunks; the cattle, who
had nothing else to do, need only move a few feet to dine.226 Meat production was maximized,
since "less activity leads to more efficient conversion of feed into weight gain."227 Amidst all of
2:!3 Earl Brookover, Jr., interview; Lawrence A. Mayer, "Monfort Is a 'One-Company Industry'," Fortune, Jan. 1973,
93-4; Wood, Kansas Beef Industry, 292. Feed mixing is now done by computer.
224 "Hormone and Antibiotic Gives More, Better Beef," Science News Letter, Jun. 4, 1955, 360; "Even Better Beef
Hormones?" Farm Journal, May 1957,39-42; "Exciting New Beef Feed Additive," Farm Journal, Apr. 1958, 12-14;
Dick Braun, "New Feed Additive May Cut Beef Costs," Farm Journal, Jun. 1960, 47. For more on feed additives and
antibiotics, see Orville Schell, Modern Meat (New York: Random House, 1984).
225 Charles Pratt, "Beefing up on a Kansas Runway," Topeka (Kansas) Capital-Journal, Feb. 18, 1968, Cattle Industry
Clippings, KSHS.
22:6 Tarvin Flannis Webb, Improved Methods and Facilitiesfor Commercial Cattle Feedlots (Washington, DC: USDA,
Agricultural Marketing Service, 1962); Michael Pollan, "Power Steer," New York Times Magazine, Mar. 31, 2002, 44-
5:, 68-77.
227 Michael Bates, "Paved Feedlot Increases Gain," Topeka (Kansas) Capital-Journal, Jul. 1, 1982, Cattle Industry
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this faceless feeding technology, a human element still remained crucial, in the form of
"cowboys" who "rode pens" on horseback, checking the cattle for any signs of illness to keep
disease from spreading among the tightly confined population. At Brookover's feedyard, this job
was done by men who maintained the "reddened face, rugged costume and cattle-savvy of the
traditional cowboy," their very names-Sanky Ruth and "Pappy" Palen-evoking a more rustic
world of open ranges.228 But their cowboy duds were in stark contrast to the "spotless white
uniform" of the feed mill technician, standing amidst a rectilinear grid of steel fences
surrounding meat-producing bio-machines.229 High-speed throughput was as essential on these
outdoor factory floors as in any mass manufacturing enterprise. As one feedlot manager
remarked in 1958, "Anyone buying steers wants them to finish fast. The quicker you can turn
them in the feedlot, the more money you'll make."230 To help speed up the process, state
agricultural experiment stations and land grant university researchers developed new cattle
breeds, mixing Herefords, Brahmans, Shorthorns, and Angus into leaner, taller, meatier animals
such as the Beefmaster, designed "for efficiency, not show ring standards."231 Like the
Beefmaster, the modern feedlot was a place where function took precedence over form.232
Irrigation and feed grains made the southern Plains an attractive place to locate the
modern feedlots, but it was highways and long-haul trucks that made the system possible.
Whereas in the early twentieth century urban stockyards had been "hotels" for cattle traveling
from all over the country to central slaughtering plants, in the 196os rural feedyards took over
this role, providing housing for cattle on their way to the decentralized slaughtering plants that
had arisen in the 195os.233 Though riding in ventilated semi-trailers rather than air-conditioned
228 Charles Hammer, "Automation on the Kansas Prairie," Kansas City Star, Feb. 5, 1961, Cattle Industry Clippings,
KSHS; Earl Brookover, Jr., interview.
229 Hammer, "Automation on the Kansas Prairie"; Pollan, "Power Steer," 44.
230 "Steers that Finish Fast," Farm Journal, Mar. 1958, 68L-68M.
231 Charles E. Ball, "The New Beef Breeds Are Rolling," Farm Journal, Nov. 1956, 62-5. See also USDA, Internal Press
Release, "RMA Livestock Research for 1947-48," Jun. 9, 1948, RG 136, Entry 42, Box 2, Folder 2.
232 Similar developments took place in the postwar chicken industry; see William Boyd, "Making Meat: Science,
Technology, and American Poultry Production," Technology and Culture 42 (Oct. 2001): 631-64; Roger Horowitz,
"Making the Chicken of Tomorrow: Reworking Poultry as Commodities and as Creatures, 1945-1990," in
Industrializing Organisms, ed. Susan R. Schrepfer and Philip Scranton (New York: Routledge, 2004), 215-35.
233 On urban stockyards as hotels, see Schein, "Hearing on Proposed Code of Fair Competition," 3. Ty Brookover, the
grandson of Earl C. Brookover, repeatedly referred to feedlots as hotels in our interview; as he noted, the business
strategies of human hotels are almost exactly the same as those of feedlots, since both have relatively high investment
costs that can only be paid off by maintaining a steady influx of customers.
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Airstream RVs, feeder cattle came like tourists from grasslands all over the West, South, and
Midwest, gathering for some hedonic dining at the feedlot buffet trough for go to 120 days.234 So
many four-legged tourists began arriving at the enormous Monfort feedlot constructed near
Greeley, Colorado, in 1970 that a separate highway lane-marked by a green-and-white
"Monfort" sign-had to be erected to prevent traffic snarl-ups.235 But once the cattle had arrived
at a feedlot, they did not have much farther to go. Packer buyers began coming directly to the
"hotels" to offer the guests an all-expenses-paid trip to rural slaughtering plants; on the
appointed day, truckers came directly to the cattle, rather than farmers or truckers taking the
cattle to a market to be sold.236 One consequence of this more direct movement of cattle was that
the animals lost significantly less weight since they rarely had to walk under their own power.
Another result was that the local auction markets that had begun replacing central stockyards in
the 1930os began to close as an era of truly direct marketing began.237
The modern feedlot created nearly monopsonistic conditions once again in cattle
marketing. As feedlots grew larger and more concentrated, fewer sales outlets existed for the
cow-calf raisers of the nation's grasslands who produced feeder cattle. In the local auction
markets of the 1930os and 1940s, cow-calf raisers had always had the opportunity to sell their
young cattle either directly to packers or to any one of thousands of Corn Belt feeders. By 1968,
however, cattle feeding had become remarkably concentrated. Although large-scale commercial
lots accounted for only one percent of the nation's feedyards, that small number handled half of
all fed cattle.238 But unlike the packer-owned terminal stockyards of the early twentieth century,
t he new near-monopsony in cattle marketing drew almost no criticisms from cattle producers.
One of the primary complaints livestock raisers had against the old terminal stockyards was that
cattle prices were highly volatile from day to day, and yardage charges often seemed arbitrary.
234 The matter of air-conditioning is not entirely in jest; cattle become agitated and lose a great deal of weight when
they get hot in transit. As a consequence, a major issue in livestock trailer design is proper ventilation. Furthermore,
many livestock truckers try to do most of their hauling at night to keep the animals cool. See Ray E. Maher, "Moving
Beef on the Hoof Is Horadam's Job," Power Wagon (May 1948): 22-3.
235 Lawrence A. Mayer, "Monfort Is a 'One-Company Industry'," Fortune, Jan. 1973, 93.
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Research Service, 1970), 24.
199
At a modern yard practicing custom feeding, however, cattlemen simply paid a flat yardage
charge (five cents per day was common in 1960) plus the cost of whatever feed the steer ate
while in residence. Cattlemen could count on relatively stable costs.239 Furthermore, a modern
feedlot maintained a staff of highly trained sales specialists who kept in daily contact with
packer buyers and made every effort to negotiate the best selling price possible for their
customers.2 40 As the manager of a southwestern Kansas feedlot noted in 1978, farmers who
hauled their cattle into a terminal market like Kansas City might find upon arrival that buyers
were offering $1.50 per hundredweight less than the price broadcast on the morning radio
program. At that point, a farmer would have to say, "What am I gonna do? I've already unloaded
my cattle. If I take them out of the stockyard and put them back in my truck, it's costing me
money." But out at the feedlot, the cattle would not be loaded until the price was right; "farmers
[got] a better deal selling directly to the packer."241 Feedlots became giant cattle factories not
just because they could achieve economies of scale and greater throughput in cattle production,
but because their very size provided farmers with more formidable power in the market.242
Agricultural policymakers in the USDA viewed the growing marketing power of
industrial feedlots as a permanent solution to the old problem of a large number of unorganized
producers selling cattle in a non-competitive marketplace. As the new forms of direct marketing
took firm hold in the late 1950s, urban stockyard managers made efforts to have the Packers and
Stockyards Division implement rules that would slow the geographical movement of cattle
marketing into the countryside. In particular, urban stockyard owners who had been required
since the passage of the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 to register their rates with the
Secretary of Agriculture argued that these rate regulations were an unfair burden, allowing
packer buyers to bypass the central stockyards in favor of unregulated direct buying stations and
country markets. The stockyards backed up their request by providing evidence that packers
were using direct buying to take advantage of farmers in unregulated markets.243 As a
239 McCoy and Wuhrman, Economic Aspects of Commercial Cattle Feeding, 15.
240 Gustafson and Van Arsdall, Cattle Feeding, 47; Earl Brookover, Jr. interview.
241 Paul Stevens, "Feedlots Give Ranchers More Market Leverage," Wichita Eagle, Aug. 18, 1978, Cattle Industry
Clippings, KSHS.
242 Webb, Improved Methods, 17.
243 Roy W. Lennartson to the Secretary of Agriculture, "Proposed Amendments in the Regulations Issued under
Authority of the Packers and Stockyards Act," May 6, 1954, RG 136, Records Relating to the Administration of the
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consequence, the Packers and Stockyards Act was amended in 1958 to bring country buying
stations under its jurisdiction; this meant that "every little yard, regardless of where located,"
was required to register its rates with the USDA-this brought approximately 2,500 livestock
markets under the eye of the Secretary of Agriculture.244
But if USDA policymakers were willing to offer this conciliation to the central stockyards,
they had no desire to put any limits or regulations on direct buying at feedlots. In 1961
representatives of the central stockyards convinced the House Agriculture Committee to hold
hearings on the problem of direct buying by packers. Direct marketing had led to precipitous
declines in sales of slaughter cattle at terminal markets since the 1920S; it appeared by 1961 that
the central stockyards were nearing extinction. In 1960, the members of the American
Stockyards Association received only 59 percent of the nation's cattle for slaughter; as late as
:1952, the percentage had been as high as 89 percent. This was a problem, argued A. Z. Baker,
president of the American Stockyards Association, because it made possible the "concentration
of buying power in fewer hands," with transactions occurring almost secretly in the
c ountryside.245 R. E. Cunningham, representing the seven largest terminal stockyards at the
hearings, pointed out that in ancient Constantinople, lamb slaughterers who bought animals
outside the city were "beaten, shorn, and banished" for direct buying; Cunningham implied that
he would have liked to see Congress pass a similar law to prevent the decline of the central
stockyard.246 But USDA offered no support for efforts to limit direct marketing. As the Assistant
Secretary of Agriculture informed the House committee: "The Department believes that packers
and other buyers should be free to purchase, and that producers and other sellers should be free
to sell, livestock for slaughter at any point."247 In this, the USDA agreed with meatpackers and
the American National Cattlemen's Association, who argued that direct buying increased
Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, 1941-1967, Entry 32, National Archives II, College Park, MD, Box 1, Folder 2;
Donald A. Campbell (Director, Packers and Stockyards Division) to Clarence H. Girard, "Proposed Change in Rate
Procedure," Apr. 21, 1966, ibid.; Solicitor to the Secretary of Agriculture, "Revision of Regulations under the Packers
and Stockyards Act," May 6, 1954, ibid.; Roy Lennartson to Rep. W. C. Cole, Mar. 16, 1954, RG 136, Entry 18, Box 1,
Folder 5; John H. Davis to Sen. Hugh Butler, Feb. 16, 1954, RG 136, Entry 18, Box 1, Folder 3.
244 Statutes at Large 72 (1958): 1749; House Committee on Agriculture, Amendment of Packers and Stockyards Act,
85th Cong., 1st sess., 1957, H. Rept. 1048. Quote is from House Committee on Agriculture, Equalize Livestock
Marketing Competition, Hearings, 87th Cong., 1st sess., Aug. 23, 24, 1961, 38.
245 House Committee on Agriculture, Equalize Livestock Marketing Competition, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 29, 30.
246 Ibid., 89.
247 Ibid., 3.
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competition in the livestock marketplace, since "the livestock producer today has the widest
possible choice of markets in which he may elect to sell."248 Only the National Farmers
Organization supported the central stockyards in their belief that the growth of commercial
feedlots threatened to replace both terminal markets and country auctions with direct,
unregulated buying.249 As it soon turned out, the National Farmers Organization was right.
Chicago's Union Stock Yard closed in 1970 for lack of business, while the terminal markets that
remained in cities such as Omaha and Kansas City began to focus solely on sales of feeder cattle,
rather than slaughter cattle. Many local auction yards and sale barns also closed down, useless
in an age of direct feedlot buying.250 The marketing machinery of the new beef industry had
penetrated deep into the countryside.
"Eat Beef, Stay Slim"-The Rise and Fall of Supermarket Monopoly Power
One of the most fascinating visual aspects of Earl C. Brookover's original feedyard was a
sign on the feed elevator, painted in 6-foot-tall red letters, declaring "Eat Beef, Stay Slim."
Though somewhat tongue-in-cheek, the sign was meant to inform passersby on Highway 50 that
the modern feedlot was dedicated to producing lean, lower-fat beef. Supermarkets of the 1950s,
Brookover understood, were increasingly demanding beef cuts with less fat marbling and a
thinner coating of white, rather than yellow, fat. Cattle fed primarily on grain instead of grass
tended to exhibit these qualities, making the modern feedlot an ideal supplier for supermarkets
seeking to dominate the retail beef trade.251 For a brief period from the early 1950s to the late
196os, supermarkets did in fact come to exercise impressive power over the beef industry. Like
the efforts of several generations of meatpackers before them, supermarketers deployed
technologies of distribution to gain influence in the marketplace. Once again, trucks and
highways provided flexible forms of transportation that allowed for shifting power relations in
the political economy of beef marketing.
248 Ibid., 16, 55.
249 Ibid., 70-7.
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The rather sudden rise of supermarkets as the most powerful actors in the beef economy
was premised partly on the decline of the Big Four packers in the 195os, but also on a new
wholesaling method called "specification buying." In the days when the Big Four's private
brands and grading systems provided the only guidance for retail meat buyers seeking a
particular quality of beef, supermarkets were essentially forced to take what the packers offered.
Since each packer had slightly different grading systems, these offerings were never exactly the
same. But with the arrival of federally mandated USDA grading in World War II and the Korean
War, supermarketers discovered they could achieve more uniform-quality supplies without
having to rely on the packers' private brands. Safeway Stores became one of the most
demanding customers in the 1950s, specifying in contracts with packers that they provide only
USDA Prime or Choice cuts.252 Through such specification buying, supermarket managers
sought to use the USDA grades to convince customers that their store had the most "consistent
quality meat," especially since marketing surveys had found that the primary reason shoppers
chose to patronize one supermarket over another was the uniformity of its meat selection.253
Specification buying allowed supermarkets to achieve "absolute uniformity of the product in the
retail case," a form of advertising more powerful than any other in attracting customers picky
about the taste of beef.254 These specifications worked back through the packers to feedlot
rnanagers, who began to "feed primarily for chain store demands," seeking to produce a taller,
leaner, meatier steer in the 900 to 1200 pound range, rather than the squat 150o-pound beasts
formerly prized by cattlemen and consumers alike.255
The importance of lean, consistent beef for supermarket success led a few chains to
establish vertically integrated beef operations in the late 1950os and early 196os. Safeway,
American Stores, Food Fair, and especially National Tea began competing directly with their
former suppliers, the large and small meatpackers, by buying cattle directly at feedlots and
2s52 Skaggs, Prime Cut, 179. See also Ovid Bay and John Rohlf, "Beefmen Face up to Consumer Whims," Farm
Journal, Feb. 1958, 52.
253 House Committee on Agriculture, Equalize Livestock Marketing Competition, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 34.
254 Ibid., 93.
2ss5 James I. Sprague, "Big Western Feed Lots, What You Can Learn from Them," Successful Farming, Feb. 1963, 64-5,
1l 1; Tarvin Flannis Webb, Improved Methods and Facilities for Commercial Cattle Feedlots (Washington, DC:
USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service, 1962), 6; Pollan, "Power Steer," 47.
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sending them to their own slaughtering factories.256 The availability of reliable refrigerated truck
trailers made this possible, since supermarket chains-or any other firm, for that matter-need
not rely on existing infrastructures for distributing beef, but could build or lease their own at
relatively low cost. The National Tea Company, for instance, built both its own feedlot and
packing plant in the Denver area in the late 1950s. The Food Fair chain of supermarkets
operated at least one slaughtering plant in the 1950s.25 7 This apparent trend toward
supermarket control of both livestock markets and wholesale meat prices brought protests from
concerned farmers. Gordon Shafer, a Missouri livestock raiser representing the National
Farmers Organization before a House committee considering a bill to prevent supermarket
chains from owning slaughtering facilities, stated that supermarkets with their own feedlots had
gained "tremendous buying power" which they were using "primarily for the purpose of
controlling the prices paid to farmers."258 Following a rapid drop in livestock prices in 1963, the
National Farmers Union passed a resolution in 1964 calling for Congressional investigations
into "the disastrously low prices forced upon [livestock] producers by large food chains through
their power to administer prices."259
Meatpackers were just as concerned about the increasing power of the food chains. Even
when not running their own packing plants, supermarket buyers began dictating harsh terms to
the packers. Chain buyers refused to enter into long-term contracts with any one packer, and
strove to divide their purchases evenly among different slaughterers to assure competitive
pricing.26 0 This practice, known as "bid and acceptance," meant that a meatpacker had to accept
"unconscionable price concessions" demanded by chain stores or face blacklisting.261 Some
chains complemented this tactic with "group purchasing," whereby a number of firms would
256 House Committee on Agriculture, Equalize Livestock Marketing Competition, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 8-14; House
Select Committee on Small Business, Small Business Problems in Food Distribution, 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1960, H.
Rept. 2234; James Roosevelt, "Food Chain Store Meat Packing Trend: A Concentration of Economic Power," Quick
Frozen Foods (Mar. 1962): 234.
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1958, 47.
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1964, 6.
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appoint a single buyer to represent them in dealings with meatpackers, creating a uniform
wholesale price unaffected by competition.262 In 1964 it appeared, as Senator Gale McGee of
Wyoming put it, that supermarket chains had "repealed the laws of supply and demand in the
marketing of beef."26 3
But despite a number of House and Senate hearings into these "problems in food
distribution," no significant antitrust action was undertaken against the chains in the 1960s.
Supermarkets never took over the opprobrious title of "Beef Trust." Part of this was due to the
complexity of the problem of monopoly, nicely summed up by Senator Philip A. Hart of
Michigan: "Sometimes I think that the antitrusters are their own worst enemies. Basically, they
want meat on the table at the lowest possible prices-[but] instead of saying that bluntly, plainly,
and simply, the economists talk in terms of concentration of power, and the lawyers talk in
terms of... market restraints."26 4 Supermarkets generally delivered low prices, so consumers had
little reason to be concerned about the problem of monopoly; livestock producers and
mneatpackers concerned about supermarket control of the beef industry had little opportunity to
convince a broad segment of the populace that monopoly power was not in the public interest.
Cattlemen like John F. Odea of the Denver Union Stock Yards could blame the consumer for
being "duped into believing that she sets the price [for beef] and benefits directly in constantly
lower prices," but such an anti-consumer attitude would not be likely to gain much support for
antitrust action.265 Meanwhile, supermarkets retorted that vertical integration in beef
production was merely the result of "good business" strategies that allowed "lower prices."26 6
This view was further supported by the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service economists, who
saw modern feedlots and supermarkets meeting the demand of the "affluent and mobile
consumer" for huge amounts of high quality beef at low cost.26 7 Even if the industry had become
more monopolistic than it had been in decades, the issue of monopoly was not in itself a
problem worthy of regulatory attention.
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In any case, supermarkets set the stage for their own declining power in the beef industry
by making low price a basic fact of the American standard of living in the postwar era.
Inexpensive beef at a time of high consumer incomes made the 196os a decade of rapidly rising
demand for meat. Backyard barbecues groaned under the increasing weight of Choice and Prime
steaks, as annual per capita consumption of beef rose from 57 pounds in 1955 to 70 pounds in
1965, reaching a peak of nearly 80 pounds of beef per American in 1970.268 By that time,
demand began outpacing the supply of beef, causing inflation that could only be blamed on
"increasing affluence" as "Americans [were] indulging in their long-standing love of beef."26 9
Beef steaks reached record high prices in the summer of 1969, and although "housewives
seem[ed] hardly daunted" by the costs that year, the rising price of meat would within a few
years cause a significant consumer backlash.270 It was in this context that a new breed of
meatpackers emerged, revolutionizing the production and distribution of beef so thoroughly
that low consumer prices offset any potential concern about a renewed monopoly that made the
old Beef Trust seem tiny by comparison.
The "Logic" of Boxed Beef
The price of meat skyrocketed in the early 1970s, and it appeared to many consumers
that supermarkets were to blame. Life magazine reported on the anger of Fred and Myrna
Green, a solidly middle-class family with two station wagons and a swimming pool who could
barely afford a package of hamburger in the spring of 1972; Myrna complained that they
"[hadn't] had a steak for I don't know how many months" and was convinced that supermarkets
were "out to gouge the customer."271 A more likely explanation for the high prices was unchecked
consumer demand for beef, coupled with a jump in feed grain prices in 1972-73 following a
268 USDA Economic Research Service, "Food Consumption (Per Capita) Data System," accessed online at
<http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/foodconsumption/>, Apr. 28, 2004. These numbers reflect mature beef only, not
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surprisingly large purchase of American wheat by the Soviet Union.272 But whatever the cause,
consumers reacted to a 75 percent rise in meat prices in early 1973 by angrily demanding that
President Richard Nixon's administration do something to control spiraling costs. Nixon
responded on March 29, 1973, announcing a freeze on wholesale and retail prices of meat, but
meatpackers and retailers easily found ways to skirt the barely enforced price controls.273 On
April 1, a spontaneous grassroots meat boycott erupted across the nation, orchestrated by
middle-class consumer groups such as Fight Inflation Together (Atlanta, Georgia), Women's
War on Prices (Wilmette, Illinois), Citizens Action Program (Chicago), and the Consumer
Federation of California. Retail sales of meat dropped by 50 to 80 percent during the weeklong
boycott, but supermarkets generally refused to lower their prices; the manager of Big Bear
Stores defended the decision, saying "We can't price by emotion."274 But emotions ran high
among consumers accustomed to low-priced beef and seeking easy solutions to complex
economic problems. With neither an obvious Beef Trust to attack nor a government willing to
enforce strong OPA-style price controls, Fortune magazine predicted that only a "profound
change in the techniques of ... beef production" could bring prices down.275 In fact, this is exactly
what happened.
A new breed of meatpackers emerged by the mid-1970os to fulfill consumer expectations
for low-priced beef. Firms such as Iowa Beef Packers (IBP), Spencer Foods, National Beef, and
Excel and Missouri Beef (later merged as MBPXL) began as relatively small firms in the early
1960s. By 1980, a few of these firms-especially IBP-would establish a near-complete
monopoly on beef processing and distribution, but in the beginning they could barely be
distinguished from other "cinder-block" packers in the rural Midwest. Like the earlier
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generation of rural meatpackers, the new breed of packers had a basic strategy of building
single-story, single-species slaughterhouses in areas of plentiful cattle and cheap labor. But
these new packers ratcheted this relocation strategy up several notches, aiming for a degree of
"rural industrialization" that would give them unprecedented control over livestock prices and
retail distribution of meat.276
The first stage of the rural industrialization strategy was a renewed westward movement
of meatpacking factories into the heart of the feedlot belt. [See Map 3.6] With the growth of
feedlots on the High Plains in the 196os, many meatpackers realized that they were spending too
much money transporting live cattle all the way from western Kansas or Colorado to
slaughterhouses in Iowa or Illinois. A number of feedlot operators also realized this. Kenneth
Monfort, manager of the giant Monfort feedyards near Greeley, Colorado, entered the packing
business "more or less by accident" in 1960 after deciding that there were not enough packers in
his area to absorb the 3,400 fattened cattle emerging from his yards each week.277 Producers
Packing Company (later Farmland) in Garden City, Kansas, was similarly established by a group
of livestock raisers in the southern Plains who wanted a local packing plant to absorb a "uniform
supply of beef' from "all the feedlots around" that area.278 But no meatpacking firm was more
focused on moving its factories to the new source of cattle supply than IBP. Under the leadership
of two previous unknowns in the industry, Currier J. Holman and Andrew D. Anderson, IBP
built its first plant in Denison, Iowa, in 1961 with the help of a Small Business Administration
loan.279 From there, IBP built successively larger plants over the next two decades, each one
deeper in the heart of the Feedlot Belt-in Dakota City, Nebraska (1967); Emporia, Kansas
276 Michael J. Broadway, "From City to Countryside: Recent Changes in the Structure and Location of the Meat- and
Fish-Processing Industries," in Any Way You Cut It, ed. Donald D. Stull, Michael J. Broadway, and David Griffith
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 27. See also Kathleen Stanley, "Industrial and Labor Market
Transformation in the U.S. Meatpacking Industry," in The Global Restructuring ofAgro-Food Systems, ed. Philip
McMichael (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 129-44.
277 House Committee on Agriculture, Prohibit Feeding of Livestock by Certain Packers, 227.
278 "Garden City Packing Firm Tabs Officers," Topeka (Kansas) State Journal, Dec. 16, 1963, Meat Industry Clippings,
KSHS; "Packers to Build: Project at Garden City to Cost One Million," Kansas City Times, Oct. 9, 1964, ibid.; "Packing
Plant Interest Grows," Wichita Eagle, May 9, 1965, ibid.; quote from Peg McMahon, "Feedlots Transform Western
Kansas," Kansas City Star, Oct. 10, 1971, 12-4, Feedlots Subject File, FCHS.
279 Holman and Anderson actually had a difficult time securing funding for IBP; besides relying on the SBA loan, they
claimed to have "mortgaged our wives and our kids and our cars." "Triumph of Logic," Forbes, Dec. 15, 1968, 48.
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(1968); Amarillo, Texas (1974).280 In 1979, IBP began construction of what remains the largest
beefpacking plant in the world, just outside Garden City, Kansas-seven miles west of Earl
Brookover's original feedlot.28x Though IBP was the largest, other firms such as National Beef,
Missouri Beef, Excel, and Spencer followed its lead, establishing giant plants "in the heartland of
feed grains" in the 196os and 1970s.28 2 By 1977, nine western states2s3 accounted for 70 percent
of the nation's beef slaughter.28 4
2s80 Dale C. Tinstman and Robert L. Peterson, Iowa Beef Processors, Inc.: An Entire Industry Revolutionized! (New
York: Newcomen Society, 1981), 9.
281 "Meat Plant to Garden City," Topeka (Kansas) State Journal, Sep. 4, 1979, Meat Industry Clippings, KSHS; "IBP
Looks toward Moving In," Garden City Times, Apr. o10, 1980, ibid.
282 Lynne Holt, "Feedlot Beefs up Swiftly in Liberal Supply Area," Wichita Eagle, Oct. 29, 1969, Cattle Industry
Clippings, KSHS; Fred Kiewit, "Kansas Beef to the Nation," Kansas City Star, Aug. 15, 1971, Meat Industry Clippings,
KSHS.
283 Iowa, Nebraska, Minnesota, Missouri, Colorado, Kansas, Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico.
284 Willard F. Williams, The Changing Structure of the Beef Packing Industry (Lubbock, TX: TARA, 1979), 56. In
1986 the state of Kansas had a higher meatpacking output than any other state, including the much larger state Texas.
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Map 3.6: Rural Meatpacdking in the 1970os
Beefpackers such as IBP undertook a "rural industrialization" strategy in the 1970s, beginning in western
Iowa and ultimately locating their largest factories in the heart of the western feedlot belt by the late
1970s. Sources: Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns 1979; Williams, Changing Patterns, 17.
It might seem that this movement of beefpacking into the heart of cattle country resulted
from the working out of an obvious logic. In fact, Forbes magazine declared in 1968 that IBP's
strategy was a "triumph of logic," allowing the packer to reduce transportation costs to a
minimum by placing plants within an hour's trucking distance from feedlots.285 A circle seemed
285 "Triumph of Logic," Forbes, Dec. 15,1968, 48; House Committee on Agriculture, Prohibit Feeding of Livestock by
Certain Packers, 24.
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to have been completed. The nation's beef industry had begun with cattle drives to Old West
towns such as Dodge City, Kansas, where cattle embarked on long railroad trips to the halfway
point of Chicago, in order to continue the journey to the populous East as swinging carcasses.28 6
By the late twentieth century, Dodge City, Kansas was once again a booming cowtown, but this
time the cattle did not begin their long journeys eastward until they had been slaughtered.
Packers no longer had to swallow the expense of shipping inedible hides, hooves, and entrails
halfway across the country. But this "logic" did not become possible until modern highways and
refrigerated trailers allowed long-distance transportation of slaughtered meat that was fast
enough to avoid losses from rotting and shrinkage. As early as 1883, Count Marquis de Mores
had attempted to fulfill this logic, building meatpacking plants deep in cattle country to save on
transportation costs, but failed utterly; his "colossal scheme" failed to take into account the need
for a year-round supply of cattle, a pool of skilled labor, and well-established ties to retail
rnarkets.28 7 Furthermore, the logic of IBP's strategy of rural industrialization did not become
politically acceptable until after American consumers had grown so accustomed to inexpensive
beef that they were willing to accept a new monopoly in order to get it.
And a monopoly they did receive. First, the new breed of meatpackers reinstated an
impressive control over the prices and terms on which they purchased live cattle, much as the
Beef Trust had done by controlling central stockyards in the early twentieth century. In the mid-
1960s packers such as IBP began paying for animals based on carcass weights rather than live
weights. This meant that the seller of an animal could not physically see that he was receiving a
fair price, since the packer set the price after slaughter within the physical confines of the plant,
rather than out in the open at a sale yard.288 But even when not engaging in such potentially
illicit practices, IBP's cattle buyers perfected the system of direct buying in the mid-196os. IBP's
buyers traveled by car each day from feedlot to feedlot, using two-way microwave radios to keep
in constant contact with each other as well as a central dispatcher in Dakota City, Nebraska. This
216 "Meat Packing Industry Blazed Early Trails to Prosperity," Kansas Business (Nov. 1937): 6-7, 23-4; "Packers and
Stockyards Near Age 50," Wichita Eagle, Nov. 25, 1937, Cattle Industry Clippings, KSHS.
287 Yeager, Competition and Regulation, 66.
288 Glenn B. Bierman (Acting Director, Packers and Stockyards Division) to Clarence H. Girard, "Proposed
Regulation-Carcass Grade and/or Weight Purchasing by Meat Packers," Apr. 17, 1967, RG 136, Entry 32, Box 1,
Folder 2.
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instantaneous feedback on market conditions prevented them from ever having to buy at a price
that did not meet with approval from headquarters.289
But the most basic business goal of the rural industrialization strategy was not simply to
gain control of cattle supplies. A voluminous, steady stream of live cattle was only a necessary
condition for IBP's ultimate goal of achieving rock-bottom prices for consumers while reaping
big profits. This does not mean IBP's managers entertained particularly pro-consumer
sentiments; instead, low retail prices were merely a way of achieving "market domination" by
underselling all competitors.290 The path to driving down prices began with capturing control of
supplies, but continued with exploitation of unorganized rural workers. IBP was widely admired
by other meatpackers in the 1960s for its steadfast refusal to peacefully negotiate wage contracts
with meatpacking unions. In particular, the company made every effort to avoid the "master
contract" achieved by employees at all of the old-line packing firms such as Armour, Swift, and
smaller independents like Oscar Mayer in the early 1950s.2 9' Strikes were commonplace in IBP
plants, including an extremely violent episode at the Dakota City plant in 1969, as meatpacking
unions sought-and usually failed-to bring the renegade firm's wages in line with the rest of the
industry.292 IBP's first president, Currier J. Holman, was so resolved to keep wages low that he
told his management team to prepare to have one of every three plants out on strike at any given
time.293 A union representative recalled in 1977 that Holman "once said you run a business the
way you run a war, and he certainly applied that to labor."294 Even a former IBP executive found
the firm's anti-labor culture to be downright militant: "Iowa Beef makes the Marine Corps look
like pantywaists."295 In addition to substandard wages, IBP demanded incredible productivity
from workers. A worker on the kill floor of IBP's Garden City plant found the pace of work so
289 Jerry Fetterolf, "Final Touches Are Due on Emporia Packing Plant," Wichita Eagle, Apr. 27, 1969, Meat Industry
Clippings, KSHS; "Ahead of the Herd in Automation," BW, Jun. 27, 1964, 106.
290 House Committee on Small Business, Small Business Problems in the Marketing of Meat, part 5, 9; Tinstman and
Peterson, Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 12.
291 Horowitz, Negro and White, 253-68; Deborah Fink, Cutting into the Meatpacking Line: Workers and Change in
the Rural Midwest (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 51.
292 "Fighting over the Cost of Cutting Meat," BW, Nov. 22, 1969, 74-6; "Iowa Beef Processors Plans to Lay off 290 at
Nebraska Plant," WSJ, Jul. 29, 1970, 2; "Iowa Beef Employes Vote End of Union Representation," WSJ, Jun. 29,
1970, 26; "Bad Old Days," Time, Aug. 9, 1982, 47-8.
293 James Cook, "Those Simple Barefoot Boys from Iowa Beef," Forbes, Jun. 22, 1981, 35.
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intense that he did not "have time to sweep sweat from [his] face."296 Managers realized that few
people could maintain such a pace for very long, and so considered an annual employee
turnover rate of up to 96 percent to be "low."297
The new breed of meatpackers also sought to drive down the cost of production by
introducing new technologies to the process of cattle slaughter. In particular, firms like IBP
effectively eliminated the old production bottleneck during the process of dehiding that had
prevented a carcass from moving continuously on the disassembly line. A group of workers
deploying powered saws each made simple cuts that eliminated the need for skilled hiders to
pull the carcass off the conveyor.298 Minute divisions of labor were introduced throughout the
rest of the slaughtering process, requiring "but a minor responsibility" from each employee,
allowing the company to hire unskilled workers and train them in a matter of hours.299 Plants
were carefully designed to allow rapid, horizontal flow of the carcass through intensely
refrigerated spaces, dramatically reducing shrinkage of the meat.300 In 1964, IBP took a live
animal from the load-in dock to the load-out cooler in only 32 minutes; a decade later the
company had the process down to 20 minutes.301 The combination of low wages, deskilling,
division of labor, and rapid throughput allowed a modern IBP-style plant to slaughter a cow for
less than $15 in the late 1970s, while old-line packers experienced costs of $18 to $20 per
head.302 The new breed of packers sought further cost advantages by finding profitable uses for
the byproducts of slaughter. Liver, tongue, sweetbreads, and cheek meat were sold to French
chefs as "variety meats," while blood became animal feed, hearts and meat scraps became
hamburger, and hides became shoes.303 By shaving costs and boosting production, IBP was able
296 Stull and Broadway, "Effects of Restructuring," 13.
297 Stull and Broadway, "Effects of Restructuring," 14; Fink, Cutting into the Meatpacking Line, 6-38.
298 Barbara Oringderff, "An Inside Look at Packing Plant's Operations," Garden City Telegram, Oct. 28, 1965, 5,
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299 House Committee on Small Business, Small Business Problems in the Marketing of Meat, part 5, 8.
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303 Evelyn Steimel, "French Chefs May Be Using Garden City Products," Hutchinson (Kansas) News, Mar. 4, 1969,
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by the late 1960os to undersell nearly all of its competitors while making remarkable profits. The
tiny company that began in 1960 with a $300,000 Small Business Administration loan became a
ranking member of the Fortune 500 by 1969, with $534 million in annual sales.304
Despite its impressive growth in the 196os, IBP would not achieve low prices and
monopoly power to rival the strength of the old Beef Trust until it achieved control over the
distribution of fresh meat. This came with the firm's introduction of boxed beef in 1969, a
technology that quickly proved as revolutionary as Gustavus Swift's refrigerated railcar had been
in the 188os. The concept of boxed beef was relatively simple. Rather than ship entire carcasses
to wholesale or retail butchers to be deboned and cut into consumer-sized portions, IBP broke
carcasses down into consumer cuts at its own rural plants, starting in Dakota City in 1969. These
retail-ready cuts were wrapped in vacuum-sealed plastic bags, placed in cardboard boxes, and
trucked via refrigerated trailer directly to the loading docks of supermarkets or other
institutional customers. This led to enormous savings in transportation costs-as much as 30
percent less than swinging beef-since only the meat that would end up in the retail meat case
made the trip to the city. Boxed packaging also allowed for much more efficient use of trailer
space; unlike the awkward shape of a swinging carcass, a box could be tightly stacked from wall-
to-wall and floor-to-ceiling. Truckers could thus haul 4,000 more pounds of boxed beef than
carcass meat. On top of all of this, the vacuum-sealed Cryovac bags extended the shelf life of
fresh meat by nearly a month, making the distance between Dakota City and New York a
relatively trivial matter.30 5 Boxed beef was not a new concept in 1969; the Army Quartermaster
Corps had pioneered the development of consumer-ready meat packaging during World War II,
and Armour had built on this work during the 1950s in conjunction with the U.S. Air Force.36
But even when IBP re-introduced boxed beef in 1969, success did not come immediately in
achieving the seemingly obvious logic of high-volume direct meat distribution.
304 "The Youngest Giant," Fortune, May 15, 1969, 293.
305 Tinstman and Peterson, Iowa Beef Processors, 8; House Committee on Small Business, Small Business Problems
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Urban wholesale and retail butchers were especially unwilling to allow the "logic" of
boxed beef to unfold. Members of the powerful Amalgamated Meat Cutters union clearly
understood that boxed beef would allow companies like IBP to transform butchering into a job
for unskilled, unorganized, low-wage rural workers. Over the entire history of beef distribution,
skilled butchers had played a central role in delivering meat to consumers. Even the
introduction of "self service" meat departments in supermarkets in the late 1940os had not
eliminated the need for a skilled butcher to make meat cuts attractive to customers.30 7 For
instance, in 1948, the A. & P. store in Cambridge, Massachusetts, attempted to reduce wage
costs for butchers by introducing automatic cutting machinery and hiring "wrapping girls" to do
the weighing and pricing of cuts. The attempt failed when managers found that the workers were
"'still too green" and "the system [was] too new, to run at top efficiency."308 Boxed beef, on the
other hand, required only one or two cuts from retail butchers, making jobs in meatcutting
departments essentially "no different from stocking cans in the grocery section of the store."309
Realizing this, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters successfully allied with Teamsters to refuse to
accept shipments of boxed beef at supermarket receiving docks in cities such as New York,
Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Louis.310 Furthermore, even supermarket managers were not
enthusiastic about boxed beef in 1969. Supermarkets had made significant capital investments
in warehouses and deboning facilities in the 1940os and 1950S that boxed beef would make
obsolete.3"
IBP was committed to achieving control of beef distribution, however, and made every
effort to break the resistance. First, IBP President Currier J. Holman broke into the lucrative
New York market by paying bribes to union officials and providing secret rebates to
supermarket meat buyers, a strategy that would land him in federal court on conspiracy
307 "Meat Prepackaging Soars," BW, Oct. 25, 1947, 62-6; Jane Nickerson, "Fresh Meat in Packages," New York Times
Magazine, Aug. 15, 1948, 32-3; "Visible Meat," BW, Dec. 28, 1957, 109; Corey, Meat and Man, 161-3.
308 "Meat Prepackaging, A New Try," BW, Apr. 17, 1948, 56, 58-9.
3"9 William Burns, "Changing Corporate Structure and Technology in the Retail Food Industry," in Labor and
Technology: Union Responses to Changing Environments, ed. Donald Kennedy, Charles Craypo, and Mary Lehman
(University Park, PA: Department of Labor Studies, Pennsylvania State University, 1982), 41.
31) Resistance remained the strongest in St. Louis, where boxed beef was not accepted until after 1981. Cook, "Those
Simple Barefoot Boys from Iowa Beef," 35, 33.
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charges.312 But even more importantly, IBP cut the price of boxed beef so low that it simply
became irresistible to supermarket managers, who realized that they could eliminate the jobs of
skilled butchers who made $2 to $3 more per hour than the workers needed to package and
stock boxed beef cuts.3 13 By 1972, IBP had so many customers for boxed beef that it was making
a profit of $5 million a year on sales of over $1 billion, despite the razor-thin profit margins
required to keep the wholesale price attractive to retailers.314 In the mid-1970s, boxed beef
quickly became the standard method of distributing fresh meat for the new breed of packers;
MBPXL built a boxed beef plant in Wichita in 1975, Monfort built one in Oakley, Kansas, in
1978, and by 1979 nearly 44 percent of beef was sold in boxed form.315
Boxed beef, like dressed beef before it, required enormous investments to make the
system work. Unlike the dressed beef packers, however, the new breed of meatpackers did not
have to invest in an expensive distribution infrastructure of branch houses and railcars; boxed
beef distribution required only a fleet of refrigerated trucks to deliver meat directly to the meat
lockers of stores and institutions. However, the low prices demanded by cost-conscious
consumers and supermarket managers forced boxed beef producers to price the new product so
cheaply that only economies of enormous scale could produce profitability. Boxed beef
producers built plants of unprecedented size that made the output of the Chicago factories of the
original Beef Trust seem puny. The IBP plant opened near Garden City, Kansas in 1982 was
officially publicized as having a daily slaughter capacity of 4,000 head, but in reality the number
was closer to 5,5oo-a capacity so large that anyone familiar with the beefpacking industry at
the time would have thought the directors of IBP "had lost their minds."316 IBP's main
competitors-MBPXL, Spencer, Monfort, and National Beef-were among the only companies
able to secure enough capital to build the huge-capacity plants required to successfully market
312 "Iowa Beef Says Official May Face Indictment by a New York Jury: Case Would Involve Possible Fees Paid to Meat
Broker in Fight with Union over Boxed Beef," WSJ, Mar. 12, 1973, 4; Lacey Fosburgh, "Big Meat Packer Accused of
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boxed beef.3l7 For both smaller beefpacking firms and the old-line packers like Swift and
Armour, the investments required to enter the boxed beef trade were prohibitively expensive. As
a consequence of these barriers to entry, the number of meatpacking firms declined by 25
percent from 1970 to 1979, with most of the losses occurring among the smallest firms. Those
smaller rural firms that survived, such as Dubuque and Hyplains, did so by selling carcasses to
IBP to be boxed, becoming "captive firms" in the process.3,8 In 1978, IBP alone slaughtered at
least 16 percent of the nation's cattle-a remarkable share, since even Swift at the height of its
power had probably never slaughtered more than 18 percent. 31 9 A new beef monopoly had
arisen.
But this new monopoly never drew the sustained outrage of livestock producers or
consumers that had made the issue of antitrust a long-term problem for the USDA. IBP brazenly
announced its plans to dominate the beef industry; Director of Public Affairs Charles Harness
announced in 1982 that IBP simply wanted "to make a buck. We think we have to grow to make
a profit."32o The incredible growth of IBP and the other new breed of meatpackers was never
seen as an issue of state concern by the administrators of the Packers and Stockyards Act, partly
because of the low retail prices achieved by boxed beef distribution. Robert Peterson, who
replaced Currier Holman as President of IBP following the bribery scandal, announced in 1981
that "the principal beneficiary of [boxed beef] is the consumer. The price of beef is still within
the reach of the average consumer largely due to economy of scale."32 Congressional Small
Business committees investigated the growing monopoly power of IBP during the late 1970s and
early 1980s, but as Representative Toby Roth of Wisconsin argued, "Looking at it through the
housewife's view, I could care less about Iowa Beef."322 Although the congressional
investigations resulted in charges of "predatory pricing practices" by IBP in dumping boxed beef
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below cost on retail markets, the main concern that arose from the hearings was not with
monopoly of beef marketing, but with the potential of the big packers to gain control of the
nation's cattle supply.323
Livestock raisers, however, generally had few complaints about the monopsony power of
IBP. When the firm opened its record-capacity plant near Garden City in 1982, Kansas
cattlemen announced that they were "gleeful" to have such a large buyer in their backyard. IBP's
insatiable demand for cattle allowed raisers and feeders near a plant to increase their production
without fear of losing their market.324 IBP not only bought live cattle in steady volumes, but also
tried to offer livestock producers higher prices than its competitors in order to maintain control
of supplies. In 1981, the firm offered as much as $20 more per head than other packer buyers.325
Representative Frederick Richmond of New York could thus sum up the lack of government
concern about IBP's power: "If indeed the IBP can pay more for the cattle, which is good for the
farmers, if they can deliver a more efficient box of boxed beef to the East, [then] the basic
concept is good, isn't it?"326 Of course, not all cattle producers were exactly "gleeful" to have IBP
dominate cattle buying; in 1976, Iowa livestock feeders filed a federal price-fixing suit against
the firm in 1976, and others have done so since, although with little result.327 Furthermore, as a
representative of the National Cattlemen's Association pointed out in 1980, even if a packer such
as IBP cornered the livestock market in one particular region, livestock raisers could simply pay
the trucking charges required to haul their cattle into another region with higher cattle prices.328
Without either consumer or producer protest, the issue of monopoly in beef production
was no longer a significant state concern by the 198os. The issues in the new beef industry that
grabbed headlines were not primarily questions of political economy, but of environmental and
food safety. Suburban residents in the vicinities of feedlots complained of groundwater and odor
pollution, manure-laden dust, and piles of dead flies on their doorsteps, but state governments
323 Ibid., 41 and passim; Skaggs, Prime Cut, 194-5; Williams, Changing Structure, 86, 92, 149.
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in the Feedlot Belt have generally refused to limit the growth of industrial cattle feeding.329
Feedlot operators have easily convinced state officials, eager to create economic growth, that the
odors emanating from the yards are not the smell of manure, but "the smell of money."330
Meanwhile, academic social scientists seem to be the only people concerned about the difficult
working conditions of rural meatpacking employees.33' The USDA, meanwhile, found evidence
of price-fixing in the packing industry after organizing a Meat Pricing Task Force in 1978-9, but
requested that Congress not pass any legislation to deal with the issue, preferring instead to
cajole packers through informal actions by the Packers and Stockyards Administration.332
Monopoly had once again become a fact in the beef industry, but it was no longer a problem.
Asphalt Cowboys
Truck transportation underlay all of the political and economic machinations involved in
the fall and subsequent rise of monopoly power in beef production in the twentieth century.
Decentralized cattle marketing and direct beef distribution relied on trucks and good highways
in the 1930s to 1950s, leading to the declining power of the Big Four in controlling prices in the
industry. In the 1960s and 1970s, trucking ironically helped rebuild a new monopoly by allowing
cattle producers to relocate and intensify cattle feeding, then by providing the equipment
necessary to make boxed beef distribution possible. Trucking proved remarkably flexible both as
a technology and as a means for a variety of economic interest groups to achieve their goals in
the marketplace. At the heart of this flexible technopolitical machinery was the "bull hauler,"
immortalized as the "asphalt cowboy" in a country song performed by the appropriately named
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Sleepy LaBeef in 1970: "His engines are his horses, with an air conditioned seat / He can cross
the desert now, and never feel the heat / He's a cowboy, he's a diesel dogging, truck driving,
asphalt cowboy."333
The independence and strong work ethic of the "asphalt cowboy" was an important
factor in making trucking a flexible form of transportation. From the beginning of large-scale
beef production in the United States, the most essential factor shaping the industry was the
problem of gathering cattle from widely distributed ranches and farms and moving them to
consumers without losing profits due to shrinkage, bruising, or early death. The movement of
cattle always relied on relatively skilled laborers capable of transporting the animals safely;
whether actual cowboys, railroad stock handlers, or eventually truckers. But finding workers
willing to put up with the stench and the demanding work required to convince stubborn cattle
to take long rides was not always easy. As a consequence, the average bull hauler in the
twentieth century was usually a beginning trucker, someone who took the job as an entry-level
position on the way up the trucking ladder to hauling cleaner, more respectable loads. As one
experienced cattle trucker put it, "other truckers ... think that we are the most stupid, stinking,
sons-a-bitches on the road" and preferred not to have to park next to cattle trailers at truck
stops.334 But for a bull hauler willing to work hard, long hours providing quality service to
livestock shippers, relatively decent money could be made; in the early 1970s, a Nebraska
trucker earned up to $1 per mile for cattle hauls.335 But money alone did not define the
experience of the bull hauler. Instead, a sense of rugged independence permeated the culture of
cattle truckers, often explicitly understood as a modern-day invocation of the idealized cowboy
life of the Old West. It was this independence that livestock shippers and meatpackers
encouraged and exploited in the twentieth century to gain market power in the beef industry.
As in the case of milk, cattle trucking began in earnest in the 1920S with farmers using
their own pickup trucks to deliver loads to local markets. For instance, Sam C. Ludwig of
Florence, Kansas, bought his first Ford Model T truck in 1922, which he remembered as having
333 Clark Bentley and Lawton Williams, "Asphalt Cowboy" (BMI / Shelby Singleton / Western Hills), recorded by
Sleepy LaBeef, Plantation Records 66 (1970).
334 Stan Holtzman, "The 'Bull Hauler': 'Other Drivers Call Us Stupid'," Overdrive (Jul. 1965): 42.
335 "The Livestock Hauler: 2oth Century Trail Boss," Overdrive (Feb. 1972): 123.
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"a capacity of two big cows or three small ones." A decade later, Ludwig had a bigger truck and
regularly hauled livestock to market for himself and his neighbors, although he continued to
farm.336 This remained a common pattern in the 193os; although more and more cattle moved
to market via truck, relatively few truckers specialized in hauling animals. Ted Berger, of
Jetmore, Kansas, began hauling livestock in the 1930s but also ran a farm, operated an
automobile repair shop, and hauled grapefruit from Florida.337 By the late 1930s, many young
men fed up with the difficult life of farming during the Depression began looking for a career
that would provide a steady income, but still allow them to maintain a sense of "working for
one's self' as they believed farming was supposed to do. Trucking was becoming an increasingly
important means of moving cattle to market, and so drivers were in demand; the decision to
haul cattle seemed obvious to many would-be farmers who knew they could stand the smell and
hard work of bull hauling.338 This trend picked up during and immediately after World War II,
as farmers and the sons of farmers found high land prices making agriculture an increasingly
difficult business in which to maintain any sense of economic independence. Cattle trucking, on
the other hand, required only a relatively small investment in a good truck to get a decent
income without being tied to a factory line or a desk job. In fact, most bull hauling operations
have historically been very small companies where the owners are also drivers and have quite
small fleets. For instance, Wayne Barnett of Moran, Kansas, began as a livestock trucker by
buying a used straight truck in 1945, and had just three tractor-trailers fifteen years later. But if
his business was not big, "Mr. Barnett likes being in business for himself. He is an individualist
who just wouldn't be happy working for someone else."339 Of course, some livestock haulers
were able to grow quite large by reinvesting earnings into new trucks, but even one of the largest
firms, headed by Vernon Carlisle in the Texas Panhandle, had only 24 tractor-trailers in 1977.340
Cattle trucking was an important business, but it was never big business; few truckers would
336 Donna Hobbs, "It All Started with a Model T," Kansas Transporter (Sep. 1962): 6-7. See also Dorothy Kelley,
"Decatur County Feedlot 50 Years Old," Wichita Eagle, Sep. 3, 1970, Cattle Industry Clippings, KSHS.
33'7 "Livestock Carriers Die in Accident," Kansas Transporter (Oct. 1956): 29
338 Robert Vandivier, interview by the author, Nov. 22, 2003, Lebanon, IN; "Bill Graves Began with One Truck,"
Kansas Transporter (Jan. 1947): 3, 14; "Bill Graves Heads Kansas Truckers," Power Wagon (Feb. 1947): 28; Doris
Quinn, "Pappy Is Happy about Being a Bull Hauler," Kansas Transporter (Dec. 1959): 6-7.
33') Doris Quinn, "In the Shadow of a Steer," Kansas Transporter (Sep. 1960): 6-7. See also Doris Quinn, "A New
Breed," Kansas Transporter (Jun. 1961): 4-5.
34' "Carlisle Moves Fat and Feeder Cattle," Ag Trucking News, Mar. 1977, 68.
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have been willing to both be required to work a hard, stinky job and also have to do so for the
benefit of an absentee owner of a large corporation.
Part of the reason for this deeply felt sense of independence among cattle haulers was the
widespread recognition that the job demanded impressive skills. Driving the truck was the easy
part; the owner of one livestock hauling firm believed that he "could teach any idiot how to drive
a truck," but finding drivers who also knew how to properly load and care for animals was a
great deal more difficult.34l The bull hauler who believed that other drivers thought of his ilk as
"stinking sons-a-bitches" defended his chosen line of work as more skilled than that of general
freight haulers, since "hauling the big brutes is actually a delicate task [because] the animals
bruise easily."342 Bruising made for unsaleable meat and was not kindly accepted by either
farmers or packers who stood to lose money when truckers drove too fast, stopped too quickly,
turned too sharply, or packed the cattle too tightly into a trailer.343 Successful cattle hauling
firms, such as Horadam Brothers in southern Texas, hired only drivers who could prove they
had "a certain amount of restraint and cattle psychology" that would allow them to load and
transport the animals without causing stress that would result in restless, bruised cattle.344 The
"twentieth century trail boss" needed to keep as close an eye on his dogies as the cowboy of
yore.3 45
Although Sleepy LaBeef sang with tongue firmly planted in cheek about the "asphalt
cowboy" and his "air-conditioned seat," many cattle haulers believed themselves to be direct
reincarnations of the Old West drovers. Floyd P. Mounkes of Emporia, Kansas, wore cowboy
boots and a fine hat while "stand[ing] tall in the saddle" of a "modern highway truck which
efficiently and economically transports a rancher's cattle to the market of his choice."346 But
while the modern bull hauler moved cattle more quickly than the drovers of the Chisholm Trail,
notions of efficiency and economy took a backseat to ideals of proper manhood. This was most
341 Robert Vandivier interview.
342 Holtzman, "The 'Bull Hauler'," 44.
343 "'5 Major Things to Watch' in Every Livestock Haul," Kansas Transporter (Feb. 1948): 14, 21; "Handle Stock
Properly to Reduce Bruising," Kansas Transporter (Jul. 1954): 23.
344 Ray E. Maher, "Moving Beef on the Hoof Is Horadam's Job," Power Wagon (May 1948): 22-3.
345 "Livestock Hauler: 2oth Century Trail Boss," 118.
346 Donna Hobbs, "Business Surrounded by Atmosphere of the 'Old West'," Kansas Transporter (Jul. 1962): 6-8. See
also "Mounkes Truck Line Builds Outstanding Safety Record," Kansas Transporter (Mar. 1970): 10.
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evident in the cattle hauler's preference for powerful trucks. C. R. Ballstadt, for instance, began
hauling cattle in Iowa in 1933 with a Model T pulling a four-wheeled trailer, but by 1970 had
assembled a small fleet of giant rigs, including a Kenworth, two Peterbilts, and three
International Harvesters. Although high-horsepower engines were not particularly necessary for
the job, Ballstadt had 335hp Cummins diesels installed in the Peterbilts and Kenworth, earning
him a highly coveted photo spread in Overdrive magazine.347 Cattle truckers who traveled any
distance over a few hundred miles used the length of their trips to justify the purchase of big
d(iesel rigs, rather than gasoline straight trucks, in the 1940os and 1950s; again, the size and
power was not necessary to get the job done, but a big manly truck made the job worth doing.348
The culture of cattle hauling was permeated by a sense of independent manhood, defiantly
upheld in an era of big business, big government, big labor unions, and, of course, big
meatpackers.
Truckers who considered themselves independent were, however, deeply embedded in a
web of regulatory structures and capitalist machinery. Both livestock producers and
meatpackers came to depend on truckers to operate a flexible transportation system that would
allow them to increase their control over beef marketing in the twentieth century. The
technology of trucking provided a certain inherent flexibility, since a big rig could travel down a
ranch's dirt path almost as easily as it could on an interstate highway. But neither this physical
freedom of motion nor the bull haulers' culture of manly independence was enough to guarantee
that trucking would provide the various economic interest groups in the beef industry with the
power they wanted. Instead, farmers and packers encouraged flexibility through subtle
manipulations of state power.
First, livestock hauling was exempt from federal rate and market entry regulation, as
described in Chapter 1. The politics of livestock hauling in the state of Kansas offer useful
insights into the importance of the federal exemption, because Kansas was one of the few states
to regulate the industry. This was done through the Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC), a
bipartisan regulatory body originally founded in 1911 in response to populist anger at railroad
34'7 "Small Fleet of the Month," Overdrive (Apr. 1970): 84.
348 Tim Heerdt, "Hauling Livestock, A Boy's Perspective," Wheels of Time, Mar. 2004, 25.
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rates.349 Although the KCC maintained a close watch over trucking rates beginning in the 1930s,
it did allow farmers who hauled their own or their neighbors' cattle directly to market to do so
without registering for a permit or filing their freight rates with the state. This exemption caused
tensions between cattle raisers and regulated freight truckers, since Kansas farmers would have
greatly preferred to have cattle hauling in their state be unregulated as it was in most other
states. 350 The Livestock Feeders' Association of Whitewater, Kansas, passed a resolution in 1940
blaming the KCC for making it "next to prohibitive to truck cattle from Texas to Kansas," forcing
them to rely on slower, more expensive rail shipping.35 Kansas cattlemen did not merely
complain about the KCC; they also regularly gave their business to truckers who did not have
KCC hauling authority. In 1950, truckers who had received proper authority from the KCC began
a two-decades long effort, spearheaded by the Kansas Motor Carriers Association, to combat the
increasing prevalence of these "bandit truckers" who were "running scott-free" and creating
"complete chaos" by not paying the appropriate state licensing fees and ton-mile taxes.352 Where
the KCC and Kansas Motor Carrier Association saw "chaos," cattle producers saw opportunities
for cheaper, faster shipping of their cattle to market, and so found ways to avoid the very
regulations that their populist forebears had demanded for railroads. Kansas cattlemen might
have envied their competitors in the state of Georgia, where farmers could rely on an
unregulated livestock trucking industry in which competition was so fierce that truckers had to
scramble to make enough money to pay for their equipment and fuel.353
Most of the nation's cattle producers relied on the flexibility of unregulated trucking
services, and so lobbied Congress and the USDA to keep the federal exemption in effect from the
1930S to the 1970s. (Chapter 1) But while the USDA's agricultural economists officially approved
of the agricultural exemption, some realized that the flexibility it entailed might add
349 "KCC History Goes back to March 1883," Wichita Eagle, Nov. 8, 1976, Motor Carrier Industry Clippings, KSHS; "A
Real Job as the Corporation Body Shifts to New Quarters," Topeka (Kansas) State Journal, Aug. 15, 1941, ibid.; Ted
Blankenship, "KCC Isn't Just Another State Board," Wichita Eagle, Nov. 7, 1976, ibid.
350 L. A. Hoffman, P. P. Boles, and T. Q. Hutchinson, Livestock Trucking Services: Quality, Adequacy, and Shipment
Patterns (Washington: USDA, Economic Research Service, 1975), ii.
351 "Livestock Feeders Pass Important Resolution," Motor Carrier (May 1940): 11.
352 "Farm-to-Market Carriers Wage War on Violators," Kansas Transporter (Aug. 1950): 20-1; John Harvey, "What
Good Are Ports of Entry?" Kansas Farmer, Jan. 20, 1951, 10.
353 "Adequate Rates Major Problem Facing Bull Haulers," Ag Trucking News, Jun. 1973, 32.
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unnecessary costs to the marketing of beef cattle.354 Truckers in a highly competitive
marketplace gained business not so much by lowering their rates, but by offering improved
service to shippers. This meant, for instance, that a trucker would travel directly to a farm or a
feedlot immediately when a cattleman called, even if this meant the trucker had to go
significantly out of his way to get there.355 Furthermore, although trucks arriving directly on
farms allowed cattle to move shorter distances on the hoof to get from a pasture to a feedlot to a
packinghouse, each of these separate movements along the highway could quickly add up. As
one cattle hauler noted in 1965, "it isn't unusual for us to haul the same cattle four or five
times."356 Furthermore, the flexibility provided by small fleets of trucks able to arrive at any
shipping point at a moment's notice also meant that trucking firms could not practice economies
of scale as more tightly integrated railroads or larger trucking firms could. Fuel could not be
purchased at volume discounts, centralized repair departments were not possible, and traffic
could not be dispatched in systematic fashion to reduce unit costs.357 The cattle producer's
demand for a flexible transportation system was not the product of an abstract ideal of economic
efficiency, but of a desire to use transportation networks to increase his ability to attain a
desirable price for his cattle by selling them where and when he wished.
Meatpacking firms likewise relied on truckers to increase their control over the terms of
cattle and meat pricing. The new breed of meatpackers such as IBP proved particularly intent
upon buying cattle less than 24 hours in advance of slaughter, in an effort to minimize the
weight loss of animals as they left the feedlot.358 This just-in-time supply chain could only work
if truckers were willing and able to send trucks wherever and whenever the packer wanted
them.359 On the meat distribution end, meatpackers also needed trucks to be able to travel
anywhere. In the era of rail-based branch house distribution, packers had moved fresh beef to
small towns and cities by relying on a combination of railcars, cold-storage warehouses, and
3M J. C. Winter to Charles B. Bowling, "Livestock Transportation Charges," Feb. 28, 1955, RG 136, Entry 42, Box 2,
Folder 2.
355 Abdou, "Economic Aspects," 964.
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35: "Winrock Farms," Ag Trucking News, May 1973, 14-5.
358 Dirck Steimel and Angelia Herrin, "Wichita's Meatpacking Era Draws to Close," Wichita Eagle, May 15, 1983, Meat
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small delivery trucks; but in an era of giant supermarkets widely distributed in suburban
shopping centers, tractor-trailers were the only machines capable of delivering in volume to
geographically diffuse customers. In particular, with the advent of boxed beef, it became
necessary for IBP to ship directly to supermarket loading docks rather than to central
warehouses. Truckers hauling boxed beef might have to make multiple daily stops across a
broad territory to dispose of a full trailer load of meat.36 0 Even if one particular retail store called
in a large meat order, the meatpackers needed truckers to be flexible. This was because no beef
carcass was ever exactly like another, even in the age of scientific breeding and feeding, so if a
supermarket demanded an entire load of beef matching its precise specifications, the packer
might have to assemble the order by bringing in carcasses from other plants. This assembly had
to occur within a matter of hours to satisfy the large-volume supermarket customer, and so
truckers might be called upon to drive from Kansas to Nebraska to Iowa with little advance
warning.36 Modern beefpacking was a fast-paced industry, demanding instant delivery of both
raw materials and finished products; only truckers traveling on good roads could fulfill such
expectations.
Meatpackers relied on the independent streak of highway haulers to achieve their
business goals. This became especially apparent during a strike at IBP's Dakota City plant in
1969, when the Amalgamated Meatcutters Union convinced the Teamsters Union to refuse to
accept loads of boxed beef bound for New York City. IBP responded by convincing the Interstate
Commerce Commission to grant "emergency temporary authorities" to non-union independent
truckers, and eventually got the meat through.36 2 Following this episode, IBP sought a more
permanent solution by helping independent truckers gain ICC authority to compete with the
unionized haulers. The firms' distribution manager described this effort in a transportation
trade journal as "a quest for new blood," perhaps unintentionally evoking Karl Marx's image of
capitalists as vampires sucking the very life out of workers.36 3 But if truckers had become cogs in
360 Starr H. Lloyd, "Food Distribution: A Study in Beef," Transportation and Distribution Management 12 (Sep.
1972): 21; "Amarillo's IBP: Where Beef Is King," Ag Trucking News, Mar. 1977, 18.
361 Lloyd, "Food Distribution: A Study in Beef," 23-4.
362 Ibid., 21. Unlike cattle haulers, truckers hauling processed meat carcasses needed ICC authority to operate across
state lines; see Chapter 1.
363 Ibid., 23; Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1 (New York: Vintage, 1977 [1867]), 342.
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the capitalist machinery of modern beefpacking, to call the beef hauler a subject of exploitation
or a victim of "false consciousness" would be oversimplification. For one thing, drivers of boxed
beef reefers considered themselves to be near the top of the truck driving totem pole; reefers
came in just below petroleum and liquid hazmat tankers as the equipment most envied by other
truckers.36 4 Furthermore, not every new-breed meatpacker tasted blood at the sight of an
independent trucker. Monfort, for instance, bought its own fleet of fifty brand-new Kenworths
with sleeper cabs in 1970 with the explicit intention of attracting good drivers who appreciated
fine equipment.36 5 Monfort understood that some truck drivers might be willing to work for
slightly less money if they had access to a manly rig like a Kenworth conventional (i.e., a truck
with an extended nose, as opposed to the flat-fronted cabover design). We will return to this
issue in Chapter 5, but first we turn to frozen food, another industry in which expensive trucking
equipment and skilled truck drivers lay at the heart of a marketing machine that brought new
economic structures to the postwar countryside.
364 Lawrence J. Ouellet, Pedal to the Metal: The Work Lives of Truckers (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
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365 "Private Fleet Cuts Delivery Time, Cargo Losses for Monfort of Colorado," Ag Trucking News, Sep. 1973, 6.
227
228
Chapter 4: The Flexibility of Frozen Food
In January 1955, Life magazine published a photo spread on Seabrook Farms of New
Jersey, calling it the "Biggest Vegetable Factory on Earth." The article sought to show Life's
readers how frozen vegetables started life on an industrial farm and ended up in suburban home
freezers. The photo essay celebrated Seabrook's mass production system in triumphant terms,
depicting the factory farm's use of the latest technologies and praising the quality of the
resulting product. For readers of Life, many of whom were new inhabitants of the booming
postwar American suburbs, the essay captured the miraculous nature of the new food economy.
Food processors like Nabisco had pioneered the packaging of cereals decades before, replacing
anonymous barrels with branded boxes. But the postwar food economy brought vegetables in a
b:ox, processed at a mega-scale industrial plant, and delivered at low prices with guarantees of
uniformity and "freshness" via self-serve supermarket shelves. Vegetables had once traveled to
consumers either unprocessed or processed to the point of tastelessness; now they flowed
t hrough Ford-style assembly lines, but still emerged with their flavor and color preserved by
freezers and plastic wraps.1
The Life article merely summarized two and a half decades of extravagant promises for
frozen food. During its early years in the 1930s, frozen food was touted as a way for private
industry to harness science and technology, achieving rationalized food production and
marketing to rival that achieved in the automobile industry. In reality, the science and
technology of freezing proved rather more difficult, requiring a decade of experimentation by
processors, food technologists, and farmers. By the onset of World War II, frozen food packers
had developed impressive systems for mass production but had not yet cultivated a mass
market. Through the war, frozen food gained in popularity due to rationing of canned produce,
justifying continued efforts to make frozen food available to the masses as a low-cost, high-
quality product. The postwar expansion of long-haul trucking and the availability of new
refrigeration technologies finally made low-cost mass distribution possible in the early 1950s.
Prior to this point, frozen food was not embroiled in farm or food politics in the manner of milk
"Biggest Vegetable Factory on Earth," Life, Jan. 1955, 40-3.
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or beef, but the successes of mass marketing in the 1950S gave frozen food a powerful political
valence. Agricultural economists and policymakers in the period increasingly came to see frozen
food as an ideal, non-statist solution to surplus problems in the fresh produce economy. The
technology needed to achieve both the political and economic promises of frozen food, however,
soon proved so complex and expensive that both goals could not be achieved simultaneously. By
the mid-196os, frozen food was no longer touted as an agro-industrial revolution, becoming
instead merely an ordinary product of profit-oriented corporate capitalism.
"A Remarkably Perfect Piece of Merchandise"
An entirely new food processing industry arrived on the American scene-or at least in
Springfield, Massachusetts-on March 8, 1930. Ten grocery stores in that city received the first
shipments of frozen meats, seafood, fruits, and vegetables from Birds Eye Frosted Foods, a
subsidiary of the General Foods Corporation. For two weeks, thousands of curious customers
crowded the Springfield stores, where salesmen perched behind glass-topped freezer cases
touted the packages within as the "Most Revolutionary Idea in the History of Food." Enough
Springfield consumers bought into the avowedly experimental concept, encouraging Birds Eye
to expand its distribution over the next year to retail stores in 30 cities throughout New
England. In August, 1931, Birds Eye products debuted in New York City at Wanamaker's
department stores. Within just seven years, Birds Eye frozen food could be purchased in over
3,000 retail and wholesale outlets in 45 states.2
Defying the general economic mood of the Great Depression, Birds Eye's experiment
brought a sense of optimism to the food economy in the early 1930s. In contrast to the bitter
political strife besetting the milk and beef industries at the time, the introduction of frozen food
promised a mass-production food economy unencumbered by the politics of the past. Hope ran
especially high among business leaders in the food processing industry convinced of untapped
2 "Birdseye Products Sales Are Pushed," Wall Street Journal (hereafter WSJ), Mar. 26, 1930, 23; Rewriting the
Menus of the World: The Story of the Most Revolutionary Idea in the History of Food (Boston: Birds Eye Packing
Company, 1931); "General Foods Service: Quick-Frozen Food Distribution Extended to 30 Eastern Cities and Towns,"
WSJ, Jun. 24, 1931, 13; "Quick Frozen Food Products Introduced in New York at Wanamaker's," WSJ, Aug. 27, 1931,
3; H. J. O'Brien, "Frosted Foods Sales Show Sharp Gain For Past Year," WSJ, Jan. 31, 1938, 1.
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markets and unprecedented profits; among food technologists thrilled by the chance to craft
new processes and devices to prevent the decay of flesh and fiber; and among industrial-style
farmers assured that freezing technology could tame the unpredictable nature of growing and
selling perishable produce. Through the 1930s, these three optimistic groups cooperated in an
effort to turn their hopes for the new product into reality. Despite successes in refining the
techniques of mass production by the end of the decade, however, the promoters of frozen food
proved unable to cultivate a mass market for their goods. After World War II, the frozen food
industry would play an important part in reshaping the nation's food and farm politics, but for
its first two decades the industry was defined primarily by experimentation and unrealized
economic hopes.
The great fanfare surrounding the introduction of frozen food in the 1930s included a
h]leroic myth of origin that celebrated Clarence Birdseye as the "Father of Frozen Food." The
standard narrative, reproduced and refined over the years in advertisements and popular
periodicals, began in Labrador in 1915 where Birdseye was either (depending on the storyteller's
fancy) a trapper and taxidermist or a wildlife observer for the U.S. Biological Survey. Supposedly
]3irdseye happened to leave a thin strip of meat outside on a particularly chilly arctic winter
night, and later upon thawing the meat found its texture and taste remarkably well preserved.
The event, Birdseye would later claim, led him to the idea of quick-freezing-applying extremely
low temperatures to food very quickly to "lock in" texture, moisture, and flavor. Or, as one
typical version of the narrative put it: "As this scientist mushed with his dog team across barren
wastes, as he faced shrieking blizzards and still, frozen nights ... he came to realize that cold-
intense, sub-zero cold-can be a wonderful preserver of life."3 Birdseye was not, however, the
first person to think of quick-freezing foods. For many years prior to Birdseye's trip to Labrador,
the North Alaska Coast Inuit had dug ice cellars into permafrost to store whale meat through the
summer and fall, while the Saint Lawrence Island Inuit placed the succulent roseroot in sealskin
3 Rewriting the Menus of the World, 1. For an only slightly less hyperbolic version, see "The Birds Eye Story," Quick
Frozen Foods (hereafter QFF) (Sep. 1954): 55-6. Clippings from newspapers and magazines that perpetuated the
myth can be found in the Harden Franklin Taylor Papers, Cornell University Library, Division of Rare and Manuscript
Collections, Ithaca, NY, Box 1 (hereafter H. F. Taylor Papers).
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icepacks to preserve its leaves for seasoning winter meals.4 Furthermore, Birdseye's successful
application of the quick-freezing concept did not come until the late 1920S, following a series of
failed efforts to ship New England fish fillets packed in ice to Midwestern markets. After
multiple instances of disastrous spoilage, Birdseye asked for advice from Harden F. Taylor, who
as Chief Technologist at the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries had experimented with freezing fish for
several years. Taylor pointed Birdseye to a series of published papers by Scandinavian and
German scientists who had experimented with brine-immersion freezing techniques in the
1910s, predating Birdseye's efforts by a decade.s
Clarence Birdseye did not invent frozen food, but he did play a crucial role in developing
the technologies and business connections that made mass production commercially feasible.
Birdseye's most important innovation was the idea of freezing food items inside consumer-sized
packages, rather than freezing them through bulk immersion. In essence, Birdseye
reconceptualized the use of low temperatures as a food preservation technique. Immersion in
brine imparted new (and often undesired) flavors and textures to foods by allowing salt particles
to penetrate the flesh of the organism. Freezing the food inside a sealed package, however, made
it theoretically possible to preserve the flavor and texture of the original. Birdseye turned this
concept into reality in the mid-192s in a small laboratory in Gloucester, Massachusetts, where
he constructed and later patented a machine capable of quickly freezing packaged foods (see
Figure 4.1). Birdseye's twenty-ton machine conveyed thin, block-shaped, tightly sealed food
packages between two endless metal belts. The belts, refrigerated by a constant spray of calcium
chloride solution held at -450F, rapidly absorbed the heat from the food with neither air, liquid,
nor metal ever coming into contact with the food inside.6 Importantly, Birdseye received a
patent not for the machine itself, but for the process it represented-that is, the idea of freezing
4 Robert F. Spencer, "North Alaska Coast Eskimo," and Charles C. Hughes, "Saint Lawrence Island Eskimo," in
Handbook of North American Indians, Vol. 5: Arctic, ed. David Damas (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press,
1984), 330, 272.
5 Harden F. Taylor, Transcript of Interview by Gould P. Colman, Oct. 12, 1965, New York, New York, Food Processing
Industry, New York State, Oral History Interviews, Cornell University Library, Division of Rare and Manuscript
Collections, Ithaca, NY, Transcript 1217, 18-9, 27-8; L. V. Burton to J. F. Thomas, Jun. 25, 1962, H.F. Taylor Papers,
Box 1, Folder 1;Harden F. Taylor to William G. Wing (New York Herald Tribune), Mar. 29, 1961, ibid. For more
details on the early history of the frozen food business, see Mark W. Wilde, "Industrialization of Food Processing in
the United States, 1860-1960" (Ph.D. diss., University of Delaware, 1988), 201-17.
6 Clarence Birdseye, "Method of Preparing Food Products," United States Patent No. 1,773,079, Aug. 12, 1930.
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food as a consumer package. Within just a few years after Birdseye filed his patent in 1927, the
machine itself was obsolete, having been superseded by equipment capable of freezing much
larger quantities of foods more quickly.7 Furthermore, Birdseye was a far better inventor than
businessman. The company he formed in 1924 to commercialize the technology, General
Seafoods (later renamed General Foods Company), lost hundreds of thousands of dollars in the
five years of its existence.8
7 These included the multiplate freezer method developed by General Foods in 1934, which froze many packages
simultaneously in hollow metal plates filled with refrigerant; improved methods of brine or sugar syrup immersion
for freezing vegetables and fruits in bulk; and air-blast tunnels and brine-fog tunnels which worked by exposing
packages of food to extremely cold vapors. See "The Birds Eye Story," 85, 87; Donald K. Tressler, "The Freezing
Process," QFF (Jun. 1963): 34-6; Harry Carlton, The Frozen Food Industry (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press,
1941), 121-9.
8 Wilde, "Industrialization," 215-9; "Birds Eye Story," 56.
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Figure 4.1: Clarence Birdseye's 20o-ton belt freezer
Clarence Birdseye's machine made it possible to freeze consumer-sized
packages of food, though within a few years the monstrosity would be
replaced by more efficient devices. Clarence Birdseye, "Method of
Preparing Food Products," United States Patent No. 1,773,079, Aug. 12,
1930.
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Birdseye became the "Father of Frozen Food," not because of his belt freezer or his
business skills, but because he was able to convince better businessmen that his patented food
preservation technique had revolutionary commercial potential. Those better businessmen were
the managers of the Postum Company, the firm famous for mass marketing breakfast cereals
such as Grape-Nuts and Post Toasties, as well as Maxwell House Instant Coffee, Jell-O, Swans
Down Cake Mix, and a host of other nationally recognized brand names. 9 Birdseye approached
t:he Postum Company in early 1929, seeking an infusion of capital for his failing General Foods
Company. Postum executives Edward F. Hutton and Colby M. Chester responded by not only
offering General Foods $1.5 million in working capital, but also, with the help of Goldman Sachs
Trading Company, engineered an outright purchase of the firm's $2 million in assets and
:Birdseye's patents and trademarks for $22 million. Within the year, Postum had adopted the
name of its latest acquisition (adding "Corporation" to the end of "General Foods") and created a
well-funded subsidiary to market Birds Eye Frosted Foods.'O
Given the utter failure of Birdseye to make a profit on his patented process over the
previous half decade, the payment of $22 million for a firm with only $2 million in assets may
seem surprising. But the managers of the firm that had introduced Americans to breakfast cereal
saw in Birdseye's frozen-food concept a similar potential to create an entirely new market-to
make big profits on high-volume sales of a branded, nationally distributed, and heavily
advertised food product that had not previously existed. Birds Eye Frosted Foods promised to go
one step further in this respect than even the remarkably successful Grape-Nuts and Post
Toasties. As with the milling and dehydrating involved in cereal production, quick freezing
converted a perishable food into a storable, packaged (and therefore brand-able) commodity."
Unlike cereal processing, however, the manufacture of frozen food under the Birdseye process
would not substantially change the form of the food; a frozen fish fillet would still be a fillet, not
a fish flake or fish powder.
9 "Let Them Eat Cake," Fortune, Oct. 1934, 69-70; James L. Ferguson, General Foods Corporation: A Chronicle of
Consumer Satisfaction (New York: Newcomen Society, 1985), 16; Harvey Levenstein, Revolution at the Table: The
Transformation of the American Diet (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 33-5.
10 "Let Them Eat Cake," 69, 124, 135, 137; Wilde, "Industrialization," 219-24.
1" On the importance of packaging and branding in the history of mass marketing, see Susan Strasser, Satisfaction
Guaranteed: The Making of the American Mass Market (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
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Understanding the science behind quick freezing helps make clear why General Foods
Corporation invested so heavily in an unproven processing technique in 1929. Two factors are
primarily responsible for the deterioration of any perishable food product: a) growth of
microorganisms (bacteria, yeast, and mold) causing flavor changes, and b) enzymatic activity
and chemical reactions that alter food color, texture, and taste. Prior to the invention of quick
freezing, canning was the most technologically advanced method used to stop these processes of
deterioration. Applying heat to foods and hermetically sealing them in tin, canners killed
microorganisms and cut off the air needed for most chemical reactions to occur, thus allowing
long-term storage of the product. Despite the consequent advantages for mass distribution, the
use of high temperatures and brine solutions radically altered the texture and flavor of the
food.13 Quick freezing, as conceived by food technologists in the 1920S and 1930s, could slow
microorganism growth and enzymatic activity nearly as well as canning, but without
significantly altering the original food.'4 This was especially true if processors subjected the food
to temperatures well below 32° F (the freezing point of water). Rapid cooling to temperatures in
the range of -15° to o° F helped prevent the formation of large ice crystals-which could draw
water from within and around the organism's cells and lead to wilting, mushiness, or oozing
upon thawing.l5
Achieving such low temperatures required expensive refrigeration machinery, making
freezing far less cost-effective than canning in the 193os. The cost seemed moot, however, for
foods that were highly seasonal and highly perishable in nature, and for which Americans had
12 Smoking, salting, pickling, and drying were among the oldest and most common forms of food preservation; all of
these used a combination of heat and/or chemicals to prevent deterioration, but at the cost of fundamentally
changing the flavor and texture of the original food. For many foods, such as cured hams or pickled herring, these
changes were desirable; but for others, particularly beef and many fruits and vegetables, such methods of
preservation were not culturally acceptable. Refrigeration-also an ageless method-had the significant advantage of
maintaining much of the flavor and texture of the original, but it was less effective at slowing the growth of
microorganisms and the pace of enzymatic reactions over a long period of time.
13 Mildred Boggs and Clyde Rasmussen, "Modern Food Processing," in USDA, Yearbook ofAgriculture, 1959
(Washington: GPO, 1959), 419. On the history of the canning industry, see Wilde, "Industrialization," 28-69; Alfred D.
Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1977), 295-6.
14 Freezing could not completely stop microorganism growth, since some psychrophilic ("cold-loving") organisms
could thrive at temperatures well below freezing. Furthermore, enzymatic activity continues, albeit more slowly, even
at temperatures as low as 4000 F below zero. M. A. Joslyn, "Certain Technological Aspects of Preservation Freezing,"
QFF (Sep. 1938): 11.
15 Harold T. Meryman, "Mechanics of Freezing in Living Cells and Tissues," Science 124 (Sep. 1956): 515-21; Joslyn,
"Certain Technological Aspects," 13.
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proven willing to pay a high price for freshness-particularly vegetables such as peas, spinach,
asparagus, and lima beans, and fruits such as strawberries, all of which had proven resistant to
other forms of processing. For these products, as one food technologist put it in 1938,
"preservation with the minimum alteration in composition, flavor, appearance and nutritive
value is our aim."' 6 The managers of General Foods invested in quick freezing because they were
convinced that it was possible to manufacture a new economic structure around perishable
foods without altering the foods' biological structures. Consequently, General Foods' managers
believed, quick freezing could be applied to the entire range of perishable foods eaten by
Americans, making even the "fresh" foods sold in grocery stores into profitable, branded,
nationally distributed packages.17
In the gap between theory and practice, however, many highly perishable foods proved
resistant to the freezing process. Even as General Foods embarked on an economic experiment
with frozen food in the 193os, a loose network of agricultural scientists began searching for the
chemical and biological knowledge needed to make organisms conform to the demands of mass
production.' s Helmut Charles "Dutch" Diehl was one of the most active of these researchers.
I:iehl joined the Bureau of Plant Industry of the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1920, where
he assisted with experiments in plant physiology and biochemistry while attending the
University of Maryland and the USDA Graduate School. Sometime between 1920 and 1924,
I)iehl began occasional investigations into fruit and vegetable freezing. Diehl was especially
interested in the chemical and physiological changes that occurred when peas were frozen, since
at that time all efforts to freeze them had resulted only in bitter, discolored, and chewy objects
barely reminiscent of peas. In 1924, Diehl moved to the Bureau of Plant Industry laboratory at
Wenatchee, Washington, where he became increasingly interested in the problems of freezing
the fruits and vegetables of the Pacific Northwest. By 1931, Diehl had convinced his superiors in
16 Joslyn, "Certain Technological Aspects," o10. Harden F. Taylor, in remembering his work on the techniques for
freezing fish in the 1920S and 193os, acknowledged that freezing was the most expensive option, but "in those days,
we were concerned with the problem of perfection in getting the fish to the public." Taylor interview, 17.
17 "Let Them Eat Cake," 135, 137.
i8 The effort to coax non-human organisms into the structures of industrial society is a central theme of Susan R.
Schrepfer and Philip Scranton, eds., Industrializing Organisms: Introducing Evolutionary History (New York:
Routledge, 2004); Michael Pollan, The Botany of Desire: A Plant's-Eye View of the World (New York: Random
House, 2000).
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the Bureau that quick freezing could revolutionize produce marketing in the Northwest, and
consequently received a commission to establish the USDA Frozen Pack Laboratory in Seattle.'9
For the next decade, Diehl headed the only publicly funded laboratory in the nation
dedicated solely to the chemistry, microbiology, and technology of frozen food. In direct
consultation with processors such as Birds Eye, Diehl and his colleagues shaped a research
program at the Frozen Pack Laboratory aimed at making frozen produce commercially viable. In
the 1930s, this entailed a focus on two main issues: 1) determining the maximum (lowest cost)
temperature at which particular fruits and vegetables could be frozen without causing significant
loss of quality, and 2) selecting and breeding plant varieties best suited to freezing.20 Working on
this latter issue, for instance, the Frozen Pack Laboratory oversaw the planting of dozens of
varieties of lima beans in multiple locations in the state of California in 1939, searching for the
combination of genetics, soil, and climate conditions that would produce a lima bean that, once
frozen, best preserved its color, flavor, and texture.2' Frozen food processors greatly appreciated
such efforts, immediately recognizing the potential profits to be gained from applying the results
of publicly funded research to their own specific commercial problems.22 Diehl reveled in the
attention, though he occasionally worried that he had insufficient time to perform actual
research while being "besieged on some days by visitors to the Laboratory."23 Besides working in
close cooperation with private industry, Diehl corresponded frequently and in great detail with
other agricultural scientists working on the science and technology of freezing. Included in his
network were important figures such as Maynard A. Joslyn at the University of California (who
worked on deactivating enzymes by immersing fruits in syrups and blanching vegetables in hot
19 Western Regional Research Laboratory, Biographical notes on H. C. Diehl, Feb. 29, 1940 and Helmut Charles Diehl,
Personnel Information Sheet, Jul. 23, 1940, Agricultural Research Service Records, RG 310, Records of the Western
Regional Research Center, Central Correspondence File, Accession 9o-ool, National Archives Pacific Region, San
Bruno, CA (hereafter Records of the Western Regional Research Center), Box 7, Folder 8.
20 H. C. Diehl, "Research Activities in Freezing Preservation, 1940," Jan. 17, 1941, ibid., Box 4, Folder 4; USDA,
"Research Staff Moves into New Laboratory," Press Release, Nov. 13, 1940, ibid., Box 2, Press and Radio Releases
folder; H. C. Diehl, "Progress Report of the U.S. Frozen Pack Laboratory at Seattle, Washington," Text for a Talk
before the Northwest Fruit Barrelers Association, Portland, OR, Jan. 4, 1933, ibid., Box 3, Folder 22.
21 USDA Bureau of Agricultural Chemistry and Engineering, Food Research Division, Report on Research Line Project
b-1-3-1l, "Technology of the Preservation of Vegetables by Freezing," Dec. 31, 1939, Records of the Western Regional
Research Center, Box 1, Folder 1.
22 Processors and growers in Washington were particularly interested in freezing apples without having the apples
turn disastrously brown in the process, a challenge not easily surmounted. Henry G. Knight to H. C. Diehl, Nov. 18,
1939, Records of the Western Regional Research Center, Box 2, Folder 1.
23 USDA Food Research Division, Seattle, Quarterly Report, Supplementary Statement, Mar. 31, 1937, Records of the
Western Regional Research Center, Box 1, Folder 6.
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water prior to freezing), R. Brooks Taylor at the University of Tennessee (who developed
techniques for preserving flavor and texture in frozen strawberries), Ernest W. Wiegand at
Oregon State College (who organized the first college course in frozen food technology), and
Donald K. Tressler (a chemist who worked with Clarence Birdseye and General Foods in the
1920S and 1930os and later authored multiple textbooks on freezing preservation).24 For Dutch
Diehl, who had stumbled into the scientific network of frozen food without ever completing a
graduate degree, the 1930s were a time of exciting experimentation. The challenge of converting
the theoretical promise of frozen food into a commercially viable reality allowed Diehl and his
colleagues to carve out highly respected and stable careers for themselves, doing stimulating
intellectual work with clear practical applications.25
Industrial agriculturists were the third group in the 1930s who became excited by the
potential payoffs from experiments with frozen food. While food processing companies such as
Birds Eye saw untapped markets and agricultural scientists saw a technically sweet challenge,
produce farmers saw in freezing the possibility to stabilize the chaotic relationship between
production and consumption in their industry. This promise was well understood by Horace
Campbell, an assistant of Dutch Diehl's at the USDA Frozen Pack Laboratory, who explained to
24 Reams of this correspondence are contained in Diehl's records housed at the National Archives in San Bruno. See,
for example, H. C. Diehl, "Memorandum for Dr. F. C. Blanck Regarding the Trip to TVA Headquarters at Knoxville,
TN," Jun. 28, 1938, Records of the Western Regional Research Center, Box 1, Folder 15. On Joslyn, see "Joslyn
Returns to University of California," QFF (Jan. 1946): 84. On the work of R. Brooks Taylor in connection with the
Tennessee Valley Authority's work on freezing strawberries, see Gabrielle M. Petrick, "Breaking the Ice: Developing
Frozen Foods that Americans Would Eat, 1930-1955," paper presented at the Society for the History of Technology,
Atlanta, GA, Oct. 23, 2003. On Wiegand, see "First Citizens in the Quick Frozen Food Industry: E. H. Wiegand," QFF
(Oct. 1938): 36, 31. On Donald K. Tressler, see "Tressler, Greatest Living FF Technologist, as Publisher, Counsels an
Industry," QFF (May 1963): 46-7. Although scientists in Europe had begun the first important experiments on quick-
frozen food, Diehl did not maintain regular contacts with Europeans, although in 1939 he sent an assistant to tour
overseas labs. The assistant was impressed only by Swiss and German efforts. V. H. McFarlane, "Report of Trip to
England, France, Germany, and Switzerland, May and June, 1939, to Study Various Preservation Methods for Foods,"
Jul. 24, 1939, Records of the Western Regional Research Center, Box 1, Folder 1.
25 On early twentieth-century agricultural scientists gaining personal and professional satisfaction doing work with
clear commercial applications, see Barbara A. Kimmelman, "Organisms and Interests in Scientific Research: R. A.
Emerson's Claims for the Unique Contributions of Agricultural Genetics," in The Right Toolsfor the Job: At Work in
Twentieth-Century Life Sciences, ed. Adele E. Clarke and Joan H. Fujimura (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1992), 198-232. Diehl would leave the Frozen Pack Laboratory a few years after it was absorbed into the Western
Regional Research Laboratory in 1940, coming to believe in 1943 that his new superiors had become too interested in
dehydrated foods and were not providing him with the proper resources to continue his work on frozen foods. Diehl
moved to the privately funded Refrigeration Research Foundation, where he continued his work on frozen foods and
was highly respected within the industry. H. C. Diehl, "Notes for Dr. R. Y. Winters, Discussion of Work of Commodity
Processing Division, Western Regional Research Laboratory," Apr. 23, 1942, Records of the Western Regional
Research Center, Box 9, Commodity Processing Folder; Horace Campbell to H. C. Diehl, Feb. 18, 1941, ibid., Box 1,
Folder 15; "Diehl Appointed TARS Managing Director," QFF (Oct. 1958): 281, 302.
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a group of produce farmers in 1940 why his work on frozen food was useful to them: "We know
what the grower of fruits and vegetables for the fresh market trade is up against; namely, as the
harvest reaches its peak production, the markets become glutted with fresh produce." In these
times of surplus, as Campbell hardly needed to remind his audience, the result was "price drops
to the grower, very frequently to the point where he even fails to re[coup] the cost of
production."26 Farmers could avoid this problem, Campbell argued, by selling some of their
surplus truck crops2 7 to frozen food processors, allowing produce that might otherwise be sold at
a loss to be stored and later sold in times of scarcity for a premium price. Importantly, Campbell
pointed out, "the superior quality that can be obtained" by freezing (in comparison to canning or
other methods of preservation) meant that farmers would receive only the highest prices from
frozen food processors for their raw materials.28
One farmer had wholeheartedly accepted this gospel a full decade before Campbell
preached it to Northwestern produce growers. Charles F. Seabrook, owner of the nation's largest
vegetable farm, first joined forces with Birds Eye in 1930 and within eight years produced two-
thirds of the nation's frozen vegetables.29 Seabrook's decision to convert his successful truck
farm in southern New Jersey into an industrial center of frozen vegetable production was part of
his long-term effort to minimize the risk and unpredictability inherent in produce farming. In
1913, "C. F." (as even his family always called him) bought his father's small southern New
Jersey truck farm-famous for supplying Philadelphia and New York consumers with high
quality spinach-and began systematically converting the small farm into a giant industrial
agribusiness. Driven by a "strong dislike of dirt" and a professed admiration of the efficiency-
oriented mindset of mechanical engineers, Seabrook hoped to rationalize the production of
26 Horace Campbell, "Frozen Food in Relation to the Farm," n.d. (1940), Records of the Western Regional Research
Center, Box 3, Folder 22, page 10.
27 The term "truck" in this case bears no relation to motor vehicles; instead, the term derives from the much older
usage of "truck" to refer to the practice of bartering. When applied to crops, it has referred since the nineteenth
century to fruits and vegetables grown for urban markets, including tomatoes, cucumbers, spinach, peas,
strawberries, cabbage, lettuce, and so on. A good history of truck farming in relation to the metropolis is Marc Linder
and Lawrence S. Zacharias, Of Cabbages and Kings County: Agriculture and the Formation of Modern Brooklyn
(Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1999).
28 Campbell, "Frozen Food in Relation to the Farm," 14.
29 "Deerfield Packing Corporation Supervisors' Conference," 1939, Artifacts File, Seabrook Educational and Cultural
Center, Upper Deerfield Township, NJ (hereafter SECC), Deane Eadie Folder. "Deerfield Packing Corporation" was
the name of the Seabrook Farms subsidiary responsible for processing frozen vegetables; to avoid confusion in the
text, I will refer to all Seabrook operations under the name of the parent firm.
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spinach to match the assembly-line methods used to make the Ford Model T. In fact, Seabrook
earned the sobriquet "the Henry Ford of Agriculture" for his success in this regard.3 Years
before he had ever heard of frozen food, Seabrook applied industrial principles to all aspects of
vegetable production. To ensure steady supplies of raw materials, in 1907 he installed the
nation's first overhead irrigation system in his fields.3' Seeking economies of scale, he steadily
increased the acreage of the farm; starting with his father's 57 acres in 1913, Seabrook's
operation covered 3,400 acres in 1921. Expansion required capital, which he secured by
incorporating the farm and inviting investment from New York banking firms. Seabrook secured
a pliant workforce by offering low-cost housing to Italian and Russian immigrants who moved
from Philadelphia to the company town he erected on his land. The farm even looked like a
factory in the early 1920S, as Seabrook put his engineering inclinations into practice by building
]lis own concrete highway, rail sidings, power plant, canning factory, ice station, sawmill,
blacksmith's shop, and a refrigerated warehouse powered by giant Corliss steam engines (see
Figure 4.2).32
30 Bruce Barton, 'You Don't Altogether Like Your Job?" American Magazine, May 1921, 114; John Seabrook, "The
Spinach King," New Yorker, Feb. 20, 1995, 225.
31 John M. Seabrook, The Henry Ford ofAgriculture: Charles F. Seabrook 1881-1964 and Seabrook Farms 1893-
1959 (Seabrook, NJ: Seabrook Educational and Cultural Center, 1995), 3; Hubert G. Schmidt, Agriculture in New
Jersey (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1973), 193.
32 Seabrook, Henry Ford ofAgriculture, 6-11.
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Figure 4.2: Aerial photograph of Seabrook farms
This view of Seabrook Farms in the mid-195os shows a central processing plant nestled among
greenhouses, worker villages, and just a few hundred of the thousands of acres dedicated to intensive fruit
and vegetable production in southern New Jersey. Seabrook Educational and Cultural Center photo
collection.
For C. F. Seabrook, the point of all this industrial machinery and organization was to
"eliminate the chance from farming."33 When Seabrook claimed to "loathe" farming, it was not
so much that he disliked the dirty, hard work, but that he disliked being dependent upon the
unpredictable whims of nature to make a living. As he told an interviewer in 1921, "it seemed as
if nature always stacked the cards against you.... No matter how hard you worked, you couldn't
be sure of anything."34 Even when rains came at exactly the right time of year and allowed for a
bumper crop, profits could quickly evaporate in a glutted market. This became especially
apparent to C. F. in the early 1920S, when southern truck farmers increasingly took advantage of
faster and cheaper rail transport to send their produce to Seabrook's primary markets in New
York and Philadelphia. These competitors enjoyed a warmer, sunnier climate and consequently
33 "This Is Seabrook Farms," QFF (Aug. 1956): 164.
34 Barton, "You Don't Altogether Like Your Job?" 34, 114.
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a longer growing season, enabling them to sell their produce in Northern markets several weeks
before Seabrook.35 Through the 1920S Seabrook's profits fell rapidly as he was forced to market
his produce at lower mid-season prices, and in 1924 the New York investors who had helped C.
F. build his southern Jersey farm into an industrial enterprise fired him and put the farm in
receivership (although C. F. maintained ownership of the land).36 For the next five years,
Seabrook happily became the civil engineer he had always wanted to be, building highways in
New Jersey, Costa Rica, and Cuba, and constructing railroads, canals, and docks in the Soviet
Union.37 But in 1929, the New York bankers running Seabrook Farms decided to pull out of the
t:ruck farming business, and C. F. bought back his farm.38 It was, unfortunately, a less than ideal
time to purchase a farm. As the Great Depression set in, C. F. was now faced with not only his
old competitors on southern truck farms, but also depressed produce prices and tight credit.
By 1930 these circumstances set the stage for Seabrook Farms to establish a decades-
].ong relationship with General Foods as the nation's largest producer of frozen vegetables.
Freezing, as C. F. readily understood, would allow him to "eliminate the chance" from the
marketing of his produce, in the same way irrigation had done for his growing operations. As he
later told a reporter about his decision to enter the frozen food field, ""the instability of the fresh
vegetable market seemed like too much of a gamble," whereas selling produce to General Foods
under contract guaranteed a steady cash flow, entirely independent of seasonal peaks and dips
in supply and demand.39 C. F.'s son Belford set the chain of events into motion, building an
experimental freezing plant on the farm after having been sent by C. F. to spend the summer of
1.929 in Clarence Birdseye's laboratory in Gloucester. It is unclear whether Seabrook or General
F oods initiated the deal that established Seabrook Farms as the primary producer of Birds Eye
frozen vegetables, but in any case it was immediately clear, as C. F.'s son John would later recall,
that the contract cemented a "perfect match."4 General Foods had patents, exhaustive reserves
of capital, and decades of experience in marketing new products. Seabrook Farms had 25,000
35 James L. McCorkle, Jr., "Agricultural Experiment Stations and Southern Truck Farming," Agricultural History 62
(Spring 1988): 234-43.
36 Seabrook, Henry Ford ofAgriculture, 9, 12.
37' Seabrook, Henry Ford ofAgriculture, 13-15.
38 Seabrook, Henry Ford ofAgriculture, 15.
39 Mona Gardner, "The Assembly-Line Farmer," Reader's Digest, Jan. 1944, 96.
40 Seabrook, Henry Ford ofAgriculture, 24-5.
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acres of land, a processing plant, and experience in breeding and selecting plant varieties
(especially peas, spinach, and lima beans) for commercial use.41 General Foods wanted a large
volume of high-quality vegetables worthy of the Birds Eye brand, and Seabrook was happy to
supply these in exchange for a guaranteed, non-seasonal market.42 Frozen food was the final link
in the agro-industrial chain that C. F. had been constructing for nearly two decades, providing
stability in the chaotic produce economy.
By the end of the 1930s all conditions seemed to have been met for frozen food to fulfill
its promise as a revolutionary mass production industry. Anchoring the industry was General
Foods, a corporation both able and willing to pump capital into the technology required to
produce and market the new product on a national scale. Agricultural scientists and food
technologists created and disseminated the knowledge required to convert biological organisms
into industrial commodities. Industrial farmers like C. F. Seabrook could provide raw materials
in the volume necessary to achieve economies of scale in production. Defying the Great
Depression, the industry increasingly showed signs of maturity in the late 193os. Birds Eye
Frosted Foods upped its production by 140 percent between 1935 and 1937.43 A major
competitor joined the field in 1937 with the introduction of Honor Brand Frosted Foods, which,
after being purchased by Stokely-Van Camp in 1939, would establish itself for the next several
decades as the nation's second-largest frozen food packer.44 A trade journal dedicated solely to
the industry appeared in August 1938 when Edwin W. Williams began publishing Quick Frozen
Foods. But even Edwin Williams, who would be the industry's most enthusiastic supporter for
the next forty years, recognized in 1939 that frozen food had not yet lived up to its promise.
The problem was not one of production. After a decade of intensive scientific and
technological work, Williams claimed, "today's frosted food package is a remarkably perfect
41 By 1935, Seabrook had hired agronomist Frank App to select and develop seed varieties with traits suitable for
freezing. "This Is Seabrook Farms," 169; Frank App to H. C. Diehl, Jan. 16, 1935, Records of the Western Regional
Research Center, Box o10, Folder 7.
42 Seabrook, Henry Ford of Agriculture, 25-6.
43 H. J. O'Brien, "Frosted Foods Sales Show Sharp Gain For Past Year," WSJ, Jan. 31, 1938, 3.
44 "Frozen Foods: Interim Report," Fortune, Aug. 1946, lo09; Advertisement for Honor Brand Frosted Foods, "Look!
Here Is Where You Can End Your Search for Freshness," 1937, N. W. Ayer Advertising Proofsheets, Smithsonian
Institution, National Museum of American History, Archives Center, Washington, DC (hereafter Ayer Proofsheets),
Series 2, Box 271, Folder 4; Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., Annual Report, 1955.
244
piece of merchandise." "But," he continued, "distribution-there's the rub."45 Frozen food, as
Williams understood, fulfilled only one half of the Fordist equation of mass production. The
industry had developed elaborate technical systems for making standardized goods in huge
volumes, but had not developed an equally elaborate system of distribution to move its goods to
the masses.46 Even though a package of frozen food might leave the factory as a "perfect piece of
merchandise," it would too often arrive in the consumer's hands as either a product of dubious
quality or at such a high price as to discourage mass consumption. This was because the
distribution of frozen food required technological systems of unprecedented scale, scope, and
complexity. These systems simply did not exist in the 1930s. The refrigeration equipment
required to maintain frozen food at extremely low temperatures was rare or nonexistent in most
warehousing, transportation, and retail facilities. Although an extensive nationwide network of
refrigeration existed, that distribution network had been built primarily for the movement of
Chicago dressed beef, California produce, and Midwestern butter and cheese-all products that
required cool temperatures but that could be seriously damaged by freezing.
The problem of distribution was especially apparent in the lack of warehouse space
dedicated to maintaining freezing temperatures. Warehousing was an essential component for
mass distribution of frozen food, since the production season of frozen food was by necessity
tied to summer and fall harvesting periods, which never aligned well with peaks of consumption
falling in late winter and early spring. Furthermore, frozen food factories were located in rural
areas, far from urban centers of consumption. Frozen food businessmen would occasionally
dream of an ideal distribution system, one in which these constraining factors of time and space
would be overcome by the construction of "a refrigerated tunnel extending from the packing
plant to the home freezing cabinet," allowing consumers to merely push a button when they
45 Edwin W. Williams, "Are Frosted Foods at the Crossroads?" QFF (Mar. 1939): 22.
45 On the conceptualization and historical development of mass production within the American economy, see Philip
Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production and American Industrialization, 1865-1925 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1997), esp. 10-11; Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the
American Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1962); David A. Hounshell, From the American System
to Mass Production, .800-1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United States (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984). On the necessity of mass distribution for making mass production possible,
see Chandler, Visible Hand, 209-39. On the development of mass consumer culture, see William Leach, Land of
Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993).
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wanted a package of frozen lima beans to arrive in perfect condition directly from the factory.47
The absurdly high cost of constructing such an "ideal" system, however, forced frozen food
distributors to rely instead on existing warehousing facilities. Through the 193os, however, the
vast majority of available cold storage warehouse space was dedicated to storing apples in winter
and eggs in summer, along with somewhat less seasonal movements of butter and cheese,
poultry, meat, and general produce.48 As a consequence, although over 275,000,000 cubic feet
of public cold storage space existed in the decade, less than 20 percent of that space was capable
of keeping temperatures at or below freezing.49 Without adequate freezer storage space, frozen
food processors could not economically move their goods beyond tightly bound geographical
markets.
The expense of transporting food over long distances at freezing temperatures further
compounded the problem of distribution. Developments in mobile refrigeration up to the late
1930S lagged far behind the improvements made in stationary refrigeration technology since the
late 19th century. By the late 1920S, refrigeration engineers had developed efficient, reliable
mechanical compression systems capable of absorbing impressive amounts of heat, allowing
brewers, dairies, and meatpackers to achieve unprecedented control over temperature
conditions in factories.50 These mechanical compressors required enormous engines, however,
to produce the high pressures needed to achieve very low temperatures, making them unsuitable
for mobile applications.51
Refrigerated transportation in the 1930s was consequently limited to one of three
methods, each preventing certain obstacles to the economically viable movement of frozen food.
47 H. J. Humphrey, "Temperatures for Frozen Foods," Ice and Refrigeration (Aug. 1951): 52; Edwin W. Williams,
"Frozen Foods 2000 A.D.: A Fantasy of the Future," QFF (Feb. 1954): 102.
48 Pamphlet for New England Cold Storage Co. (n.d. (19oo?)), Warshaw Collection of Business Americana,
Smithsonian Institution, National Museum of American History, Archives Center, Washington, DC, Warehouses
Subject File, Box 1, Folder 20; C. Bartlett Eddy, "The History of Cold Storage Warehouses in New England," QFF (Sep.
1959): 84-8.
49 "Cold Storage Space Idle Now, But New Warehouses Keep Rising," Business Week (hereafter BW), Jun. 25, 1930,
26-8; Sidney Shalett, "Warehousemen Chill Everything but Ideas," Nation's Business, Feb. 1954, 33. The total volume
of cold storage space was actually quite a bit higher than this, since meat packers maintained their own private
facilities.
50 Oscar Edward Anderson, Jr., Refrigeration in America: A History of a New Technology and Its Impact
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 97-102.
51 Pacific Fruit Growers Express actually developed a mechanically refrigerated railcar in 1931, but it was never used
commercially since it proved ineffective in warm weather and was too expensive to justify widespread use.
"Mechanically Operated Reefer No Longer an 'Experiment'," QFF (Oct. 1951): 61.
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Regular, or "wet" ice, was the cheapest refrigerating option and the one most widely used by
railroads. Even when mixed with salt to lower the freezing temperature, however, wet ice
generally proved incapable of producing the extremely low temperatures required to keep frozen
food in pristine condition. Furthermore, wet ice was extremely heavy and bulky and had the
unfortunate habit of melting along the trip, requiring re-icing at designated stops along the track
which delayed shipments and greatly increased the chances of frozen food melting en route.52
Dry ice (solid carbon dioxide) was the second option available to shippers of frozen food.
Capable of absorbing about twice as much heat as wet ice, pound-for-pound, dry ice could
effectively keep frozen food frozen. Dry ice was, however, far more expensive than wet ice; as
].ate as 1949, a Pacific Fruit Express traffic manager could note that the cost of dry ice in a
refrigerated railcar exceeded the base cost of shipping (minus refrigeration) by as much as
$250.53 The third refrigerating option available in the 1930S was the cold plate system, in which
hollow metal plates, installed either in railcars or truck bodies, were filled with pressurized
refrigerant from a central compression plant. Plate systems had the great advantage of
producing extremely low and controllable temperatures with relatively low operating expenses,
but had the disadvantage of requiring a much higher initial investment in equipment than either
dry or wet ice systems. Furthermore, after about eight hours of use, plate systems required
overnight charging at the central plant; as a consequence, they were limited almost exclusively
to local distribution of items such as ice cream.5 4 Through the 1930s, the limitations of mobile
refrigeration technology made long-distance transportation of frozen food prohibitively
expensive.
The retail end of the frozen food distribution chain was even less developed than the
warehousing and transportation sectors. Chain stores proved especially reluctant to invest in
expensive freezer cabinets in the 1930s. Freezer cabinets at the time not only carried a high
sticker price, but also ate up costly electricity and took up floor space that chain store managers
p referred to dedicate to food products with proven sales records. Even five years after the
52 William McGinnis Holroyd, "Influences and Challenges of the Growing Frozen Food Industry on Refrigerated
Transport Equipment" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1960), 21, 43-4.
53 Holroyd, "Influences and Challenges," 37; A. L. Reneau, "Frozen Food Transportation and Distribution," Ice and
Refrigeration (Oct. 1949): 18.
54 Holroyd, "Influences and Challenges," 45-6.
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American Radiator Company developed a low-cost retail freezer cabinet in 1934, only about
8,ooo cabinets were to be found in the nation's grocery stores-and many of these were located
in specialty stores that sold only frozen foods at high prices.55 High sales volumes could have
allowed chain stores to offset the cost of cabinets, but many consumers in the 1930os associated
frozen food with "cold storage" food, which had gained a poor reputation in the early twentieth
century after investigations by state health commissions in New York and Massachusetts.56
Selling frozen food was an expensive and risky gamble for most retailers in the 193os, as
consumers either distrusted the product or refused to pay high prices for guaranteed quality.
With retailers reluctant to invest in freezing equipment, frozen food processors
depended on luxury hotels and restaurants for most of their sales in the 1930s. Chefs proved
more willing than the average consumer to pay the high prices demanded by frozen food
distributors to cover the costs of transporting and storing high-quality out-of-season vegetables
and fruits.57 Even in the institutional market, however, the problem of distribution prevented
frozen food from achieving full acceptance. Inadequate refrigerated transportation equipment
and warehouse space could ruin a "perfect piece of merchandise" on even the shortest trip from
factory to stovetop. For instance, food technologist M. A. Joslyn wrote Dutch Diehl in 1935 to
recount a distribution disaster he had witnessed first-hand. Joslyn had been hired by F. M. Ball,
a San Francisco area frozen food packer, to develop a low-temperature blanching system to
improve the quality of its frozen peas. Within weeks of installing the new system, Ball began
receiving "excited" calls from its distributors, who in turn had received angry complaints about
brown and sour peas from hotel chefs in San Francisco. Ball blamed Joslyn's blanching system,
but Joslyn found that packages of peas leaving the Ball factory as well as those stored in
distributor warehouses were in perfect condition. The cause of the brown peas, Joslyn soon
found, was "faulty distribution" between the warehouse and the hotel. Either the delivery trucks
55 "Quick-Frozen Foods," Fortune, Jun. 1939, 118; "Birds Eye Story," 67; Williams, "Are Frosted Foods at the
Crossroads?" 22.
56 "Frozen Foods: Interim Report," 180; Wilde, "Industrialization," 209-10; Anderson, Refrigeration in America, 127-
41.
57 O'Brien, "Frosted Foods Sales Show Sharp Gain," 3.
248
had poor insulation or the hotel's freezers were malfunctioning, allowing the peas to defrost and
leading to rapid growth of lactic acid bacteria, causing the brown color and sourness.58
If good quality could not be maintained in the distribution of frozen peas within the tight
geographical confines of the Bay Area, one could hardly hope for better results on a national
scale. This would explain why General Foods utterly failed in its efforts to develop a national
market for frozen food in the 1930s. The company struggled to convince retailers to carry Birds
Eye products, first offering freezing cabinets to stores on a monthly rental basis, then slashing
the wholesale price of an average package from 25 cents to 16 cents. These efforts met with some
success, giving General Foods a network of 2,000 retailers by 1937, up from 516 in 1933.59 Even
so, retail distribution of Birds Eye frozen food was limited almost exclusively to specialty stores
in the New England and New York area. Without mass distribution to provide the volume sales
required to justify the expense of mass production, Birds Eye racked up losses of approximately
$17 million before turning its first profit in 1941.60 In fact, had fortune not smiled on the
industry during World War II, the problem of distribution might have consigned frozen food to
the dustbin of history.
An Essential Industry
The arrival of World War II temporarily created a mass market for frozen food, but did
nriot lead the industry to solve its underlying technological problem of distribution. Scientific and
technological research had led to methods for mass-producing high-quality preserved foods by
the eve of the war, but that quality came at a price that prevented mass marketing.61
Consequently, canned fruits and vegetables continued to be the obvious choice for consumers
searching for low-price produce available year-round. In 1940, per capita consumption of
58 M. A. Joslyn to H. C. Diehl, Nov. 8, 1935, Records of the Western Regional Research Center, Box 10, Folder 1.
59 "Birds Eye Story," 67-9.
60 Ferguson, General Foods Corporation, 19.
61 Richard Tedlow has characterized the development of mass marketing as following a historical path from Phase I
(goods sold in low volume at a high margin in geographically limited markets) to Phase II (goods sold in high volume
at a low margin on a national scale) to Phase III (goods sold in high volume at multiple price levels to
demographically segmented markets). The situation of the frozen food industry at the end of the 193os does not
correspond neatly to either Phase I or Phase II, since frozen food was sold in relatively high volumes but as a luxury
item for geographically limited markets. See Richard S. Tedlow, New and Improved: The Story of Mass Marketing in
America (New York: Basic Books, 199o).
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canned vegetables amounted to 34.4 pounds, an amount 57 times greater than the 0.6 pounds of
frozen vegetables Americans consumed that year. In the next three years, however, this situation
changed markedly. In 1944, American civilians continued to eat 34.4 pounds of canned
vegetables per person, but the average individual's consumption of frozen vegetables had nearly
tripled to 1.6 pounds.62 Improvements in the technology of distribution clearly did not cause this
increased consumption, since the wartime emergency essentially halted production of new
transportation or refrigeration equipment for civilian use. Instead, the growth of the frozen food
industry during the war resulted from a sudden jump in demand for all processed foods.
Most of this increased demand came from the armed forces of the United States and
Great Britain. Canned food particularly appealed to military quartermasters. Although the
American canning industry's cylindrical cans (unlike the French or Norwegian flat tins) resulted
in some wastage of space during transportation either overseas or in soldiers' packs, the foods
contained compactly within required no refrigeration, allowing easy storage in diverse
locations.6 3 In early 1942, the War Production Board formally recognized the importance of
canned fruits and vegetables to the war effort by requiring canners to set aside certain items for
military use. Canners were asked, for instance, to reserve 23 percent of their fruit cocktail pack
for American soldiers and sailors and lend-lease partners, along with 30 percent of asparagus,
25 percent of lima beans, and 26 percent of peas.6 4 By December 1942, military purchases,
combined with tin rationing that limited supplies to canners, had reduced the amount of canned
food available to civilians by almost half. Panicked consumers desperately swept available cans
off grocery store shelves, leading Food Administrator Claude Wickard to institute rationing of
canned foods.65 Consumers who had grown accustomed to eating canned peas and asparagus
year-round could not turn to their Victory Gardens to provide out-of-season produce. As a
consequence, frozen food became the best available option, despite its expense.
62 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington: GPO,
1960), 187. Per capita consumption of canned fruits and juices was approximately 20 times higher than that of frozen
fruits and juices in 1940, with the ratio down to 6.5 by 1944; ibid., 186.
63 Deborah K. Fitzgerald, "Necessity and Convenience in the Military: Food Research for Captive Consumers," paper
presented at the Society for the History of Technology, Atlanta, GA, Oct. 23, 2003.
64 "Canned Food Allocated to U.S. Armed Forces, Lend-Lease Nations," WSJ, Mar. 14, 1942, 8.
65 "Food Trade Slows, Awaiting Ceilings," New York Times (hereafter NYT), Apr. 22, 1942, 35; "Half of '43 Food Pack
Going to War; That's the Reason for Rationing," WSJ, Dec. 28, 1942, 3.
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The frozen food industry was well positioned in 1942 to fulfill the sudden demand for
processed food. In January of that year, a group of frozen-food executives, including C. F.
Seabrook's son Courtney, organized the National Association of Frozen Food Packers. The new
group had the explicit goal of convincing the War Production Board that frozen food production
should be considered "essential" for the war effort. Government administrators quickly accepted
the packers' argument that the amount of steel required to construct and maintain frozen food
plants paled in comparison to the amount of steel used to can food.66 Unconstrained by the
quotas imposed on the canning industry, the frozen food industry quickly ramped up production
in 1943 to 350 million pounds of fruits and vegetables; 140 million pounds of this were
purchased by the armed forces of the United States and Britain, the rest going to civilians
seeking replacements for canned items.6 7 As canned food shortages worsened in late 1943, the
War Food Administration met with the National Association of Frozen Food Packers and urged
the processors to increase their production still more.6 8 The Office of Price Administration
(OPA) provided further incentives for increased production of frozen food, setting generous
wholesale price ceilings that allowed processors to sell at a 27 percent margin despite the OPA's
findings that the average processor margin on frozen vegetables before price controls had been
a8.5 percent.6 9 Furthermore, although the OPA instituted rationing on frozen food at the same
time as it had rationed canned food, those restrictions were lifted on March 18, 1944-a full 17
months before canned food was derationed.70 Taken all together, the purchasing and
administrative policies of the federal government enabled a mass market for frozen food during
the war.
6'6 "Frozen-Foods Packers Organize," NYT, Jan. 26, 1942, 28; Seabrook, Henry Ford ofAgriculture, 27.
6, Joseph M. Guilfoyle, "Frosted Foods: Industry's 1941 Pack Expected to Approach Peak of Billion Pounds," WSJ,
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War," WSJ, Aug. 7, 1943, 1.
68 Marvin Jones to Chester Bowles, Aug. 16, 1944, Agricultural Marketing Service Records, RG 136, Fruit and
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MD (hereafter RG 136, Entry 58), Box 10, Folder 9.
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The largest firms in the frozen food field benefited most from the sudden increase in
demand.7 The Birds Eye division of General Foods, which in 1940 had been considered by Wall
Street analysts to be "in the experimental stage" and an unimportant contributor to General
Foods' earnings, turned its first profit in 1941 as armed forces purchases first took off.72 Edwin
T. Gibson, Vice President of the General Foods Birds Eye division, predicted in 1944 that the
long-expected "mass market" for frozen foods was just around the corner, with increased
production expected to bring the price of frozen food within the reach of "Americans of average
income."73 By 1944, Birds Eye controlled about half of the nationwide market for frozen food,
having used the wartime influx of cash to buy out several smaller competitors on the West
Coast.74 Seabrook Farms likewise seized the opportunity to improve its competitive position in
preparation for the expected postwar boom. Still the largest producer under contract for Birds
Eye, Seabrook also began selling directly to the Army Quartermaster and to civilians under its
own label in 1943. By 1945, Seabrook grossed $1.6 million on direct sales of its own product,
using the funds to double the size of its freezing plant and on-site cold storage facilities.75
Increased production on the farm and in the freezing plant required Seabrook to recruit a
workforce of unprecedented size. After experiencing difficulty finding local men and women
willing to work for low wages in exchange for a steady job and free housing, C. F. crafted a "rural
global village" of displaced peoples from the American South, Jamaica, Estonia, and above all,
Japanese-Americans released from internment camps specifically to join the Seabrook labor
force.76 As of January 1945, Seabrook Farms was officially the largest truck farm in the world,
employing over 7,500 workers during peak season and covering 31,000 acres. It was
71 On the impact of state policies on the growth of big business during World War II, see John Morton Blum, V Was
for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1976), 117-46.
72 "General Foods First Quarter Net on Par with 1940," WSJ, Apr. 16, 1941, 5.
73 "Frozen Food Pack to Show 15% Rise," NYT, Aug. 26, 1944, 18.
74 "Frozen Food," BW, Dec. 30, 1944, 65.
75 Seabrook, Henry Ford ofAgriculture, 38; "Frozen Foods: Interim Report," log9; "Company Plans Expansion, Sees
Demand Rising," Seabrooker (Sep. 1945): 1, 3, The Seabrooker Clippings File, SECC.
76 The stories of these migrant and semi-permanent workers are well told in Charles Hampton Harrison, Growing a
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furthermore the only farm of such size dedicated almost solely to producing frozen food.77 Large
firms like General Foods and Seabrook fully intended to capitalize on wartime conditions by
cultivating a permanent mass market upon the cessation of hostilities.
Hundreds of other firms likewise saw the end of the war as the true beginning of the
frozen food revolution. During the war, the War Food Administration had not permitted
construction of new freezing plants by firms not already engaged in the trade, but the end of
-these restrictions brought a flurry of investment in new facilities.78 Having witnessed the
phenomenal growth of Birds Eye during the war, everyone from returning GIs to "[fWormer
ribbon salesmen and taxi drivers" jumped into the fray, often converting small canning factories
into frozen food plants. By the end of 1946 at least 450 commercial firms had joined General
Foods, Stokely-Van Camp, and Seabrook Farms in packing frozen food.79 The big firms were
horrified by the arrival of these "fly-by-nighters," as they characterized their new competitors,
but bankers and Wall Street investors readily opened their pocketbooks at the mere mention of
"quick-freezing."8 ' For instance, Harry C. Cushing, chairman of Pratt's Fresh Frozen Foods,
launched 450,000 shares of common stock on the New York Stock Exchange in 1945. Despite
the stock's stated book value of 31 cents, investors quickly snapped up shares at more than $6
apiece.8 Not all of the new entrants to the frozen food field were over-hyped flashes in the pan.
(One of the most important companies established at war's end was Snow Crop, headed by a
former Birds Eye divisional sales manager; another entrant was Libby, McNeill, and Libby, the
giant canning company which had previously been wary of the unprofitable frozen food
business.82 Both new and old packers were convinced that the wartime market for frozen food
was only a foretaste of a giant postwar expansion. By 1947, the frozen food pack had reached the
e xtraordinary volume of nearly one billion pounds.8 3
z7 "Farm Facts," Seabrooker (Jan. 1945): 3, The Seabrooker Clippings File, SECC.
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Despite rapidly expanding production, the distribution problem that had limited mass
marketing through the 1930os remained unsolved. Refrigeration technologies required to
transport, store, and merchandise frozen food reliably and at low cost remained
underdeveloped. The amount of cold storage warehouse space capable of maintaining freezing
temperatures did not increase appreciably during the war, since wartime restrictions on
production precluded the manufacture of new refrigeration equipment. Cold storage space
remained dedicated primarily to cooling, not freezing, perishable food.84 This lack of storage
space led to a major shake-up of the industry in the late 1940s. Unable to move the almost one
billion pounds of frozen food optimistically produced in 1947, both large and small packers
found themselves stuffing cold storage warehouses almost literally to bursting. Unprepared for
the 41 percent rise in volume between February of 1946 and 1947, many warehousers found it
impossible to keep packages from thawing and refreezing for lack of adequate space. Desperate
to unload inventories, distributors sold off frozen stock at cut-rate prices, too often mixing
ruined packages in with the lots.8 5 Major packing companies-including Birds Eye, Stokely,
Libby, and Snow Crop-feared that consumers would permanently associate "frozen" with "poor
quality," and so slashed their own wholesale prices in order to drive smaller firms with lower
standards out of business.8 6 But even with such dramatic efforts to accept low profit margins or
even losses to assure their future place in the industry, the big packers could not overcome the
fundamental distribution problem that made it extremely expensive to keep a package frozen all
the way from the factory to the consumer.
This was especially true on the retail end of the frozen food distribution chain, as
retailers continued to resist investing in freezer cabinets. Chain supermarkets, particularly, saw
frozen food as too expensive for its most valued customers-buyers of average income who
visited stores repeatedly to buy low-priced staples and thereby create high turnover of goods.8 7
In 1946 only 40,000 of 520,000 retail food stores in the United States had facilities to
84 "Space Is Scarce," BW, Sep. 11, 1943, 29-34; "Warehouse Bulge," BW, Jan. 15, 1944, 44-9; "Full House," BW, Jul. 1,
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merchandise frozen food.88 Even two years later, frozen food accounted for only 0.4 percent of
chain store food sales.8 9 The high price of frozen food had been less of a problem for consumers
beset by shortages of canned food during the war, but in the late 1940 the much lower price of
both fresh and canned produce proved more appealing to the vast majority of consumers whose
food purchasing decisions were based more on price than on promises of convenience. As the
president of the National Wholesale Frozen Food Distributors Association noted in 1949,
"Really, the masses have not become acquainted with frozen foods. Because of our production
and distribution costs we've been mostly appealing to the people with higher incomes."90
Business Week agreed with this assessment, noting in 1947 that despite booming production,
frozen food could not compete with fresh or canned produce on cost, making it "far from being
high-volume merchandise."9 Fortune magazine likewise pointed out that the "vast to-do"
regarding frozen food in late 1946 was "over a line of merchandise whose total national tonnage
de oes not yet equal that of sauerkraut and pickles."s2 In the mid-lg40s, frozen food remained
essentially a high-priced luxury product, a fact recognized by Birds Eye marketing executives
who placed advertisements in highbrow magazines such as the New Yorker as late as 1949.93
Just-in-Time Distribution
Between the end of World War II and the mid-195os, technological developments helped
frozen food packers make their products fit for mass consumption. Packers and farmers
perfected techniques of mass production in this period, but even more importantly the industry
made a concerted effort to reduce distribution costs to bring their products within the reach of
the masses. The surprisingly successful introduction of frozen concentrated orange juice in the
late 1940s provided the impetus for this work, convincing frozen food packers that their
products no longer needed to be marketed as luxury items. Aided by developments in
88 "Frozen Foods: Interim Report," 180.
89 "Frozen Foods: Slow Start to Big Boom," Chain Store Age (May 1954): 97.
90 W. M. Walsh, "A Message from the President," Annual Yearbook of Frozen Food Distribution (1949): 9.
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refrigeration technology and, especially, long-haul trucking, the frozen food industry succeeded
by the mid-195os in convincing consumers that quick-freezing could provide high-quality,
convenient staple food at a reasonable price.
Packers put the mass production of frozen food into high gear immediately after the war.
Seabrook Farms was at the vanguard of using industrial methods and machinery to reduce the
cost of frozen food production. With over 25,000 acres of crops planted across four states-New
Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania-Seabrook developed methods of coordinating
the planting, harvesting, and processing of frozen vegetables that resembled military operations
in their precision. In the mid-194os, Seabrook hired agronomists and operations research
specialists to implement the "heat unit" method of planning crop plantings. The heat unit
provided a measure of the amount of light and heat required to bring a particular seed to
maturation, allowing Seabrook's field managers to predict when a particular field of crops would
be ready for harvest based on its climate and soil characteristics at the time of planting. By
forecasting the date of harvest, plantings could be spread out across time and across the 25,000
acres to assure that during harvest season the freezing plant would only receive as much raw
material as could be processed in one day.94 To speed up the harvest and reduce labor
requirements, Seabrook made extensive use of machines such as the Porter-Way pea harvester,
which cut and loaded peas directly onto field trucks in one operation. Mechanization allowed
one man to pick 200 pounds of peas in one hour in 1951, compared to 6 pounds per man-hour in
1941.95 Two-way FM radios were installed in Seabrook's field trucks in 1946, allowing managers
to direct loads of crops to the central freezing plant within four hours of harvest.96 Upon arrival
at the plant, crops entered into a highly mechanized continuous-flow production line. In 1948,
for instance, Seabrook introduced the first continuous-flow asparagus packaging line that
carried the vegetable from field box to finished package, eliminating a bottleneck caused by the
previous need for workers to arrange spears all in one direction by hand; throughput of
94 Seabrook, Henry Ford ofAgriculture, 30; John Fuyuume, Interview by the Author, Jun. 21, 2004, Upper Deerfield
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asparagus increased by fifty percent in the new system.97 By 1955, Seabrook Farms was
celebrated by Life magazine as the "biggest, best-organized vegetable factory in the world," using
"the mass production adeptness usually associated with motor cars" to produce 100 million
pounds of frozen vegetables and fruits.98
But despite these refinements in mass production, frozen food might have forever
r emained a high-priced luxury product if not for the astounding commercial success of frozen
concentrated orange juice. Invented by a group of USDA researchers at a Florida laboratory in
1945, frozen concentrated orange juice quickly became so popular among the nation's
consumers that industry leaders declared it a verifiable "miracle." Minute Maid Corporation, the
]largest firm to take advantage of the USDA's freely available patent on frozen concentrate,
achieved annual sales of nearly $30 million by 1951-a loo-fold increase in sales just four years
after introducing the product to the nation. The success of the new product resulted largely from
its appeal to consumers, who found concentrated orange juice much cheaper than fresh oranges
and far more consistently pleasing in flavor than canned juice. By 1952 the American Can
Company undertook a survey that found frozen orange juice to be the nation's favorite breakfast
drink, a staple food product that Americans of multiple income levels found to be an excellent
value.99 For many consumers, the desire for frozen orange juice was a primary incentive to
purchase a home freezer or a refrigerator with a built-in freezer compartment. Between the end
of the war and 1954, consumers bought over 6 million home freezers; as result, the amount of
freezer space in private homes totaled approximately 8o million cubic feet-a volume almost
equal to the total amount of commercial frozen storage space that had been available in
warehouses prior to the war.100 For the first time, millions of American shoppers owned the
technology required to make repeat buying of frozen food a feasible practice. As sales of frozen
97 "New Line Ups Production 50 Per Cent," QFF (Jul. 1948): 51. See also C. Courtney Seabrook, "A Farmer-Packer
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juice mounted steadily between 1948 and the mid-195os, leaders of the frozen food industry
became fully convinced that a permanent mass market for their products had finally arrived.
Supermarket managers responded to the orange juice boom by finally jumping on the
frozen food bandwagon in the early 1950s. The National Association of Food Chains surveyed 50
chain supermarket managers in 1950 and found that many of them continued to think of frozen
food as too expensive to warrant investment in freezer cabinets; at the time, fully half of the
chains provided no freezer space in their stores.101 The continuing success of frozen orange juice,
however, convinced at least one national chain-Safeway Stores-to "go all out" on frozen food
in 1951, when the chain installed freezers in all of its stores for the first time.102 Seeking to use
frozen orange juice as a "draw" that would lure buyers in to stores on a weekly basis, retailers
increasingly installed open-display or glass-cased freezers, replacing the old "coffin-type" cases
that hid packages from view under an opaque lid.1o3 Chain store managers who had previously
shunned frozen food declared in 1953 that it had become the "'golden' item of today and the
future," as supermarket sales of frozen items accounted for 3.5 percent of total food sales in that
year and reached 4 percent three years later.l4 In 1956 the National Tea supermarket chain
declared its intent to push frozen food up to o10 percent of total sales by building new stores and
remodeling old ones to provide more space for freezer cabinets.05s In 1949 Business Week had
declared that the "biggest bottleneck" preventing the arrival of a mass market for frozen food
was the lack of retail freezer space.l06 By the mid-195os, that bottleneck had all but disappeared.
Behind supermarketers' acceptance of frozen food in this period was the success of
frozen food packers in solving the nagging problem of distribution. In the decade following the
end of World War II, packers developed a host of strategies that markedly reduced the cost of
lo, "What Chain Stores Think about Frozen Foods," QFF (Mar. 1950): 65.
102 "Safeway Goes All out on Frozen Foods," QFF (Mar. 1951): 90go. Safeway had tested frozen food sales in certain
markets since 1949, but did not install freezer cabinets in all of its stores until 1951. See "Safeway Stores to Expand
Frozen Food Installations," QFF (May 1949): 68; "Safeway Stores: Frozen Foods Titan," QFF (Oct. 1960): 218-30,
255-7.
'
0 3 Max Mandell Zimmerman, The Super Market: A Revolution in Distribution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955), 148;
"Reach-In Case Sells More Frozen Foods," Progressive Grocer (Dec. 1957): 66. The first open-display case was
installed in a Stop & Shop in Quincy, Massachusetts, in 1953. See "Birds Eye Story," 95.
104 "Chain Store Meeting Focuses Spotlight of Enthusiasm on Frozen Foods," QFF (Oct. 1953): 95; Super Market
Institute, The Super Market Industry Speaks (Chicago: Super Market Institute, 1959), 19.
105 "Why Frozen Foods Are Climbing," Chain Store Age (Mar. 1956): 138.
106 "Comeback for Frozen Foods," BW, Mar. 19, 1949, 23.
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distributing frozen food and consequently brought the price within the reach of "the masses."
The first step to achieving economically viable nationwide distribution was to vastly increase the
volume of freezer warehouse space. For the first time, firms began building warehouses
dedicated specifically to frozen foods in the late 1940s. The Birds Eye division of General Foods,
f'or instance, built a new freezer warehouse in Watertown, Massachusetts in 1948. The new
facility tripled Birds Eye's storage space in New England and allowed the company to send
deliveries to any retailer in the region within 24 hours.107 Seabrook Farms doubled its own on-
farm warehouse capacity in 1946, achieving the ability to hold 50 million pounds of food at
to°F.'o8 Other frozen food packers and distributors built entirely new frozen-food warehouses
on the West Coast and in the Midwest, extending the range of distribution throughout the
country.10 9 Meanwhile, warehousing firms that before the war had dedicated most of their cold
storage space to non-frozen foods expanded and updated their facilities. Prior to the war, for
example, only 30 percent of the space in Terminal Warehouse in Washington, DC, could
maintain freezing temperatures. After installing new insulation and revamping its refrigeration
units just after the war, the firm could store frozen food in 70 percent of its space."0 All of this
construction brought a rapid expansion in the nation's freezer warehouse space, as volume
increased by a remarkable 23 million cubic feet between 1947 and 1949."'
The mere fact of increased warehouse space, however, did not inherently reduce the cost
of distributing frozen food. In the decade following World War II, the technology of
warehousing underwent a dramatic if largely invisible revolution.112 The change came as a
response to the high cost of storage, a problem that was especially apparent in the frozen food
industry. In 1946, the Wall Street Journal estimated that the cost of warehousing frozen food
C107 "Birds Eye Opens New Warehouse," BW, Jun. 26, 1948, 81.
l0c8 "Giant New Cumberland Warehouse Now Complete," Seabrooker (Jun. 1946): 2, The Seabrooker Clippings File,
SECC.
lo, "Distributor Builds Frozen Food Warehouse," QFF (Nov. 1948): 56, 92; "Continental Freezers Builds Warehouse to
Serve Key Mid-West Markets," QFF (Jan. 1950): 82, 84.
ll George Haddock, "Frozen Foods: Billion Dollar Industry," Nation's Business, Jun. 1954, 61; Walter E. Bernd, "How
One Multi-Story Warehouse Converted to Meet Growing Frozen Food Demand," QFF (Jan. 1954): 109-10.
l1L "Zero Storage Space up 23 Million Cu. Ft. since '47," QFF (Feb. 1951): 87.
":' For the average person as well as historians of technology, the role of the warehouse in the twentieth-century
economy is something of a "black box," hidden from view and therefore largely taken for granted. J. B. Jackson is to
my knowledge the only scholar to write, if briefly, on the "steady flow" concept of modern warehousing in A Sense of
Place, a Sense of Time (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 173-85.
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amounted to $0.025 per pound per month.l3 This may seem like a miniscule amount, but when
frozen food packers computed the expense of storing several million tons at 3 cents per pound
per year, the impact on price structures became dramatically apparent. Multiple factors led to
such high costs. First, a frozen food warehouse was a costly structure to build, requiring
investments in custom design, insulation, and refrigeration machinery. A 1968 textbook
estimated that an average frozen food warehouse cost $20 per square foot to build, exclusive of
land expenses.l4 Once constructed, a frozen food warehouse was expensive to operate, with as
much as half of expenses dedicated to labor costs.s15 But perhaps most important, frozen food
warehousers were confronted by Benjamin Franklin's famous maxim that "time is money."' l6
The longer food remained frozen in a warehouse, the more it cost. This was partly due to the
expense of labor and the cost of electricity needed to run refrigeration equipment, but even more
a result of the fact that a package of frozen food in storage represented tied-up capital. Not only
was the stored package not earning profits for food processors in the marketplace, but its
production required capital investment that accrued interest charges as it lay-quite literally a
frozen asset.
The postwar revolution in warehousing was dedicated to achieving a steady flow of goods
to minimize time in storage. Two key technologies lay at the heart of the new system: forklift
trucks and standardized pallets, both of which were first used together on a large scale by the
U.S. military during World War II. Forklifts and pallets made it possible to move and stack
enormous quantities of goods at stunning speed, especially when compared to the previously
widespread practice of moving irregularly shaped cartons with hand-operated two-wheeled
trucks or dollies. As the Navy discovered in a 1947 study, palletized loading could allow one man
to accomplish in two hours a job that would otherwise take 14 men four hours.ll7 Commercial
13 John A. McWethy, "Frozen Food Glut," WSJ, Dec. 3, 1946, 1.
"4 S. O. Kaylin, Understanding Today's Food Warehouse (New York: Chain Store Age Books, 1968), 165.
15 H. Wayne Bitting, Factors Affecting Costs of Wholesale Distribution of Frozen Foods (Washington: USDA,
Agricultural Marketing Service, 1959), 30.
116 On the history of time as a commodity, see E. P. Thompson, "Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism,"
Past and Present 38 (Dec 1967): 56-97.
"7 Kaylin, Understanding Today's Food Warehouse, 52-6; "Modern Handling of Frozen Foods in Storage," QFF (Feb.
1948): 47-8; "Palletizing Solves Distributor's Problems," QFF (Jul. 1948): 42; D. O. Haynes, "Mechanized Materials
Handling and the Manpower Problem," QFF (Mar. 1951): 93-5, 234, 236; Rick LeBlanc, "Pallet Evolved Along with
Forklift: Industry's Roots Predated WWII," Pallet Enterprise, <http://www.palletenterprise.com/
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warehousers quickly recognized the potential of palletization to reduce labor costs; with fewer
workers required to move much greater quantities of goods, managers could limit their single
largest category of operating expense while simultaneously minimizing the power of unions to
dictate work conditions. As one distribution executive noted in 1968, "[Mechanical] equipment
is never absent or temperamental and draws no fringe benefits."' s Palletization greatly
amplified the power of an individual warehouse worker at the expense of his laid-off
compatriots, but its impact on a warehouse's rate of throughput was just one part of a larger
effort of mechanization. Ultimately, warehouse designers and managers hoped to
reconceptualize the warehouse as a place of dynamic movement rather than "dead" space.
Continuous-flow principles of assembly-line manufacturing were imported to the warehouse,
with overhead or in-floor towlines and conveyor belts installed in single-story structures to
move goods horizontally rather than vertically (as in older multi-story buildings)."1 One of the
best examples of the modern continuous-flow warehouse was the 7.5 million cubic foot Alford
Refrigerated Warehouse constructed outside Dallas, Texas in 1949. "Keep it moving, preferably
by machinery," was the motto of Fred F. Alford, who could brag that his new structure was not
only the largest of its kind in the world, but was also capable of moving packages of frozen food
from the "in" to the "out" dock without ever being touched by a human hand.20o
The search for efficiency in frozen food warehousing gained new urgency in 1951 when
Birds Eye announced a paradigm shift in its distribution policy. For the previous two decades,
Birds Eye had relied on independent wholesalers to distribute its products to retailers, but as of
June 1951, the firm decided to sell as much as possible directly to supermarkets to drive down
articledatabase/view.asp?articleID=821> (Dec. 2, 2002); "Mechanized Handling of Frozen Foods," QFF (May 1947):
58.
118 Kaylin, Understanding Today's Food Warehouse, 63. Management's concern over the rising cost of warehouse
labor was a direct result of the remarkable success of the Teamsters in organizing the nation's warehouse workers
from the late 1930s through the early 196os. Jimmy Hoffa, in fact, started his union career working in a Kroger
produce warehouse in Detroit. Thaddeus Russell, Out of the Jungle: Jimmy Hoffa and the Remaking of the American
Working Class (New York: Knopf, 2001), 17-20.
119 "Warehouses and Distribution Centers," Architectural Record, Dec. 1966, 121-5; "Industry-Wide Trend to New
One-Story Warehouses," BW, Dec. 13, 1947, 24-5; Kaylin, Understanding Today's Food Warehouse, 50, 57-8. The
Ford Motor Company was at the forefront of designing single-story factories to achieve continuous horizontal flow of
goods; see Lindy Biggs, The Rational Factory: Architecture, Technology, and Work in America's Age of Mass
Production (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
120' "Newest Texas Whopper, the Biggest Refrigerator in the World," BW, Oct. 8, 1949, 22-3; "'Keep It Moving' Means
Efficiency," QFF (Jan. 1949): 62.
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retail prices and drive up the volume of its sales.121 Known as "direct selling," the new approach
to frozen food distribution threatened to bypass independent wholesalers both economically and
literally. Economically, the independents were increasingly excluded from getting their fingers
in the markup pie; whereas distributor markups prior to 1950 averaged around 30 percent, by
1954 the average wholesale markup had dropped to 16 percent since most large chain store
buyers could get a cheaper price by buying directly from a processor like Birds Eye.22
Wholesalers were also literally bypassed in the distribution chain, as both packers and
supermarkets built their own warehouses (or leased space in existing warehouses) to entirely
eliminate the wholesale markup and gain control of distribution logistics.123 By the mid-195os,
many independent frozen food distributors faced the choice of either accepting profitless
margins or initiating their own form of direct selling.124 One company that chose the latter
option was Merchants Refrigerating in New York City, which in the mid-195os began to style
itself "a sort of United Parcel Service for the frozen food industry."125 Rather than conceive of its
warehouses as storage sites, Merchants hired a large trucking company to transform itself into a
"funnel in the distribution system"-a business dedicated solely to keeping frozen food
constantly moving from producers to retail display cases.26 The new machinery of movement
radically restructured time as a factor in the cost of distributing frozen food, as the traditional
role of the warehouse as a place of storage was increasingly replaced by the warehouse as a place
of movement.1 2 7
121 Charles G. Mortimer, Jr., "A Statement of Birds Eye's New Distribution Policy," QFF (Jun. 1951): 54, 173-5. Birds
Eye, along with Stokely-Van Camp's Honor Brand, had begun this trend toward direct sales in 1948 in an
arrangement with a Los Angeles consortium composed of 1,300 supermarket buyers representing 16 chains. Edwin
W. Williams, "From Los Angeles to Seattle," QFF (Jul. 1948): 35; "The Certified Grocers Operation," QFF (Aug. 1949):
42-3; "What's Happening in Distribution?," QFF (Oct. 1949): 37-9, 80, 82.
122 "What's Ahead for the Frozen Food Distributor," QFF (Mar. 1954): 77.
123 Edwin W. Williams, "Frozen Foods Forum: Chains in Warehouses," QFF (Aug. 1954): 33; Herbert M. Thornton,
"Private Space Needs 15-Ton Weekly Turnover," QFF (Sep. 1954): 177, 184; "FF Warehouse Included in New Safeway
Depot," QFF (Mar. 1955): 438; "Warehouse Acts as Chains' Distribution Center to Keep Pace with Frozen Food
Trends," QFF (Apr. 1956): 184.
124 A third option was to encourage Congress to initiate anti-trust investigations into direct selling, as did the
executive director of the National Frozen Food Distributors Association in 1959. See House Select Committee on
Small Business, Small Business Problems in Food Distribution, Part I, Volume 2, Hearings, 86th Cong., 1st sess.,
Jun. 24, 25, Jul. 7-9, 1959, 320-29.
125 "Warehouses Expand Deliveries and Services to Chains," QFF (Jan. 1958): 46-7, 128.
126 "Howell Sees Permanent Role for Truckers in Direct Deal," QFF (Jan. 1951): 42-3; "How to 'Distribute' Frozen
Foods at about 6% over Cost," QFF (Nov. 1952): 41-2; Edwin W. Williams, "Frozen Foods Forum: Coming Truck
Deal," QFF (Feb. 1954): 69; "Distributor Triples as Zero Trucker and Warehouseman," QFF (Oct. 1959): 80, 84.
"Warehouses Expand," 47.
127 Kenneth F. Stepleton, "New Warehouse Role in a Changing Economy," QFF (Aug. 1959): 119, 126.
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Long-haul refrigerated trucking made this new low-cost distribution system possible.
With supermarkets and warehouses dedicated to high-volume, high-turnover throughput of
frozen food by the mid-195os, the speed of transportation among the nodes in the distribution
network became more essential than ever before. Most important, the rationalization of frozen
food distribution required a flexibility in transportation that only trucks could provide. This
flexibility took two forms, one geographical and the other technological. Geographically, long-
haul trucking allowed frozen food packers to mesh an increasingly decentralized mode of
production with the increasingly decentralized geography of suburban consumption.
Technologically, refrigerated trucks provided the ability to carefully monitor individual loads of
frozen food, effectively solving the problem of spoilage that had long haunted the industry's
efforts to provide consumers with a high-quality, low-cost convenience food.
Frozen food packers relied on trucking to fundamentally reshape the economic
geography of production in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Prior to this period, the majority of
frozen food factories were located on either the East Coast or the West Coast, primarily in New
York, New Jersey, Oregon, Washington, and California.128 Beginning in 1944, however, Birds
Eye began a five-year program of building and buying plants throughout the country, moving
into the rural Midwest and South [see Map 4.1]. The purpose of this decentralization was to
minimize the risks inherent in agricultural production due to unpredictable weather
conditions-to achieve, on a larger scale, C. F. Seabrook's vision of "eliminating the chance from
farming." In other words, Birds Eye's managers sought to supply their factories with raw
materials from "widely dispersed" sites in order to be "practically weatherproof."129 Selection of
new factory sites was far from random; Birds Eye and other major packers sought to gain access
to harvests in places where the environment-including not only weather and soil conditions,
but the cost of land and labor-suited the production of particular fruits and vegetables at the
12:3 See maps in Carlton, Frozen Food Industry, 71-3.
129 "Frozen Foods: Interim Report," lo09. See also General Foods Corporation, Annual Report, 1945; ibid., 1948.
Besides building new plants, Birds Eye continued to contract with independent growers and processors around the
country for raw and finished products. Besides Seabrook Farms, these contractors included B. E. Maling in Oregon,
Snider Packing in New York and Maine, Baxter and Brothers in Maine, Fairmont Canning in Minnesota (which would
later be renamed Green Giant), Walla Walla Canning in Washington, Beutel Canning in Michigan, Kelley Farquhar in
Washington, Cedergreen in Washington, and Durney and Son in Maryland. See "Work Sheets on Costs of Birds Eye
Frozen Foods," 1941, Office of Price Administration Records, RG 188, Entry A95, Work Sheets on Costs of Birds Eye
Frozen Foods, National Archives II, College Park, MD, Box 1.
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lowest possible cost.130 Furthermore, the climate and soil conditions at those sites would ideally
allow harvests to fall in different times of the year so that the firm's factories could maintain a
steady flow of production, allowing popular items to be marketed throughout the year, while
simultaneously minimizing the time any one particular lot of frozen food had to spend in
storage. Consider the example of green beans. In the 1947-48 season, packers harvest and
packed beans from December through April in Florida; in Virginia in May; in Delaware,
Maryland, southern New Jersey, Tennessee, and California in June and July; and in Michigan,
the Pacific Northwest, and New York in July and August.l13 By having factories located in some
or all of these different sites, a packing firm could avoid crop failures in any one particular
region. At the same time, this decentralized production would allow a firm to distribute green
beans to markets throughout the year without the need for expensive long-term storage in
freezer warehouses.
130 For a map of important vegetable production regions in 1949, see Ladd Haystead and Gilbert C. Fite, The
Agricultural Regions of the United States (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955), 73.
'31 "The 1947-48 Quick Frozen Foods Production Map," QFF (Mar. 1947): 76.
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Map 4.1: Birds Eye Frozen Food Plants, 1949
Birds Eye, like other frozen food packers, began decentralizing packing operations in 1948 in order to
become "weatherproof." Sources: General Foods Corp., Annual Report, 1948, 1949.
In order to realize the advantages of decentralized production, however, packers had to
rely on flexible transportation to move their products from producing areas to areas of
consumption. One of the great economic promises of freezing food was the theoretical ability to
remove perishability as a factor in distribution, allowing agricultural production to take place
where and when it could be done most cheaply, yet permit placement of those goods on the
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market where and when they would bring the best prices.132 With packers moving to
decentralized production after the war, the distance between producers and consumers
expanded quite dramatically, increasing the necessity for reliable long-haul transportation.133
Railroads might have seemed the logical choice for long-distance transportation, since the unit
cost of moving goods over distances of several hundred miles or more has always been lower for
rails than for trucks, primarily because of lower fuel costs.l3 4 But at the same time as frozen food
packers began decentralizing their production, they were also faced with an increasing
decentralization of consumption as Americans and their supermarkets moved into suburbs
following World War II. Furthermore, the sprawling one-story warehouses supplying these
suburban centers of consumption required large plots of land, which could only be had cheaply
in suburban or rural areas. This often meant the new warehouses had only highways, not rails,
connecting them to their customers. 35 In the postwar geography of suburban consumption,
shipping by truck became "increasingly logical" as a means of moving frozen food from rural
areas of production to the suburban areas where warehousers, supermarkets, and consumers
increasingly located themselves.36
Trucks provided the geographical flexibility of point-to-point shipping that railroads,
tied to inflexible steel rails, could not. Seabrook Farms, for instance, realized the importance of
flexible transportation in 1943, when it established its own trucking subsidiary, Cumberland
Auto and Truck. With 22 tractor-trailers, Cumberland was able to provide overnight shipping of
Seabrook products directly to any distributor or supermarket warehouse in the East Coast
132 Theoretically, then, frozen food should have made moot the geographical theories of Johann von Thiinen, which
dictated that the high degree of perishability and thus high cost of transportation would limit production of seasonal
fruits and vegetables to the "inner ring" of intensive agriculture, along with dairy farms. But as economic geographers
have shown, the relative cheapness and speed of transportation achieved in the mid-twentieth century allowed the
Thiinien rings, centered on the highly populated northeastern "Megalopolis" of Boston-New York-Baltimore, to
expand all the way to the Rocky Mountains; thus, the "inner ring" of market garden production effectively stretched
far into the Midwest and South. See Peter O. Muller, "Trend Surfaces of American Agricultural Patterns: A Macro-
Thiinian Analysis," Economic Geography 49 (Jul. 1973): 228-42.
'33 Keith O. Burr and Lawrence S. Martin, "Transportation Requirements," QFF (Dec. 1946): 68.
'34 The economic literature on this issue is enormous, but a quick summary can be found in Albro Martin, Railroads
Triumphant: The Growth, Rejection, and Rebirth of a Vital American Force (New York: Oxford University Press,
1992), 13-4.
135 James F. McCarthy, Highways, Trucks and New Industry: A Study of Changing Patterns in Plant Location
(Washington, DC: ATA Foundation, 1963).
136 "Trucks Are Taking over for Frozen Food Transportation," QFF (Oct. 1951): 55; E. R. Wagner, "Choice of Carrier Is
Decided By Market Conditions, In-Transit Rights, Time of Shipment," QFF (Nov. 1955): 92; Forney A. Rankin,
"Inherent Advantage of Trucks & Rails Make Both Necessary for Frozen Food Movement," QFF (Apr. 1962): 226.
266
metropolitan area by the early 1950s (see Figure 4.3).137 As Seabrook Farms increased its
production in the late 1940s, however, it sought to expand its distribution to reach outside of the
major metropolitan areas of the Northeast. As Harold Emerson, the director of Seabrook's
Cumberland subsidiary, noted in 1948: "People in the smaller cities and towns are demanding
frozen foods from their suppliers. In many cases the only means of getting frozen foods to these
people is by the motor truck."'38 As one frozen food packer explained in 1955, "Truck lines can
make deliveries to any warehouse [but] the rails can deliver only to those points that have rail
sidings."'39 As Map 4.2 illustrates, even as early as 1947 truck terminals capable of handling
frozen food were located throughout areas of intensive production and of heavy consumption, as
well as hundreds of points in-between. The largest number of terminals were of course located
in the metropolitan centers of the Northeast and Midwest, but truckers also maintained facilities
in places like Twin Falls, Idaho, and Jonesboro, Arkansas. The states with the highest ratio of
terminals to population included those of the upper Midwest, Idaho, Nebraska, and Colorado-
all primarily rural states where frozen food terminals would have served primarily as links
between farms and small towns and cities.140 As a North Dakota food processor noted in a 1963
survey, "Trucking can go anywhere. Rail can't."141 Geography did not dictate a shift to shipment
bly truck, but for frozen food packers seeking to distribute their products as widely as possible,
trucks became an increasingly attractive mode of transportation despite the higher cost
compared to railroads.
137 "This Is Seabrook Farms," 188-9; Advertisement for Seabrook Farms, "A Mechanized Army Keeps 30,000 Stores
Stocked with Seabrook Farms Frozen Foods," QFF (Nov. 1954): 140-1. Seabrook first began shipping frozen food by
truck in the 1930s via the Davidson Transfer & Storage Company, but those early truck shipments, using wet ice,
traveled only to Jersey City. B. D. Davidson, "Refrigerated Motor Truck Service for Frozen Foods," Ice and
Refrigeration (Jan. 1946): 50.
138 Harold C. Emerson, "Trucks," QFF (Mar. 1948): 94-5.
3;9 "Whole Sun Cites Many Advantages of Shipping FF by Truck," QFF (Sep. 1955): 128.
141' "Truck Lines & Terminals for Frozen Food Shipments," QFF (Nov. 1947): 56-62. The population figures used to
compute the per capita relationship are from the 1950 census of population.
141 McCarthy, Highways, Trucks and New Industry, 63.
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Figure 4.3: Seabrook Farms truck with reefer
Seabrook Farms established its own trucking fleet in 1943, operating as a subsidiary under the name of
Cumberland Auto and Truck. By the mid-195os when this photo was taken, the company used tractors
such as this GMC Model A to haul frozen food in refrigerated trailers as far north as Maine, as far west as
Illinois, and as far south as Florida. Seabrook Educational and Cultural Center photo collection.
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Map 4.2: Truck Terminals for Frozen Food, 1947
Decentralization of frozen food packing facilities was made possible by the availability of truck
terminals for frozen food. The majority of these terminals were located in major urban centers, but
many were spread throughout rural areas where vegetables and fruits were grown for freezing,
particularly in the Midwest, Tennessee, Virginia, and Texas. Sources: QFF, 1947; U.S. Census of
Population 1950.
Trucks also provided a technological form of flexibility that proved essential for the
frozen food industry to cultivate a mass market for its goods in the postwar period. At the most
basic level, the technology of train transportation is founded on the idea of subsuming any one
particular unit of goods (a boxcar) within a larger whole (the train and the rail network) to
achieve an overall level of efficiency in movement. Trucks, however, make the unit of goods (a
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trailer) into the whole, allowing truckers to provide a degree of service and speed unattainable
by railroads. Though less efficient in the sense of maximizing use of energy, labor, and
infrastructure, a truck is inherently more flexible in movement. Two technologies of flexibility
were especially important in allowing trucking to help lower the cost of frozen food distribution
after World War II: mechanical refrigeration and speed.
Mechanical refrigeration became cheap, reliable, and widely available in truck trailers in
the late 1940s. "Reefers," as the devices were known, were not new; an African-American
inventor named Frederick McKinley Jones had developed a mechanical refrigerator small and
lightweight enough to be used in truck trailers in 1938. After establishing the Thermo King
Corporation with a business partner, Jones sold thousands of his reefer units immediately
before and after the war, especially to meat haulers anxious to reduce the spoilage common with
the use of ice.142 The popularity of the first Thermo Kings came from their ability to provide
truck drivers with an unprecedented degree of control over the temperature maintained in a
trailer. Mechanical refrigerators work by forced convection of air past coils filled with
compressed refrigerant; unlike ice or cold plate systems, a mechanical refrigerator does not
merely absorb ambient heat but continually circulates cold air through a space. As a result, a
mechanical system's degree of refrigeration is controllable and adaptable to multiple conditions
(such as either cold or hot outside temperatures), whereas ice refrigerates by absorbing heat at a
more or less constant rate and can only be varied in strength by changing the quantity of ice
used.143 Shippers had long recognized the theoretical advantages of mechanical refrigeration; the
Pacific Fruit Growers Express company had been working on a mechanical unit to be used in
railcars since the early 1930s. Until the arrival of the Thermo King, however, such efforts were
142 "Trucking Exec's Challenge Spurred 'Refrigerator on Wheels," Transport Topics (Jul. 5, 1997); American Society of
Mechanical Engineers History and Heritage Center, "Thermo King Model C Transport Refrigeration Unit," Oct. 1,
1996, <http://www.asme.org/history/brochures/hl92.pdf> (accessed Sep. 20, 2004); J. W. Kalmes, "Thermo-King
Refrigerator Units on Trucks and Trailers," Dec. 3, 1946, International Harvester Company, Motor Truck Engineering
and Product Bulletins/Reports, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI, Box 12, Folder 4. Jones received patent
#2,303,857, in 1942 for his idea of putting a refrigeration unit in a truck trailer.
143 Holroyd, "Influences and Challenges," 24-6.
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impeded by the expense of constructing a unit that was simultaneously lightweight, compact,
and yet able to operate reliably under the constant strain of vibration experienced in transit.l44
With the release of the Thermo King Model R in 1949, frozen food shippers gained the
power to maintain unprecedented control over their products in transit. Prior to the Model R,
Thermo Kings had been designed and used primarily to keep meat and produce in the 35° to 450
F range, not to keep frozen food near o° F.145 The Model R packed a more powerful 4-cylinder
gasoline engine than previous Thermo Kings, allowing the compressor to produce extremely low
temperatures. This engine was coupled to an automatic electric starter, allowing for constant
operation of the unit's compressor even when the truck engine was not running (see Figure
4.4). Controlled by a thermostat, the electric starter allowed a steady temperature to be
maintained by starting, stopping, and restarting the compressor motor as needed. As a result,
the Model R could not only produce very low temperatures, but it could do so by operating its
engine only when needed to achieve the desired temperature. Furthermore, the Model R
incorporated a new invention by Frederick McKinley Jones-a control device that kept the unit's
engine running at peak efficiency at multiple settings. With these innovations, the Model R
needed only a relatively small amount of fuel to keep an entire load of frozen food at or near
o:°F.146 In a 1957 comparison, for instance, a group of agricultural engineers found that on a
shipment of frozen food from Waseca, Minnesota, to Jersey City, New Jersey, a mechanical
reefer used $20 of fuel and maintained a steady temperature of o°F in transit, while an iced
railcar used $214 of ice and salt with temperature spikes up to 14.60F.47 Besides offering fuel
efficiency, reefers based on the Model R design provided an important form of flexibility to the
owners of trucks, since they could operate not only at extremely low temperatures suitable for
flrozen food, but also at higher temperatures better suited to fresh produce or meat. With this
144 "Transporting Frozen Foods by Truck," QFF (Aug. 1946): 71, 75; Douglas Albert, "Truck-Trailer Refrigeration,"
Refrigerating Engineering (Jan. 1948): 31-2; George M. Ellig, "Transportation Developments in 1947," QFF (Mar.
1948): 115.
145 Kalmes, "Thermo-King Refrigerator Units."
146 "Pre-Cooling of Perishables," Power Wagon (Sep. 1948): 20; Holroyd, "Influences and Challenges," 14; G. D.
Albert, "Truck-Trailer Refrigeration for Frozen Foods," QFF (Mar. 1949): 174. Thermo King's only significant
competitor was the Trail-Aire Company, which produced refrigerator units that were placed inside, rather than on the
outside front, of a truck trailer.
'47 Russell H. Hinds, Harold D. Johnson, and Robert C. Haldeman, A Performance Test of Refrigerated Rail Cars
Transporting Frozen Foods (Washington: USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service, 1957).
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ability to haul a wide variety of goods, truckers with good reefers could more easily count on
picking up a "backhaul" or return load to defray the expense of hauling frozen food on the initial
trip, allowing an overall cost savings that could be passed on to the frozen food shipper. As a
consequence, frozen food packers quickly found mechanical reefers to be the cheapest and most
reliable form of refrigerated transportation available, especially in comparison to dry ice.148
Seabrook Farms, for instance, installed lo Thermo King Model Rs in 1950 and noticed a rapid
drop in fuel and maintenance costs in its reefer trailers.l49
148 "PIE Cites Contributing Factors that Led to Refrigeration Change," QFF (Apr. 1954): 141.
'49 Advertisement for Thermo King, "Cuts Shipping Costs for Seabrook Farms," QFF (Mar. 1950): 17.
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GREATEST ADVANCEMENT
IN TRUCK REFRIGERATION
HISTORY!
REFRIGERATES FRUITS AND VEGETABLES LOADED
DIRECTLY FROM FIELD . . .
MAINTAINS SUB-ZERO TEMPERATURES FOR
FROZEN FOODS . . .
Figure 4.4: Thermo King Model R
The Thermo King Model R, released in 1949, provided frozen food shippers with a
compact, fully automatic form of mechanical refrigeration capable of reliably
maintaining freezing temperatures. "A Brand New Thermo King with Super
Capacity," Quick Frozen Foods (Apr. 1949): 35.
Mechanical refrigeration was cheaper and more reliable than dry ice, but even so the cost
of shipping frozen food over very long distances by truck usually made rail shipment more
economical. For instance, a survey of frozen food processors in 1955 found that the primary
reason shippers chose rails over trucks was the simple fact that it was "cheaper"-in some cases,
truck rates from West Coast factories to markets east of Chicago were as much as 62 percent
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higher than rail rates.150 But taking advantage of mechanical refrigeration necessitated the use of
tractor-trailer transportation in the late 1940os and early 1950s, because railroads proved
reluctant to adopt mechanical reefers until years later. The Fruit Growers Express Company
teamed up with Frigidaire and the General Motors Corporation to deploy the first large scale
fleet of 102 diesel-powered mechanical reefer railcars in 1951, but even four years later the
nation's railroads had only 934 mechanical units in operation. As late as 1958, mechanical
reefers represented less than 2 percent of the total number of refrigerated rail cars in use.l5
Behind railroaders' reluctance to invest in a $20,000 reefer car in this period lay three-quarters
of a century's worth of investment in ice manufacturing and harvesting plants, all of which
would become obsolete upon conversion to mechanicals.152 Many trucking firms, on the other
hand, had just entered the transportation business following the war's end and saw investment
in specialized reefer equipment as a means to gain customers. In 1949, for instance, while
railroads had no commercially available mechanical reefers, approximately 11,ooo mechanical
units were installed in the nation's trucks.'53 Frozen food packers and distributors were among
those customers seeking the specialized service of reefer truckers, since many had found that
railcars using dry or wet ice generally had trouble reaching temperatures below 20 ° F. Spoilage
due to melting would often more than offset the cost savings achieved by shipping by rail.l54 This
became especially apparent to the Florida orange juice concentrate industry in 1950, when
major processors such as Minute Maid, Pasco, and Snow Crop began receiving complaints about
melted OJ from irate supermarket managers in the Northeast. After funding a study by USDA
transportation engineers Harold D. Johnson and Walter H. Redit, the orange juice packers
determined that mechanical refrigeration was necessary to avoid melting in transit.
150 James R. Snitzler and Robert J. Byrne, Interstate Trucking of Frozen Fruits and Vegetables under Agricultural
Exemption (Washington: USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service, 1959), 30.
151 James A. Mixon and Harold D. Johnson, "Iceboxes on Wheels," in USDA, Yearbook ofAgriculture, 1954:
Marketing (Washington: GPO, 1954), 103-4; "Mechanically Operated Reefer No Longer an 'Experiment'," 61-2; "It's
about Time," QFF (Nov. 1955): 87; Snitzler and Byrne, Interstate Trucking of Frozen Fruits and Vegetables, 34.
152 Reneau, "Frozen Food Transportation and Distribution," 19.
'53 Margaret R. Purcell, Transportation of Florida Frozen Orange Juice Concentrate: A Case Study of Carrier
Competition Induced by Dynamic Industry Growth (Washington: USDA, 1955), 21, 23; Harold E. Sweeney
(Industrial Economist, Investment Counsel, Market Surveys) to William C. Crow, "The Market for Transport
Refrigeration," Sep. 26, 1949, Agricultural Marketing Service Records, RG 136, Transportation and Facilities Research
Division Subject Files, Entry 42, National Archives II, College Park, MD (hereafter RG 136, Entry 42), Box 5, Folder
20.
'54 "Truck Transportation Soars for Frozen Food Cargoes," QFF (Jan. 1949): 41.
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Consequently, even shipments to points as far north as Chicago would best be done by trucks,
since "practically all movement of frozen citrus concentrates from Florida by truck is in
equipment with mechanical refrigeration."'55
Hauling frozen food by truck also added a human element-the driver-that made reefer
trucks more flexible than iced railcars. Even with thermostatically controlled automatic
compressors, reefer operation required a knowledgeable driver capable of properly loading a
trailer and checking or repairing the reefer in transit. A reefer driver's responsibility for a load of
frozen food began hours before picking up the shipment, in a process known as pre-cooling.
Shippers expected drivers to arrive at the loading dock with their trailers cooled to temperatures
below lo°F to prevent damage during loading.l56 The driver then supervised or assisted in the
loading of the trailer by warehouse dock workers known as "lumpers," ensuring that the
packages of frozen food were packed tightly to avoid heat loss but not too close to the trailer
walls to allow for proper circulation of cold air.'s7 After loading, the driver became fully
responsible for the load's safe arrival. As all reefer drivers knew, even the best-designed
mechanical refrigerators needed defrosting on long trips and were prone to breakdowns.
"Running a reefer" required frequent stops on the road for inspection of machinery and cargo,
and possibly mechanical skill to repair the unit's engine, compressor, or thermostat. Frozen food
packers and distributors relied on skilled truck drivers to use "good judgment" and "correct
operation of the refrigeration unit" to keep frozen food frozen in transit.158 Gaining these skills
often required extensive training; in 1954, two-thirds of processors and distributors reported
providing reefer drivers with instructional courses in handling frozen food.'59 The Minute Maid
Company put all of its truck drivers through a 3-month training course, while Safeway Stores
showed a 17-minute film at the beginning of each summer to teach "basic refrigeration
1'; Walter H. Redit, et al., Transportation of Frozen Citrus Concentrate by Railroad and Motortruckfrom Florida to
Northern Markets (Washington: USDA, 1951), 2, 4.
155 "Keeping Cool with the Reefers," Overdrive (Aug. 1972): 37; "Truckers See 23% Bigger FF Haul; Pre-Cool Trailers
only to 12.7°," QFF (Nov. 1956): 81.
'57 "Keeping Cool with the Reefers," 40.
158 John D. Keefe and Don M. Parmelee, "Our Warehousing and Transportation System," Seabrooker (Jan. 1956): 5-6,
The Seabrooker Clippings File, SECC.
159 "Motor Carriers Expect to Haul 22% More Frozen Food in '54," QFF (Nov. 1954): 68.
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principles" to drivers delivering frozen food from its warehouses to its stores.160 In general,
drivers were well rewarded for having the proper skills; in the late 1970s, for instance,
Seabrook's truckers earned an hourly wage 30 percent higher than factory supervisors.161 Not all
reefer drivers worked for wages; many shippers preferred to rely on independent owner-
operator truckers. Owner-operators not only purchased their own refrigerated equipment, but
also received a flat percentage of a load's revenue upon delivery-minus any damage claims;
they therefore had a "greater sense of responsibility to the shipper" to maintain the proper
temperature of frozen cargo.162 Whether run by a hired driver or an owner-operator, a reefer
truck placed a human in charge of every single load of frozen food, providing a flexibility of
service that railroads simply could not.
Trucks furthermore provided speed in hauling that was crucial for minimizing the time-
in-transit of frozen food in the postwar distribution system. Railroads using ice cars to ship
frozen foods required a "great deal of transportation time," since railcars had to be shunted to
icing stations, where "they might have to be cut out of a train of cars and possibly lay over for the
next freight coming through," a process that could take up to 24 hours on some lines.'6 3 Delays
in railroad shipping caused by layovers and interchanges to add or subtract cars from the train
furthermore introduced opportunities for frozen food to spoil; every moment a package of
frozen food spent outside of a stationary freezer meant the possibility of lost profits for packers
and distributors.16 4 For Seabrook Farms, trucking became an especially important means of
achieving speed in long-haul transit in the early 1950s, when the firm decided to differentiate its
label from the products of Birds Eye and other major packers by advertising its frozen vegetables
as 'fresher because they're quick-frozen right on our farm."'6 5 Putting this marketing strategy of
"freshness" into action, Seabrook expanded its distribution network in the early 1950s,
supplementing its own fleet of tractor-trailers with for-hire trucking companies such as Lahn
160 J. A. Podmore, "Private Fleet and Driver Education Keyed to Product Protection," QFF (Nov. 1953): 67; "How
Safeway Stores Uses Company-Produced Driver Training Aids," Refrigerated Transporter (Jul. 1967): 23-4.
161 John Melchiorre, Transcript of Interview by William Brown, 1994, Oral Histories of a Community, Volume I,
SECC, 11.
162 "Leased Operator Declared Most Efficient; Truck Line Plans LTL Service," QFF (Dec. 1957): 99.
163 H. C. Emerson, "Developments in Transportation," QFF (Aug. 1951): 91.
164 "Refrigerator Truck Line," BW, May 4, 1946, 64-5.
165 Advertisement for Seabrook Farms Baby Lima Beans, "You Couldn't Grow Them Fresher in Your Own Back Yard,"
1954, Ayer Proofsheets, Series 2, Box 431, Folder 2.
276
Transportation of Bridgeton, New Jersey, which provided direct transportation from southern
New Jersey to points along the entire Atlantic Coast and into Pennsylvania and Ohio.16 6 By 1960,
Seabrook had expanded its own fleet of trucks, allowing it to ship frozen food as far west as
Kansas City and as far south as Florida; for points farther west, Seabrook relied on national for-
hire common carrier trucking firms.16 7 Twenty years after establishing its own trucking
company, Seabrook had become entirely reliant on the speed of trucks for shipping its products,
with a management training manual noting in 1965 that "very few shipments are made in
refrigerated railcars due to time limitations."6 8
Even express railroad shipment could not compete with trucks in terms of speedy
service. If railroads sent an express shipment direct from factory to warehouse, shippers were
precluded from partially unloading along the way to hedge their bets on prices in various
markets. For instance, a shipper of a carload of frozen orange juice from Florida to Boston might
wish to sell part of the load in Baltimore and New York to help defray the cost of shipping.6 9
Only trucking could simultaneously provide both speed and flexibility, particularly by offering
t:he option of "less-than-truckload" shipping to processors and distributors. Truckers providing
L.TL service, as it was known in the transportation industry, would consolidate relatively small
loads from multiple shippers into one trailer, then deliver those loads to one or more
destinations. Railroads offered a similar service, known as "less-than-carload" or LCL shipping,
but generally charged a much stiffer rate than truckers because of the inconvenience of creating
customized loading and routing schedules. Truckers, tied neither to fixed steel rails nor to pre-
established schedules, could use LTL service as a relatively easy way to lure customers away
friom rail shipping.170 This service was especially valuable to warehouse managers seeking to
reduce operating costs by keeping inventories at a minimum. Both LTL service and full
truckload shipments-which in 1949 averaged 24,000 pounds versus a railcar's standard
capacity of 36,o00 pounds-allowed warehousers to achieve the goal of constant turnover of
166 "This Is Seabrook Farms," 174; John Fuyuume, Interview by the Author, Jun. 21, 2004, Upper Deerfield Township,
NJ.
16;, "Our 'Over the Road' Operations," Seabrooker (Oct. 1960): 5-6, The Seabrooker Clippings File, SECC; John D.
Keefe, "Our Transportation Department," Seabrooker (Aug. 1958): 5-6, The Seabrooker Clippings File, SECC.
168 Seabrook Farms Co., "Data on Operations," May 1, 1965, Artifacts File, SECC, John Melchiorre Folder, 4.
169 "Truck Transportation Soars for Frozen Food Cargoes," QFF (Jan. 1949): 41.
17) George M. Ellig, "Transportation-Your Link with Your Customers: Part I," QFF (Aug. 1947): 64-6.
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frozen food by limiting the amount of product that arrived and departed on any particular day.l7'
By being a loosely coupled technological system, trucking provided point-to-point service with
minimal delays. For the drivers of those trucks, of course, achieving just-in-time distribution
demanded "the fortitude to run anywhere at any time on a moment's notice."172 Although in
theory the storability of frozen food should have eliminated time as a factor in distribution, the
very real cost of time in storage and transportation dictated otherwise.
By the mid-195os, the integration of long-haul reefer trucking and modern warehousing
significantly reduced the cost of frozen food distribution. In 1953, truckers using mechanical
refrigeration hauled the great majority of frozen food-72 percent of all shipments by volume.'73
Four years later, when that percentage had risen to 77.7 percent, an industry observer noted that
"the only proper way [to distribute frozen foods] is in a refrigerated truck."74 Trucking tied
together a distribution system characterized by decentralized mass production, low-margin
direct selling to suburban supermarkets, and minimal time in transit and storage. The
combination allowed frozen food packers to achieve reliable profits by selling high volumes on
thin margins. As a result, frozen food finally became price-competitive with canned food in the
early 1950s. In 1953, for the first time in history, an average package of frozen peas could be
purchased for less than a comparable can of peas.175 The reduction in price was a direct result of
the new distribution system; as one commentator declared in 1954, "It may not be generally
known that the total cost of packing, storing and shipping a dozen of o10 oz. frozen food is
approximately 24¢ per dozen less than for a similar item of canned goods."76 The flexible
technology of the postwar frozen food marketing machine made mass marketing possible.
Improved distribution not only brought lower prices, but helped convince consumers
that frozen food was a good value. Through the 1930os and during the shakeout of "fly-by-
171 Alan F. Keenan, "Long Haul Refrigerated Motor Carrier Transportation," QFF (Nov. 1948): 70-2; Bitting, Factors
Affecting Costs of Wholesale Distribution, 15-17, 39; "Truck Transportation Soars for Frozen Food Cargoes," QFF
(Jan. 1949): 42.
172 "Keeping Cool with the Reefers," 36.
173 "Motor Carriers Haul 72% of Frozen Food Output," QFF (Nov. 1953): 63, 109-10.
174 "Motor Carriers Haul 77.7% of Frozen Food Shipments," QFF (Dec. 1957): 128; Louis Woehl, "More Attention
Should Be Paid to Trucking Equipment," Frozen Food Factbook (1957): 23.
175 "Frozen Peas Today as Cheap-Often Cheaper than Canned," QFF (Mar. 1953): 105.
176 Hubert F. Sandoz, "It Costs Less to Pack Frozen Foods than the Equivalent Canned Goods!" Frozen Food Factbook
(1954): 29. Emphasis in original.
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nighters" in 1946-47, frozen food packers had faced considerable resistance from consumers
who associated cluick-freezing with spoilage, often with good reason. By shifting to a distribution
system based on speedy movement, reliable refrigeration, and constant supervision, packers
were able to change many consumers' minds about the quality of the product. From 1949 to
1956, consumer purchases of frozen food expanded dramatically, accounting for $2 billion or
3.93 percent of total food store sales in the latter year, having risen from $496,ooo,ooo or 1.43
percent of total food sales in 1949. Frozen food outpaced the sales growth of all other food items
in this period.'77 This increased consumption came at the expense of fresh and canned fruits and
vegetables. Although overall consumption of fruits and vegetables dropped in the period,
consumption of frozen produce increased by a remarkable 170 percent. Especially popular were
peas, green beans, lima beans, asparagus, and spinach, as well as orange juice concentrate-
]hardly luxury foods.l78 Advertisements of the period proclaimed frozen food to be "fresher than
fresh," offering consumers a convenient and nutritious product at a low price.l79 Improvements
in distribution had made such claims more than just empty rhetoric.
The Political Economy of Convenience
The cultivation of a mass market in the mid-195os signaled an important shift, as
packages of frozen food quickly took on a political importance that had been absent during the
industry's first two decades. Economists and policymakers at the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) became increasingly attracted to the idea that quick-freezing could solve
surplus problems in the fresh produce economy. As a consequence, the USDA provided
engineering, scientific, and economic expertise to the frozen food industry, particularly working
on fine-tuning the operation of the trucking-based distribution system. As policymakers saw it,
frozen food could not only provide convenience to consumers, but could also provide a form of
177 "Frozen Food Share of Grocery Store Sales, 1949-1956," Frozen Food Factbook (1958).
178 "Frozen Fruits, Vegetables Usage Continues Post-War Uptrend," QFF (Sep. 1957): 107-8; "Per Capita Consumption
Comparison," Frozen Food Factbook (1957): 91.
179 Hamilton, "Economies and Conveniences," 42-53.
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political-economic convenience by converting one inflection of the "farm problem" into an
industrial problem.
Mass consumption of frozen food in the 1950S was based not only on the low prices
brought by rationalized distribution, but also on consumer acceptance of frozen food as
convenience food. Frozen food had been marketed as a luxury good for so many years that, as
late as 1952, a Woman's Home Companion survey could find that 36 percent of respondents did
not buy frozen food because they thought it was "too expensive."'so Nonetheless, marketers
increasingly found consumers "more than willing to pay extra" for frozen food that provided
consistent flavor and required only minimal preparation time.ls As one frozen food marketer
put it in 1957: "Mama buys frozen foods not because they are cheaper but because of their
superior taste, quality, and convenience."182 And the new frozen food items marketed in the
1950S were convenient, as a string of products followed in the wake of frozen orange juice
concentrate to capitalize on consumer demand for simple foods that could be easily prepared.
Birds Eye unveiled the "fish stick" in 1951 after seven years of research and development to
assure consumer acceptance. The work paid off, as consumption of fish sticks rose from 7
million pounds in 1953 to 44 million pounds a year later, almost overnight creating "a whole
new market of fish eaters."'8 3 Pot pies, TV dinners, french fries, and pizzas all achieved similar
instant success in the mass market over the next four years. Sales of potatoes for use in frozen
french fries, for example, increased 1,800 percent between 1946 and 1956, driven largely by the
rise of the McDonald's fast food chain-the most recognizable symbol of Americans' desire for
convenience food in the period.l84 Although modern historians may scoff at french fries and fish
sticks as examples of consumers being duped by corporate marketers, evidence suggests that
consumers understood such foods to be truly convenient. Especially among working-class
families in which women held full-time jobs, consumers who bought frozen food such as pot pies
s80 "Trends in the Use of Frozen Foods by U.S. Housewives," QFF (Mar. 1952): 110.
i81 Charles W. Lubin, "It's Easy to Get Your Price for Quality," Frozen Food Factbook (1958): 27; "Quality and
Convenience Lead in Impelling FF Purchases," QFF (Oct. 1954): 39.
182 George Egger, "Quality Is the Key to Further Expansion of Frozen Food Sales," Frozen Food Factbook (1957): 29.
183 "Fish Sticks Score with All-'Round Convenience," QFF (Sep. 1953): 81-2; "1955 Frozen Foods Almanac," QFF (Mar.
1955): 173; "Birds Eye Story," 91.
184 Victor J. Hillery, "Frozen Foods: Packers Prepare Flood of Victuals," WSJ, Feb. 3, 1954, 1; "French Fries Sales
Climb 1,8oo% in Ten Years with 40% Going to Institutional Markets," QFF (Oct. 1957): 97-100; Eric Schlosser, Fast
Food Nation: The Dark Side of the All-American Meal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001), 111-31.
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or TV dinners generally did so because they appreciated the speed of preparation and believed
that freezing provided the most nutrition and flavor for the money.'8 5 For instance, a 1957
marketing survey of Birmingham, Alabama steelworker families by a local newspaper found that
working-class purchases of frozen food were increasing at a much faster rate than purchases by
higher-income groups.'86
The greatest convenience factor of frozen food, however, may have been its potential to
restructure the political economy of food in the 1950s. When consumers bought frozen food for
its convenience, they helped push pricing decisions "downstream" in the agro-food economy.
That is, the power to determine prices paid to farmers and by consumers became increasingly
lodged in the hands of food processors and supermarket managers, rather than "upstream" in
the collected decisions of individual farmers as to how much food they would produce in any
given year. Even if consumers believed frozen food to be a good value, there was no question
that consumers paid for "the convenience of having some of the work of food preparation
transferred to the factory." In 1939, the value added to the food economy by manufacturing
amounted to $3.5 billion; by 1954, that amount had risen to $13.5 billion. Even after adjustment
for inflation, consumers paid an additional $4 billion per year for convenience in the latter year,
prompting two agricultural economists to observe that "it is obvious that our food does cost
inore."'8 7 But because consumers proved quite willing to pay for convenience-which they
apparently saw as a legitimate increase in value-there was no sustained political protest from
consumer groups about the fairness of price or the problem of monopoly in frozen food as
occurred in the milk and beef industries. Furthermore, the farmers who provided the raw
materials that allowed frozen food packers and supermarkets to profit from the manufacture of
convenience never took political action against the increasingly "downstream" economy.
Because frozen food packers bought agricultural products in large volumes and on contract,
farmers apparently appreciated the security of selling their produce at a fixed, guaranteed
185 Daniel B. Levine, Consumers Appraise Canned and Frozen Foods, Their Packages and Labels in Atlanta, Kansas
City, and San Francisco (Washington: USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service, 1958); "No End to Prepared Foods
Climb as New Sales Patterns Emerge," QFF (Oct. 1957): 35, 156.
186 "Frozen Fruits, Vegetables Widen Sales Base among Lower Income Groups," QFF (Mar. 1957): 44.
'
87 Boggs and Rasmussen, "Modern Food Processing," 428.
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price.188 Quick freezing would consequently appear to agricultural policymakers in the 1950 to
be an ideal solution to one version of the "farm problem," simultaneously bringing high prices to
produce farmers and high value to consumers without the need for significant state intervention
in either production or marketing decisions.
The upshot of this was that in the 1950S the U.S. Department of Agriculture cooperated
closely with frozen food packers to consolidate their power in the food economy, but to
understand how the state first became enrolled in the frozen food project requires further
explication. After all, the USDA's mandate as a government agency was to help farmers-not
food processors-achieve their economic goals. At one level, the USDA's interest in frozen foods
in the 1950os derived from its goal of helping farmers, particularly produce growers, solve their
surplus problem. Economist S. R. Smith, director of the Fruit and Vegetable Branch of the
USDA's Production and Marketing Administration, explained the surplus problem of fresh fruit
and vegetable production to the House Agriculture Committee in a lengthy 1946
memorandum.' 89 Surpluses in fruit and vegetable production resulted primarily from the
unpredictability inherent in both seasonal production and seasonal marketing. Most produce
farmers, constrained by climate, could only grow vegetables and fruits at particular times of
year; furthermore, the extreme perishability of fresh produce forced them to sell within a
relatively tight time window after harvest. Farmers could not predict at the time of planting how
the weather would turn out that year, and consequently had relatively little control over either
the size or the timing of their harvests. As Smith recognized, even the most favorable weather
conditions could lead to disastrous prices for farmers selling their produce on an open market,
since a bumper crop of perishables arriving all at once in any particular market could not be
stored until a time when a better price might be had. Individual farmers were often forced to
188 Ibid., 429.
189 S. R. Smith, USDA Production and Marketing Administration, Fruit and Vegetable Branch, "Improving the
Marketing of Fruits and Vegetables," Jan. 18, 1946, Agricultural Marketing Service Records, RG 136, Entry 52, Office
of the Administrator Deputy Administrator's Correspondence Subject File, 1940-58, National Archives II, College
Park, MD (hereafter RG 136, Entry 52), Box 13. The memorandum was intended as a policy primer for the committee
members considering H.R. 5496, which if it had been enacted would have amended the Agricultural Marketing Act of
1937 to make it easier for the USDA to administer marketing orders in the fruit and vegetable industries. House
Committee on Agriculture, Marketing Agreements and Orders, Hearings, 79th Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 3, May 3, 1946.
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accept prices below the cost of production. The same process could also work in reverse, creating
shortages which would bring unacceptably high prices to consumers.19°
The surplus problem was exacerbated, as Smith's memo further explained, by the chaotic
methods used to market fresh produce throughout the country. Unlike grains, fresh fruits and
vegetables were neither fungible nor storable, making it impossible to stabilize prices through
the buying and selling of futures at a large central exchange like the Chicago Board of Trade.
Instead, prices for fresh produce were set by millions of individual buyers and sellers,
bargaining at widely scattered points throughout the country over distinct lots of merchandise.
This geographical scattering, combined with the perishability of produce, meant that even when
surpluses existed in any particular produce market, scarcities might occur simultaneously
elsewhere. In short, the fresh produce economy was atomistic and chaotic, and thus an
intractable policy problem for agricultural economists such as S. R. Smith, who strongly
recommended in 1946 that Congress pursue a legislative strategy for helping produce growers
develop a "program of coordinated action" to rationalize the marketing of perishables.191 At the
same time, Smith recognized that a Republican-controlled Congress was unlikely to view with
favor any highly statist policies, such as marketing agreements modeled on the New Deal
solution to the milk problem. As Smith put it, "Government programs cannot take the place of
efforts on the part of farmers, shippers, processors, wholesalers, retailers, and other handlers in
devising and adopting better marketing practices."192
The USDA had made various efforts to help fresh produce growers devise a long-term
solution to the surplus problem in the 1930os and 1940s. The first significant effort came with the
amendment of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act in 1937, which enabled fruit and
vegetable growers to develop methods of "orderly marketing" based on the model of the dairy
industry; in other words, to cooperatively establish quotas for how much of any one commodity
l90 Smith, "Improving the Marketing," 6. The problem of unpredictability was especially apparent to citrus growers,
since it took four years after planting for an orange tree to produce marketable fruit; farmers might thus have
expanded their orchards during times of high prices only to find their first harvest occurring during a price-
dampening glut. See Ray A. Goldberg, Agribusiness Coordination: A Systems Approach to the Wheat, Soybean, and
Florida Orange Economies (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1968), 152.
191 Smith, "Improving the Marketing," 4-6, 12-16. On the Chicago Board of Trade as a privately regulated market
center providing stability in grain pricing, see Cronon, Nature's Metropolis, 97-147.
192 Smith, "Improving the Marketing," 13.
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could be marketed in any particular season to prevent flooding of markets and keep producer
prices high. But as we have seen in the case of the milk marketing agreements, the establishment
of quotas required significant cooperation among producers to abide by the agreements. If even
a small group of farmers refused to abide by the quotas, the entire system would fail. In the
dairy industry, a relatively small and geographically concentrated group of "inner-ring" farmers
were able to use the power granted by the state-sanctioned marketing agreements to achieve
relative success in stabilizing production. In fresh produce agriculture, however, such
organization was significantly hampered by the atomistic nature of the industry, composed of
millions of small farmers spread out all over the country. Although various fruit and vegetable
groups attempted to implement marketing orders after passage of the 1937 Marketing
Agreement Act, nearly all of the attempts soon collapsed, so that by 1946 only citrus fruit
growers-led by the powerful California Fruit Growers Exchange (Sunkist) -had an effective
agreement.l 93
In 1944 agricultural economist H. S. Kahle proposed a radically different, though
unsuccessful, approach to the surplus problem in fresh produce marketing. As a statistical
analyst in the USDA's War Food Administration, Kahle observed that stabilizing prices for
perishable fruits and vegetables was hampered by the fact that they were "seasonally produced
in concentrated areas." Surpluses of potatoes, for instance, did not occur across the entire
country at one time, but occurred only in Maine during the some harvest seasons. The War Food
Administration had consequently been unable to devise a nationwide policy of surplus
reduction, and had instead relied on localized direct government purchases to boost farm prices
during seasonal gluts. Kahle proposed a less statist approach, which he called a "transportation
indemnity," which he believed could effectively stabilize farm incomes without raising the price
of perishables for consumers. By paying a transportation credit to farmers or shippers of surplus
produce in a particular region, Kahle argued, the cost of shipping perishables over long
distances could be reduced enough to justify transporting produce from a glutted market to a
193 Ibid., o10. On the challenges posed by atomistic agriculture to cooperative marketing-in this case, of the California
raisin industry-see Victoria Saker Woeste, The Farmer's Benevolent Trust: Law and Agricultural Cooperation in
Industrial America, 1865-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). On the California Fruit
Growers Exchange, see Ron Tobey and Charles Weatherell, "The Citrus Industry and the Revolution of Corporate
Capitalism in Southern California, 1887-1944," California History 74 (Spring 1995): 6-21.
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place of scarcity. If shipping costs were subsidized in this way, Kahle reasoned, consumers in
New York might be able to buy green beans from the deep South in April at the same price they
would pay for locally grown beans in June. Given the high elasticity of demand for fresh
produce, especially among lower-income groups, such seasonal reductions in price would enable
consumers to spend more overall money on produce through the year, without raising the retail
price for any individual buyer. Farm incomes would remain steady, even during periods of
highly localized "flash surplus," through the relatively simple administrative mechanism of
providing shippers instant transportation credits. But as Kahle recognized, the elegance of the
plan was counterbalanced by two major flaws; namely, that it would require the government to
make direct cash outlays at unpredictable times and of unknowable amounts, and that it
furthermore had the potential to drive many food processors out of business by making fresh
produce available at low prices throughout the year. Combined with the fact that Kahle was a
low-level bureaucrat with no previous policymaking experience, the transportation indemnity
proposal never reached Congress, dying quietly in the hands of his direct superior in the War
Food Administration, Frederick V. Waugh.194
From an agricultural policy perspective, quick-freezing provided an almost magical
solution to the surplus problem in produce marketing. The industry's recent success in
cultivating a mass market made real the possibility of stabilized prices for both consumers and
farmers without government economic regulations-whether marketing orders or
transportation indemnities. The "miracle" of frozen orange juice concentrate drove this point
forcefully home to agricultural policymakers. This was because the frozen orange juice boom not
only created a whole new market for firms like Minute Maid, but also quite dramatically solved a
daunting surplus problem in the postwar Florida orange industry. In the early 1940s, generous
income tax laws had encouraged Florida orange growers to expand their orchards. By 1947,
these expanded groves were producing so much fruit that growers were unable to sell them at
prices high enough to cover the cost of shipping to northern markets. The successful
commercialization in 1948 of the process for concentrating and freezing orange juice arrived at a
194 H. S. Kahle to F. V. Waugh, "Proposal for Transportation Indemnity Program as a Mechanism for Price Support
and Surplus Removal,," Dec. 7, 1944, RG 136, Entry 52, Box 1.
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fortuitous moment. Quick freezing not only allowed firms like Minute Maid to buy up surplus
oranges and convert them into storable commodities which could be sold throughout the year,
but also created an entirely new product that consumers almost literally could not get enough of.
By the mid-195os, expanding demand for frozen orange juice seemed to have permanently
eliminated the surplus problem in the Florida orange industry.l95
Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, the great promoter of "free enterprise" in
agriculture, was one of the most avid supporters of quick-freezing as a solution to the surplus
problem.l96 Speaking to a group of frozen food industry leaders in 1954, Benson congratulated
them on their "spectacular achievements" in "revolutioniz[ing] the marketing of oranges." As
Benson saw it, quick-freezing replaced seasonal marketing of perishable commodities with
"year-around markets for products in essentially fresh form." As the frozen orange juice example
took hold among other fruits and vegetables, Benson predicted the achievement of "real stability
of prices of so many highly perishable foods which traditionally sold for a song when the
markets were glutted at harvest time."'97 Such a statement may seem inconsequential in terms of
agricultural policy goals, given its context as a laudatory speech at an industry banquet, but this
was exactly the point. Benson's speech was not a statement of a new governmental approach to
the surplus problem, but a pat on the frozen food industry's back for taking care of the problem
themselves, without the need for government regulation of production or marketing. Benson
literally showed his appreciation by presenting a certificate of achievement to Charles G.
Mortimer, president of General Foods Corporation.'98 But Benson offered more than just a
plaque to the frozen food industry. As he continued his speech, Benson explained his faith in
government research in science and technology, when undertaken "in close cooperation" with
industry, to achieve the surplus-reducing goals of New Deal-era agricultural policies-without
the policies. In particular, Benson offered to the frozen food industry the services of agricultural
engineers and scientists working on improved methods for "processing, transportation,
'95 Hamilton, "Cold Capitalism," 565-6.
196 On Benson, see Chapter 1.
197 Ezra Taft Benson, "Research Results in Progress," Address at a dinner in honor of the 25th Anniversary
Celebration of the Founding of the Frozen Food Industry, Washington, DC, Apr. 13, 1954, USDA History Collection,
National Agricultural Library, Special Collections, Beltsville, MD, Box 1.3/15, Folder B3. See also "Benson Sees Boon
to Nation in Atom," NYT, Apr. 14, 1954, 43.
198 "Benson Sees Boon," 43.
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distribution, and storage of frozen foods." 199 As Benson saw it, state-funded research on specific
technological problems of the frozen food industry could create not only higher farm incomes,
but also industrial stability.200
Benson's speech merely crystallized and intensified the USDA's ongoing commitment to
technological research intended to benefit the frozen food industry in its search for an efficient
marketing machine. Fifteen years before Benson became Secretary of Agriculture, the
Department had begun research on grading produce for use in freezing. Horace Campbell,
assistant to Dutch Diehl at the USDA Frozen Pack Laboratory, was a key figure searching for
"objective" methods to determine grades of raw materials in the late 1930s.20 Objective grades,
as Campbell understood, would allow farmers to quickly negotiate prices with packers for their
fruits and vegetables. Grades were even more important for packers, however, who saw them as
essential tools for predicting and controlling raw material costs.202 Campbell's first efforts to
find objective standards focused on peas, the most popular frozen vegetable in 1938. Campbell
tested a variety of methods that he hoped might replace "organoleptic" tests-subjective
measures of flavor and texture determined by smelling, touching, and tasting the peas-with
mnethods that could be reliably reproduced in diverse contexts. Tests included floating raw peas
in water tanks to measure their specific gravity, measurement of pea size and juice volume per
unit weight, and chemical analyses of sugar content.20 3 None of these quantifiable measures
could be correlated, however, to human perceptions of taste, texture, and juiciness after the
freezing process.
199 Benson, "Research Results in Progress."
200 Benson's thinking was thus of a piece with the "corporate commonwealth" approach to political economy espoused
by the Dwight Eisenhower Administration in the 195os. Robert Griffith, "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate
Commonwealth," American Historical Review 87 (Feb 1982): 87-122.
2C)1 On the role of scientists, technologists, and their machines as arbiters of "objectivity" in politics and business, see
Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1995); M. Norton Wise, ed., The Values of Precision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
2C2 USDA Bureau of Chemistry and Soils, Food Research Division, Report on Research Line Project b-1-3-5,
"Chemistry of Peas, Preserved by Freezing, as Related to Variations in Maturity, Harvesting, Handling, and
Processing," Mar. 31, 1938, Records of the Western Regional Research Center, Box 1, Folder 3; USDA Bureau of
Chemistry and Soils, Food Research Division, "Quarterly Report, Supplementary Statement," Mar. 31, 1938, ibid.
203 USDA Bureau of Chemistry and Soils, Food Research Division, Report on Research Line Project b-1-3-5,
"Chemistry of Peas, Preserved by Freezing, as Related to Variations in Maturity, Harvesting, Handling, and
Processing," Sep. 30, 1938, ibid., Box 1, Folder 2.
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Success came with a device called a "tenderometer," which provided a quantifiable
measure of pea quality by recording a pea's resistance to pressure. As of May 1939, Campbell's
work resulted in the USDA promulgating tentative frozen pea grades.204 Frozen snap beans
followed in 1944, then apricots and rhubarb in 1945. Other popular frozen foods did not receive
official grades until the 1950s, with broccoli grades announced in 1950 and lima beans in
1953.205 But even after the grades went public, many packers refused to acknowledge them,
preferring their own in-house grades. This was partly because an in-house grade of, say, "Honor
Brand Fancy, Grade A" could be used as a marketing tool to distinguish an Honor Brand
package from a less well-known packer. It was also because the USDA grades focused on
determining the price a farmer could expect for his raw peas, rather than the flavor a consumer
might experience upon cooking the frozen peas.206 In the 1950s, the USDA continued its
tradition of providing voluntary grades "to serve as a basis of sales transactions," but also
stepped up its efforts to provide on-site inspection and grading, for a fee, to packers seeking to
stamp their frozen packages with the "U.S. Grade A, Fancy" label. In both situations-creating
grades for raw materials and standards for finished products-the government's policy was "to
develop and revise standards in close cooperation with the industry."207 A tight relationship
already existed between the state and the industry by the time Ezra Taft Benson called for
additional cooperative research into the science and technology of marketing frozen food.
After Benson's call, a large part of the USDA's work on the frozen food marketing
machine focused on maintaining the flexibility of trucking in the distribution system. Despite
having largely surmounted the distribution problem by the mid-195os, frozen food packers
called on the USDA to help them smooth the functioning of the marketing machine by doing
technical research and policy work on truck transportation. One problem that the industry
found particularly vexing in the mid-195os was a disjunction that many packers perceived
204 USDA Food Research Division, Seattle, "Annual Report for the Fiscal Year 1939: Research Project b-1-3-5," Jun.
29, 1939, Records of the Western Regional Research Center, Box 1, Folder 9.
205 "U. S. Frozen Food Grades," Frozen Food Factbook (1954): 69.
206 "Frozen Food Squeeze," BW, Feb. 22, 1947, 70, 72; Paul M. Williams to Raymond P. Melhart, Sep. 26, 1941,
Records of the Western Regional Research Center, Box 9, Commodity Processing Folder.
207 Leonard S. Fenn, "An Explanation of the USDA Grading Program," QFF (Feb. 1952): 57; Advertisement for Prime
Froz-n, 'Your Double Assurance...They Have to Be GOOD!" Frozen Food Factbook (1954): 1. See also "How Federal
Inspection Works," QFF (Feb. 1947): 65; Dennis T. Avery, "A Day with a Fruit & Vegetable Inspector," QFF (Sep.
1964): 43, 170.
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between the theoretical advantages and the actual practice of using mechanically refrigerated
long-haul trucking. The geographical and technological flexibility of trucking made just-in-time
distribution possible, but it also meant that frozen food shippers had to choose among
thousands of trucking firms with thousands of different standards for equipment and service. In
a series of annual surveys of packers and distributors in the 1950s, the trade journal Quick
Frozen Foods uncovered a persistent dissatisfaction among some shippers regarding truckers.
(Complaints abounded of truckers who overloaded or did not properly pre-cool their trailers, or
ran reefers with insufficient insulation, underpowered compressors, or poor circulation setups.
.All of these factors could cause spoilage, cutting into profits and potentially causing consumers
to return to canned or fresh produce.208 As frozen french fry packer F. Gilbert Lamb noted in
:1957, there was little point in advertising "such strong talking points as convenience and
economy .... unless the industry can guarantee delivery of quality products to the consumer."209
What the newly mature frozen food industry needed most in 1957, argued Lamb, was a
set of objective and reliable standards for transportation equipment. Such standards, ideally
expressed in a single quantitative measure such as the British Thermal Unit, would allow
shippers of frozen food to know exactly what level of refrigerated service they were paying for
when they hired one trucking firm over any other.210 As Lamb and other frozen food packers
realized, however, finding such a standard would require expensive and time-consuming road
tests of thousands of possible reefer-trailer configurations. This was where the USDA proved
useful, particularly in the person of Harold D. Johnson. As an agricultural engineer specializing
in refrigerated transportation with the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service, Johnson had
been working since 1948 on a project to develop "exact knowledge as to desirable refrigerated
trailer characteristics and operating standards" for frozen food transportation.1 In the early
1950s Johnson stepped up his efforts in this regard after receiving multiple requests from frozen
208 "Motor Carriers Haul 72% of Frozen Food Output," QFF (Nov. 1953): 63, 109-10; "Truckers See 23% Bigger FF
Haul; Pre-Cool Trailers only to 12.7°," QFF (Nov. 1956): 81;
209 F. Gilbert Lamb, "Let's Stress Quality in Frozen Foods," Frozen Food Factbook (1957): 13. As an interesting aside,
Lamb was the inventor of the Lamb Water Gun Knife, a device that used a giant water hose to shoot potatoes through
a steel grid to create perfectly shaped french fries, a key technology in the development of the french fry industry. See
Schlosser, Fast Food Nation, 130.
210 Lamb, "Let's Stress Quality," 51, 53.
211 John B. Hulse, "Trailers," QFF (Mar. 1948): 95.
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food industry representatives to do so, both through the mail and at the annual conferences of
the National Association of Frozen Food Packers which he regularly attended.212 Cooperating
closely with the National Bureau of Standards and the Truck-Trailer Manufacturers Association,
Johnson sought standard rating of reefers as a tool to help the frozen food industry navigate
through the "great flexibility and diversity of the motor carrier industry itself," with its "many
different types and sizes of equipment used in such diverse ways and under such a variety of
conditions."213 Johnson coordinated the running of hundreds of refrigerated truck trailers
through two rigorous series of road tests in 1957. Unlike the in-plant tests performed by trailer
manufacturers such as Fruehauf Trailers, the new rating system emerged from measures of
refrigeration capacities under actual conditions of use-in multiple weather conditions, on a
variety of road surfaces, and at varying speeds of travel.214 These factors were important since
the movement of air and engine exhaust around the outside of the trailer, along with the amount
of sunshine on any given day, or even the reflectivity of the road surface, could all have
significant influences on a reefer's ability to keep frozen food at desired temperatures.215
Johnson, along with C. W. Phillips of the National Bureau of Standards, released the resulting
standards in 1959. The new rating system immediately gained widespread use, and was credited
by frozen food industry leaders as a significant method for assuring the delivery of high-quality
products.21 6
Spurring the search for standard trailer ratings in 1957 was the release of a report by
USDA researchers that radically altered the way shippers thought about the way frozen food
moved through the distribution system. The results of the "Time-Temperature-Tolerance" (TTT)
study were first made public in 1957 by food technologists W. B. Van Arsdel and M. J. Copley,
directors of the project. These USDA scientists worked at the Western Regional Research
212 John B. Hulse to Harold D. Johnson, Feb. 12, 1952, RG 136, Entry 42, Box 5, Folder 20; "Trailer Refrigeration
Costs Studied by TTMA Task Force," QFF (Aug. 1955): 119; Harold D. Johnson, "Tests Show Truck Warmup Remains
Major Roadblock to FF Hauling," QFF (Jan. 1957): 430.
213 Harold D. Johnson, "Work on Reefer Standardization Pushed forward on Several Fronts," QFF (Feb. 1956): 428.
214 John B. Hulse, "New Reefer Trailer Standards Will Guide Truck Manufacturers, FF Shippers," QFF (Dec. 1957):
95-6, 103.
215 "First FF Trailer Ratings Via New Method Slated for April at Budd Co., Philadelphia," QFF (Apr. 1959): 150.
216 "First FF Trailer Ratings," 150; Sterling P. Doughty, "'Task Force 1957' Is Answer to Industry's Handling
Problems," Frozen Food Factbook (1958): 13; "Standardized Ratings of Truck Refrigeration Units Will Ease
Estimation of Requirements," QFF (Mar. 1964): 253-60.
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Laboratory (WRRL) at Albany, California, which in 1940 had absorbed Dutch Diehl's Frozen
Pack Laboratory.217 The TTT study first began in 1949 on the request of the USDA's Cold Storage
Research Advisory Committee, the group of prominent frozen food and refrigerated warehouse
businessmen that vetted relevant USDA projects undertaken with Research and Marketing Act
:unds.218 At the time, the frozen food industry had not yet overcome the distribution problem,
and wanted USDA scientists and engineers to find out exactly what it was that made it so
difficult to distribute frozen food without spoilage. Ideally, the Advisory Committee wanted the
USDA's researchers to define "tolerable variations" in frozen food temperature that would allow
shippers to improve distribution strategies without having to invest in expensive new
technologies.219 In seeking to define these "tolerable variations," researchers at the WRRL spent
"substantial amounts of money" over the next decade, putting over 50,000 packages of frozen
food through a wide variety of refrigeration conditions like those that might be expected to occur
in the real world of refrigerated trailers and warehouses. The tests were carried out in a "battery
of test rooms" specially designed to expose packages to blasts of cold air constantly fluctuating
in temperature. Upon emerging from the test room, the food was removed from its package and
tested for loss of ascorbic acid, degradation of chlorophyll content, as well as subjected to
organoleptic tests of taste, color, and odor to determine the degree of quality deterioration
caused by deviations in temperature while in storage.2 20
When M. J. Copley presented the results of the Time-Temperature-Tolerance study eight
years later, the industry heard essentially the exact opposite of what they had hoped the studies
217 Wallace B. Van Arsdel, Michael Joseph Copley, and Robert L. Olson, Quality and Stability of Frozen Foods: Time,
Temperature Tolerance and Its Significance (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1969), 1-10o; H. C. Diehl, "Research
Activities in Freezing Preservation, 1940," Jan. 17, 1941, Records of the Western Regional Research Center, Box 4,
Folder 4. On the establishment of the Regional Research Laboratories, see Mark R. Finlay, "The Industrial Utilization
of Farm Products and By-Products: The USDA Regional Research Laboratories," Agricultural History 64 (Spring
1990): 41-52.
218 Western Regional Research Laboratory Director's Newsletter, Feb. 4, 1949, Records of the Western Regional
Research Center, Box 22.
2 1
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Attack," Food Technology (Jan. 1957): 28.
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would find.221 Rather than establishing "tolerable variations," the TTT study showed that frozen
food had to be kept at o0F at all times-not just upon departing the plant or upon arrival at a
retailer's cabinet, but at all points in the distribution process. As Copley and his audience at the
1957 National Frozen Food Industry convention well understood, however, even the most
careful handling of frozen food was likely to introduce the packages to some fluctuations in
temperature between plant and retail cabinet. The question then was how much fluctuation was
permissible, but the answer that Copley and Van Arsdel had found was ... not much.222 As Van
Arsdel later put it, "frozen foods have a memory for adverse experience," meaning that even
minor temperature fluctuations had a summing effect as they occurred over time, leading to
substantially reduced storage life even after the product was placed in a o°F environment.223
Furthermore, the quality loss induced by fluctuating temperatures displayed a distressing
pattern of exponential increase; at 5°F the quality loss was twice that experienced at o0F, at lo°F
the loss was four times that at o0F, and so on.22 4 For the frozen food industry, the TTT study
implied that the distribution problem had not in fact been fully solved. Within a few years, the
industry would enroll the USDA once again to iron out this new wrinkle-an issue to which we
will return below. First, however, we need to examine one major exception to the rule-
illustrated by the creation of frozen food grades and trailer standards and the TTT project-that
the USDA generally placed its scientific and technological expertise in the service of an industry
seeking to fine-tune its marketing machinery, hoping to navigate the narrow path between
flexibility and lack of control over distribution.
The USDA's interest in developing a smoothly functioning marketing machine for frozen
food did not always align precisely with the interests of the industry. This became particularly
apparent in 1956-57 in a bizarre legal-ontological debate over whether a chicken, once frozen,
221 It took so long for the TTT results to be made public because the Cold Storage Advisory Committee, upon reviewing
initial data, understood that the results would have far-reaching (and expensive) impacts on frozen food distribution
practices. Members of the Committee hoped that the data had been corrupted by poor quality samples, so would not
allow the WRRL researchers to publish their results until more data had been gathered on a much larger sample of
raw materials. W. B. Van Arsdel, "Temperature Tolerance Studies," Western Regional Research Laboratory Notes
from the Director, Jun. 13, 1952, Records of the Western Regional Research Center, Box 22.222 M. J. Copley, "Keeping Frozen Foods at Zero All the Time Best Assurance of Consumer Satisfaction," QFF (Feb.
1957): 177.
223 Arsdel, "Time-Temperature Tolerance," 32.
224 USDA, Agricultural Research Service, Protect Frozen Foods from Temperature Damage (Albany: Western
Utilization Research and Development Division, 1957).
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was nonetheless still a chicken. The chicken quandary arose after a series of court cases in the
mid-195os in which the USDA's legal team in the Solicitor's Office struggled with the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) to broaden the definition of which agricultural commodities
should be considered exempt from regulation under the 1935 Motor Carrier Act (MCA). As
explained in Chapter 1, the USDA's efforts to broaden the "exemption clause" of the MCA were
based on a decades-long effort to increase the flexibility of long-haul trucking by allowing small,
decentralized trucking firms to haul agricultural commodities to and from anywhere, at rates of
their own choosing, without first receiving authority from the ICC to do so. In the case of frozen
food, the USDA's legal team came to believe in the mid-195os that if truckers hauling frozen
goods were exempt from ICC regulation, they would be able to provide geographically flexible
service that would benefit both farmers and processors. As Mark L. Keith of the Farm Bureau
Cooperative Association stated the farmers' interest in exemption in 1957, farmers selling
perishable products to frozen food packers required "complete flexibility of truck service ... so
that trucks [can] move from producing areas to any market dictated by the 'unpredictable' forces
of supply and demand."225 In other words, farmers wanted trucks to be available on short notice
to haul produce to whichever processor was offering the best price at any particular moment.
For regulated truckers who were not exempt from ICC regulations, this was often not possible,
since they might not have the ICC-sanctioned operating authority to haul loads to or from
certain states.
Some processors, meanwhile, had also sought help from the USDA to make the
transportation of frozen food exempt from ICC regulation. Like farmers, some frozen food
packers saw the geographical flexibility of exempt trucking as a way to minimize the risks of
selling semi-perishable goods in an unpredictable market. For instance, in the early 1950s a
group of Florida orange juice processors called on the USDA to help them solve a growing
transportation crisis. Few Florida processors had access to sufficient, locally available cold
storage warehouse space at the time, meaning that packers often had to search far and wide for a
warehouse capable of storing cans of orange juice during busy processing seasons. Furthermore,
225 "Exemption Debate Moves Forward as Farm Groups Plan Own Study," QFF (Aug. 1957): 131.
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even when the juice processors were able to ship their products directly up the coast to the
major consuming centers of the Northeast, they generally found that truckers did not have
operating authorities that would allow them to bring back a cost-reducing backhaul of, say, meat
or dairy products. Both of these situations could be easily fixed, the processors told the USDA's
legal team in 1953, if the truck transportation of frozen orange juice were exempted from ICC
regulation, allowing truckers to haul OJ to any available warehouse space without going through
the expensive and time-consuming process of receiving additional geographic operating
authority from the ICC.226 In this particular case, the USDA's legal team successfully petitioned
the ICC to grant temporary authority to eight Florida trucking firms to haul frozen orange juice.
At the same time, the USDA hoped to find a more permanent expansion of trucking services
available to frozen food processors.
The desire of farmers and some processors to make frozen food exempt from ICC
regulations was restrained by a 1951 decision by the Interstate Commerce Commission, known
as the "Determinations" decision. In the decision, the ICC established a list of products that it
had determined to be "unmanufactured," and therefore within the scope of the agricultural
exemption of the MCA. The list explicitly omitted frozen food, meaning that truckers wishing to
haul frozen products had to receive appropriate operating authorities from the ICC. The decision
was heavily influenced by pressure from a lobby group, the Refrigerated Carriers Association,
formed in 1949. Composed of large firms who had previously received authority from the ICC to
haul frozen food, including Mathews Trucking, Safeway Truck Lines, Barnes Frozen Food
Express, and Refrigerated Transport, the lobby group sought to convince the ICC that
unregulated carriers should be explicitly forbidden from hauling frozen food, since their
"inferior equipment standards ... often result in a serious deterioration of perishable foods in
transit" and were thus harmful to the public interest.227 The Department of Agriculture took the
opposite position during the hearings, using testimony of agricultural scientists and economists
to argue that processes such as freezing were intended only to transform raw agricultural
226 Purcell, Transportation of Florida Frozen Orange Juice, 8, 31, 33, 37-8; "Asks Truckers for 'Greater Efficiency',"
QFF (Apr. 1953): 16o.
227 Excerpt from Traffic World, "Refrigerated Truck Lines Form New Association," Nov. 5, 1949, RG 136, Entry 42,
Box 5, Folder 20.
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commodities into marketable form, not to make them into "manufactured products."228 In
declaring frozen food to be a "manufactured" food product in the Determinations case, however,
the ICC followed its historical pattern of siding with the large, regulated common carriers rather
than with the USDA or the smaller, exempt trucking firms.229
Following the decision, the USDA's legal team began working to overturn the
Determinations decision by injecting the question of whether frozen food was "manufactured"
:into the regular court system. Two opportunities to do so arose in 1955 and 1956, one involving
frozen chicken and the other involving frozen fruits and vegetables. The chicken debate began
when Frozen Food Express, a regulated trucking company based in Texas, sued the ICC in
Federal District Court over the Determinations case, which the firm claimed deprived it of the
right to haul frozen poultry to and from all points within the United States. The Secretary of
Agriculture immediately signed on to the case as an intervening plaintiff, seeing an opportunity
to broaden the agricultural exemption to include frozen food. The Federal District Court for the
Southern District of Texas decided against the plaintiffs in 1955, but Frozen Food Express and
the USDA appealed the decision, bringing it before the Supreme Court in the spring of 1956. In
the hearings before Supreme Court, the USDA relied on expert testimony from agricultural
economists who stated that a frozen chicken maintained a "continuing substantial identity" with
an unfrozen chicken. In simpler words, if a frozen chicken still looked like a chicken, it was still a
chicken. Because the chicken had not taken on a new name or identity through the process of
freezing in the way that, say, a sheet of raw steel became an automobile, the chicken was not
" manufactured" and thus should be exempt from ICC regulation. Perhaps surprisingly, the
Supreme Court agreed with the USDA, stating that "A chicken that has been killed and dressed
is still a chicken.... We cannot conclude that this processing which merely makes the chicken
marketable turns it into a 'manufactured' commodity."230 This decision was soon made
applicable to nearly all frozen foods in November 1956, when the Supreme Court affirmed a
2:!8 Celia Sperling, The Agricultural Exemption in Interstate Trucking: A Legislative and Judicial History
(Washington: USDA, Agricultural Marketing Service, 1957), 27-8.
229 See Chapter 1.
230 Sperling, Agricultural Exemption, 34-6; American East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Frozen Food Express,
3.51 U.S. 49 (1956), HR2.
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lower court decision that had granted the Home Transfer and Storage trucking firm the right to
haul frozen fruits and vegetables without first receiving ICC authority.231
As a consequence of these two cases, the ICC declared all frozen food to be exempt from
MCA regulations in late 1956. One year later, over half of all frozen food shippers began relying
on exempt truckers to haul their products. Flexibility was the key reason these shippers switched
to exempt carriers, particularly to gain the advantages of less-than-truckload shipping.232 As
explained above, LTL shipping provided frozen food packers and distributors the ability to break
up loads into smaller lots to minimize warehousing and deliver to multiple sites. Many regulated
common carriers-including both trucking and railroad firms-were unwilling to carry LTL
(LCL, on rails) freight. In order to offer LTL/LCL service on a large scale required a
transportation firm to invest in expensive freight terminals and load-switching systems that
would allow firms to assemble full loads out of partial shipments. Without extensive terminal
networks, a transportation firm's only other way to provide LTL/LCL service was to accept half-
empty trailers or cars-a sure way to lose money.2 33 For instance, Trans-American-a major
regulated common carrier trucking firm-noted in 1957 that LTL operations required a "large
investment" but brought only a "doubtful return."234 Before the Supreme Court declared frozen
food an exempt agricultural commodity in 1957, some frozen food packers found it so difficult to
get LTL service at reasonable rates that they bought their own tractor-trailer fleets. One example
was Chun King, a northern Minnesota packer of frozen chow mein. Despite the increasing
popularity of chow mein in the mid-195os, Chun King could not sell the item to stores or
distributors in full truckload quantities (24,000 pounds or more), and so needed the flexibility
of LTL in order to ship smaller lots to many locations. In the days before exemption, Chun King
found it cheaper to assemble its own fleet of tractor-trailers rather than pay the high rates
charged by regulated common carriers.235 Once frozen food was declared exempt, however,
shippers generally found that there was "no problem" finding trucking firms willing to carry LTL
231 Home Transfer & Storage Co. v. United States, 141 F. Supp. 599 (1956); Sperling, Agricultural Exemption, 36-7;
Neil Olmsted, "ICC Indecision Seen Forcing Fight to Widen Exempt Product List," QFF (Nov. 1956): 78.
232 "Motor Carriers Haul 77.7% of Frozen Food Shipments," QFF (Dec. 1957): 128.
233 William G. Mitchell, "Do Packers Really Want LTL Shipment Service?" QFF (Nov. 1956): 80, 90o-1.
234 "Leased Operator Declared Most Efficient; Truck Line Plans LTL Service," QFF (Dec. 1957): 99.
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shipments at reasonable rates.236 Exemption had flooded the transportation market with
competitors; smaller trucking companies or individual owner-operators previously shut out
from hauling frozen food were suddenly able to compete with the larger firms, and often found
t:hat offering LTL service at low rates was the surest way to get more business.237
The cost of shipping frozen food dropped rapidly in response to the exemption decision.
Two USDA economists, James Snitzler and Robert Byrne, found that in the two years following
exemption, motor carrier rates on frozen food shipment dropped by 19 percent overall, and up
to 36 percent on certain frozen items, even as railroad rates rose from 6 to 14 percent.
Furthermore, many of the processors the economists interviewed found that truckers were
providing more flexible service than ever before.238 John D. Keefe, traffic manager at Seabrook
Farms, especially appreciated "the greater flexibility of the exempt hauler's operation" since
Keefe had to "correlate one month's production with 12 months' distribution."239 Exempt
haulers, as Keefe understood, were often more willing to arrive when and where they were
needed than were larger common carriers. Truckers who hauled only exempt commodities did
not need ICC authority to operate in certain geographical areas; the larger common carrier firms
(lid, meaning that even though they could also haul exempt commodities to and from anywhere,
they were less likely to be willing to do so for fear of not having the proper authority to pick up a
backhaul at the destination. The National Association of Frozen Food Packers recognized this
issue at its 1957 convention, where it passed a resolution calling on the ICC to grant regulated
truckers statewide authorities rather than point-to-point route authorities in order to give them
"the flexibility of service which is available to exempt motor truckers."240
But even as some packers came to appreciate the flexibility of exempt hauling in 1957,
others saw the potential for disaster. Ray V. Harron, traffic manager at Birds Eye, countered
John D. Keefe's assertion that exempt haulers provided more flexible service with his own
assertion that regulated carriers provided better equipment. As a general rule, the regulated
carriers were larger firms with greater financial stability, able to invest in the latest refrigeration
236 "FF Shipping Costs Drop Sharp 5.6% in 1958, but Will Rise in 1959," QFF (Dec. 1958): 30.
237 Snitzler and Byrne, Interstate Trucking of Frozen Fruits and Vegetables, 2.
238 Ibid., 1, 50.
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equipment.241 This sentiment was echoed by Philip Hertz of Federated Truck Lines of Chicago, a
regulated common carrier, who maintained that exempt haulers could only provide cheap rates
by using cheap equipment. Furthermore, even if exempt haulers could travel to and from
anywhere at any particular time, they generally could not do so on a regular basis since "most
exempt carriers today own only one tractor and trailer."242 The findings of Snitzler and Byrne's
1958 survey of exempt hauling of frozen food offered some evidence for these views. For
instance, the two economists found that the primary reason processors reported for not using
exempt truckers in 1957 was the lack of available trucks.243 Furthermore, some exempt truckers
used equipment that was clearly unsuited for frozen food; five percent of exempt truckers used
trailers that had less than two inches of insulation, whereas the industry-wide standard required
a minimum six inches.244 Frozen food packers wanted flexible distribution, but they did not
want to sacrifice control over their products to achieve it.
By 1958 several large packers had decided that exemption had gone too far. Led by Birds
Eye, Welch's Grape Juice, and Stokely-Van Camp, frozen food packers joined up with the ICC
and regulated common carriers to petition Congress to amend the Motor Carrier Act to exclude
frozen food from the exemption clause.245 Ironically, one of the common carriers joining in the
effort was Frozen Food Express-the firm which had initiated the court case that led to the
Supreme Court's definition of a frozen chicken as a non-manufactured chicken. Apparently the
firm's Chairman of the Board, Cyrus B. Weller, had found that a year's worth of exemption had
brought too much competition into the field of frozen food hauling. Whereas Frozen Food
Express had previously argued that a frozen chicken was not manufactured, in testifying before
Congress Weller argued that "Frozen fruits and vegetables are not farm commodities. They are
the products of a substantially centralized, highly competitive industry characterized by large
commercial firms." As Weller and the ICC saw it, this meant they were manufactured and should
241 "Effects of Agricultural Exemption Debated," 163.
242 Philip Hertz, "Know-How of Certified Truckers Gives FF Superior Protection," QFF (Aug. 1957): 31, 142.
243 Snitzler and Byrne, Interstate Trucking of Frozen Fruits and Vegetables, 30.
244 Ibid., 70-1.
245 John W. Burks (Assistant General Traffic Manager, Welch Grape Juice Co.) to J. C. Winter, Jan. 11, 1957, RG 136,
Entry 42, Box 2, Folder 15.
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not be exempt.246 The USDA, meanwhile, reiterated its assertion that freezing was merely a
means of converting a raw agricultural product into a more marketable form. Furthermore, as
Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson wrote to Oren Harris, chair of the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, "The exemption presently in effect provides flexibility and
economy in the movement of agricultural commodities."247 The exemption for frozen food
benefited the public interest both by providing the flexibility in transportation demanded by
industry and agriculture, while also providing the low cost food demanded by consumers. USDA
economist George A. Dice expanded on Benson's statement, drawing on the research of the
USDA economists Snitzler and Byrne to show that exemption reduced the cost of transportation
and was greatly appreciated by packing firms such as Seabrook Farms.248 Nonetheless, with the
two largest frozen food packers (Birds Eye and Stokely-Van Camp) calling for an end to the
exemption, the passage of an amendment to the Motor Carrier Act was almost inevitable.
The amendment came as part of the Transportation Act of 1958, which proclaimed
frozen food to be ineligible under the agricultural exemption clause of the MCA of 1935. It was
t:he first and only setback for the USDA's efforts to broaden the exemption clause in the service
of flexibility. The episode demonstrated above all else that "flexibility" was itself a flexible term
with multiple valences. For the USDA's economists and legal team, flexibility primarily
represented a high degree of competition in the transportation industries, characterized by
thousands of small firms unfettered by ICC restrictions on rates or geographic mobility. Frozen
food packers found significant drawbacks to the system, however, after experiencing this kind of
flexibility for a year and a half. Although they appreciated the lower rates, faster service, and
unrestricted point-to-point delivery of deregulated trucking, some also found that "flexibility"
entailed reliance on carriers who often used ineffective refrigeration equipment and were likely
to go out of business at any moment. In defeating the exemption effort, the frozen food industry
essentially brought the USDA's marketing economists in line with their agricultural engineers
and scientists, who had been working all along to bring higher standards to the technology of
246 House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Interstate Commerce Act: Agricultural Exemptions,
Hearings, Apr. 23-25, 1958, 85th Cong., 2d sess., 288. The Chairman of the ICC reiterated the views expressed in the
Determinations case; ibid., 6-18.
247 Ibid., 4.
248 Ibid., 18-41. John I). Keefe also testified against the proposed amendments to the MCA; ibid., 378-9.
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frozen food distribution. The industry effectively enrolled the USDA's expertise by the end of the
1950S to negotiate the fine line between flexibility and control, with control emerging the
winner.
In the long term, the close cooperation between the USDA and the frozen food industry
on the marketing machine produced an ironic result. In the mid-195os the industry had brought
the USDA on board by touting the possibility of a rationalized distribution of agricultural
commodities, a system that would not only benefit farmers by eradicating the surplus problem
but also benefit consumers by providing a high-quality, low-cost convenience food. By the mid-
1960s, however, the industry became increasingly reliant on more complex and expensive
distribution machinery, encouraged by the Time-Temperature-Tolerance work of the WRRL as
well as the trailer-rating standards pushed by Harold D. Johnson. In combination with other
factors, the increasing cost of distributing frozen food brought a shift away from the goal of mass
marketing low-price staple foods, towards a new goal of maximizing the profits of convenience.
The first indications of this shift came in a 1957 Senate report on monopoly in the
nation's industries. Examining data from the 1957 Census of Manufacturing, the Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee reported that more than half of
the total shipments of frozen vegetables were made by the four largest firms. In contrast, only 28
percent of total shipments of canned vegetables were made by the four largest firms, a relatively
low degree of economic concentration that held true in most other food industries. In fact, the
study found that the frozen food industry in 1957 was more monopolistic than the meatpacking
industry, in which the four largest firms sent only 39 percent of total shipments.249 The number
of firms processing frozen food declined by more than half between 1946 and 1957, from 450 to
215.250 This increasing concentration was partly a result of the "shakeout" of smaller firms that
had occurred in the wake of the 1947-48 season of overproduction, but also came as certain
powerful firms bought out their competitors. Minute Maid, for instance, bought Snow Crop in
1954, the same year that Stokely-Van Camp acquired PictSweet. Six years later, Minute Maid
was in turn purchased by Coca-Cola. Seabrook Farms was bought in 1959 by Seeman Brothers,
249 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Concentration in American Industry, Committee Print, 85th Cong., 1st sess.,
1957, 42, 64, 41.
250 McWethy, "Frozen Food Glut," 1; Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Concentration, 492.
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one of the nation's largest grocery wholesalers.25 A major new competitor arrived to the field in
1962 when the Green Giant Company converted a number of its canning factories to freezing
factories and began purchasing competitors' factories; within a decade it had become Birds Eye's
primary competition.252 Driving this wave of consolidation was a desire on the part of powerful
firms to gain the factories and markets of their competitors. Buying up factories allowed firms to
spread out their production sites, thereby minimizing the risks to any individual firm of
purchasing seasonally produced raw materials from a large number of farmers. This can be seen
in Map 4.3, which shows the distribution of 114 large frozen food factories, operated by 42
firms, in 1968. Although the factories were confined to states with environmental conditions
suitable to intensive produce production, each of the large firms owned multiple factories at
multiple sites to assure access to raw materials in any season. In other words, little had changed
in the geography of production since Birds Eye first began its push for decentralization in the
late 1940s, except that now that decentralization was combined with a greater degree of
economic centralization.253
25'1 This sale was initiated by C. F. Seabrook, who sold his shares in the company to Seeman Brothers without first
consulting his sons, who had become the de facto managers of the company. C. F.'s action sparked a bitter series of
court battles, as his sons believed C. F. had made the deal either out of spite for his well-educated sons (he had no
formal degree), or as a result of senility caused by an earlier stroke. Seabrook, Henry Ford ofAgriculture, 48-53; "The
Seabrook Purchase," QFF (Jun. 1959): 51-3.
252 "Minute Maid Buys Snow Crop Unit of Clinton Foods," WSJ, Dec. 1, 1954, 8; "Stokely-Van Camp Buys Control of
Pictsweet Foods," WSJ, Jul. 7, 1954, 4; "Coca-Cola Says '60 Net Will Exceed That of '59," WSJ, Dec. 23, 1960, 4;
"Green Giant Continues Its Diversification To Stabilize Earnings," WSJ, Jun. 11, 1971, 23.
253 Directory of the Canning, Freezing, Preserving Industries (Westminster, MD: Edward E. Judge & Son, 1968).
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Map 4.3: Major Frozen Food Factories, 1968
Geographic decentralization of frozen food packing was coupled with economic centralization in the
1960s, as major firms such as Birds Eye, Green Giant, Libby, and Coca-Cola purchased the facilities of
smaller firms. (Only fruit and vegetable plants of firms producing an annual volume over 30 million
pounds are shown.) Source: Directory of the Canning, Freezing, and Preserving Industries (1968).
The mass-marketing approach of the 1950o meant that only frozen food packers
practicing very high-volume production and operating at relatively low margins could
successfully compete in the marketplace. But even at high production volumes many packers
found profits slacking in the late 1950s, as illustrated by a Standard and Poor's survey that
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showed nearly all packers and distributors bringing sub-par returns in 1957.254 As the so-called
"Eisenhower recession" took shape in 1957 and 1958, frozen food firms sought to reassert their
power in the marketplace to increase profits. Whereas the industry had focused for the previous
decade on cultivating a mass market by offering convenient staple foods at prices competitive
with canned items, by the early 196os packers devised a new strategy. Turning from mass
marketing to segmented marketing, the industry sought to take into account race, ethnicity, age,
gender, and especially class differences in order to cultivate "untapped markets."255 Above all,
packers worked to attach a higher price tag to the "convenience" of frozen food.
Besides the recession, the new approach derived from two more proximate causes. One
was an article appearing in Fortune magazine in 1959 which showed that wealthier consumers
spent a far greater percentage of their income on frozen food than middle- and lower-income
buyers.256 The second was a case study published in 1960 by the Harvard Business School which
argued that frozen food did not offer a reasonable return on investment for supermarkets.257
Summing up these two studies, Edwin W. Williams, the editor of Quick Frozen Foods, called for
a redefinition of the industry's goals: "The industry has become pretty much a 'class-less society'
with price as the only yardstick. This is not only dangerous, but a deterrent to profit and
growth."258 The way to make frozen food sell at higher prices was to redefine the value of
"convenience." The big-selling convenience foods of the mid-195os had been simple items-
orange juice, fish sticks, french fries, pot pies, plain vegetables and fruits-but in the late 1950s
and early 1960s packers began unveiling entirely new lines of "premium products." Consumer
incomes were rising, noted one contributor to Quick Frozen Foods in 1958, making buyers "fair
prey to more exotic, better packaged and more expensive foods-no doubt about it."259 "Exotic"
may have been a stretch, but the new frozen food items of the 1960os were certainly different.
Seabrook Farms kicked off the new approach in 1958 with a line of premium quality vegetables,
including petite peas and asparagus with hollandaise, sold in classier-looking packages than
25s4 "Financial Outlook for Frozen Food Packers," QFF (Oct. 1957): 52.
255ss Hamilton, "Economies and Conveniences," 53-9.
2E56 "The 'Ordinary' $125-Billion Market," Fortune, Sep. 1959, 132-5.
257 John E. Bingham, C. Richard Kramlich, and John D. Leland, Jr., Are Frozen Foods Profitable for Supermarkets?
(Boston, 1960).
258 Edwin W. Williams, "What's Ahead in Frozen Foods," QFF (Nov. 1961): 77.
259, "Retailers Advised to Get Set for Rise in Demand for Prepared Frozen Foods," QFF (Aug. 1958): 67.
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staple items and selling for a few cents more at retail.26o Other packers quickly followed suit. In
1959 the trade journal Chain Store Age reported that the introduction of premium and gourmet
lines had resulted in a 20 percent increase in the number of frozen foods available in the
nation's supermarkets in just one year.261 In 1959 the Stouffer Corporation began freezing items
available in its East Coast restaurants, including lobster Newburg, king crab imperial, and
spinach souffle.262 The Birds Eye division of General Foods continued the trend, noting in 1962
that "the total U.S. expenditure for food has been moving consistently upward," thereby
justifying the introduction of a "new line of premium quality frozen vegetable dishes" including
Green Peas with Sauteed Mushrooms, Fordhook Lima Beans with Cheese Sauce, and Mixed
Vegetables with Onion Sauce.26 3 Birds Eye advertisements touted these new vegetable
combinations as being "as exciting as the rest of your meal."26 4 Furthermore, Birds Eye claimed
that the new vegetables offered "built-in chef service"-a noticeable change from 1950s claims
that frozen food provided "built-in maid service." Whereas the value of convenience had
previously been sold in terms of labor-saving, now it was an indicator of an elevated concept of
"the good life."26 5 Even as packers continued to sell high-volume, low-priced staple products
such as green peas and orange juice-although increasingly as "B grade" or store labels-through
the 1960s they enticed consumers with new flavors, new sauces, and new packages.266 Such
luxuries, even if less conspicuous than the enormous Cadillacs of the period, came at a price.26 7
The new focus on highly prepared foods required more complex marketing machinery
than ever before. Premium products, with their sauces and diverse mixtures of vegetables,
meats, and starches, proved to be more unstable in texture and flavor than the more traditional
260 Seabrook Farms, Annual Report, 1959; "Premium Line of Frozen Vegetables," QFF (Aug. 1958): 64; Fred R.
Fleischman, "The History and Future of FF in Boilable Bags," QFF (Mar. 1960): 222.
261 "Annual Frozen Food Merchandising Section," Chain Store Age, Apr. 1959, 160.
262 Victor J. Hillery, "Sales of Frozen Food Speed up but May Hit a Legal Barrier; States Start to Regulate Food
Temperatures," WSJ, Dec. 15, 1960, 1; "Growth: The Story of Stouffer's Frozen Prepared Foods," QFF (Jun. 1962):
163-82.
263 General Foods Corporation, Annual Report, 1962, 5-6.
264 Advertisement for Birds Eye, "Why Should Vegetables Be the 'Quiet Corner' of Your Plate?" Ladies Home Journal,
Nov. 1963, 38; "Sauce Varieties other than Butter Create Plus Sales for Prepared Vegetable Packer," QFF (Nov. 1964):
81.
265 General Foods Corporation, Annual Report, 1963, 9.
2
6 6
"Are B Grade Brands Coming Back?" QFF (Aug. 1958): 310; "Output Doubled in Frozen Foods," NYT, Apr. 15,
1963, 118.
267 Roland Marchand, "Visions of Classlessness, Quests for Dominion: American Popular Culture, 1945-1960," in
Reshaping America: Society and Institutions, 1945-1960, ed. Robert H. Bremner and Gary W. Reichard (Columbus:
Ohio State University Press, 1982), 165-70.
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frozen foods. The Western Regional Research Laboratory's TT study had emphasized the
importance of keeping frozen food at o0F at all times, but this recommendation took on a
greater importance as packers sought to implement their new marketing strategy of
emphasizing quality over price. Most important, frozen food packers began a concerted effort to
upgrade their distribution system-particularly refrigerated transportation equipment. The need
for haste in this project was spurred by a report issued in 1959 by the Association of Food and
Drug Officials of the United States (AFDOUS). Traditionally concerned with promulgating codes
for consumer health safety, in 1959 AFDOUS took a new path, "stepping into the regulation of
quality" by drafting a code meant as a guide for states to require frozen food shippers to
maintain products at or below o0F.26 8 Apparently the officials had read the TTT study results
and felt its recommendations should be backed by the force of law.26 9 The main problem,
AFDOUS officials believed, was that perhaps less than one in ten truck trailers for frozen food
,was capable of maintaining o°F over long hauls.27 Various states began passing laws based on
the AFDOUS code, the first being Florida in 1959, followed by Massachusetts in 1961, then
Illinois, Connecticut, and Georgia by 1964.271 As states began calling the bluff of packers
advertising the high quality of their premium products yet often utilizing inadequate
t:ransportation equipment, the National Association of Frozen Food Packers sought to forestall
increasing state regulation by implementing a "voluntary" code of frozen food handling based on
upgraded distribution equipment.272
Once again the frozen food industry enlisted the help of the USDA's transportation
engineers to develop standards for improved reefers. With funding provided by the National
Association of Frozen Food Packers and the Truck-Trailer Manufacturing Association, the
UISDA's Agricultural Marketing Service undertook a set of projects to evaluate trailers capable of
268 Hillery, "Sales of Frozen Food Speed Up," 13.
269 M. J. Copley, "AFDOUS Meeting," Western Utilization Research and Development Division Notes from the
Director, Jun. 17, 1960, Records of the Western Regional Research Center, Box 22.
27'0 Hillery, "Sales of Frozen Food Speed Up," 13; "Revised Frozen Food Handling Code Adopted by Food & Drug
Officials," QFF (Jul. 1961): 111-3.
271 H. P. Schmitt (Research Director, National Association of Frozen Food Packers), "Status of the AFDOUS Zero
Degree Code," Refrigerated Transporter (Aug. 1964): 11.
272! "All-Industry Voluntary FF Handling Code," QFF (Jun. 1961): 50-2, 161-2.
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maintaining o°F over long hauls.273 The most promising trailer technology was the "cold-wall
trailer," developed in 1961 by the Utility Trailer Manufacturing Company and Thermo King.
Unlike standard reefers, the cold-wall trailer provided a "blanket of cold air" between the
trailer's inner aluminum walls and its insulated outer walls. This blanket of cold air circulated
around the entire load of frozen food, allowing reefers to achieve lower temperatures without
greatly increasing the size or capacity of the refrigeration equipment.274 As in earlier tests on
reefer trailers, the USDA ran various cold-wall trailer configurations through road tests, carrying
for instance a load of frozen french fries from Idaho to Cincinnati, Ohio, in go-degree outside
weather. In comparison to a traditional reefer carrying the same load, the cold-wall trailer
successfully maintained a temperature several degrees below o0 F while the standard reefer
reached temperatures as high as 8°F.2 75 Importantly, the Agricultural Marketing Service
justified these tests, not as being in direct service to an industry seeking to increase its profits,
but as a method to "improve the marketing of farm products and to hold down its costs."276 But
in reality, the tests were performed in close cooperation with Ore-Ida (a major processor of
frozen french fries), Utility Trailer, and Thermo-King-with the latter two especially
uninterested in holding down the cost of refrigeration equipment.27
The frozen food industry used the USDA's work on reefers to insist that trucking
companies immediately upgrade their equipment. Many truckers resisted, however,
understanding that cold-wall trailers or other trailers capable of meeting the stringent
requirements of the TT and AFDOUS codes would be expensive, requiring not only new
equipment but also driver retraining. Perhaps most frightening was the prospect of increased
damage claims, since shippers armed with TIT data could demand that truckers pay for loads
that arrived at the warehouse above o°F. In 1958 M. J. Copley informed his colleagues at the
273 "Wanted: Zero Degree Frozen Food Transports," Trailer/Body Builders (Dec. 1959): 6; "New 'Cold-Wall' Reefer
Eliminates Need for Normal Air Circulation in Transit," QFF (Sep. 1962): 139.
274 David Warren Kuenzli, The Cold-Wall Trailer Maintaining Frozen Food below Zero (Washington, DC: USDA,
Agricultural Marketing Service, 1962), 2.
275 Ibid., 7-13.
276 Ibid., ii.
277 Thermo King, for instance, began installing diesel engines in its reefer units in 1961. Although a diesel engine was
cheaper to operate than a gasoline engine, the initial sticker price was significantly higher since only Mercedes-Benz
made a diesel engine lightweight enough to be used in reefers. Earl Melby (Chief Test Engineer, Thermo King), "New
Developments by Thermo King," Presentation at Transportation of Perishables Conference, University of California,
Mar. 28, 1961, RG 136, Entry 42, Box 4, Folder 28.
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WRRL that the I'TT study had gained widespread currency among frozen food packers and
distributors, who were using it as leverage to demand that truckers record temperature
variations during shipment, a request that "many of the carriers have bitterly protested."278
Sympathizing with frozen food packers and shippers-and hoping to have their decade's worth
of research fully implemented-Copley's team at the WRRL initiated a project in 1958 to force
truckers to conform to the TT standards. The solution was a tiny piece of monitoring
technology called a "time-temperature indicator," developed in cooperation with the
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company. Essentially a thermometer capable of recording
temperature fluctuations over time, the device housed dissimilar metals at each end of a
cigarette-sized plastic tube. The dissimilar metals were connected by a copper strip which
c reated electrochemical reactions in response to temperature changes; these responses were
then transmitted to a pH-sensitive paper which recorded a shipment's temperature history as a
clearly visible color gradient.279 By 1963 Minneapolis-Honeywell had successfully
commercialized the device, allowing frozen food packers to gain an unprecedented degree of
control over the conditions under which their products moved through the distribution
system..280 By 1968, such efforts to tame the flexibility of frozen food distribution were declared
successful by the author of a textbook on the subject, who noted that the issues raised by the
1TT studies and AFDOUS codes were no longer a "major problem."28 1
By the mid-196os, then, the USDA's work on frozen food transportation equipment,
along with the AFDOUS codes and the frozen food industry's new interest in marketing
premium products, brought a marked increase in the expense of distribution. This became
especially apparent in the reefer trucking industry, as the rapid increase in capital needed to
purchase the new reefer trailers began driving small trucking firms out of business. In 1964 and
1965, the largest reefer trucking firms expanded their fleets by an average of 14 new trailers
278 M. J. Copley, "TIT Publicity Bearing Fruit," Western Utilization Research Branch Notes from the Director, Sep.
26, 1958, Records of the Western Regional Research Center, Box 22. See also "Wanted: Zero Degree Frozen
Transports," 6.
279 M. J. Copley, "Time-Temperature Indicator for Frozen Foods," Western Utilization Research and Development
Division Notes from the Director, Sep. 22, 1961, Records of the Western Regional Research Center, Box 22.
280 Fred Stitt, "Frozen Food Packers Becoming Quality Conscious," Western Utilization Research and Development
Division Notes from the Director, Mar. 15, 1963, Records of the Western Regional Research Center, Box 22.
281 Kaylin, Understanding Today's Food Warehouse, 158.
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capable of holding frozen food at o°F. Smaller firms and owner-operator truckers were left with
the choice of either investing huge amounts of capital to compete, or simply giving up and hiring
themselves and their tractors out to the bigger fleets.282 In the late 1940os and early 1950s,
packers had relied on flexible distribution technologies to bring the price of frozen food within
the reach of "the masses," but by the mid-196os those distribution technologies were the
centerpiece of an industry-wide effort to raise the price of convenience. Ironically, the USDA's
engineering work on the distribution system helped make this happen, even though the original
reason for the USDA's involvement had been the political conveniences of a low-cost mass
market.
Conclusion
In 1964 Birds Eye hired the McKinsey management consulting company to evaluate the
success of its new marketing strategy. Surveying the entire system of production and
distribution, McKinsey found that in comparison to other foods, frozen food had become
remarkably expensive to handle, store, and distribute. The expense of distribution, however,
could be offset by selling high-end convenience products at high margins while allowing
supermarkets to push "B grade" staples under their own labels at lower margins.28 3 The
McKinsey study vindicated the segmented marketing approach, but it also unintentionally
exposed an essential irony in the progression of the frozen food industry. Born amidst hopes of
revolutionizing the American diet by providing quality and convenience to "the masses," the
industry rather quickly gave up such hopes almost immediately after achieving the goal in the
mid-195os. The industry's successes in the 1950s convinced the USDA to help refine the
technologies that made such mass distribution possible, with frozen food promising not only
revolutionized diets but also rationalized agricultural marketing; yet, by putting those
technological refinements into place the frozen food industry conformed more closely to
patterns of profit-oriented corporate capitalism than to a political economy based on
282 H. P. Schmitt, "Status of the AFDOUS Zero Degree Code," Refrigerated Transporter (Aug. 1964): 11; "Fewer
Trucklines Gain Greater Share of Zero Temperature Transportation," QFF (Feb. 1965): 319-22.
283 McKinsey and Company, McKinsey-Birds Eye Study: The Economics of Frozen Foods (White Plains, NY: General
Foods Corporation, 1964).
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harmonious relations between farmers, processors, consumers, and the state. The flexibility of
trucking, which had helped frozen food packers shift from luxury to mass marketing, later aided
packers in their efforts to combine economic centralization, geographical decentralization, and
segmented markets to maximize profits. Reefer trucking thus proved flexible, indeed-not only
in geographical and technological terms, but also as a function of political economy.
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Chapter 5: The Truck Driving Man in the Rural Industrial
Landscape
"The combination of truck drivers and Country music is a 'natural' as most
everyone knows," declared music reporter Virginia Alderman in 1975, noting that truck
drivers were "some of the best fans country music has."l By the time of that statement,
country music artists and producers had recorded a catalog of several hundred popular
songs about truckers, seeking to profit from the fact that trucking had become "country"
by lauding the "truck driving man" as a new kind of rural working-class hero. Trucks
were deeply embedded in the political and economic structures of the postwar
countryside, as earlier chapters have argued. But trucks carried more than agricultural
commodities and processed food products. They also carried a set of distinctly rural
values, providing opportunities for men who wished to maintain a rural lifestyle and
culture as they navigated the structures of late industrial capitalism. Trucking was a
manly occupation, and the manly culture that enveloped it provided a vehicle for rural
men to imagine themselves as independent small producers, at a time when farming-
traditionally the means of cultivating that sense of independence-declined in
importance as the defining feature of rural life. Encouraged by popular culture
representations that declared truckers "kings of the open road" and the "last of the
American cowboys," truckers embraced a culture that became increasingly fierce in its
individualism from the 1930S to the late 1970s. In so doing, truckers helped push the
social world of the postwar countryside away from any affinity for collective social values
or appreciation (however reluctant) for state intervention in the rural economy, and
towards a vigorous form of producerist populism that was anti-statist, anti-corporate,
and anti-labor union.
'Virginia Alderman, "Truckers Jamboree," Country Song Roundup, May 1975, Dick Curless File, Country
Music Hall of Fame Library, Nashville, TN (hereafter CMHF Library).
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The Rural Industrial Landscape
This dissertation has left one question tantalizingly unanswered to this point.
How did truck drivers, the men behind the wheels of the marketing machine, come to be
enrolled in that machinery? Capitalism must produce not only goods and values, but also
must reproduce itself as a system; in doing so, it requires either the cooperation or the
co-optation not only of the state, but also of workers.2 In the case of the postwar
marketing machine, we have seen how the state was enrolled to produce and reproduce
capitalist values in the context of a super-industrialized consumer-oriented food
economy. But how were truck drivers convinced to participate in that new economy?
The answer is that long-haul trucking created the conditions for rural men to
preserve a meaningful sense of rural identity even while being enmeshed in the tentacles
of urban-industrial capitalism. The arrival of long-haul trucking as a significant
technological force came at a key moment in rural America's history, as industrialized
agriculture made the practice of farming increasingly peripheral to the daily economic
and social lives of most rural people. The story of the "death of the family farm" is
familiar, if misleading; for while the size and scale of the average farming operation
increased dramatically in the mid-twentieth century, the social impact had less to do
with the disappearance of the family-owned farm than with the rapid decline of the
number of people who made their living directly from the land.3 Over the long twentieth
2 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1906 [1867]),
Chapter 23; Donald J. Harris, "On Marx's Scheme of Reproduction and Accumulation," Journal of Political
Economy 80 (May 1972): 505-22; David Harvey, The Condition of Postrnodernity: An Enquiry into the
Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 121-4.
3 The number of farms in the United States decreased by 62% between 1930 and 1980 (from 6,545,600 to
2,439,510); while the average farm size increased from approximately 15o acres in 1930 to 425 acres in 1980,
with the average farm size doubling between 1950 and 1980. Nonetheless, the "family farm" has not
disappeared; the vast majority of American farms continue to be owned by individuals rather than
corporations (in 1997, for instance, 86% of farms were operated by an individual or family proprietor) and
are relatively small in size (at least by U.S. standards). More importantly, the percentage of the U.S.
population living on farms declined from 24% in 1930 to only 2.5% in 1980, while the overall rural
population only declined from 44% to 26% of the total population in that period. The percentage of the labor
force "engaged in agriculture," according to the Census, declined from 21% in 1930 to less than 3% in 1980.
Even for those who continued to stay on the farm, income derived from off-farm work became increasingly
important, particularly in the postwar period; 38 percent of farm operators worked off the farm at least some
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century, and with especially rapidity following the end of World War II, a set of
wrenching economic and social changes redefined rural life in America, creating what we
might call a "rural industrial landscape."
More commonly referred to as the industrialization of agriculture or the "death of
the family farm," what happened to rural American life during this period was more
widespread and pervasive than these phrases allow. Most historians writing about
industrial agriculture emphasize the increased scale and commodity orientation of
farming; the intensive mechanization of planting and harvesting; the application of
scientific methods to plant breeding, livestock raising, crop fertilization, and pest and
weed control; and the development of wage-labor relations as the keys to agricultural
industrialization. Depending on which factor is taken to be the central feature of
industrial agriculture, historians have pointed to a multitude of locations and time
periods as the origins of this system. Most commonly noted are the "bonanza" wheat
farms of California's San Joaquin Valley in the 187os and 188os, where spreads as large
as entire counties were owned by speculative capitalists deploying giant machines to
extract profits out of the land at an industrial pace.4 Other agricultural historians, noting
the short-lived existence of the bonanza farms, take the wheat farms of the Great Plains
in the post-World War I period to be more representative of a widespread industrial
ideal in agriculture, characterized by a systematic, capital- and technology-intensive,
state-supported effort to make farmers into efficient businessmen, raising food solely for
sale to distant markets with minimal concern for local ecological conditions.5 Still others
have interpreted industrialization primarily as a social rather than economic shift, as the
days in 1949, and by 1978 that was the case for 64 percent. "Rural" thus did not correlate with "agriculture"
by 1980. For data, see U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States.
4 Carey McWilliams, Factories in the Field: The Story of Migratory Farm Labor in California (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1939), 48-65; Steven Stoll, The Fruits of NaturalAdvantage: Making the
Industrial Countryside in California (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 25-31;
5 Deborah K. Fitzgerald, Every Farm a Factory: The Industrial Ideal in American Agriculture (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2003), esp. 106-56; Donald Worster, Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); David B. Danbom, The Resisted Revolution: Urban America and
the Industrialization ofAgriculture, 1900-1930 (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1979). Pete Daniel,
while agreeing with this model of industrial agriculture, has shown that its development in specific Southern
ecological and social contexts did not fully arrive until federal government policies forced the issue; see
Breaking the Land: The Transformation of Cotton, Tobacco, and Rice Cultures since 1880 (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1985).
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family farm model was supplanted by a gendered division of labor in which women were
consigned to "reproductive" rather than "productive" roles on the farm, even as white
male farm owners came to rely increasingly on racialized wage labor, while community-
based social bonds eroded in the countryside.6
But however one defines industrial agriculture, it is clear that by the mid-
twentieth century, the life of most rural Americans came to be defined less by productive
relations to the land than by the demands of agribusiness corporations, the federal
government, and distant consumers. One consequence of this shift was the erosion of the
political and cultural sway of the "agrarian myth," a widespread conviction held since the
colonial era that men (and they were always men) who worked the soil were the
"backbone" of American participatory democracy and the anointed repositories of moral
virtue.7 In the mid-twentieth century, however, the cultural power of the agrarian myth
faded dramatically, as the industrialization of agriculture brought an unprecedented
centralization of economic power into the production of foodstuffs, making even family
farming so highly capitalized and commodity-oriented that the agrarian myth's ever-
6 Deborah Fink, Agrarian Women: Wives and Mothers in Rural Nebraska, 1880-1940 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Joan Jensen, With These Hands: Women Working on the Land
(Old Westbury, NY: Feminist Press, 1983); Mary Neth, Preserving the Family Farm: Women, Community,
and the Foundations ofAgribusiness in the Midwest, 1900-1940 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1995); Jane Adams, The Transformation of Rural Life: Southern Illinois, 1890-1990 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Cletus E. Daniel, Bitter Harvest: A History of California
Farmworkers, 1870-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981); Sucheng Chan, This Bittersweet Soil: The
Chinese in California Agriculture, 1860-1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Neil Foley,
The White Scourge: Mexicans, Blacks, and Poor Whites in Texas Cotton Culture (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1997); Cindy Hahamovitch, The Fruits of Their Labor: Atlantic Coast Farmworkers and
the Making of Migrant Poverty, 1870-1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Walter
G. Goldschmidt, As You Sow: Three Studies in the Social Consequences ofAgribusiness (Montclair:
Allanheld, Osmun, 1978 (1947)); John L. Shover, First Majority, Last Minority: The Transforming of Rural
Life in America (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1976); Hal S. Barron, Mixed Harvest: The
Second Great Transformation in the Rural North, 1870-1930 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1997).
7 The literature on the agrarian myth is extensive. Key texts include Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform:
From Bryan to F. D. R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955); Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden:
Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000 [1964]),
esp. 97-100, 125-8; Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), esp. 123-32; Tamara Plakins Thornton, Cultivating Gentlemen: The
Meaning of Country Life among the Boston Elite, 1785-1860 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). The
use of the word "men" is quite intentional; as Deborah Fink and Joan Jensen (among others) have shown,
the agrarian myth was strictly gendered from its inception. See Fink, Agrarian Women; Jensen, With These
Hands; also Jon Gjerde, The Minds of the West: Patterns of Ethnocultural Evolution in the Rural Middle
West, 1830-1917 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), esp. Chapter 6; Sonya Salamon,
Prairie Patrimony: Family, Farming, and Community in the Midwest (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1992).
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tenuous connection to rural reality became farcical.8 Furthermore, as farms consolidated
and rural people increasingly migrated to cities in the twentieth century, the population
base of rural America collapsed, bringing down with it the power of the agrarian myth to
dominate the nation's political arrangements. This became most apparent in the "one-
man, one-vote" decisions of the Supreme Court in 1964, which tied Congressional
representation and electoral votes to population rather than geography, breaking
centuries' worth of rural dominance in the nation's legislative domain.9
The agrarian myth, as promulgated by Thomas Jefferson and St. John de
Crevecoeur, became utterly divorced from rural reality in postwar America, as the
demands of urban industrialism penetrated deep into the countryside. Agrarianism,
whether understood as economic reality or cultural myth, came to be replaced by a rural
industrial landscape where not only farming became industrialized, but non-agricultural
manufacturing became increasingly central to the rural experience.'0 Whereas rural life
had once been clearly defined by a combination of an agriculturally based economy and
sparse population, by the mid-twentieth century rural people were forced to confront the
challenges of maintaining a rural sense of identity in the most modern of times.
"Ruralness" in the postwar period came to be defined by a sense of living in places that
were on the periphery of, yet deeply intertwined with, urban industrial capitalism. Even
as rural people recognized that those peripheral places were exploited and shaped by
distant centers of power, they came increasingly to search for personal and collective
8 Gilbert C. Fite,.American Farmers: The New Minority (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981).
9 The Supreme Court cases were Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964). See Michael L. Balinski and H. Peyton Young, Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man,
One Vote (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Gordon E. Baker, Rural versus Urban Political Power:
The Nature and Consequences of Unbalanced Representation (New York: Random House, 1955); Elizabeth
Sanders, Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 1877-1917 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1999); John Mark Hansen, Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
10 On rural industrialization by non-agricultural firms, see Michelle Hoyman, Power Steering: Global
Automakers and the Transformation of Rural Communities (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997);
Melissa Walker, All We Knew Was to Farm: Rural Women in the Upcountry South, 1919-1941 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).
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identities that would help them establish secure psychological moorings, allowing them
to take pride in their outsider status."
From the 1930S through the late 1970s, the culture of long-haul trucking
emerged within this context to represent a reinvigorated form of the agrarian myth, an
agro-industrial myth, that corresponded more closely to the new social and economic
realities of America's rural industrial landscape. At the heart of the old agrarian myth
was a faith, not necessarily based in reality, that working the land could provide a man
with the ability to control his own destiny. Independence and hard but self-directed
work, as opposed to urban wage labor, defined the core of rural manliness. As the
economic basis of this ideal eroded in the twentieth century, rural men were forced to
look elsewhere for a chance to cultivate their masculinity, and the arrival of long-haul
trucking proved fortuitous in this search. Truck driving provided men with meaningful
work opportunities that allowed them to imagine themselves as bearers of traditional
rural values of manhood in an industrial context. Encouraged by country music, films,
and television representations of trucking culture, men came to believe that trucking
provided a sense of economic independence akin to that previously imagined for
farming; a sense of geographic and sexual mobility even as they maintained traditional
family values; a chance to publicly demonstrate mechanical skill and power; and an
arena in which to work out anti-authority and anti-establishment sentiments-all values
that had long been central to masculine identity in rural America.l2
As we shall see, this new agro-industrial myth was not necessarily more realistic
nor more admirable than the agrarian myth that it replaced. In particular, the idea that
driving a truck provided a route to economic independence was always as much a dream
1 W. Keith Warner, "Rural Society in a Post-Industrial Age," Rural Sociology 39:3 (1974): 309; Harvey,
Condition of Postmodernity, 286-7, 292, 302.
12 This statement should not be taken to mean that masculinity is an unchanging construct, in either rural
culture or in American culture more broadly. Instead, this chapter will trace how the technology of long-haul
trucking helped rural men define and redefine their ideals of masculinity in specific economic and work
contexts. This approach owes much to E. Anthony Rotundo, American Manhood: Transformations in
Masculinity from the Revolution to the Modern Era (New York: Basic Books, 1993); Ruth Oldenziel, Making
Technology Masculine: Men, Women, and Modern Machines in America, 1870-1945 (Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 1999); Roger Horowitz, ed., Boys and Their Toys? Masculinity, Technology,
and Class in America (New York: Routledge, 2001).
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as a reality. Furthermore, like the old agrarian myth, the benefits of being a "truck
driving man"' were reserved almost solely for white men, at least until the late 196os.
Finally, the agro-industrial myth surrounding long-haul trucking never proved a
successful means for organizing a political movement to contest the exploitative aspects
of the rural industrial landscape. The emergence of the truck driver as the "last American
cowboy" in the 1970s defined rural manhood as a matter of fierce independence rather
than social belonging, helping contribute to the increasingly chaotic nature of life in the
postwar rural industrial landscape.
Getting off the Farm, But Staying Country
The rapid growth of long-haul trucking in the 1930s came at a time when
thousands of young rural men were forced to look for off-farm work. Faced with both a
decade-long--and deepening-agricultural depression, as well as an increasingly
industrialized agriculture requiring fewer farm workers, many young men had to make
an uncomfortable choice. Staying on the farm most likely would entail years of debt and
uncertain prospects. Moving to the city to take a factory job might provide economic
security, but it might also entail a painful separation from one's rural roots, particularly
if those roots were Southern and the factory city was Northern.l3 For many rural men in
the 1930s, trucking offered a chance to remain in the country while, at least theoretically,
becoming the owners of their own small businesses rather than factory "hands" deprived
of their independence. This helps explain why, by the 1970s, sociologists found that up to
70 percent of truck drivers, especially "independent" owner-operators who drove their
own trucks, were either one-time farm boys or otherwise had their roots deep in the
country. 14
13 Chad Berry, Southern Migrants, Northern Exiles (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000).
14 Jason Landsback, "Inception and Growth of an Anti-Teamster Movement among the Independent Steel
Haulers" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1971), cited in D. Daryl Wyckoff and David
H. Maister, The Owner-Operator: Independent Trucker (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1975), 65.
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Farm boys were common recruits for the growing trucking industry in the 1930s.
In one of the first comprehensive government surveys of the industry, the Federal
Coordinator of Transportation noted in 1936 that intercity truck drivers were mostly
"farm boys and young men from country villages" who were willing to work
unconscionably long hours at low pay just to be working at all.15 The work ethic of farm
boys proved especially attractive over the years to firms looking for employees
"accustomed to hard work" who also had intimate familiarity with operating and
maintaining heavy mechanical equipment.'6 But their work ethic was not the only reason
many farm boys became truckers; during the Great Depression, a set of interrelated
economic factors made the occupation very appealing. As Secretary of Agriculture Henry
A. Wallace noted in testimony before the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1934, the
price of gasoline and tires dropped dramatically in the early '30s, making shipment of
farm products by truck cheaper for than by rail for farmers located near good roads.
Furthermore, trucking, unlike farming, as "a business comparatively easy to enter,"
attracted both unemployed rural men and farmers who, "faced with lower returns from
production, have been willing to spend more of their time in marketing their products."'7
Trucking's growth in the 1930S was further encouraged by a dramatic expansion in truck
production, with truck manufacturers seeing farmers as a key market to be lured by
generous credit terms. Farmers bought 26 percent of the nation's total truck production
in 1936, contributing to a record-breaking year of sales for the truck manufacturers.
General Motors, for instance, saw a sales gain of 156 percent between 1935 and 1936,
while Mack gained 118 percent.l8 These factors combined with the agricultural
depression under way in the 1930S to make truck driving a viable option for getting off
the farm.
15 Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Hours, Wages, and Working Conditions in the Intercity Motor
Transport Industries (Washington: GPO, 1936), 57.
16 Fred De Armond, "Selecting and Keeping Good Routemen," Milk Dealer (Jun. 1960): 50.
17 Henry A. Wallace, "High Freight Rates as a Retarding Factor in Agricultural and Industrial Recovery,"
statement at hearings before the Interstate Commerce Commission on Increase in Freight Rates and
Charges, Docket Ex Parte 115, Dec. 7, 1934, Secretary of Agriculture Records, RG 16, General
Correspondence, Entry 17, National Archives II, College Park, MD, Box 2001, Folder 7.
i8 "Trucks Are Going over the Top," Business Week (hereafter BW), Sep. 12, 1936, 13-14.
318
One of the most attractive features of trucking for rural men in this period was
the apparent ease of becoming an independent businessman, since farm ownership and
profitability had come into serious question. The biographies of dozens of men who
became truck drivers in the 1930s illustrate this. R. E. "Blick" Blickenstaff, for example,
founded Ideal Truck Lines of Norton, Kansas in August 1933, after a summer of drought
left him with such stunted corn that he decided to "[leave] the tractor at the end of a row
of that corn and hea[d] for town," Blickenstaff later recalled. "I could see the need for a
truck and since it looked like the thing to do at the time, I started in this trucking
business. I always planned to go back to the farm if things got better, or after it rained. It
didn't rain to any extent for seven years, and by that time I had a nice business going."l9
Bill Graves of Salinas, Kansas, was another typical farm boy who began hauling grain,
livestock, and fertilizer with his father in a one-ton truck in 1935. Eventually, like
Blickenstaff, he got a nice business going, building Graves Truck Service into Kansas's
first farm-to-market Class I interstate carrier (meaning the firm grossed over $1oo,ooo
annually) by 1949.20 Stories abound of farm boys turning one prewar truck into a giant
postwar trucking empire. J. B. Hunt, whose name is familiar to anyone who has been on
an interstate recently, was born to Arkansas sharecroppers but escaped the farm by
hauling rice in the 1940s.2 ' Arno Dalby, who founded T.I.M.E. Freight, Inc.-one of the
nation's largest trucking firms by the 196os-started with a $200 loan from his farmer
father in 1927, buying a used Ford Model T truck to haul cotton for a Texas ginning
mill.22 Paul Merrill was raised on a farm in Cumberland County, Maine; he bought his
first truck, a used 1922 four-cylinder Reo, in 1929; by 1975 his Merrill Transport
Company had become the largest trucking firm in Maine, with $9 million in gross
19 Dick Boyd, "'Blick's' Ideal Truck Lines Has Come Long Way Since 'Dirty 30s'," Norton (Kansas) Daily
Telegraph, May 31, 1978, Motor Carrier Industry Clippings, Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, KS.
20 "Bill Graves Heads Kansas Truckers," Power Wagon (Feb. 1947): 28; "Bill Graves Began with One Truck,"
Kansas Transporter (Jan. 1947): 3, 14; "Four Brothers Get First State Class I Award," Wichita Eagle, Sep. 3,
1950.21 Marvin Schwartz, J. B. Hunt: The Long Haul to Success (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1992).
22 Kenneth Rhodes, "Arno Dalby Is Living Proof That Any Goal Is Possible If You Work for It," Lubbock
Avalanche-Journal, Feb. 28, 1961, Loyd M. Lanotte Papers, Texas Tech University, Southwest Collection,
Lubbock, TX (hereafter Lanotte Papers), Reel 1.
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sales.23 Not every farmer used trucking to get off the farm; some used the cash earned
from driving to keep the farm afloat. Joe Robinson, of Springdale, Arkansas, started
raising poultry in 1932 and began driving a "cackle crate" in 1938, delivering his chickens
to the nearby Tyson Foods plant. By 1958, the poultry trucking business had grown so
profitable that Robinson owned 33 tractor-trailers, hauling not only his own chickens
but those of all his neighbors as well as much of Tyson's dressed poultry, making it
possible for Robinson to invest his trucking earnings into his chicken farm.2 4
But for each driver who became a big businessman and therefore had his name
recorded in the trade literature, there were thousands of anonymous drivers who
struggled to become economically independent in the 1930os and 1940s. Trucks in this
period were primarily small "straight trucks" (without trailers), making the capital costs
of entering the trucking industry relatively low, especially with truck manufacturers and
dealers extending seemingly generous credit terms. Many of the men who were able to
scrap together enough money to put a downpayment on a truck in this period were
simply desperate for work and had little business experience-being unfamiliar with, for
instance, the concept of depreciation. "Such men were not really entrepreneurs," noted
economist Samuel E. Hill in a 1942 report on work conditions in New England trucking.
"They were, in essence, workers who had hired tools with which to manufacture and sell
the product of their own labor."2 5 Although they did not fit the economists' definition of
"entrepreneur," the men who purchased beat-up Fords, Reos, and Dodges in the 1930S
established a long-lived idea central to trucking culture-the belief that with enough hard
work, it was possible to gain economic security as an independent small business owner.
As one self-employed truck driver told Studs Terkel in the early 1970s, the "only reward"
from his work was that "in your mind, you feel you're in business."26
23 Paul Merrill, Forty-Six Years a Truckman: The Story of Merrill Transport Company (New York:
Newcomen Society, 1975), 8-9.
24 House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Interstate Commerce Act: Agricultural
Exemptions, Hearings, 85th Cong., 2d sess., Apr. 23-25, 1958, 255.
25 Samuel E. Hill, Teamsters and Transportation: Employee-Employer Relationships in New England
(Washington, DC: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), xii.
26 Studs Terkel, Working: People Talk about What They Do All Day and How They Feel about What They
Do (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), 211.
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The irresistible but difficult dream of being in business for oneself provided the
central dramatic theme of the first major trucking film, They Drive by Night, released by
Warner Brothers in 1940. Joe and Paul Fabrini, played by George Raft and Humphrey
Bogart, are two "wildcat" truckers seeking a living hauling produce in California's
Imperial Valley. Driving a straight truck ("no speedway special") purchased on credit, the
Fabrinis struggle to find enough loads to keep the finance company from repossessing
their machine. The prospects are grim; the brothers rely on a San Francisco produce
broker to send paying loads their way, but the cigar-smoking fat-cat broker is in cahoots
with the finance company, and seems as dedicated to having the Fabrinis lose their truck
as he is to having them deliver his produce. But for Joe, the chance to be his own man is
the fuel that keeps him going; when confronted by another driver who works for a
trucking company and brags of receiving a steady paycheck "every Saturday," Joe retorts,
"Yeah, but you get ordered around every other day." The company driver questions Joe's
independence, pointing out that "you ain't workin' for you, you're workin' for the finance
company." But Joe will have none of it; he is sure that with enough hard work he can
turn the tables on the capitalists: "I'm on my own, anyway. You know if a guy can get
together two or three big rigs there's a fortune in this business." Wildcat trucking is a
gamble, as Joe fully realizes, putting his financial future at great risk, but the
psychological dividends of self-assured manhood make the risk worth taking.27
They Drive by Night quickly became a popular and critical success (and,
incidentally, launched Humphrey Bogart's career), reinforcing an idea that took firm
root as a centerpiece of American trucking culture. Even when truckers realized that
relatively few made "a fortune in this business," the feeling of owning a stake in one's
financial future drove many a trucker into the work. When a Christian Science Monitor
reporter asked Burly Lockwood in 1947 why men like him became truckers, the answer
came readily, if in a "slow Iowa drawl": "We're our own bosses; most of us own our own
businesses. There's a lot of responsibility, but it's all our own-nobody else's."28 Or as H.
27 They Drive by Night, dir. Raoul Walsh, 97 min., Warner Bros., 1940, digital video disc.
28 Thorp McClusky, "Truck Drivers Are Human, Too," Christian Science Monitor Magazine, Aug. 9, 1947, 13.
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A. Strayer of Greeley, Colorado, put it two decades later: "What do I like most about
trucking? Independence, I suppose. I've been in trucking 28 years for myself and it's
made a good living for my family, wife, and son. I like it fine."2 9 Economic self-
sufficiency was central to masculine ideals in places like Iowa, Colorado, or the Imperial
Valley, where farming had previously been the most common means of being a small
businessman.
But like the old agrarian myth, the dream of economic independence in trucking
was based only tenuously in reality. Even for drivers who owned their own rigs (owner-
operators), the appropriate occupational analogy was less likely the yeoman farmer than
the sharecropper. After interviewing a group of long-haul truckers in Livingston,
Alabama, in 1953, Alfred Maund wrote in the Nation magazine that the typical owner-
operator "is apparently no better off than a share-cropper, being held in similar peonage
by his employer." In order to purchase a truck and trailer, truckers often relied on
installment loans provided by the trucking firm to whom they contracted their labor-
loans which were generally provided with the interest charged up front. In return,
owner-operators received ICC operating authority under the license of the trucking
company, as well as a specified share of the revenue received for each load. The typical
contract, however, did not guarantee a minimum number of loads or revenue for the
driver. During slow business periods, it was all too easy for an owner-operator to miss a
payment on his loan, sending "his" truck and trailer directly to the firm.30 And even if a
trucker had paid in full for his equipment, he still generally relied on a trucking firm with
ICC operating authority to provide legal loads, prompting William J. Hill, an owner-
operator who agitated for deregulation during the 1970s independent trucker strikes (see
below), to state: "As things stand now, we're nothing but sharecroppers."31 The pages of
Overdrive magazine (the "Voice of the American Trucker") regularly displayed a similar
frustration with the unrealized promise of economic independence. Hank Miller, for
instance, wrote a lengthy letter to the editor expressing a common sentiment: "Didn't
29 "A Man's on His Own on the Highway," Open Road and the Professional Driver, Jun. 1967, 5.
30 Alfred Maund, "Peons on Wheels: The Long-Haul Trucker," Nation, Nov. 14, 1953, 393-4.
31 Axel Madsen, Open Road: Truckin' on the Biting Edge (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, 1982), 134.
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most of us as children dream of going into the trucking business when we grew up? And
if we worked hard, maybe own a fleet of trucks.... Like all the Horatio Alger stories all
you had to do was work hard and have a little luck to achieve success. What a grand
illusion!"32 )r as Otto Riemer, an owner-operator from Wisconsin who spent dozens of
years hauling produce and dairy products, summed up his life's work: "This practice,
which amounts to selling out your body to haul someone else's dirty freight, is why some
drivers look like old men early in life."33
Such sentiments pointed to a core tension in American trucking culture. While
the goals of ownership and self-sufficiency had always been important motivating
factors, the social and economic reality of trucking made it an inherently working-class
occupation. For one thing, as the Bureau of Labor Statistics pointed out in its 1959 guide
to careers, "Promotional opportunities in [truck driving] are limited," no matter whether
drivers owned their trucks or worked for wages.34 Even more important than the low
chance for a truck driver to become a manager or true entrepreneur, however, the work
culture of trucking cultivated a deep sense of opposition to, and separation from,
bourgeois society. Working-class manhood, particularly in a rural context, has
traditionally been defined less by whether or not one owns the means of production than
by an ethos shaped by economic uncertainty and the pride of overcoming that
uncertainty on one's own terms.35 In this regard, Paul Willis's classic study of how
English schoolboys "learned" how to become working-class men is informative. Willis
saw working-class male identities being forged in the industrial shops of
"Hammertown," where "despite harsh conditions and external direction, people do look
for meaning and impose frameworks.... Paradoxically, they thread through the dead
experience of work a living culture which is far from a simple reflex of defeat."36 Rather
32 Hank Miller to the Editor, Overdrive (Jan. 1963).
33 Otto Riemer, Hammer Down (Winona, MN: Apollo Books, 1985).
34 Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Over-the-Road Truckdrivers," Occupational Outlook Handbook 1255, 4th Ed.
(1959): 419.
35 Jack Temple Kirby, Poquosin: A Study of Rural Landscape and Society (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1995); Kathryn J. Oberdeck, "Review of Workin'Man Blues and Don't GetAbove Your
Raisin'," Labor History 44:4 (2003): 528-31.
36 Paul E. Willis, Learning to Labor: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1981), 52.
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than becoming alienated from the value of their labor because they did not own the
factories where they worked, Willis's industrial workers created a defiant work culture,
particularly in their informal social relations with each other, "where strategies for
wresting control of symbolic and real space from official authority" were "generated and
disseminated."37 The key difference between a worker and a manager in Hammertown
was thus a matter of the degree to which one either resisted or accommodated the
demands of authority figures. A real working man, as boys learned from their earliest
days in school, resisted formal authority at every opportunity, even while being expected
to take great pride in working hard to produce profits for those very authorities.
Managers and middle-class workers in general, on the other hand, were
accomodationists who sold their manhood for comfort and security.38 As George Raft's
character, Joe Fabrini, stated in They Drive by Night, working for a guaranteed salary
was "the easy way." A man who wished to be admired for his work did not take the easy
way.
These statements should not be taken as a reification of working-class culture,
but only to note that truck driving provided a specific context for men to create a
meaningful work culture. That culture changed over time, as we shall see in more detail
below, especially as truck driving men came to be more fully integrated into the growing
marketing machinery of modern industry. The masculine ideal portrayed by George Raft
in They Drive by Night, even if it was rooted in an oppositional ethos, nonetheless made
respectability in the eyes of the bourgeois world a valid goal. Joe Fabrini was willing to
use his fists in defense of his perceived rights, but he did right by women, refused to
drink alcohol, and avoided unnecessary violence. Joe Fabrini was a man to be admired-
as indicated by Raft's eagerness to take the part to shed his reputation as a "heavy" in
gangster films such as Scarface.39 The image of the respectable trucker in the 1930os and
1940s circulated outside the world of Hollywood, as truckers became known as "Knights
of the Road" for helping stranded motorists and using their blinkers and headlights as
37 Ibid., 54.
38 Olivier Zunz, Making America Corporate, 1870-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 199o).
39 "Divided Highway: The Story of They Drive by Night," companion film to digital video disc.
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courtesy signals.40 Such an image, in direct contrast to the "bandit" or "outlaw" image
that would take root in the 1970s, was further reinforced by the standard driver's
uniform of the era: trim, neat pants and buttoned shirt and a chauffeur's cap (see Figure
5.1). Even as the symbols of manhood changed within the culture of trucking over time,
the mythologies of manhood grew larger and moved increasingly into a wider cultural
world, where those images were then reflected back to truckers by movies, music, and
television. However, the greater currency of the "truck driving man" imagery should not
be taken to imply that truckers necessarily "bought" those ideas wholesale-or that by
buying those ideas they were duped into a sense of false consciousness, preventing them
from understanding the exploitative nature of their work. For as we shall see, truckers
were continually aware that the economic and political machinery that their work
contributed to quite literally "rode on their backs" (one of the most common health
complaints of truck drivers has always been back pain, making the purchase of an air-
ride seat a prerequisite).41
40 McClusky, "Truck Drivers Are Human, Too," 3; "Ickes and the Trucks," Motor Carrier (Dec. 1939): 5.
41 Jerry Jones, "Company Drivers: Are You Breaking Your Back on 'Buckboard' Seats?" Overdrive (Aug.
1966): 46.
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Figure 5.1: A neatly dressed truck driver
A typical depiction of a truck driver in the 1940os showed a
clean-cut, respectable working man wearing neat overalls
and a dapper chauffeur hat. Driver's Manualfor Truck
Owners, Superintendents of Fleets, and Drivers
(Cleveland: White Motor Company, 1944), Warshaw
Collection of Business Americana, Archives Center,
National Museum of American History, Smithsonian
Institution.
Furthermore, truckers themselves have always held rather complex notions of
their own socioeconomic status that do not fit neatly into strict Marxist categories. The
wide range of pay scales in trucking made some drivers downright wealthy, though
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rarely.42 In a 1968 study of 200 long-haul drivers, sociologists found that 3 of the drivers
considered themselves "upper-class," though 128 of the men self-identified as "working-
class," and 64 as "middle-class."43 The unclear socioeconomic position of truck drivers
often engendered serious status anxiety, as illustrated by a 1964 letter to Overdrive from
a woman married to an owner-operator livestock hauler. Upon moving to a middle-class
neighborhood in a small Kansas town, the couple found an unwelcoming community,
"like we were just not good enough to live next to them." This, despite the fact that the
couple easily met the standards of a middle-class lifestyle: "We pay our bills on time, go
to church and live nice too. We just built a new home, we have almost all new furniture,
and it's paid for, and we also have a new car in the garage and that's also paid for."44
Verla Bullard, another wife of an independent trucker, wrote a similar letter after reading
Vance Packard's The Status Seekers, which she noticed did not mention truck drivers.
"This could be because the truck driver actually does not fall into any set category in the
social register," posited Bullard. Though she herself believed truckers belonged in the
"upper middle class," she was well aware that outsiders considered truckers to be deep in
the working-class ranks.45 Such statements serve as a caution that there can be no single
definition of the truck driver, and that any discussions of the working-class culture of
trucking must take into account a wide variety of often contradictory evidence.
One thing can be stated with confidence, however, which is that many of the men
who became truckers in the 1930os and 1940s were rural, and they brought to trucking
culture a distinct sense of rural identity that continued, if in modified form, into the
postwar period. Hard times on the farm drove many men into trucking in the 193os, but
even during the postwar years of high farm prices, many young rural men became
truckers. In Kansas in 1950, for instance, the trucking industry provided the second-
42 Byron Guise, "Men on the Road," Kansas Transporter (Oct. 1972): 12.
43 Edwin G. Flittie and Zane P. Nelson, "The Truck Driver: A Sociological Analysis of an Occupational Role,"
Sociology and Social Research 52:3 (1968): 209. John F. Runcie found a similar pattern in a survey of 150
New Jersey union drivers; although none of his respondents identified as "upper-class," 55% were "working-
class," 5% were "middle-working-class," and 39% were "middle-class." John F. Runcie, "Social Group
Formation in an Occupation: A Case Study of the Truck Driver," (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1971),
226.
44 A Trucker's Wife to the Editor, Overdrive (Oct. 1964): 16.
45 Verla Bullard, "Social Status of the Truck Driver," Overdrive (Feb. 1971): 55-6.
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highest number of jobs in the state, behind only agriculture.46 This was partly due to the
fact, explored in previous chapters, that agriculture became increasingly dependent on
trucking rather than railroads for shipping goods to market. As improved highways made
it possible for those goods to move much farther than before, it also became more
difficult for farmers to take the time to do their own trucking, making farm-to-market
hauling a full-time occupation in its own right. In 1954, for instance, a pair of
agricultural economists noted that even though farmers owned 2.5 million out of 9.2
million trucks registered in the United States, only 35 percent of farmers owned a truck.
Furthermore, most of those trucks were small straight trucks, unsuited for very long
hauls, meaning that most farmers relied on for-hire truckers with larger equipment to do
their hauling in this period.47 Another key factor was the social process by which many
drivers entered the trucking industry in the postwar period. Although formal driver-
training schools existed from the earliest days of long-haul trucking, a significant
percentage of drivers in the postwar years learned to drive from a relative or friend; in
two sociological studies from the late 196os, scholars found that approximately one of
every three drivers was related to another driver who had convinced and trained him to
enter the occupation.48 Like often breeds like, and fathers who had left the farm to
become truckers in the 1930s commonly brought their sons into trucking after the war
(see Figure 5.2).
46 "Kansas Motor Carriers Plan 15th Annual Convention," Wichita Eagle, Sep. 3, 1950; "Trucking Represents
Second Largest Industry in Kansas," Wichita Eagle, Sep. 28, 1952.
47 Donald E. Church and Margaret R. Purcell, "From Farms to First Market," in USDA, Yearbook of
Agriculture, 1954: Marketing (Washington: GPO, 1954), pp. 87-92.
48 Flittie and Nelson, "Truck Driver," 207; Runcie, "Social Group Formation," 146.
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Figure 5.2: Joe and Jess Jaca of Jaca Truck Lines
Joe Jaca (left), son of Jess Jaca (right), followed in his father's footsteps as a bull hauler out of
McDermitt, Nevada. Photo taken May 1981 by Carl Fleischauer; "Buckaroos in Paradise"
collection, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress, NV81-CF3-17.
Furthermore, as industrialized agriculture created larger but fewer farms in the
postwar period, trucking became one of the only available alternative occupations for
rural men who might otherwise have been farmers. This helps explain why the Interstate
Commerce Commission found in 1978 that the "typical owner-operator [truck driver] ...
is a male residing in Iowa."49 For example, writer Frederic Will asked a man named
Chuck how he had become a trucker in the 1960s: "I'd been brought up on a farm, back-
country, real quiet. I'd handled farm vehicles but I got out onto the highway pretty much
by accident, helping a farmer haul potatoes.... I signed on with a refrigerated foods
company out of Louisville... and that was that. It was the best work I could find."50
49 Interstate Commerce Commission, The Independent Trucker: Nationwide Survey of Owner-Operators
(Washington, DC: ICC Bureau of Economics, 1978), 5.
50 Frederic Will, Big Rig Souls: Truckers in America's Heartland (West Bloomfield, MI: A & M, 1992), 129.
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Especially for rural men with little education, truck driving was often one of the only
work opportunities available. As Kevin, a truck driver from rural Maine, told a sociologist
in the early 199os: "Where I live, you either farm, log, or drive a truck. There is nothing
else."51 Drivers for J. B. Hunt, stationed in rural Arkansas, made a similar point in the
early 199os; as Charlie Watts told business historian Marvin Schwartz, "there's easier
ways to make a living," but "there are no jobs in this part of the country where you can
make nearly fifty thousand dollars a year."52 Such drivers recognized the limited range of
their choices in an economic world not entirely of their own making, yet in choosing to
become truck drivers they also carved out a space in that world where economic
independence at least seemed possible.
Above all, long-haul trucking provided many rural men the chance to maintain a
sense of rural identity and rootedness in an urban-industrial world. Country music
artists and marketers were among the first "outsiders" to recognize this in the 1940s,
'5os, and '6os, which helps explain why nearly all trucking songs are country songs.
Trucking songs emerged within country music, a commercial form of entertainment
distinguished primarily by its reliance on the lived experiences of rural people
(particularly southern whites, at least in its earliest inceptions) as the inspiration for its
tales and sonic textures.5 3 In particular, the sound of chugging steam locomotives was
clearly a direct stimulus for the basic 4/4 rhythm of most country songs, and lyrics about
freight trains defined the career of many an early country singer, from Jimmie Rodgers
("the Singing Brakeman") to Roy Acuff (who imitated a steam whistle in his version of
51 Bruce Patrick Day, "The Role-Set of the Truck-Driver: Issues of Worker Autonomy, Ideology, and Identity"
(Ph.D. diss., University of New Hampshire, 1996), 244-5.
52 Schwartz, J. B. Hunt, 8o.
53 The word "inspiration" is key here, since we can by no means take country music to be a faithful "mirror"
of the actual historical experiences of rural people. Recorded country music has always been, after all, an
inherently commercial art form-artists and record producers have always sought to make money from their
work rather than make objective statements about rural life. Nonetheless, one of the most successful
methods of getting rural people to buy country records (and rural people were the main buyers of those
records until quite recently) was to tell stories that at least seemed authentic to rural ears. An entire
literature exists on this problem; see James C. Cobb, "Rednecks, White Socks, and Pind Coladas? Country
Music Ain't What It Used to Be and It Really Never Was," Southern Cultures (Winter 1999): 41-50; Richard
A. Peterson, Creating Country Music: Fabricating Authenticity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1997); Cecilia Tichi, High Lonesome: The American Culture of Country Music (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1994); Bill C. Malone, Don't Get above Your Raisin': Country Music and the Southern
Working Class (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002).
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"Wabash Cannonball").54 The first trucking songs emerged from this tradition of country
artists singing about what they saw and knew best from their daily lives, which was quite
often a railroad. In fact, the first known trucking song, "Wreck on the Mountain Road"
recorded by the Red Fox Chasers in 1928, was simply a parody of the traditional country-
folk train ballad, "Wreck of the Old '97."55 The first original song about truck driving,
however, came in 1939 when Cliff Bruner and His Boys recorded "Truck Driver's Blues"
by Ted Daffan.56
Daffan never drove a truck, but he saw in truck drivers an untapped market for
country music about trucking. As he later recalled, he had been dining in a roadside cafe
when he noticed that truck drivers walked in, "headed for the juke box and put a nickel
in" to hear country tunes. Daffan "realized that no one had ever written a song about
[truck drivers] and that such a song would have a ready-made audience."57 Recorded as a
slow western swing tune by Cliff Bruner's band, the song empathized with a driver who
was "feelin' tired and weary" as he pulled in to see his "honky-tonk gal," lyrics that
helped sell 100,000ooo records, primarily to jukebox vendors.58 The timing was felicitous, as
the jukebox had recently become "Big Business," as a New York Times reporter noted in
1941, with at least 300,000 "automatic phonographs" in operation that year, grossing an
estimated $90,000,000.59 Bigger truck driving hits followed on the tails of Daffan's tune,
particularly "I'm a Truck Driving Man" by Art Gibson (1947), and Terry Fell's "Truck
Driving Man" (1954). Besides being a rollicking harmonica-driven tune, Fell's "Truck
54 Nolan Porterfield, Jimmie Rodgers: The Life and Times ofAmerica's Blue Yodeler (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1979); Bill C. Malone, Country Music U.S.A., rev. ed. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985);
Norm Cohen, Long Steel Rail: The Railroad in American Folksong (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1981).
55 Joe Fodor, "Truck Song, 1928-1965: 'Wreck on the Old Mountain Road' to 'Giddyup Go"' (draft of an
unpublished paper), Trucking Songs Subject File, CMHF Library, p. 3. Many later trucking songs were
likewise reworkings of classic train songs, such as "Big Wheel Cannonball" in place of "Wabash Cannonball"
(Vaughan Horton, "Big Wheel Cannonball," performed by Dick Curless, Capitol 2780). Several country songs
appeared in the 1930S with the word "trucking" in their titles, though the reference was most commonly not
to motor transportation but to a style of jazz dancing and / or an unprintable word that rhymes with
"trucking." One of the best is "Everybody's Truckin'," performed by the western swing band The Modern
Mountaineers; another is "Let's Get Drunk and Truck," recorded in 1936 by the Harlem Hamfats.
56 Ted Daffan, "Truck Driver's Blues," performed by Cliff Bruner and His Boys, Decca 5725.
57 Dorothy Horstman, Sing Your Heart Out, Country Boy: Classic Country Songs and Their Inside Stories,
by the Writers Who Wrote Them, 3d rev. ed. (Nashville: The Country Music Foundation, 1986), 326.
58 Fodor, "Truck Song," 4.
59 Lewis Nichols, "The Ubiquitous Juke Box," New York Times Magazine, Oct. 5, 1941, 22.
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Driving Man" used an ingenious marketing device, referring to itself being played on a
truckstop jukebox in the chorus ("I'll put a nickel in the jukebox / And play the "Truck
Driving Man").6 0 Though Fell's recording of the song was only a moderate hit, it would
later be covered by dozens of established country artists, including Jimmy Martin, Glen
Campbell, and George Hamilton IV. By the early 199os the song had sold an estimated
five million copies.6 '
In the 1960s trucking songs would transcend their jukebox orientation and
contribute significantly to country music's efforts to become the nation's working-class
music. Often referred to as "countrypolitan" or "the Nashville Sound," much of the
country music that was recorded in the 1960s sought to reach out to broader audiences
by discarding the "raw, nasal 'hillbilly' sound, alien to urban ears."62 Particularly under
the guiding hands of record producers Owen Bradley and Chet Atkins, country artists
such as Roger Miller, Kitty Wells, Patsy Cline, and Ernest Tubb scored giant hits by
minimizing the use of twang and maximizing the use of smooth vocal choruses, clean
electric guitars, tight drums, and lush orchestral arrangements.6 3 As a consequence,
country music, which had started its career denigrated by urbanites as "hillbilly music,"
accounted for four out of ten record sales in 1966.64 The growth in sales was due not only
to savvy record producers and high-quality artists, but to the rapid spread of all-country
music radio stations in the 1960s and '70s. Country music had long been a staple of radio
programming, particularly on Atlanta's WSB, Chicago's WLS (known for the National
Barn Dance show), and Nashville's WSM (of Grand Ole Opry fame). But each of these
60 Art Gibson, "I'm a Truck Driving Man," Mercury 6065; Terry Fell, "Truck Driving Man," RCA Victor "X"
oolo. Fell was not the first to think of this; the Milo Twins recorded "Truck Driver's Boogie" in 1948 and
included a similar self-reference to their song being played on a "juke." Edward and Edwin Milolen (The
Milo Twins), "Truck Driver's Boogie," Capitol 40138.
61 Fodor, "Truck Song," 7-8.
62 "The Gold Guitars," Newsweek, Apr. 4, 1966, 96.
63 Paul Hemphill, The Nashville Sound: Bright Lights and Country Music (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1970); Steve Waksman, Instruments of Desire: The Electric Guitar and the Shaping of Musical Experience
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 75-112; Malone, Country Music, U.SA., 256-8.
64 "Country Music Snaps Its Regional Bounds," BW, Mar. 19, 1966, 96. The commercial success of the
Nashville sound did not arrive without protest from country musicians and fans who preferred the twang,
but as Richard Peterson and others have pointed out, the tension between maintaining "authenticity" and
selling popular records has always been and probably always will be key to the music's identification as a
distinct genre. Peterson, Creating Country Music; Robert Cantwell, Bluegrass Breakdown: The Making of
the Old Southern Sound (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984); Nicholas Dawidoff, In the Country of
Country: People and Places in American Music (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997).
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stations merely interspersed country music within a much broader spectrum of music,
from light classical to rock and roll. The first radio station to feature an all-country
format was KDAV in Lubbock, Texas, starting in 1953. A decade later, the Country Music
Association sponsored a nationwide survey of country music radio listeners, finding
them to have significant loyalty to the genre as well as impressive disposable incomes
that would appeal to advertisers. Within a few years, the all-country music station
"moved uptown from downhome," with stations cropping up all over the country to
serve northern as well as southern, urban as well as rural listeners. Many stations that
converted to the all-country format saw their ratings jump dramatically, particularly
those in urban markets already saturated with rock and roll stations.6 5
It was within this "countrypolitan" context that trucking songs became a sizeable
sub-genre in their own right, after the 1963 release of Dave Dudley's recording of "Six
Days on the Road."66 Despite being sung by a previously obscure artist from Spencer,
Wisconsin, "Six Days on the Road" hit #2 on the country charts and #32 on the pop
charts. The fact that Dudley professed to be a "Yankee," and that his song first became
popular on Milwaukee radio stations, was a significant indicator of the changing market
orientation of 196os country music; the new listeners wanted modern-sounding music
with a rural sensibility, not "hillbilly" music.6 7 The song was written and performed to be
a hit-to appeal not only to truck drivers with nickels to spare, but to a much broader
audience who would see in the truck driver, rather than the railroad man, a "new folk
hero."6 8 Key to this strategy was the song's shearing off of the nostalgic overtones that
characterized so much of the train song oeuvre; the song was hard-driving, modern, even
industrial in its sound and story, as it sought to make the lived experiences of rural
65 George 0. Carney, "Spatial Diffusion of the All-Country Music Radio Stations in the United States, 1971-
74," JEMF Quarterly 13 (Summer 1977): 58-66; "C&W Pulse Published for 24 U.S. Markets," CMA Close-Up
(Sep. 1965): 1.
66 Earl Green and Carl Montgomery, "Six Days on the Road," performed by Dave Dudley, Golden Wing
GW3020.
67 Dixie Deen, "Six Days on the Road Puts Ravin' Dave Dudley on Country Music Map," Music City News 4
(July 1966): 11.
68 Robert Shelton, "Meet a New Folk Hero, the Truck Driver," New York Times (hereafter NYT), Dec. 4,
1966, D33.
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people relevant in a postwar context.69 Especially important in this respect was the
song's signature sound-a combination of a mildly distorted "fuzz box" electric guitar
riff, a "tick-tack" bass line, and the deep baritone vocals of Dudley.70 As Dudley put it,
"that shotgun guitar came through real good," giving the song an electric energy that has
brought sales to date of over one and a half million records and inspired dozens of covers
by artists as diverse as Junior Brown, Taj Mahal, and Country Joe McDonald.71
Along with the "shotgun guitar" sound, "Six Days on the Road" brought
something new to trucking music: it was based in the experiences of actual truckers. The
men who penned the song, Earl Greene and Carl "Peanut" Montgomery, were drivers
who had spent years hauling flooring products from Tuscumbia, Alabama, up and down
the eastern seaboard. The reference to having "Georgia overdrive" came from their
familiarity with throwing a truck's transmission into neutral on a steep downgrade on
Highway 67 into Decatur, Alabama.72 Other terms in the song conveyed a similar
familiarity with real trucker lingo and concerns-"Jimmy" (GMC truck), the ICC, "little
white pills" (amphetamines), log books, and weigh scales. "Six Days" became an instant
hit with truckers who appreciated a song that had more to do with driving than stopping
at truck stops, as well as with a wider audience who found the lingo fascinating.
The remarkable success of "Six Days on the Road" encouraged other artists and
producers to record trucking songs as part of an effort to make country music that
appealed simultaneously to rural and urban audiences. One key figure was Don Pierce,
the owner of a specialty Nashville record label, Starday Records. Pierce's Starday sold
69 On nostalgia in train songs, see Shane Hamilton, "Trains Are Like Flowers: Nature and Technology in
Traditional Bluegrass Music," OASIS (Feb. 2003): 1-32; Vivien Green Fryd, "'The Sad Twang of Mountain
Voices': Thomas Hart Benton's Sources of Country Music," South Atlantic Quarterly 94:1 (Winter 1995):
301-335.
70 Dudley's deep baritone was the reason he was selected by record producer Jimmy Newman to record the
song; Newman thought it essential to have a manly voice on a trucking record. Dave Dudley, Interview by
Daniel Zwerdling, on National Public Radio's All Things Considered, Aug. 30, 1997, transcript, Dave Dudley
File, CMHF Library, p. 5. Similarly, Dick Curless was chosen to sing "Tombstone Every Mile" because the
song's writer wanted someone who could hit the low notes of the chorus. Dick Curless press release, 8 July
1970, Dick Curless File, CMHF Library, p. 4. In fact, most important trucking singers have sung in the
baritone or even bass registers (Red Simpson and Red Sovine being the most obvious examples).
71 Deen, "Six Days," 11; Fodor, "Truck Song," 19;"Imitation Insures Success," Music City News (Sep. 1965):
30.
72 Horstman, Sing Your Heart Out, 321. Greene and Montgomery may also have chosen to call this action
"Georgia overdrive" to avoid the equally common, though more offensive, terms "Mexican overdrive" and
"Jewish overdrive."
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country music exclusively, unlike larger labels such as Mercury, Columbia, and Decca,
where country contributed only a minority of records to catalogs dedicated mostly to
pop, jazz, classical, and rock. Pierce was a marketer extraordinaire; among other
strategies, he used direct-mail catalog campaigns to reach rural customers and jukebox
operators.73 For Pierce, the whole point of recording country music was to sell country
music: "Music that doesn't sell [is] obviously music that isn't communicating," he once
stated. "You have got to be commercial! A song can involve itself with basic things such
as women, drinking, gambling, death, and traveling BUT it's got to have something
fresh."74 After the release of "Six Days on the Road," Pierce jumped on the chance to sell
"something fresh" in the form of trucking music; as Starday producer Tommy Hill later
recalled, Pierce "wanted to record every truck song that came through the door."75
Among the Starday artists who recorded trucking songs in the 1960s were the Willis
Brothers ("Give Me 40 Acres") and Red Sovine ("King of the Open Road," "Teddy
Bear").76 Another small Nashville label, King Records (which later merged with Starday),
produced artists Charlie Moore and Bill Napier ("Truck Driver's Queen") and Coleman
Wilson ("Passing Zone Blues").77 Meanwhile, labels on the West Coast also contributed
to the growing catalog of trucking songs. Many of these were part of the "Bakersfield
Sound," distinguished from the Nashville Sound by its unapologetic use of hard-driving
guitars, pedal steels, and honky-tonk harmonies (rather than smooth, overdubbed vocal
choruses).78 Trucking songs from West Coast artists such as Red Simpson, Merle
Haggard, Del Reeves, and Kay Adams appealed to working-class listeners who found the
"countrypolitan" sound a bit too tame. Red Simpson was perhaps most successful at this
approach, recording several full-length trucking albums of lasting quality, although Del
73 "Starday's Unique Concept: A Country Label Exclusively," Billboard (Nov. 2, 1963): 73.
74 Dixie Deen, "Don Pierce of Starday," Music City News (Jan. 1967): 9.
75 Fodor, "Truck Song," 20.
76 Atlas Artist Bureau press release, "The Willis Brothers," October 1978, Vic Willis File, CMHF Library;
Starday/Gusto Records press release, "Red Sovine," October 1978, Red Sovine File, CMHF Library; Jack
Hurst, "Red Sovine: Teller of Sad Tales," Macon (Georgia) Telegraph, Aug. 2, 1976, 5B.
77 Charlie Moore and Bill Napier, "Truck Driver's Queen," King 936; Coleman Wilson, "Passing Zone Blues,"
King 45-5512.
78 Gerald W. Haslam, Workin'Man Blues: Country Music in California (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1999).
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Reeves was the first artist to score a #1 hit on the Billboard country charts with a
trucking song-"Girl on the Billboard," recorded in 1965.79 In any case, trucking songs
helped drive the growing popularity of country music in the period; between 1957 and
1972, at least 300 minor and major trucking hits were recorded by country artists.80
Even as trucking songs contributed to the broadening popularity of country
music, they continued to appeal directly to truck drivers as a distinct marketing segment.
All-night radio shows aimed at truckers helped in this regard. The first such show began
in 1969, hosted by Charlie Douglas on WWL in New Orleans. Despite the station's far-
reaching power of 50,000 watts, Douglas considered his show to be not "broadcasting"
but "narrowcasting": "We point at one guy in one truck going in one direction."s8 Bill
Mack started a similar trucker show in 1969 on WBAP out of Fort Worth, Texas.8 2
Encouraged by funding from advertisers such as Cummins Diesel, such shows spread
rapidly to dozens of stations across the country in the early 1970s. 8 3 "Big John" Trimble
established the most popular all-night truckers-only show in 1977 on WRVA,
transmitting from Jarrell Truck Plaza in Doswell, Virginia. Although he played only
country music, Trimble claimed his show was not a country music show, but "a truckers'
show. I play country music, and other people can listen if they want to. But the show's for
the truckers."8 4 With a 50,ooo-watt signal reaching 32 states, Big John played truckers'
requests received by phone or Citizens Band radio-particularly music about the "Five
D's: divorce, drinking, death, devotion and desperation," along with songs specifically
about trucking, all interwoven with constant countrywide weather reports.8 5
79 Walter Haynes and Hank Mills, "Girl on the Billboard," performed by Del Reeves, United Artists 824;
Fodor, "Truck Song," 25.
80 Neville Raymond, "Hitch Your Truck to a Country Star," Country Music, Sep. 1972, 182; "Country Charts,"
Cash Box, Jan. 29, 1966, 52-3. Not all trucking songs have been country; Tom Waits, for instance, penned a
number of songs about truckers in the 1970S as part of his beat-poetry inspired phase of writing about
recluses and loners. An excellent example is "Diamonds on My Windshield," on The Heart of Saturday
Night, Asylum 7E 1015.
81 Blaine Harden, "Big John-Truckers' Favorite DJ," Washington Post, Dec. 1, 1979, 4.
82 "Bill Mack: Radio Friend of the Trucker," Open Road and the Professional Driver, Jul. 1969, 18.
83 "C & W Singer Is Knight's Favorite," Michigan Trucking Today, Apr. 1972, Trucking Songs Subject File,
CMHF Library.
84 "For the Truck Driver on the Road, a Special Radio Show," NYT, Dec. 2, 1979, 87.
85 Harden, "Big John," 1.
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Behind these marketing efforts lay the recognition that truck drivers, as a distinct
demographic, liked country music. C. O. Bruce, Jr., a trucker from Blum, Texas, wrote in
a letter to Overdrive in 1966 to complain of radio stations that played light classical
music in the early morning hours: "I am sure that there are a lot of truckers who like
[light classical], but I believe that 50% more truckers would rather hear country music
on the road as it is the only kind you can understand what they are saying.... What we
want is country music from 12am to 12am."86 The key phrase here was "you can
understand what they are saying," indicating truckers' belief that only country musicians
wrote songs that spoke to a drivers' real-life concerns. As Lee Tamplen, a driver from
Fort Worth, Texas, told Open Road magazine in 1978, he listened only to country music
"because the other stuff on the radio these days is not worth a damn."8 7 Leo Hayes,
whose route regularly took him from Amarillo, Texas, to New York City, claimed that "he
[had] always been a country boy and the country will never leave him," which led him to
complain that "one of the greatest misfortunes bestowed on mankind is that New York
doesn't have a country station."8 8 Vern Husband, an owner-operator from Hooker,
Oklahoma, tried to avoid such misfortunes by keeping a list of the nation's all-country
radio stations in his cab "so I know where to tune in wherever I am."89 Of course, if a
trucker could not find a decent country station, he could always pop a Merle Haggard
tape into his 8-track stereo-a popular piece of trucking equipment declared by
International Harvester's marketing department to be a "necessory" (necessary
accessory) in 1966.90
To the country music industry, it was clear that trucks and country "went
together" by the late 1970s. Country musicians and record producers took up the truck
driver as the new rural working-class folk hero, replacing the cowboy, the dirt farmer,
the coal miner, the steel-driving man, and the train engineer of earlier generations. In a
86 C. 0. Bruce, Jr.. to the Editor, Overdrive (Aug. 1966): 7-8.
87 "Truckers Everywhere Love Country Music," Open Road and the Professional Driver, Sep. 1978, 30.
88 Raymond, "Hitch Your Truck to a Country Star," 179
89 "Truckers Everywhere Love Country Music," 30.
90 Marketing Dept., International Harvester Co., Motor Truck Division, General Letter MT-711, "Automotive
Stereo Tape Player," Sep 30, 1966, International Harvester Company, Truck Circular Letters, Wisconsin
Historical Society, Madison, WI, (hereafter IH Truck Circular Letters) Box 9.
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rural industrial landscape where small farms and long trains had been replaced by
agribusinesses and interstate highways, the truck driving man was a more fitting symbol
on which to hang a new agro-industrial mythology based on the work culture of rural
men. As we have seen, part of this agro-industrial myth was shaped by the belief that a
trucker could maintain at least some sense of economic independence akin to that
imagined for the small farmers of a bygone era. But there were other messages contained
in country songs, and trucker culture more broadly, that comported well with rural ideals
of manhood in the postwar economic context.
The Wandering Man
Country trucking songs sold a distinctively rural vision of masculinity, informed
by a belief that a real man could and should wander (geographically and sexually) while
simultaneously maintaining a faithful connection to his home and family. The idea of the
"rambling man" has been a consistent theme in commercial country music, from Jimmie
Rodgers's statement that "when a man gets blue, he grabs a train and rides," to Hank
Williams's declaration that the Lord had made him a rambling man, to Steve Earle's
penchant for reading from Kerouac's On the Road during his live performances.9 Just as
prominent in country music has been the importance of settling down to a stable home
and family life, from songs waxing nostalgic for the "old homeplace" to moralistic
warnings against marital infidelity and the lure of the honky-tonk.92 These contradictory
themes worked their way readily into trucking songs; from Johnny Dollar's "there ain't
noplace that I ain't been" to Red Simpson's plaintive worry about his son "not doing too
good in school," the truck driving man's torn allegiance to roaming and remaining home
served as the narrative fuel for many a country song.93 But this tension did more than
91 Malone, Don't Get above Your Raisin', 117-48; Tichi, High Lonesome, 51-78; Jordan Kessler, review of
Steve Earle concert at the Knitting Factory, New York, New York,
<http://www.popmatters.com/music/concerts/e/earle-steve-020414.shtml> (May 1, 2002).
92 Malone, Don't Get above Your Raisin', 53-88; Tichi, High Lonesome, 19-50.
93 Charles Fields, James Kirchstein, and Donald Riis, "Big Rig Rollin' Man," performed by Johnny Dollar,
Chart Records 1057; Tommy Collins, "Roll, Truck, Roll," performed by Red Simpson, Capitol ST 2468.
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just help sell records; it also helped truck drivers negotiate a meaningful sense of
manhood, an explicitly rural masculinity rooted in a deep resistance to becoming a
"desk-pilot" or a "factory hand" simply for the sake of a stable home life.
The rambling man imagined by Jimmie Rodgers and Hank Williams used a train
to see the wider world. Songs such as Rodgers's "Brakeman's Blues," based in his own
experience as a brakeman, told of riding the rails from "sunny Tennessee" to Portland,
Maine. "It's good times here," sang Rodgers, "but it's better down the road." The train
brought excitement and mobility, as Rodgers's wife later recalled: "As freight brakeman,
young Jimmie Rodgers thought he was doing fine. He was going places, seeing things,
doing things."94 The railroad, as landscape historian John Stilgoe has written, brought
the crackling electric energy of urban modernity to the turn-of-the-century rural
landscape; for many a country boy, a train ticket was a ticket out of boredom and stasis
and into the scurrying efficiency of the modern metropolis.9 5 But for many rural men,
working for the railroad brought not the excitement of modernity but the emasculating
demands of systematized, clock-based wage labor.96 A man could ramble on a train, but
potentially at the cost of losing his rural roots.
Trucking culture, on the other hand, was infused with the romance of the "open
road," a space of mobility where a man could imagine himself being his own man. This
was the central theme of countless trucking songs, from Asleep at the Wheel's "I've Been
Everywhere" (in which the narrator rattles off a seemingly endless list of places across
the nation that he's visited) to Dave Dudley's "Rollin' Rig" (which tells of a trucker's
addictive need to roam, something his wife and children simply cannot understand).97
The "long white line" as addiction, something that truckers must follow at all costs,
94 Horstman, Sing Your Heart out, Country Boy, 355.
95 John R. Stilgoe, Metropolitan Corridor: Railroads and the American Scene (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1983), esp. 167-221.
96 Walter Licht, Working for the Railroad: The Organization of Work in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1983); Ronald L. Lewis, Transforming the Appalachian Countryside: Railroads,
Deforestation, and Social Change in West Virginia, 1880-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1998), 131-84. On the time-discipline of industrial labor, see also E. P. Thompson, "Time, Work-
Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism," Past and Present 38 (Dec 1967): 56-97; Daniel T. Rodgers, The Work
Ethic in IndustrialAmerica, 1850-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
97 Geoff Mack, "I've Been Everywhere," performed by Asleep at the Wheel, United Artists UA-LAo38-F; Roy
Baham, "Rollin' Rig," performed by Dave Dudley, United Artists / Rice RR-5o64.
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figured prominently in songs performed by Moore and Napier and Merle Haggard,
among others.98 The draw of the open road, however, was much more than a country
music phenomenon; it was often the most important value that a truck driving man
attached to his work. As an anonymous trucker told writer/photograph Robert Krueger
in 1975, "[The highway] is sort of the last frontier, where a guy can roam, be his own
boss, and not listen to a whole lot.... If I want to go someplace, I just catch a load going
there."99 Almost any interview with a trucker will elicit a similar response, as sociologist
John Runcie found in the late 196os: "I get to see different parts of the country; I get to
see sunrises if I am working at that hour. In a factory all you can see is the factory."lo o
Work on the road was still work, though it was occasionally punctuated by moments of
astounding beauty; but more importantly, that work was not performed under the
constraints of walls, foremen, or managers. As one woman described her husband's love
of driving in a 1965 letter to Overdrive, ""He has been offered office jobs and each time
we talk it over again together and decide against it. We both know that he could never be
happy behind a desk."10l For a real truck driving man, the long white line was addictive
precisely because of the allure of escaping the watchful eyes of authority figures. As a
trucker named Chuck, who was born in a small Texas town, told writer Axel Madsen in
the early 198os: "What I like about truckin' is that even if you drive for someone else,
there ain't anybody standing over you when you're out there on the highway."102 When a
man's workplace was the road, there were no orders from the foreman or middle
management and no line speed-ups or stopwatch-toting scientific managers.
Trucking firms attempted to deploy technologies in the cab in the hope of gaining
some control over the work process of a trucker, though with little success. The
tachograph was a good example. Invented in the 1920S but not introduced to U.S.
markets until 1940 by the Sangamo Electric Company, the tachograph was intended to
98 Abner Buford, "Long White Line," performed by Charlie Moore and Bill Napier, King 45-6004; Merle
Haggard, "White Line Fever," Capitol ST 384.
99 Robert Krueger, A Gypsy on 18 Wheels: A Trucker's Tale (London: Praeger, 1975),.13.
100 Runcie, "Social Group Formation," 161.
101 Mrs. Wilfred Abernathy to the Editor, Overdrive (Jan. 1965): 6.
102 Madsen, Open Road, 17.
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provide an objective measure of a driver's productivity, by measuring a truck's distance
traveled, its speed, and the frequency and duration of stops, recording these data on a
wax chart (see Figure 5.3).103 As an advertisement for Wagner Electric's version
proclaimed in 1956, a tachograph was supposed to provide clear evidence of a trucker
making "unscheduled stops," a point graphically presented as a trucker drinking coffee
and chatting with a truck-stop waitress.'0 4 Tachographs proved easy for truckers to
outwit, however, as the manager of a trucking firm found in 1960 when he noted that
"90% of the cutting knives in the doors of the tachograph clocks have been removed and
destroyed by drivers." Besides simply breaking the machine, drivers could leave the clock
open while driving, or set the clock back or ahead, which effectively falsified the records
provided by the machine. The company manager was quite familiar with these tactics,
stating that he knew "there are exactly 41 ways that tampering has appeared on these
clocks and every one of them [is] known to management." But since the manager could
not actually ride in the cab with each driver, there was no way to prevent such
tampering.l0 5 Some trucking firms would occasionally send out "road checkers" in
unmarked cars to observe their drivers in action, looking for excessive speed,
unnecessary passing, or use of faulty equipment, but even in such situations drivers often
claimed to be able to "'smell' a road-checker a mile away."106 Tachographs and road
checkers could not bring factory-style discipline to the cab.
103 R. H. Kimes, et al., "Recording Device for Motor Vehicles," U. S. Patent No. 1,471,850, Oct. 23, 1923;
"Graphic Clocker," BW, Dec. 21, 1940, 36; "Watchman in the Cab," Power Wagon (Apr. 1956): 18-9, 47;
International Harvester Co., Motor Truck Division, Motor Truck Circular 161, "Tachograph," Dec. 15, 1961,
IH Truck Circular Letters, Box 8.
104 Advertisement for Wagner Electric Corporation, "5 Ways that Tachographs Can Improve Your Fleet
Operation," Power Wagon (Mar. 1956): 9.
105 G. M. Nequette (Vice President of Safety and Personnel, Central Wisconsin Motor Transport Company) to
All Drivers, Terminal Managers and Mechanics, "Tampering with Tachograph Clocks," Jun. 15, 1960,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695 (Madison, WI) Records, Wisconsin Historical Society,
Madison, WI (hereafter IBT 695 Records), Box 13, Folder 14.
,06 Wayne G. Broehl, Jr., Trucks, Trouble, and Triumph: The Norwalk Truck Line Company (New York:
Prentice-Hall, 1954), 178. In more recent times, companies have deployed satellite tracking systems to much
greater effect. See Matthias Roetting et al., "When Technology Tells You How to Drive: Truck Drivers'
Attitudes towards Feedback by Technology," Transportation Research Part F: Traffic Psychology and
Behaviour 6 (Dec. 2003): 276.
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Figure 5-3: A tachograph, or "Watchman in the Cab"
The Sangamo Electric Company marketed tachographs such as this beginning in the 1940s,
intending to provide trucking fleet managers with a means of "observing" truck drivers while on
the road. "Watchman in the Cab," Power Wagon (Apr. 1956): 18.
But for all the allure of "movin' on," truckers did not cruise down an open road
free of constrictions or demands. After all, no matter how many states a trucker passed
through, he was always doing so on the way to picking up or delivering a load.
Nonetheless, truck driving was different from most other industrial jobs in one key
respect: a trucker's time was dictated primarily by the task at hand, rather than by the
clock. When a driver sold his labor time to an employer, that time was valued not by the
hour but by the mile. In negotiating a wage rate, then, truckers and employers had to
take into account issues that did not arise in a factory context, such as time required for
sleep, mechanical breakdowns, impassable highways, and so on.10 7 When the load and
107 National War Labor Board Trucking Commission, "In the Matter of Southeastern Area Employers'
Negotiating Committee and International Brotherhood of Teamsters," Nov. 26, 1943, National War Labor
Board Records, RG 202, Trucking Commission Records (hereafter RG 202), Miscellaneous Records, 1942-
45, Entry 305, National Archives II, College Park, MD, Box 2423, Folder 1.
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the road dictated how a driver's time would be spent, a trucker's bodily rhythms had to
be flexible enough to adjust both to periods of intense work and to periods of absolute
inactivity. As Otto Riemer noted, trucking often involved an exasperating game of hurry-
up-and-wait: "You break your ass getting there, only to find that the consignee is short
on storage space and you will have to wait until the next day to unload."'o8 A trucker's
time was most certainly not his own; even at home, a trucker could expect a call from a
dispatcher at any moment, ordering him back on the road. Of course, such calls could
theoretically be refused, but as one trucker put it, "I go when they call if I want to make
money." °9 Such lack of time-discipline could be seen as a distinct disadvantage; after all,
a factory worker who sold his or her labor time to an employer did so with the
recognition that once the whistle blew, the worker received leisure time to do with as he
or she wished. Furthermore, the commodification of labor time made it possible for
workers to wrest a shorter workday from management, a useful organizing tool in the
early days of the American labor movement.l10 On the other hand, the task-orientation of
work in trucking could be a significant source of masculine pride, providing truckers a
sense of control over their work, reminiscent of that experienced by pre-industrial
artisans and farmers."' Charles Seetin, for instance, took his farmer's work ethic and
sense of time into trucking when he began hauling his potatoes to market in the 1930s,
and also after he purchased Capitol Truck Lines in 1945: "He often worked around the
clock, or through the weekend, without concern for the effort expended. He was working
for himself, in a business he loved."112 Like the work required to run a farm, a trucker's
108 Riemer, Hammer Down, 30.
109 Day, "Role-Set," 123.
lO Thompson, "T'ime, Work-Discipline"; Thomas Dublin, Women at Work: The Transformation of Work
and Community in Lowell, Massachusetts, 1826-1860 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979); Roy
Rosenzweig, Eight Hoursfor What We Will: Workers and Leisure in an Industrial City, 1870-1920
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
"I On manliness and pre-industrial task-orientation, see Merritt Roe Smith, Harpers Ferry Armory and the
New Technology: The Challenge of Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), esp. 65-6. On farmers
and task orientation, see Gerrit Wildenbeest, "'Keeping up with the Times': Time and Its Rhythms in the
Countryside," Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences 24 (Oct 1988): 132-145; Michael O'Malley, Keeping
Watch: A History ofAmerican Time (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 199o).
112 Doris Quinn, "Portrait of a Trucker," Kansas Transporter (Nov. 1959): 12-3.
343
work was not made any easier by its task-orientation; nonetheless, it could be far more
satisfying to a man's sense of self than factory work.ll3
The appeal of mobile, task-oriented work was not solely confined to men. Women
who wished to defy the traditional definition of woman's work as indoor work joined the
trucking work force in increasing numbers, particularly in the 1970s. Prior to that
decade, women drivers were a rare sight in trucking; in a 1933 survey of 4,ooo drivers,
not a single woman was employed as a driver, though around 400 worked for trucking
firms as cashiers, bookkeepers, and clerks.l14 In 1955, the trade journal Power Wagon
noted that Martha Thomas was only one of three female drivers in the state of Florida.15
As late as 1979, a survey of over 9,ooo drivers found only 57 women employed as
truckers.1 6 The exclusion of women from the trucking workforce can partly be explained
by policies of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, which excluded women from
membership until government pressure forced a change during World War II. Even
afterwards, many Teamster locals instituted separate pay scales and seniority rules for
men and women, often designating "men's jobs" (driving) and "women's jobs" (inside
work).l7
It was precisely this distinction, however, whether codified or unspoken, that
drew some defiant women into trucking in the 1960s and 1970s. Within a year of the
publication of Betty Friedan's Feminine Mystique, a flood of letters arrived at the desk of
the editor of Overdrive from women who saw trucking as a means of liberation from the
confines of the home or the factory. A good example was this 1964 statement from one
Linda Buis, who team-drove with her husband: "'Company policy' tells me that I should
be content in our little cottage, to keep a lamp in the window and stick to my knitting....
113 Michael O'Malley, "Time, Work, and Task Orientation: A Critique of American Historiography," Time and
Society 1, no. 3 (1992): 341-58.
114 Don Q. Crowther and Mortier W. LaFever, "Wages and Hours of Labor in the Intercity Motor Bus and
Truck Transportation Industries, July 1933," Monthly Labor Review 38 (Jun. 1934): 1433.
115 "Trucker's Wife Shares Long-Haul Distance Driving," Power Wagon (Mar. 1955): 14.
16 D. Daryl Wyckoff, Truck Drivers in America (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1979), 77.
117 Leah F. Vosko and David Witwer, "'Not a Man's Union': Women Teamsters in the United States during the
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[But] we are both truck drivers and proud of it."18 Though most of a truck driver's
working hours were spent in a cab much more confining than even the smallest cottage,
the lure of the "open road" was compensation enough for women whose work had
traditionally been defined by enclosure. As Monti Tak explained her decision to become
a trucker in the early 1970s: "If you know what trucking is, I don't have to explain it to
you.... I enjoy traveling and seeing new sights and faces. Like most truckers, I feel closed
in if I work indoors."'19 Judy Kuncher, "a small platinum-blonde woman of 27 years and
124 pounds," took a driving job for "the freedom; that's what I like. My time is my own."
While appreciating the degree of control over her time, she had originally been drawn to
trucking by the stories her husband told of seeing the West Coast-"I wanted to get out
there, too."l2' Movement, so central to the masculine ideal of meaningful work, was also
what drew Marilyn Larson to drive a milk truck in the early 1970s: "I tried an assembly
line job and didn't care for it.... [Driving] gives me a chance to be outside."2 Such
defiance of gender stereotypes inspired the 1966 hit song "Little Pink Mack," in which
Kay Adams sneered that she was a "gear-swapping mama" who didn't "know the
meaning of fear."122 But the reactions of men to women drivers belied the fact that
wandering was at its core reserved for men; women who worked not only outside the
home but outside were crossing a dangerous line. Men's interpretations of female
truckers ranged from the patronizing-such as an article in the Modern Milk Hauler that
applauded Shirley Genrich for her ability to both drive and yet remain "at heart ... a
homemaker [who] likes to cook and bake"-to downright chauvinistic, as when trucker
118 Linda Buis to the Editor, Overdrive (Sep. 1964): 15-6. See also Helen Mudd to the Editor, Overdrive (Apr.
1964): 15.
"9 Quoted in Krueger, Gypsy on 18 Wheels, 74-5.
120 Judy Klemesrud, "New Breed of Women Driver-Chugging along in an Astro 95," NYT, Nov. 1o, 1975, 58.
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mentioned as a contrast to the massive size of the rig they drive, but the difference between a 200o-pound
man and a 125-pound woman would seem inconsequential when measured against a 15- to 30-ton tractor-
trailer.
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122 Chris Darrell Roberts, Jim Thornton, and Scott Turner, "Little Pink Mack," performed by Kay Adams,
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Charlie Johnson shook his head in disbelief upon sight of Judy Kuncher, exclaiming: "A
woman driving a damn big rig like this!"123
Such resistance to the idea of a woman driver may have been influenced by the
widespread belief that trucking permitted not only geographical wandering but also
sexual deviance. Truck driving men were imagined to have a remarkable gift, even a
compulsive need, for sexual conquest as they traveled from one truck stop to another.
This myth became firmly established in the country trucking songs of the 1940S with the
idea of the beautiful siren-esque truck-stop waitress. Dick Reinhart's "Truck Driver's
Coffee Stop" (1941) and Jim Anglin's "Truck Driver's Sweetheart" (1942) set a pattern
that would be copied by dozens of country artists over the years, imagining a comely
waitress who served hot lovin' along with hot coffee and hot hash.12 4 Songwriters told of
truckers with "girlfriends everywhere," of a "Truck Driving Son of a Gun" who liked his
women "everywhere I go," of a "Truck Drivin' Cat with Nine Wives."125 Cal Martin's
"Diesel Smoke, Dangerous Curves" warned of the perils faced by a manly trucker-and
the "curves" in question were not those of twisting roads. 6 The idea of the truck-stop
temptress circulated outside of country music, as well; the film They Drive by Night
depicted Ann Sheridan as a waitress with a "classy chassis." A 1946 article in the
Saturday Evening Post told of a roadside cafe with "four girls behind the counter, any
one of whom might have won a beauty contest of some sort."127
Such oblique references to the sexual lives of truckers were tame compared to the
stories of prostitution that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, as truckers told of "lounge
lizards" or "pavement princesses" who patrolled truck-stop parking lots offering their
services to lonely truckers. Overdrive magazine helped publicize the issue in 1961 when
it ran a three-page story on the dangers of venereal disease, which editor Mike Parkhurst
123 Marcella Hurley Koch, "Her Producers Accept and Respect This Lady Hauler," Modern Milk Hauler (Oct.
1962): 16; Klemesrud, "New Breed of Woman Driver," 58.
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believed could be mitigated by legalizing prostitution.128 A highway rest stop near
Darien, Connecticut became notorious in the late 1970s as a home of "highway hookers"
who used Citizens Band radios to solicit drivers.l29 It seems unlikely that most truckers
regularly engaged in sexual relations with either waitresses or prostitutes; as one driver
put it: "[Truckers] talk of women like all guys do, but it's not a reality, it's dreaming....
They're moving too much.... Maybe if they [had] more time."30 Nonetheless, the belief
that a truck driver had the ability to wander as a sexual being without supervision was
probably more important to the masculine culture of trucking than whether or not
truckers acted on their urges. As one truck driver's wife wrote to Overdrive in 1967,
claiming that she approved of her husband's ability to meet women everywhere he went:
"My husband is a man, and being a truck driver helps keep him that way."l3 The ability
to roam was a defining feature of the truck driving man.
But even if trucking culture writ large defined wandering as manly, a paradoxical
dedication to home and family was equally prevalent. When sociologist John Runcie
asked a group of drivers in the late 196os who the most important people were in their
lives, the truckers uniformly responded "family."132 Statistical surveys consistently
showed that a relatively high proportion of truckers in the period were married; Runcie
found that in 1960, 85 percent of truckers were married, compared to 71 percent of all
men in the general population over the age of 15.133 Daryl Wyckoff s 1979 study found a
similar pattern, with only 11 percent of the male truckers he surveyed reporting they
were unmarried; this compared to 38 percent of all men over 15 reporting themselves as
single, divorced, or widowed.134 The reality of the truck driving man as a family man may
not have inspired as many country songs as did the truck-stop waitress, but the theme
was surely prevalent. Singer Red Sovine became particularly famous for his songs about
128 "VD: Still Around, Still Vicious!" Overdrive (Oct. 1961): 8-1o.
129 Michael Knight, "Darien Begins a Crackdown on Prostitutes Who Solicit Truck Drivers by CB Radios,"
NYT, Jul. 16, 1977, 25.
30 Terkel, Working, 208.
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'33 Ibid., 95.
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the family values of truck drivers, especially "Woman behind the Man behind the Wheel"
and "Giddy-Up Go."135 Dave Dudley, for his part, believed that the theme of a trucker
desperate to get home, as explored in "Six Days on the Road," was an essential reason for
the song's appeal to truck drivers who "were really a family guy [sic]. And they wanted to
get home to the wife and kids. And Labor Day, play in the back yard.... That was the
idea."36 After all, the narrator of "Six Days on the Road" claimed that he "could have a
lot of women," but he wasn't "like some other guys" who would cheat on their wives. Kay
Adams, who recorded the "answer" to "Six Days on the Road" with "Six Days Awaiting,"
amplified this theme, singing that her truck driving man "better make it home
tonight."37 For every song about "moving on," there was another about "coming
home."138 As in country music more generally, trucking songs imagined rural manhood
as a constant negotiation between the poles of promiscuity and fidelity.
Behind this tension lay the simple fact that trucking was, for most drivers,
primarily a way to make a living. There might have been easier ways to support a family.
As Irene Silah of Trenton, New Jersey, wrote to the National War Labor Board's
Trucking Commission in 1943, her husband's pay of $48 per week, with no overtime
provisions, made for "pretty hard sledding, let me tell you."139 In the film They Drive by
Night, Humphrey Bogart's character Paul Fabrini is repeatedly confronted by his wife,
who demands that he find "a job with a regular pay envelope" so they can afford to raise
a child. When Paul loses his arm in an accident and is no longer able to drive, his wife
takes grim satisfaction in the fact that "now he'll be home nights.... Maybe it's worth a
right arm." Losing an appendage was not the only option for drivers who wanted a steady
135 Red Sovine and Gordon Clifford Grills, "Woman behind the Man behind the Wheel," performed by Red
Sovine, Starday Gusto 169; Tommy Hill and Red Sovine, "Giddy-Up Go," performed by Red Sovine, Starday
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paycheck and a chance to be home regularly; many trucking jobs were "line hauls"
between two freight terminals, allowing a trucker to return home at regular intervals. For
instance, Elmer Arbaugh drove for the Smith Transfer company in the 1970s, with the
lo-hour trip between terminals in his hometown of Louisville, Kentucky, and Atlanta,
Georgia giving him a chance to spend half of his off-duty time at home.140 Companies
such as Smith Transfer that maintained a network of freight terminals tended to hire
drivers to work for straight wages, rather than contract with owner-operator drivers, so a
"company driver" could generally count on a regular paycheck (see Figure 5.4). Some of
the romance of seeing new faces and places would be lost in the bargain, however, since
line-haul drivers traveled the same road every day.141
140 Wayne King, "Truckin' Man and His Radio Roll on through the Night," NYT, Dec. 17, 1975, 47, 90.
141 Lawrence J. Ouellet, Pedal to the Metal: The Work Lives of Truckers (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1994), 140-53,193.
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Figure 5-4: A "company driver" receives a steady paycheck
A "company driver" employed by a large trucking firm with a
network of freight terminals generally had the opportunity to not
only draw a steady paycheck, as depicted here, but also to return
home at regular intervals. "Big Wheels Rolling," Popular Science,
Feb. 1941, 121.
For those long-haul truckers whose loads kept them far from home most of the
time, the separation from their families could be quite painful for both the driver and
those who stayed behind. The vast majority of an average trucker's working day was
spent in complete isolation, away from family and friends. Many truckers and their wives
learned to manage, though. Some truckers' wives preferred an arrangement that kept
their men on the road. As one woman put it: "True, it's lonesome when my man is on the
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road, but ... each time he comes home it's like a second honeymoon."l42 Such an attitude
could be inspired by a sense that a woman should not question her husband's choice of
career. One trucker's wife wrote to Overdrive in 1965, responding to an earlier letter
from a woman who regretted not being able to have an "old fashioned" marriage: "It
would seem to me that old fashioned means to allow your husband to do the type of work
he enjoys most. After all, if a man is not happy in his work he can not be happy at
home."143 On the other hand, an absentee husband could encourage a less "old
fashioned" view of gender roles, a theme explored by Bobbie Ann Mason in her 1982
short story "Shiloh." The story's main character, Norma Jean Moffitt, is married to a
trucker named LeRoy. With LeRoy constantly on the road, Norma Jean develops an
independent sense of self, taking college courses and lifting weights. When LeRoy injures
his leg in an accident and begins lounging about the house collecting unemployment,
Norma Jean decides she must leave him, stating: "In some ways, a woman prefers a man
who wanders."'144
The work experience and cultural mythology surrounding truck driving provided
many rural men with opportunities to cultivate a meaningful sense of manhood. Men
whose culture taught them to admire both the wanderer and the stable breadwinner
could use trucking to navigate their way between these contradictory ideals. Particularly
in a rural context, this negotiation mattered. But manhood was not only about the degree
to which one wandered; it was also about power-or at least a feeling of such.
"A Truck Does Not a Trucker Make"
A modern tractor-trailer is a very large machine. Though by definition its
operation requires the existence of an extensive technological system of highways,
142 Mrs. L. R. K. to the Editor, Overdrive (Sep. 1964): 13-4.
'43 Carol Horsey to the Editor, Overdrive (Nov. 1965): 17.
144 Bobbie Ann Mason, Shiloh and Other Stories (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), 16. For women who
preferred to keep their marriages intact, the option of team-driving with their husbands became increasingly
popular in the 1960s and '70s. See, e.g., Robert Lindsey, "Lonely Truckers Teaming up with Wives," NYT,
Dec. 15, 1971, 37.
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warehouses, manufacturers, shippers, fuel providers, and so on, the truck itself is a self-
contained prime mover under the complete control of one person. Guiding a machine
weighing up to 30 tons down the highway could provide a man with an incredible sense
of power. Especially for someone with little education and limited economic
opportunities, the feeling of control that came with piloting a big rig could make a man
feel that he, as an individual, mattered. This feeling helped shape a belief that truckers
were the "backbone of America"-a phrase notable not only because it appears on so
many belt buckles sold in modern truckstops, but because it is a direct extension of the
agrarian myth's contention that farmers were the "backbone of America." As the agrarian
myth had once declared that men who worked the soil held a privileged and separate
place within the moral and political universe, so truckers by the late 1970S came to define
themselves as a group apart from, yet central to, society at large. As Merle Haggard
declared in 1975, it took "a special breed to be a truck driving man."45
Trucks were not always giant machines. In the first few decades of the twentieth
century, rigs resembled horse-and-wagon delivery vehicles much more than small trains.
Several key technological developments in the 1920S and 1930S paved the way for the
arrival of the frighteningly large freighters of the postwar period; as noted in Chapter 1,
the pneumatic tire and detached trailers were key in this regard. Meanwhile, firms such
as Mack, Cummins Engine, and General Motors' Detroit Engines developed diesel
engines that provided higher compression ratios, more torque, better fuel economy, and
greater horsepower than gasoline engines. However, diesel engines were so much
heavier than gasoline engines that they did not become standard equipment until well
into the 1950s.'46 Making truck bodies that were large enough to accommodate a diesel
145 Merle Haggard, "Movin' On," Capitol 4085.
146 Cummins Engine Company Sales Manager, Press Release, "Diesel Equipped Automobile," Jan. 30, 1930,
Clessie Lyle Cummins Records, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, Box 1, Folder 2; C. L.
Cummins, "Recent Developments, Applications and Trends of High Speed Diesel Engines," speech before
ASME Oil and Gas Power Meeting, Dallas, TX, Jun. 6, 1938, ibid., Box 1, Folder 5; Stan Holtzman, Big Rigs:
The Complete History of the American Semi Truck (Stillwater, MN: Voyageur Press, 2001), 108; T. C.
Flaningham, "Factory Sales of Diesel Engines," May 2, 1958, International Harvester Company, Motor Truck
Engineering and Product Bulletins/Reports, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI, Box 14, Folder 1; T.
C. Flaningham, "Trucks with Diesel Engines-Over 26,000 GVW Class," Oct. 17, 1958, International
Harvester Company, Motor Truck Engineering and Product Bulletins/Reports, Wisconsin Historical Society,
Madison, WI, Box 14, Folder 1.
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power unit required the use of aluminum rather than steel, a process begun by the
Freightliner subsidiary of Consolidated Freightways in 1939 as part of an effort to build
trucks capable of climbing the mountainous terrain of the West.l47 With all of these parts
in place, the trucks that traversed America's highways after the end of World War II
deserved the name "big rigs."
The increasing size of postwar trucks presented drivers with an irony. Controlling
such a big, powerful machine would seem to affirm a man's strength and skill, but
achieving that control required the use of increasingly elaborate technologies. A popular
theme in trucking songs was the element of danger posed by high-speed highway travel,
requiring "big and burly men" to master machines that were always on the verge of
veering out of control on icy or mountainous roads crowded with teenagers and
drunks.l48 Flattery of a truck driving man's imagined skill was often seen as a way to sell
more records; as the jacket of the Willis Brothers' 1964 hit record "Give Me 40 Acres"
stated: "It takes a lot of skill and know-how to handle a big rig and bring the load in on
schedule."49 Like a bucking bronco, a big rig needed an "asphalt cowboy" to tame its
wildness. But as the tongue-in-cheek song "Asphalt Cowboy" noted, handling a big rig
was not exactly like taming a bronco, since the trucker had an "air-conditioned seat."'50
After the mid-1950s, trucks and trailers were also likely to have air suspensions, rather
than steel springs, which not only smoothed the ride for cargoes and drivers by
absorbing road vibrations, but also reduced "vertical whip" at the back end of the trailer
and minimized lateral sway as a truck moved through a tight curve.l51 Air suspensions,
however, decreased a driver's "feel" of the road, creating a "floating effect" that many
147 "Freightliner: Girding for a Shake-Out by Broadening Its Truck Market," BW, Nov. 10, 1980, 76-8;
Holtzman, Big Rigs, 58.
148 Daniel Blaine Fulkerson, "A Tombstone Every Mile," performed by Dick Curless, Allagash Records o101;
Fabor Robison, "Highway Man," performed by Curtis Leach, Fabor Records 135; Charlie Moore and Bill
Napier, "Hot Rod Kids and Women Drivers," King 936; Penny Jay and Robert Buddy Wilson, "Widow
Maker," performed by Jimmy Martin, Decca 74536.
149 Liner Notes to The Willis Brothers, Give Me 40 Acres (To Turn This Rig Around), Starday 681.
150 Clark Bentley and Lawton Williams, "Asphalt Cowboy," performed by Sleepy LaBeef, Plantation 66.
151 "Designing Profit into Trucks," BW, Mar. 30, 1957, 202; Emerson W. Swan, "'Air Ride' Suspension Gives
Us Better Cargo Protection," Power Wagon (Apr. 1957): 24.
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drivers found reduced their sense of control over the machine.l52 Similarly, Clessie
Cummins's invention of the "jake brake" in 1954 introduced a means of gaining more
control of a truck on a steep downgrade, but at the cost of deskilling a truck driving man.
Cummins's jake brake, or engine retarder, worked by automatically opening a valve near
the top of a diesel engine's compression stroke, releasing energy that would otherwise be
used to drive the vehicle's wheels; the engine in effect became a brake.153 The jake brake
(so named because it was produced by the Jacobs Manufacturing Company) provided
drivers in mountainous territory the ability to slow a truck's descent on a steep grade
with less use of standard brakes. Though some drivers considered the device to be "the
best invention since the wheel" since it lessened the chance for brake burnout, many also
found its automatic operation disconcerting, putting yet another layer of technology
between the driver and the road.154
The trade-offs between ease of driving and manliness also shaped the exterior
design of big rigs. Two basic tractor configurations exist: the "conventional" tractor with
its engine housed in a "nose" that extends out front of the windshield, and the "cab-over-
engine" design (introduced in 1908 by the Autocar company) in which the engine sits
beneath the driver, making the cab of the tractor look like a cube.155 A cab-over design is
generally acknowledged to provide a driver with significantly more control over the
machine, since the frontal placement of the windshield provides much better road vision,
and the shorter overall length of the tractor allows for tighter turns. A conventional style,
however, provides room for a larger, more powerful engine and, because of its longer
152 T. C. Flaningham, "Proposed Air Suspension for R-19o and Larger Trucks in City and Highway
Operations," Aug. 23, 1960, International Harvester Company, Motor Truck Engineering and Product
Bulletins/Reports, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI, Box 14, Folder 3, p. 16.
153 C. L. Cummins, "For Diesel 4 Cycle," [Notes on engine brake], May 20, 1954, Clessie Lyle Cummins
Records, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, Box 3, Folder 4; Clessie L. Cummins, U.S.
Patent 2,876,876, "Diesel Engine Braking Control," Application Nov. 25, 1955, patented Mar. 10, 1959,
Clessie Lyle Cummins Records, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, Box 3, Folder 4; Clessie
L. Cummins, U.S. Patent 3,220,392, "Vehicle Engine Braking and Fuel Control System," Application Jun. 4,
1962, patented Nov. 30, 1965, Clessie Lyle Cummins Records, Lilly Library, Indiana University,
Bloomington, IN, Box 3, Folder 5.
'54 Quote from Joe Barnett to the Editor, Overdrive (Jun. 1966): 28; C. Lyle Cummins, Jr. to Arthur M.
Stoner (Vice president, Jacobs Manufacturing Co.), Sep. 2, 1959, Clessie Lyle Cummins Records, Lilly
Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, Box 3, Folder 5; W. P. Wodell (Jacobs Manufacturing Co.), "C.
L. Cummins Compression Brake Marketing Survey," Feb. 8, 1960, Clessie Lyle Cummins Records, Lilly
Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, Box 3, Folder 6;
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wheelbase, gives the driver a smoother ride.'56 Furthermore, a conventional simply looks
more manly. The importance of the symbolic power of a manly-looking rig was well-
known by drivers and employers alike; it has been quite common for drivers to take a
substantial pay cut in order to be allowed to drive a conventional rather than a cab-
over.'5 7 This was especially true if that long-nosed tractor were a Peterbilt or Kenworth-
known as the equivalents of the "Mercedes" and "Cadillac" of big rigs, respectively. Both
companies have long been famous for producing custom-built, sharp-looking tractors
that appeal primarily to truckers looking for a rig that publicly announces its owner or
driver as a manly man. As one owner-operator put it, "Owning that big Pete [Peterbilt],
with the chrome stacks, the padded dashboard, and stereo radio, and shifting thirty-two
gears and chromed wheels, that's heaven."l58 The aesthetics of a custom-built truck have
often taken on an almost erotic tone, with magazines such as Overdrive dedicating
significant space to centerfold "Tractor of the Month" photographs of gleaming "Petes"
and "KWs."'s9
The experience of being behind the wheel of an enormous machine empowered
truckers as a social group riding high above mere "civilians" in their "four-wheelers." The
act of climbing up into a semi's cab has often been referred to by drivers as a thrill like no
other: "The minute you climb into that truck, the adrenaline starts pumping. If you want
to have a thrill, there's no comparison."160 Stepping down from such a high perch could
make a driver feel so low to the ground that he became "downright sick."161 Unlike the
operation of most industrial machinery, driving a big rig could produce a sense of
empowerment as one's body merged with the machine, creating a "high" for the
156 T. C. Flaningham, "Cab-Over-Engine Trucks," Oct. 21, 1958, International Harvester Company, Motor
Truck Engineering and Product Bulletins/Reports, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI, Box 14,
Folder 1; James Harold Thomas, The Long Haul: Truckers, Truck Stops, and Trucking (Memphis: Memphis
State University Press, 1979), 124-5.
157 Schwartz, J. B. Hunt, 76; Ouellet, Pedal to the Medal, 141, 192.
158 "Peterbilt Is Betterbilt," Overdrive (Sep. 1963): 24-6; "'all Come to Peterbilt Country!," Overdrive (Feb.
1972): 35; Holtzman, Big Rigs, 94; Terkel, Working, 214.
'59 See, e.g., Stan Holtzman, "Tractor of the Month," Overdrive (Sep. 1964): 26.
i60 Terkel, Working, 209. See also Jane Stern, Trucker: A Portrait of the LastAmerican Cowboy (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1975), 2.
i61 J. Anthony Lukas, "A Trucker's Grind: 'Me, the Rig and the Road'," NYT, Apr. 17, 1970, 32.
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driver.16 2 Rather than be dwarfed by the size of his rig, a driver could come to feel so
intimately connected to the equipment that, as one trucker put it, "a ground gear is a
feeling of pain as real as a cut or scratch would be to the operator."163 Becoming one with
the machine in this context made a man feel larger than himself, in direct contrast to
narratives of being a mere cog swallowed up and unmanned by the scale of industrial
machinery, as depicted most famously by Charlie Chaplin in the 1936 film Modern
Times. 64
Simply taking the wheel was not enough to make a driver into a fully empowered
truck driving man. In the words of Otto Riemer, "a truck does not a trucker make," by
which he meant that a true trucker was one who could harness the power of his machine
to drive safely and courteously, maneuver easily in tight positions, and maintain a
consistent speed in all types of terrain.l6 5 Opportunities to make such skills apparent to a
wider audience came in the form of "Truck Roadeos," state and national contests
sponsored by the American Trucking Associations beginning in 1937 that tested a
driver's knowledge of safety rules and his ability to drive skillfully through an obstacle
course consisting of barrels, tight alleys, and parallel parking stations. 166 Truckers
understood possession of such skills to be the essential distinction between themselves
and "civilians" whose small, maneuverable four-wheeled automobiles did not require the
ability to "anticipate situations a block ahead of you ... because you can't stop like a car's
gonna stop."'6 7 Echoing an idea central to trucking work culture, country songs about the
"King of the Open Road" warned the "dad-blamed tourists" that they had best respect the
power of the professional driver.16 8 One of the biggest hits of the genre, "Diesel on My
Tail" by Jim and Jesse McReynolds, poked fun at a driver of a "little foreign car" followed
162 Joseph A. Blake, "Occupational Thrill, Mystique and the Truckdriver," Urban Life and Culture 3, no. 2
(1974): 205-20.
'
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164 Modern Times, dir. Charles Chaplin, ulo min., Charles Chaplin Productions, 1936, videocassette.
65 Riemer, Hammer Down, 1o.
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167 Terkel, Working, 209.
168 Earl Grace and Tommy Hill, "King of the Open Road," performed by Red Sovine, Starday SLP 341; Robert
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by a giant diesel truck, who asked his rearview mirror with a "mighty pale" reflection,
"Can this compact take the impact?"6 9 Only a professional driver could control the raw
power contained under the hood of a big diesel.
The coded jargon of Citizen's Band radio helped contribute to the truck driver's
sense of himself as one of a "special breed." Although introduced in 1947 by the Citizens
Radio Corporation, the "CB" did not become standard equipment in trucks until the
1970s, after the invention of solid-state electronics made the mass production of
powerful, lightweight transmitter/receivers possible.l70 For many truckers, a CB was
simply a useful work tool, replacing ambiguous hand and headlight signals previously
used to communicate with other truckers about the location of police radar traps.l71 A
trucker could, for instance, radio to another passing in the opposite direct that his "front
door" was "clear" (meaning that no police lay in wait ahead), so he could feel free to "put
the hammer down" (accelerate). But CBs also became a way for truckers to create a sense
of solidarity as individuals distinct from the general populace, as they developed a
complex argot composed of obscure metaphors incomprehensible to outsiders.172
Marked by the use of a vaguely "Texarhoma" accent and an inventive sense of humor, CB
lingo transformed the mundane events, people, and places of a trucker's world into a
lively linguistic game. Pulling an empty trailer became "hauling post holes," an
unmarked police car was a "Smokey in a plain wrapper," a low overpass was a
"barbershop," a Volkswagen Beetle was a "pregnant rollerskate," a truckstop with
tasteless food was a "choke and puke," and so on.173
'
6 9 Jim Fagan, "Diesel on My Tail," performed by Jim and Jesse McReynolds and the Virginia Boys, Epic
10138; Dixie Deen, "'Diesel on My Tail'-Jim and Jesse," Music City News (May 1967): 6, 8, 10.
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"America with Its Ears On," New York Times Magazine, Apr. 25, 1976, 28. See also Thomas, Long Haul,
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Truckers' sense of separateness was further encouraged by the rise of the
truckstop as a space of male working-class culture. The modern truckstop appeared
primarily after the construction of the nation's interstate highways in the late 1950os and
196os, as small mom-and-pop roadside cafes were increasingly replaced by full-service
multiplexes, operated as chains by a few large petroleum companies.l74 For instance, the
Union Oil Company (Union 76) owned 300 of the 700 such truckstops built in the ten
years leading up to 1971.175 Built to lure truckers who spent hundreds of dollars on fuel at
each stop, the new truckstops offered some combination of food, coffee, truck washing
and repair, truck scales, restrooms and showers, lodging, and above all, a place to meet
other truckers.'76 To help truckers avoid interaction with the despised "civilians," most
truckstops created separate dining rooms and rest areas for "professional drivers only."
As the owner of a stop outside Tampa, Florida, explained in 1965: "We cater strictly to
Truckers and not to tourists."'77 The "professional drivers only" section provided a space
for truckers to fuel up on "loo-mile coffee" while swapping war stories about "Smokeys,"
road hazards, and "the different drunks that try to get under your wheels."'78 Truckstops
rather pointedly defied middle-class notions of dress, behavior, and taste; men wore
overalls and work boots or cowboy hats and big belt buckles, while eating meals where
quantity took precedence over quality.79 Truckstops created a space where suburban
middle-class individuals were meant to feel uncomfortable, a theme dramatized in
Steven Spielberg's 1971 made-for-TV movie Duel. The movie depicts a southern
174 William A. Clark, "Truck Valets," Wall Street Journal (hereafter WSJ), Nov. 28, 1951, 1, 11; Thomas J.
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72,75.
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'77 Kirk Slack to the Editor, Overdrive (Jul. 1965): 10-1.
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of truth. The issue was not that truckers did not prefer "good" food, but that their definition of "good" was
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provide a sensation of fullness for a reasonable price. See, for instance, R. M. (Johnnie) Johnson to the
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"Thumbs Down on the Following Truck Stops," Overdrive (Apr. 1963): 16. On postwar middle-class notions
of masculine meals, see Jesse Berret, "Feeding the Organization Man: Diet and Masculinity in Postwar
America," Journal of Social History 30 (Summer 1997): 805-26.
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Californian businessman, dressed in shirt and tie, who drives his compact Plymouth
Valiant into the rural landscape where truckers own the road-a fact that is driven home
after he cuts off a trucker in a gas tanker, unwittingly starting a deadly game of cat-and-
mouse driving in which the trucker repeatedly tries to run the commuter off the road. A
tense moment comes when the exhausted commuter pulls into a truckstop, hoping to
confront his unseen antagonist. Stepping into the diner, the milquetoast is clearly out of
his element, surrounded by sunburned men in cowboy boots and Stetson hats and big-
haired waitresses who emanate a palpable dislike for the outsider.18° The truckstop was a
place for truckers to bond, however briefly, as working-class men; all others were
unwelcome.
There were limits to the working-class solidarity of trucking culture. Particularly
for black truckers, the hope that one's identity as a truck driving man could take
precedence over one's racial identity too often proved unobtainable. A black trucker
named John J. Harris, for instance, wrote a letter to Overdrive in 1963 to complain of
separate but unequal facilities at truck stops in certain southern states: "When I start on
duty at my job I automatically lose my [racial] identity and become a 'trucker' and I
sincerely feel and will demand the same treatment and respect as any other 'trucker."'
But, as Harris noted, that respect was clearly lacking in segregated washrooms that did
not provide "the same decent and modern facilities as [those available to] the white
driver." Harris further recognized that the "professional drivers only" section of the
restaurant often implied "white drivers only," as "if they don't want us there."' 8, As in the
case of women, black truckers often found it difficult to be accepted as a "true" trucker in
an occupation dominated by white men. And like women, black truckers suffered from
informal and formal arrangements in Teamster locals that defined long-haul driving as a
white man's job, reserving for black men lower-paying jobs in warehouses, local delivery
driving, and "spotting" (guiding trucks to delivery docks).182
180 Duel, dir. Steven Spielberg, go min., Universal, 1971, videocassette.
i8s John J. Harris to the Editor, Overdrive (Nov. 1963): 11-2.
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359
The act of driving a truck could be an empowering experience, providing a sense
of controlling an enormous piece of machinery that marked a man as part of a distinctive
social group. Because the pride associated with this sense of power was so important to
truckers, they created carefully guarded boundaries to their group identity, excluding
"civilians," unskilled drivers, and black truckers from full membership. Like the old
agrarian myth that defined a farmer as a hard-working (white) man whose labor made
the lifestyles of lesser men possible, trucking culture imagined a truck driving man as
both central to American society yet essentially separate. In the 1970s, this sense of
separateness would take on a new intensity as the truck driving man came to understand
himself as the "last American cowboy."
'"Truckers Ain't Organization People!"
Anti-establishment sentiments, which ran strong in American trucking culture
from the earliest days of long-haul trucking in the 193os, emerged in the 1970s as a full-
fledged repudiation of all large-scale institutions. In particular, many truckers came to
deeply resent the very existence of large trucking firms, the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, and layers of government regulations which they saw as constraining their
sense of independent manhood. Truckers came to imagine themselves as outlaw figures
resisting all efforts of liberal society to bring stability and social cohesion to American
life-a process encouraged by a slew of popular culture representations of truckers as
cowboys, bandits, and renegades following in the wake of the "independent trucker"
shutdowns of the 1970s. The uprising, in both its political and mythological forms, drew
from a wellspring of anti-establishment resentment that had long simmered in the rural
social landscape, a resentment that had risen, abated, yet lived on after the Populist
agrarian movement of the 189os.183 In tune with a wider cultural moment in the 1970s
183 On the Populists, see Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt
in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978); John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History of the
Farmers'Alliance and the People's Party (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961 [1931]); Robert C.
McMath, Jr., American Populism: A Social History, 1877-1898 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993). Elizabeth
Sanders has persuasively argued in Roots of Reform (op. cit.) that the Populist movement, broadly
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when populism became a means of protesting liberal social change rather than
encouraging it, the "bandit" trucker who defied authority figures became a national
(anti-)hero.184 But like the original Populist movement, the independent trucker
shutdowns of the 1970S led to an unintended consequence, contributing to a push for the
economic deregulation of the trucking industry, which brought a new degree of chaos to
the rural industrial landscape.
The corporate consolidation of large sectors of the trucking industry in the 196os
contributed to the driver resentment that emerged in the 1970s. A wave of mergers
occurred in the general freight trucking business in the mid-196os, reshaping what
Business Week had declared in 1952 to be "one of the most loosely organized businesses
in the U.S." with "no central authority, no single data-collecting or coordinating agency,"
and in which "more than half of the trucks are owned by individuals who have just one
truck. l"8 5 Firms seeking to tame this chaotic situation were encouraged by the provisions
of the 1935 Motor Carrier Act, administered by the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC). The ICC required any trucking firm engaged in interstate commerce to receive a
license granting authority to operate in particular geographical areas, licenses which the
ICC did not readily give out, since its goal was to limit competition in the industry (see
Chapter 1). This effectively prevented most trucking firms, even the very largest, from
creating nationwide freight networks. A company wishing to deliver goods from one
coast to the other generally had to consign shipments to another trucking firm to get the
load through, preventing any opportunity to achieve economies of scale on a national
level. After the construction of the interstate highway system began in 1956, making
high-speed cross-country hauling both feasible and desirable, a number of companies
began buying up their competitors to attain authority to operate throughout the
nation.1 86
construed, did not in fact fail politically, since agrarian reformers helped push the federal government
towards a Progressive model of using the power of the national state to regulate the industrial economy. But
as even Sanders recognizes, this was not necessarily the intent of the Populist movement.
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One leading company in this regard was Consolidated Freightways of Menlo
Park, California. In the mid-195os Consolidated began reaching out from its established
position in the western half of the country to create a nationwide network. From 1957 to
1960, the company purchased 20 smaller truck lines and applied to the ICC for
permission to acquire 13 more. Once the acquisitions were in place, Consolidated had a
nationwide hub-and-spoke network consisting of more closely spaced freight terminals,
allowing it to reduce the mileage traveled between each terminal from 750 miles to an
average of 400 miles, providing greater operating efficiency and making it the largest
trucking firm in the nation.187 In the mid-196os, this trend accelerated. Between 1964
and 1965 alone, the ICC approved 200 mergers and acquisitions, contributing to a
decline in the number of for-hire trucking firms from 30,000 in 1935 to 15,000 in
1965.188 Companies such as Yellow Transit aggressively acquired competitors to gain
their operating authorities and terminals; by the mid-1970s, the firm had bought itself a
position as the third-largest trucking firm.18 9 It should be noted, however, that even with
these mergers the trucking industry remained much less concentrated than other
industries such as the railroads or airlines; as late as 1977, the three largest trucking
firms (Roadway Express, Consolidated, and Yellow) controlled only 13 percent of the
market of Class I (annual revenues over $3 million) for-hire, common-carrier interstate
freight. Although this sector of the trucking industry was the most profitable, the vast
majority of trucks continued to be operated by smaller firms, including Class II
($500,000 to $3 million in revenues) and Class III (revenues under $500,000)
regulated for-hire carriers, non-regulated haulers of exempt agricultural commodities,
and non-trucking firms operating their own private fleets.190 Nonetheless, the decade of
the 196os saw a significant introduction of corporate capital to an industry that
187 "Merger Trend Picks up Speed in Trucking as Rivalries Get Hot," BW, Jan. 2, 1960, 38-41.
188 "Trucking Rolls into an Age of Giants," BW, Jun. 12, 1965, 175, Lanotte Papers, Reel 1.
189 'Yellow Transit, Trucker in a Hurry," BW, Aug. 28, 1965, 61-6; "Routes (And How to Acquire Them),"
Forbes, May 15, 1977, 68-70.
190 American Trucking Associations, American Trucking Trends (Washington, DC: American Trucking
Associations, 1979).
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investment bankers had previously shunned as too unstable to warrant long-term
investment.'
For many truck drivers, this shift in the trucking industry marked a betrayal of
the spirit of trucking that had drawn them into the work in the first place. The most vocal
opponent of the increasingly corporate orientation of trucking was an ex-driver named
Mike Parkhurst. Parkhurst started trucking in 1951, at the age of 17, as an owner-
operator. A decade later, he sold his truck and used the proceeds to establish Overdrive
magazine to espouse his "populist philosophy" and speak in "The Voice of the American
Trucker," as the magazine's masthead proclaimed.192 In the first few issues of Overdrive,
which were essentially pamphlets sold for a dime at any truckstop willing to provide the
rack space, Parkhurst railed against unclean truckstops and user-unfriendly truck
designs, while advocating legalized prostitution and occasional use of amphetamines. By
February of 1962, however, Parkhurst took a more political direction, having decided
that he was a "radical conservative."'93 Parkhurst proclaimed the mission of Overdrive in
a 1962 manifesto for the independent truckers of the world: "Today, the small
businessman is being swallowed up by the big businessman.... Yet, there remains a
combination small businessman and adventurer [who] is commonly referred to as a
trucker. While this may seem to be a romantic description of a tired ex-farmer from
Iowa, that is just what many thousands of truckers are." Parkhurst vowed to fight for the
independent trucker who represented the only hope for a society overrun by corporate
control; to that end, he would publish brutally honest stories, whether about venereal
disease or corporate greed, no matter how many advertisers were offended.l94 As he later
told a reporter for Time, he wanted "to wake the truckers up to the fact that they're slaves
191 "Merger Trend Picks Up," 38.
192 "Truckin' with Overdrive," Trime, Sep. 1, 1975, 56.
193 Harry Maurer, "Organizing the 'Gypsies'," Nation, Jan. 11, 1975, 12.
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consistently offending advertisers; the White truck manufacturing company, for instance, pulled its account
after a story criticized one of its machines. Nonetheless, the magazine did well financially, especially after it
raised its price per issue to $1, and then to $2.50 ("The Price of the Truth"), circulating to approximately
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to a monopoly."19 5 But if Parkhurst directed his early populist anger towards big
corporations, most of his venom-and that of many truckers in the 1970s-was reserved
for big labor and big government.
Many truckers came to believe that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
was an impediment to their independence in the 1970s. As detailed in Chapter 1, the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters reached its greatest strength in the mid-196os.
For three decades the Teamsters had honed a strategy that paradoxically combined the
use of brute force and pragmatic "business unionism" to organize large and medium-
sized trucking firms. By 1964, the Teamsters gained the acceptance of a National Master
Freight Agreement, binding nearly every large trucking firm in the country to a standard
labor contract that covered approximately 450,000 truck drivers.l96 The Teamsters had
become the nation's largest single union, exercising significant influence in the economic
relations of the trucking industry as well as in local, state, and federal politics.197
That power, however, had largely been achieved by union leaders dedicated more
to the enlargement of the organization's membership and jurisdictional reach than to
empowering rank-and-file Teamster members. The Teamsters did, of course, achieve
significant improvements in the wages, benefits, and working conditions of its members.
For an industry that had begun in the 1930S with essentially no labor standards, the
truck-driving members of the postwar Teamsters had made remarkable gains of job
stability, seniority rights, strong wages, guaranteed pensions, and paid vacations, among
other benefits. As Teamster member Harvey Holliday declared in 1978, his membership
in Local 641 had assured him "plenty of work and in terms of direct pay, I'm doing
well."'98 Especially in comparison to general trends in industrial wage gains, Teamsters
benefited handsomely from union membership. The differential between the average
Teamster's annual earnings and his counterparts in general manufacturing industries
195 "Truckin' with Overdrive," 56.
196 Harold M. Levinson, et al., Collective Bargaining and Technological Change in American
Transportation (Evanston, IL: Transportation Center at Northwestern University, 1971), 19-20.
197 Russell, Out of the Jungle; Ralph C. James and Estelle Dinerstein James, Hoffa and the Teamsters: A
Study of Union Power (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1965).
198 "Life of a Trucker Has Changed over the Decades," NYT, Dec. 14, 1978, A27.
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increased from 19 percent in 1938 to 72 percent in 1972.199 These achievements had
come primarily under the leadership of Dave Beck and his protege James R. Hoffa, both
of whom established the political and economic strength of the union by centralizing
power in their own hands and creating an exceptionally undemocratic internal
bureaucracy. Hoffa declared the reason for this centralization in 1957: "The future of
labor-management relations is big labor and big business, for there is no room for the
small business or the small union."200 Remarkably, this attitude did not necessarily
alienate rank-and-file members from their union's leadership, even when Hoffa used his
power to make shady business deals with mobsters, inviting close federal scrutiny and
eventually a prison sentence for defrauding the union's pension funds. As one driver
explained his unshakeable commitment to Jimmy Hoffa, even after a series of Senate
racketeering investigations in 1958 had brought negative publicity to his union: "Every
year that old raise is there, and it has been ever since Hoffa took over."20' Many rank-
and-filers in the 196os remained deeply loyal to the Teamsters union that, although it
had utterly silenced individual members' voices in labor negotiations, had nonetheless
brought them undeniable economic benefits.20 2
The signing of the National Master Freight Agreement (NMFA) in 1964, however,
marked not only the extraordinary rise of Teamster power but also the beginning of a
steady decline in the number of truck drivers belonging to the union. Four years after the
signing of the first NMFA, approximately 500,000 truck drivers belonged to the
Teamsters (out of 1.6 million total members). By 1976, the number of unionized long-
haul truckers had decreased to 280,000, and by 1985 that number had dropped to
160,000.203 These decreases came at a time when overall employment in the trucking
industry increased, so that between 1966 and 1977, the volume of freight carried by
199 Council on Wage and Price Stability, The Value of Motor Carrier Operating Authorities (Washington,
DC: Council on Wage and Price Stability, 1977), 31.
200 Witwer, Corruption and Reform, 139.
20 1A. H. Raskin, "Why They Cheer for Hoffa," New York Times Magazine, Nov. 9, 1958, 78.
202 Russell, Out of the Jungle, 213-26.
203 Charles R. Perry, Deregulation and the Decline of the Unionized Trucking Industry (Philadelphia:
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1986), 35, 110.
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unionized truckers declined by approximately 25 percent.2 0 4 The reasons for this decline
were multiple, but were primarily rooted in the growth of smaller non-union trucking
firms and self-employed owner-operator truckers. The growth of such firms was partly
due, as we have seen in earlier chapters, to the expansion of trucking companies hauling
specialized commodities such as milk, beef, and frozen foods (along with non-
agricultural commodities such as steel, furniture, and petrochemicals). Shippers of such
products valued the flexibility of service that small trucking firms could provide. Unlike
the large common carriers, such as Consolidated Freightways, smaller firms did not
make deep investments in hub-and-spoke freight terminals to gain overall systemic
operating efficiency by consolidating, breaking up, and reconsolidating less-than-
truckload (LTL) shipments. Instead the smaller companies focused on hauling full
truckload (TL) shipments that only required them to drive up to the loading site and haul
the load directly to its destination. The hub-and-spoke system of the LTL shippers
provided systemic efficiency by creating a network of short, regular routes, but also
required big outlays of capital, salaried systems engineers, and reams of paperwork to
coordinate the logistics. Smaller TL companies needed only their trucks and trailers and
a willingness to show up wherever and whenever their services were needed.
Many of these firms were located in rural areas, where the small-business, non-
unionized pattern set by agricultural trucking firms had already been well established. In
Kansas in 1962, for instance, 95 percent of the state's trucking companies had fewer than
five employees each.20 5 Such small, rural firms had proven consistently difficult for the
Teamsters to organize, as exemplified by a failed effort in the summer of 1960 by a
Teamster recruiter to organize Hanefeld Trucking, a small cattle-hauling firm in central
Wisconsin. Hanefeld employed 12 drivers, making it the largest (yes, the largest) cattle-
hauling firm in the state at the time. Though the drivers were assured that "only through
the Teamsters Union can you make this job a decent one," the Hanefeld brothers who
owned the firm threatened to cease operations if the workers organized. Only six of the
204 Harold M. Levinson, "Trucking," in Collective Bargaining: Contemporary American Experience, ed.
Gerald G. Somers (Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1980), 135.
205 "Trucking Industry Second in Kansas," Wichita Eagle, Jun. 10, 1962.
366
drivers voted to accept Teamster representation, with the other six drivers and four
additional employees opting out.206 In similarly hostile situations in earlier times-as in
a successful drive to organize small companies in Nebraska in the early 1950s-the
Teamsters had been able to resort to secondary boycotts (i.e., cutting off a firm's supplies
of fuel, tires, and truck parts delivered by drivers at organized firms) to compel
recalcitrant companies to sign collective bargaining agreements.2 07 But when Congress
passed the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959, the secondary boycott used so effectively over
the years by the Teamsters became illegal, forcing the union to rely solely on the much
less effective methods of picketing and firm-by-firm balloting.208
Non-union trucking firms consequently sprouted rapidly in the 1960os and 1970s,
particularly in rural areas where anti-union sentiments had always run strong, making
worker-initiated organizing campaigns unlikely. Many of these firms started out small,
such as the trucking company established by cattle farmer Lamar Beauchamp in Winter
Haven, Florida, in the early 1960s to haul carcasses from midwestern beef packing plants
to supermarkets in the Southeast. What started as a fleet of five reefer trucks expanded
dramatically in 1965, however, when Beauchamp decided to buy out the Refrigerated
Transport Company. Although Refrigerated Transport was one of the nation's largest
trucking firms at the time, it was on the verge of bankruptcy, and sold out to Lamar
Beauchamp and his son Richard for only $600,000. By employing solely non-union
owner-operator drivers, the Beauchamps were able to undercut the freight rates of
unionized firms hauling perishables. By 1980 Refrigerated Transport had become the
206 "Hanefeld Trucking (Brothers)," notes by anonymous Teamsters Local 695 recruiter, n.d. (May 1960?);
"Hanefeld Election ... Eligibility List as Submitted by the Company," n.d. (Jun. 1960); A. E. Mueller
(Teamsters Local 695) to All Hanefeld Trucking Employees, Jun. 29, 1960; National Labor Relations Board,
Certification of Results of Election, Case No. 13-RC-7223, Jul. 18, 1960, all in IBT 695 Records, Box 37,
Folder 1.
207 "Minutes of Meeting Held at Lincoln Hotel," Jan. 11, 1951, International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Records, Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI, Reel 63.
208 The Landrum-Griffin Act emerged out of the Senate anti-racketeering hearings of 1957 and 1958 headed
by Senator John McClellan, with Robert F. Kennedy serving as lead counsel and publicist of the committee's
investigation into corruption charges in various unions (but particularly the Teamsters). The Landrum-
Griffin Act did not outlaw the secondary boycott, which had already been made illegal by the Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947; it simply closed up a loophole in the Taft-Hartley legislation that had allowed the Teamsters to
insert "hot cargo" clauses in its contracts, meaning that organized employees could refuse to handle "hot"
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nation's largest reefer trucking firm.209 Such firms often practiced a form of welfare
capitalism reminiscent of the 1920S to keep truckers loyal to the "family atmosphere" of
a company. This was the case at Merrill Transport of Maine, which maintained its status
as the largest non-union trucking firm in that state in the 1970s by offering profit-
sharing plans, promotion to managerial status from within the ranks of drivers, and a
"generous Christmas program."21 0 The single largest non-union trucking firm, Overnite
Transportation of Richmond, Virginia, similarly relied on a welfare capitalist strategy in
the 1970S to fend off the Teamsters, though the company supplemented this strategy
with less benign tactics. Begun as a one-truck affair in the 1930os by Harwood Cochrane
(a former dairy farmer), Overnite expanded rapidly in the 196os and 1970s by buying up
struggling unionized companies, laying off all the drivers, and filling the jobs with
"extremely loyal people."211 Under Cochrane's direction, Overnite earned a reputation as
a virulently anti-union company, even pouring salt in the wound by successfully suing
the Teamsters in 1961 for $863,193 in damages caused by a secondary boycott.22 As
such companies, along with a host of much smaller concerns, flourished in the 1970s, the
"independent" owner-operator became a much more common figure in the trucking
industry. In 1979, industry analyst Daryl Wyckoff estimated that approximately 100,000
of the nation's 500,000 long-haul truckers were owner-operators, and most (upwards of
80 percent) did not belong to any union.21 3 A 1977 article in U.S. News argued that the
209 Jean A. Briggs, "Put that Hammer Down, Good Buddy!," Forbes, Sep. 1, 1980, 118-20.
210 Merrill, Forty-Six Years a Truckman, 23-4. On corporate welfare as a tool for preventing unionization,
see Sanford M. Jacoby, Modern Manors: Welfare Capitalism since the New Deal (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1997); David Brody, Workers in IndustrialAmerica: Essays on the Twentieth Century
Struggle, 2nd Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 48-81; Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New
Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 159-83;
Ellis W. Hawley, The Great War and the Searchfor a Modern Order: A History of the American People and
Their Institutions (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), 68-71;
211 "From One Secondhand Truck to a Giant Truckline," Nation's Business, Jul. 1978, 40-6, quote on 44.
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owner-operators (approximately 20%) belonged to the Teamsters. Perry, Deregulation and the Decline of
the Unionized Trucking Industry, 62. This was also the percentage given by a 1977 ICC survey of owner-
operators; Interstate Commerce Commission, Independent Trucker, 17. However, as Wyckoff and Maister
pointed out in their 1975 survey of owner-operators, government agencies tended to undercount owner-
operators, since they often ignored many haulers of exempt agricultural commodities; this would make the
percentage of unionized owner-operators significantly less than 20%. See Wyckoff and Maister, Owner-
Operator, 8-12.
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Teamsters union was itself to blame for the trend, having been so successful at gaining
wage increases over the years that "its members are being priced out of their jobs."214
But for many truckers who chose to join non-union firms, the issue at hand was
not a matter of pure economics, but a more generalized sense that the Teamsters
leadership had lost touch with the working man. The centralized bureaucracy that had
developed a powerful means of attaining nationwide bargaining-a remarkable feat in an
inherently decentralized industry-appeared to many truckers in the 1970S to be allied
with all the big institutions constraining the independence of the trucker. As an owner-
operator steel hauler (and former Teamster), told Studs Terkel in 1974, "Outside of the
dues money [the Teamsters] take out of your check, they did absolutely nothing. They
did less than nothing.... They're establishment. They're interlocked with the steel mills
and the trucking companies."215 This statement from a steel hauler represented a
broader sentiment among owner-operators in that industry, as had become clear during
a set of violent wildcat strikes in 1967 and 1970 in Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. A
group of owner-operators belonging to the Teamsters organized a dissident group called
the Fraternal Association of Steel Haulers (FASH), determined to gain recognition within
the union for their unique needs "as the semi-independent owner-operators of their own
expensive equipment." As one member of FASH stated the aim of the wildcat strikes,
"The [T]eamsters say they represent you, but they don't. We're just dues payers."216 The
formation of FASH was only part of a much broader frustration with the Teamsters
among many truckers in the 1970s. As an anonymous trucker told writer Robert Krueger
in 1975, "The Teamsters don't give a damn about the rank and file now."217 In a work
214 "A Big Union that's Haunted by Its Own Success," U.S. News and World Report, Aug. 8, 1977, 75.
215 Terkel, Working, 211-12.
216 Christopher Lydon, "Steel Truckers Will Press Fight," NYT, May 25, 1970, 43. See also John Kifner,
"Thousands of Workers Are Laid off as Result of Wildcat Teamster Strike," NYT, May 3, 1970, 80; Samuel R.
Friedman, Teamster Rank and File: Power, Bureaucracy, and Rebellion at Work and in a Union (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1982). FASH was not the only group to form within the Teamsters to push
for a decentralization of power; a national group called the Teamsters United Rank and File (TURF) pushed
for reforms beginning in 1970. Although it was dissolved several years later, its place was taken by the
Professional Road Drivers Council (PROD) and Teamsters for a Democratic Union (TDU), both of which
promoted insurgent candidates for leadership of the national union, though with little success. See Kenneth
C. Crowe, Collision: How the Rank and File Took back the Teamsters (New York: Scribner's, 1993).
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culture that defined a true trucker as a self-made man, the Teamsters increasingly
seemed parasitic, demanding membership dues without offering meaningful
participation in union decisions in return. Writer Frederic Will, for instance, interviewed
an independent trucker from Johnsons Corners, St. Louis, in the early 198os who
professed "a strong contempt for the Teamsters." Though the driver received his load
assignments from trucking brokers who charged him ten percent of each load's revenue,
he considered this a deal compared to paying "thirty percent to the Teamsters."218 The
pages of Overdrive magazine were consistently filled with anti-Teamsters diatribes, of
which the following is representative: "I have lived for ten years without the Union and I
can say I've been really happy.... I was hired for my willingness and dependability as a
man. I don't have to sell myself to anybody to make a living."219 The measure of a truck
driving man in this formulation was not merely the thickness of his pay envelope, but his
ability to fend for himself in a difficult economic environment.2 2 0
The deep involvement of government in regulating that economic environment
came to be particularly despised by truckers in the 1970s. Even for truckers who were
exempt from the economic regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the
presence of agents of government-whether local, state, or federal-was a persistent
feature of the daily work experience. The most obvious agents were police, disparaged as
"Smokeys" or "county mounties," whose speeding tickets and radar traps provided a
constant source of irritation for drivers. Most truckers, however, understood the need for
reasonable controls in the name of safety; in fact, truckers generally took great pride in
their ability to avoid citations for violation of traffic laws.2 1 Country musician Red
218 Will, Big Rig Souls, 5.
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370
Simpson, for his part, recorded an entire album dedicated to highway police in 1966, The
Man behind the Badge, seeing no contradiction with his catalog of trucking songs.222
Much more vexing for truckers were the bewildering array of state-level
regulations and taxes. Each state set its own restrictions on maximum weight, height,
and length of trucks and trailers; in Western states these rules were often quite liberal,
while in the so-called "iron curtain" stretching through seven states from Illinois down to
Mississippi, the limits were more strict. Furthermore, each state devised its own method
for measuring a truck's weight or length. Some would consider the weight of the tractor
separately from the trailer while others weighed the entire assembly; some measured the
length of a truck from the front of the tractor to the rear of the trailer while others
measured only the length of the trailer. Adding to the confusion, some states required
truckers to register and license a vehicle in that state, while other states participated in
reciprocity agreements that would allow a trucker to register only once and pay only one
fee to gain authority to travel through multiple states. Certain states charged fuel taxes
based on the mileage driven through the state, even if the driver did not purchase fuel in
that state, while others charged a ton-mile tax instead. Interstate travel required a driver
to have intimate knowledge of all of these rules and many more, a task that was still
further complicated by the fact that the rules were constantly changing and often
arbitrarily enforced.223 Truckers may have imagined themselves "kings of the open
road," but that myth was belied by their need to navigate through a dense web of weigh
stations, ports of entry, reams of paperwork, layers of taxation, and often contradictory
regulations.
Federal regulations limiting the number of hours a driver could spend on duty
were consistently despised since 1938. In that year, the Interstate Commerce
222 Red Simpson, The Man behind the Badge, Capitol ST 2569. The album reached #34 on the Billboard
country charts; his Roll, Truck, Roll album reached #7 the same year.
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Commission declared that truckers could drive no more than o10 hours in one day nor
more than 60 hours in one week; furthermore, drivers were required to keep a "log book"
tracking the time they spent driving, loading or unloading, resting, and sleeping.22 4
Truckers often called these records "lie books" since they were relatively easy to falsify
(by undercounting fuel stops or counting dock waits as off-duty time, for instance).2 2 5
Even so, truckers deeply resented a system that not only devalued their individual
judgment of their ability to drive safely, but also placed them between "conflicting
demands of government and business."226 A trucking firm would often ask a driver to
deliver a load in a specified amount of time-knowing full well that this would not be
possible if the driver followed both speed limits and hours-of-service rules. For instance,
a driver from San Antonio was routinely asked in the early 196os to make second-
morning deliveries to Los Angeles, a feat that he could only accomplish by working
beyond the legal hours limit and "juggling the logs."227 For Otto Riemer, who dedicated
an entire chapter to "Government" in a 1985 memoir of his life in trucking, such
practices were a sign that big government had aligned with big business to subject the
independent trucker to the arbitrary exercise of power. "Out on the road we are little
more than checkers," wrote Riemer, "being moved on the boards of power by the agents
of government.... Big Brother is no longer merely looking over our shoulders, he is slowly
but surely taking complete control over our lives."228
Riemer's statements captured an anti-statist sentiment that by the mid-1970os was
a central part of trucker culture, as one can easily see by opening any issue of Overdrive
magazine from the period. Riemers's statement deserves particular attention, however,
because it was delivered as part of a remarkably complex political orientation that cannot
be labeled either conservative or libertarian. In a book ostensibly about his experiences
as a truck driver, Riemer offered eloquent commentaries on a broad range of political
224 William R. Childs, Trucking and the Public Interest: The Emergence of Federal Regulation, 1914-1940
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1985), 164.
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372
topics, including opposition to abortion and drugs and welfare and taxation and
corporate capitalism, as well as support for racial and economic equality and organized
labor (but not the Teamsters) and animal rights and pollution control and free
enterprise.2 29 Though such a mix of views may seem contradictory, for Riemer the entire
package was coherent in its concern for the most vulnerable members of society and its
opposition to all forms of institutionalization, bureaucratization, and corporatization.
Riemer's version of populist politics was by no means his alone; as one driver told Studs
Terkel: "It's a strange thing about truckers, they're very conservative. They come from a
rural background or think of themselves as businessmen. But underneath the veneer
they're really very democratic and softhearted and liberal.... You tell 'em they're liberal
and you're liable to get your head knocked off. But when you start talking about things,
the war, kids, when you really get down to it, they're for everything that's liberal."230 The
rural backgrounds, daily work experiences, and absorbed mythologies of many truckers
made them deeply resistant to intrusions of big business, big labor, and big
government--but this did not necessarily make them social, economic, or political
conservatives. 23 '
The populist politics of trucking culture erupted in an abortive political
movement during the 1970os-the independent trucker shutdowns of 1973, 1974, and
1979. Though the shutdowns were triggered by a sudden rise of fuel prices following the
OPEC oil embargo of 1973-4 and the energy crisis of 1979, the protests drew on a much
deeper set of grievances. Like the agrarian revolts of the late 19th century, the
independent trucker shutdowns of the 1970s were characterized by an angry
dissatisfaction with the broad contours of industrial capitalism, the distant powers-that-
be that applauded the self-made man while simultaneously constraining his
229 Ibid., passim.
230 Terkel, Working, 210.
231 Truckers were not the only Americans to cultivate an "indigenous populism" based on a resistance to
modern forms of capitalism, the state, and labor relations; as David A. Horowitz has argued, such views
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373
opportunities to be that man. Also like the agrarian protests, the shutdowns were
characterized by the difficulties of organizing a political movement composed of fiercely
independent individuals, making the truckers as unsuccessful as the Populists at
achieving their direct demands for reform.
In the wake of the OPEC oil embargo, the price of diesel fuel rose from an average
of 31 cents per gallon in May 1973 to 50 cents in September. Fuel became as scarce as it
was expensive, prompting the Nixon administration to imposed a nationwide 55 miles-
per-hour speed limit in November in an effort to promote conservation. Owner-operator
truckers suddenly found themselves in a tight squeeze, forced to pay more for fuel while
also carrying fewer revenue-providing loads at the lower speeds. A spontaneous protest
erupted in December 1973 when three truckers with the CB handles Dopey Diesel, Big
Sissy, and Doggy Daddy stopped their tractor-trailers on the middle of Interstate 84 on
the New York-Connecticut state line, blocking traffic for an hour and a half. Later that
day, another blockade formed on Interstate 80 near Blakeslee, Pennsylvania and lasted
all night.232 These incidents were soon followed by owner-operator truckers blocking
roads and encircling fuel pumps around the country, prompting Mike Parkhurst of
Overdrive to call on all owner-operators to unite in a simultaneous nationwide shutdown
on December 13 and 14 to dramatize their plight.233 Thousands of drivers heeded the call,
whether by parking their rigs in the middle of a highway or by simply staying home. A
number of owner-operators became more militant, seeking to prevent other truckers
from moving on the highways by toting shotguns, puncturing tires, and throwing bricks
and bottles at windshields. Angry truckers planted a bomb in an empty tractor cab in
Arkansas, while at least 35 episodes of gunfire were reported by December 15.234 On that
date, the first shutdown officially ended, having achieved nothing but unsympathetic
232 "The Shutdown," Overdrive (Jan. 1974): 40; Harry Maurer, "Organizing the 'Gypsies'," Nation, Jan. 11,
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publicity and a determination among several leaders to coordinate a second and larger
protest.2 35
That second protest came in January-February 1974, emerging out of a hastily
organized conference at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington. Approximately 19 different
groups had arrived to represent the distressed owner-operator, bearing names such as
American Truckers for the Country and the Council of Independent Truckers, along with
already established groups such as the Fraternal Association of Steel Haulers (FASH)
and the Mid-West Truckers Association. Seeking to make the second shutdown more
than just a publicity stunt, the leaders of these groups hammered out a list of demands,
which would be presented to the Congress and President Nixon by a five-man group
named the Truckers Unity Council, headed by William Hill, the president of FASH.
Among the demands were a request to roll back the price of gasoline and diesel fuel to
May 1973 levels, a guarantee of fuel supplies for commercial use, and a public audit of
petroleum firms. The Council issued a statement calling for a nationwide shutdown on
January 31, but the leader of the Ohio-based Council of Independent Truckers demanded
the shutdown begin the day after the meeting, January 24. In response, the second
shutdown began in Akron, Ohio, on the 24th, quickly spreading to Pennsylvania and
then to most of the nation, from New Jersey to Oklahoma, in early February.236
Once again the protests were violent, with gunshots and bricks thrown through
windshields killing two drivers and injuring dozens more. The governors of Florida,
Pennsylvania, and Ohio called out the National Guard to ride shotgun with drivers who
refused to be intimidated by the protestors. Even so the flow of commodities was
drastically reduced, particularly impacting steel mills, farmers, and supermarkets.2 37
Beef packers and steel plants in the Midwest, cut off from their supplies, laid off
thousands of workers; Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz predicted that farmers would
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lose millions of dollars as perishables rotted in storage; grocers warned of "serious
shortages" as consumers raided meat and produce cases; and McDonald's resorted to
airlifts to bring hamburger patties to its Midwestern restaurants.238 On February 6, 7,
and 8, the Truckers Unity Council met with William J. Usery, Jr., a Nixon aide, to
present their list of demands. After tense negotiations, the government offered to
institute a freeze on the retail price of diesel fuel until March 1 and grant a 6 percent
surcharge on the rates of regulated trucking firms to absorb some of the cost of fuel. The
offer was essentially meaningless, since Nixon had already frozen the price of fuel, and
the rate increase would provide no relief for owner-operators who did not contract with
regulated carriers (such as produce and livestock haulers). Thousands of truckers refused
to acknowledge the Unity Council's call for an end to the shutdown, agreeing with
trucker Ralph Meeks of Birmingham, Alabama, who called the "so-called settlement"
"inadequate." By February 12, however, most truckers had given up on achieving more,
and returned to the roads "trying to get a few bucks in their pocket."2 39 Mike Parkhurst,
who had not participated in the negotiations, called the deal a "sellout" and used the
pages of Overdrive to call for "The Real Shutdown" in May. The planned protest never
materialized, however, with many truckers believing "they could not afford to shut down
again." 240
Fuel costs and speed limits may have sparked the conflagration, but something
much deeper was at stake. A truck driving man was supposed to be the king of the open
road, the backbone of America, not a mere cog in the wheels of global energy politics.
Harry Davis, an owner-operator hauling produce out of Florida, painted on the side of
his trailer what he saw as the mission of the shutdowns: a "Fight for Freedom" and "The
American Way."2 41 By refusing to haul the loads that made the American consumer's
238 Steven R. Weisman, "Strike of Truck Drivers Makes 75,000 Jobless," NYT, Feb. 6, 1974, 20.
239 William Robbins, "Truckers Reach Accord, Leaders Ask Strike End," NYT, Feb. 8, 1974, 65; Philip
Shabecoff, "Most Truckers Still Idle," NYT, Feb. 9, 1974, 1, 14; "Most Truckers End 11-Day Strike," NYT, Feb.
12, 1974, 69.
240 "Another Truck Strike Set," NYT, Apr. 2, 1974, 7; "Truckers' Strike Called a Failure," NYT, May 14, 1974,
75; Maurer, "Organizing the 'Gypsies'," 14.
241 "Thousands of Truck Drivers Stay off the Road to Protest Effects of Fuel Shortage," NYT, Dec. 14, 1973,
18.
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lifestyle possible, truckers hoped to call widespread attention to the importance of their
work and to the threats posed to their sense of independent manhood. Those threats
were multiple. Powerful corporations seemed at least partly to blame, as one group
called on truckers to get off the highways and blockade the American Petroleum Institute
instead for its promotion of "profiteering by the major oil companies."2 42 The Teamsters
also came under fire-often quite literally, since the trucks of "company drivers" who
worked for a guaranteed wage (and therefore did not immediately feel the squeeze of
rising fuel costs) were generally the objects of thrown bottles and shotgun blasts.2 43 And
most important, the government seemed directly to blame. "The Great White Fathers
back in Washington don't give a damn about truck drivers," said John Welcher, a truck
driver from Bennett, Iowa.2 44
For truckers like Welcher, the nation's political leaders seemed completely out of
touch with the economic reality and work experiences of the common man. This fact was
made especially clear by Nixon's imposition of a 55 miles-per-hour speed limit. Drivers
insisted that they achieved better fuel economy at 70 miles per hour, since their engines
were geared for greatest efficiency at high speeds. It did not matter that engineers at
General Motors had used computer models demonstrating that speeds above 55
increased air resistance and brought lower fuel economy.2 45 The very idea of a
Washington bureaucrat telling a professional driver how to do his job produced a deep
sense of loathing. For years, Big John Trimble refused to say "55" on his all-night trucker
radio show, considering the term an "obscenity."2 46 Adding to the truckers' ire was the
fact that the Nixon administration not only did not provide any real relief for the owner-
operators, but attributed the "settlement" that was reached to Frank Fitzsimmons, the
president of the Teamsters, rather than to the Truckers Unity Council.2 47 The
242 Philip Shabecoff, "Truck Drivers Plan National Stoppage," NYT, Dec. 8, 1973, 18.
243 David Harris, "The Truckers Go to Washington," Rolling Stone, Apr. 23, 1974, 55-6.
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government appeared to have aligned with big trucking companies, petroleum firms, and
organized labor to crush the independent working man.
Beyond an exasperation with the specific actions and inactions of the powers-
that-were, however, the truckers were protesting the very existence of those powers.
Corporations, labor unions, and the regulatory agencies of the government seemed to be
sucking the economic lifeblood from the men who made America run. "We can't take no
more," explained Joseph Lehoe, an owner-operator who participated in the shutdowns.
"We're caught in the middle," he continued, meaning that maintaining his livelihood
depended on the difference between the revenues gained from shippers-who pushed for
the lowest possible freight rates-and the costs of trucking-which were pushed as high
as possible by fuel companies and state and federal taxation and regulation.248 This
feeling of economic helplessness explains why truckers like Lehoe-who professed to
have been "enraged" by the student anti-war protests of the 196os-would engage in a
violent mass public protest even though most would not have considered themselves
radical.249 In fact, for many truckers the greatest achievement of the shutdowns was a
renewed sense of independent manhood. As "Big Sissy," one of the instigators of the first
blockade on 1-84 in Connecticut, put it: "Maybe we're all getting back our self-respect.
Feels good to walk tall and look a man in the eye again, doesn't it?"25 Or in the words of
Don Miller, "the average truck driver ... has finally spoken."251 The shutdowns failed to
achieve any of the truckers' stated aims, but they provided a public forum for truckers to
assert their importance to the American economy and demand respect as bearers of true
manhood.
248 Agis Sakulpas, "Owner Driver Gives Case for Fuel Protest," NYT, Jan. 31, 1974, 19. When the ICC
interviewed a sample of 479 owner-operators in 1977, it received similar responses from more than half of
the respondents. One trucker, for instance, pointed out that although the cost of his tractor was
"astronomical" at $26,000, that amount was still "$5.41 short of the total that it cost me to operate my
tractor.... When fuel cost has risen 110o percent and ... freight rates have been increased less than 30 percent,
there is no way owner-operators can survive." ICC, Independent Trucker, 15.
249 Ibid.; Maurer, "Organizing the 'Gypsies'," 15; Charles Bisanz, "The Anatomy of a Mass Public Protest
Action: A Shutdown by Independent Truck Drivers," Human Organization 36, no. 1 (1977): 63-9.
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That respect came in the mid-1970s, though perhaps not in the exact form
desired, when a sudden outpouring of popular culture media celebrated truckers as the
"last American cowboys." Author Jane Stern used the phrase as the subtitle of her 1975
book, in which she admitted that "the reality can never match the legend," but
nonetheless dedicated 163 pages of text and photographs to comparing truckers to the
riders of the Old West.252 The term held a certain irony, since truckers used "cowboy" as
a derogatory epithet for reckless drivers or ridiculous dressers-"Those who are just
plain unable, mechanically speaking, to own and operate a rig. The ones with the 'double
clutching boots' and the 'chain drive billfolds'," as one driver put it.253 The idea of the
trucker as a renegade figure who refused to bow to authority, however, gained purchase
in the social climate of the 1970s, as the "Southernization" of America brought an
explosion of cultural forms celebrating individual freedom, family values, and hell-
raising in the name of defying mainstream urban modernity.2 5 4 Merle Haggard's tongue-
in-cheek 1969 hit song "Okie from Muskogee" celebrated moonshine and patriotism over
marijuana and free love.255 "Okie" helped define a new sub-genre of music known as
"outlaw country," in which Haggard, Johnny Paycheck, David Allan Coe, and Waylon
Jennings used their prison records as marketing tools. Artists who had not served time
used other cues to cultivate a country version of countercultural rebellion; Willie Nelson
wore sandals and a ponytail, while Johnny Cash wore only black and dabbled in drugs.256
By the end of the decade, Jennings sang the theme song to the television show The Dukes
of Hazzard, in which "good ol' boys" Bo and Luke Duke used their souped-up Dodge
Charger-painted with Confederate symbols and named the "General Lee"-to humiliate
the witless police and greedy capitalists of Hazzard County, Georgia.
252 Stern, Trucker, 13.
253 John P. Stevenson to the Editor, Overdrive (Aug. 1964): 13-6.
254 Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics (New York:
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Sandwiched between the two cultural endpoints of "Okie" and the Dukes of
Hazzard came a flood of trucking movies.2 57 The two most popular movies, Smokey and
the Bandit (1977) and Convoy (1978), presented very different versions of the rebel
trucker, though the narrative tension in both films centered on truckers flouting the long
but incompetent arm of the law. Burt Reynolds, as "The Bandit" in stuntman-turned-
director Hal Needham's wildly popular trucking comedy, guided an 18-wheeler filled
with contraband Coors beer from Oklahoma to Georgia, evading and taunting Buford T.
Justice (played by Jackie Gleason) and a host of other "Smokeys" along the way. Smokey
and the Bandit was the first major trucking movie since They Drive by Night, and the
contrasts between it and the earlier film are striking.258 Where the 1940 film had
centered on the struggles of a common working man to become economically
independent, Smokey imagined trucking as a hedonistic joyride, entirely divorced from
economic reality, in which Burt Reynolds's character displayed his manhood by seducing
women, cavorting through the countryside, and otherwise defying "establishment"
standards of propriety.259 Like the television show The Dukes of Hazzard which it helped
to inspire, Smokey and the Bandit was an escapist fantasy, depicting the unbridled
enthusiasm of rural outlaws resisting authority figures. (See Figure 5.5.)
257 Two television shows of the period also centered on truck drivers: Movin' On (1974-75, theme song by
Merle Haggard) and BJ and the Bear (1979-81).
258 Seven trucking films were released between They Drive by Night and Smokey and the Bandit, though
none gained comparable commercial success. They were Thieves' Highway (1949), The Wages of Fear
(1953), The Long Haul (1957), Deadhead Miles (1972), White Line Fever (1975), Great Smokey Roadblock
(1976), and Citizens Band (1977).
259 Smokey and the Bandit, dir. Hal Needham, 97 min., Universal Studios, 1977, digital video disc. The
selection of Coors beer as a plot device was appropriate, since the Coors company at the time marketed its
beer only in western states, giving it an image as an anti-Eastern working-man's brew. Furthermore, the
company's owner, Joseph Coors, was also a right-wing politician famous for his opposition to hippies, the
federal government, the "liberal establishment," birth control, and labor unions. See Grace Lichtenstein,
"Rocky Mountain High," New York Times Magazine, Dec. 28, 1975, 14-16.
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Figure 5.5: The Bandit
In contrast to the neatly uniformed driver of the 1940s, this renegade trucker wore his shirt half-
unbuttoned when his picture was taken by Marc F. Wise at a truck stop in Ontario, California, in
1988. The horse's-head belt buckle and the Confederate Battle Flag design on his long-nose
Peterbilt publicly declared him as a "Bandit." Marc F. Wise, Truck Stop (Jackson: University
Press of Mississippi, 1995).
Unlike Smokey and the Bandit, the makers of the 1978 movie Convoy intended to
make a broader statement about the truck driving cowboy's place in the modern world.
Sam Peckinpah directed the movie. As a former scriptwriter for the television show
Gunsmoke, and famed for his ultra-violent 1969 western The Wild Bunch, Peckinpah
wanted Convoy to be a new kind of western; Mack trucks would replace quarter horses,
Smokeys would replace federal marshals, and truck stops would replace saloons as the
loci of spontaneous brawls. "Outlaw" country singer/songwriter Kris Kristofferson
played the part of "Rubber Ducky," an independent trucker with an icy-blue stare whose
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control over his big rig is so complete that he does not even need to wear a shirt to drive.
Nor does he need the Teamsters, which he informs the audience "ain't my damn union."
"I'm independent," declares the Duck, emphasizing that "there ain't many of us left." The
Duck is a wanderer, his freedom constrained only by the exercise of state authority,
represented by Sheriff "Dirty" Lyle Wallace (played by Ernest Borgnine). Lyle extorts a
kickback out of the Duck and a group of fellow truckers caught for speeding, provoking
the Duck into a retaliatory punch. Forced to flee as Lyle, handcuffed to a barstool, calls in
backup, the Duck inadvertently becomes the leader of a "mighty convoy." With the help
of CB radios, the convoy attracts hundreds of truckers who hail the Duck as a "people's
hero" for his defiance of the 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. Federal Agent Hamilton
arrives in a "bear in the air" (a police helicopter), using a "computerized system" to lock
onto the truckers' CB frequency and inform the Duck that he is in violation of federal
law. The convoy nonetheless continues to barrel down the highway, as the Duck sneers
"well, piss on your law!" to Lyle, ultimately confronting the machinery of the state
directly in an explosive Hollywood-style climax.26 0
Although the movie never makes clear what exactly the Duck was protesting, the
broad appeal of the movie was later explained by C. W. McCall, a country musician
whose 1975 hit song "Convoy" was the direct inspiration for the movie. "Convoy appeals
to the rebel instinct in Americans," said McCall, making it possible for he and Kris
Kristofferson "to make a few statements-about how regulated our lives have become
and how many of our freedoms we have lost."26 1 Like Peter Fonda's character "Captain
America" in the 1969 film Easy Rider, the Duck was a renegade for whom the open road
was a source of, and solace for, anti-establishment yearnings. Unlike Captain America,
however, the Duck found that solace not in smoking marijuana and harboring an elitist
grudge against small-town conservatives, but by embracing his traditional, rural
manhood in his lonely search for the soul of America. Convoy was panned by critics for
its undeniable tackiness, but it was a hit with moviegoers. Furthermore, the movie struck
260 Convoy, dir. Sam Peckinpah, 11o min., EMI Films, 1978, videocassette.
261 Quoted in Kenneth L. Woodward, Peter S. Greenberg, and Susan Malsch, "The Trucker Mystique,"
Newsweek, Jan. 26, 1976, 44.
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a chord among truckers who saw in the movie a dramatization of the fact, as one driver
put it, that "Truckers ain't organization people!"262
One year after the release of Convoy, an actual independent trucker protest
emerged, with angry drivers calling for the complete dismantling of federal economic
regulations in the trucking industry. Like the protests of 1973-74, the shutdowns of the
summer of 1979 were provoked by a rapid rise of fuel costs, as part of the energy crisis
instigated by the overthrow of the Iranian Shah.26 3 After several years of gaining
publicity as "cowboys," however, truckers in the 1979 shutdown sought to demonstrate
that truckers were not just renegades, but that their independent way of living and doing
business was central to the American economy and its social fabric. The shutdown began
on June 5, 1979, when a convoy of truckers arrived in Washington and circled the Capitol
building, while hundreds of other truckers parked their rigs on interstates in the
Midwest and West. Mike Parkhurst, as president of a new group called the Independent
Truckers Association (representing 30,000 drivers), seized the moment and called for a
nationwide shutdown; by the middle of June, blockades had spread across the country.
By the end of June, approximately 75,000 truckers had stopped driving. Once again the
protests were violent, as roving bands of truckers set fire to empty trucks and shot at the
windshields of drivers who refused to stop. At least nine states called out the National
Guard to protect company drivers. By the time the shutdown ended in early July, at least
one driver had been shot and killed, while dozens more were injured. As in the 1973-74
shutdowns, independent trucker groups formed a Unity Council, headed by William Hill
of FASH. The coalition demanded that the Carter Administration reduce the price of
diesel and make more fuel available to truckers, remove the 55-mile-per-hour speed
limit, ease weight and length restrictions on highways, and provide a lo percent freight
surcharge to compensate for rising fuel costs.2 6 4
262 Will, Big Rig Souls, 84.
263 Franklin Tugwell, The Energy Crisis and the American Political Economy: Politics and Markets in the
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Unlike the shutdown of 1973-74, however, this time independent truckers made a
more organized effort to gain the ear of the President by garnering sympathy from
consumers. This strategy came primarily in the form of efforts to block the movement of
food from farms to supermarkets. As Oscar Williams, an official with Parkhurst's
Independent Truckers Association, declared: "I can predict that when housewives in the
major cities go to market and cannot find peaches, cherries, or fresh meat, or find they
have to pay double for these goods, there will be one hellacious uproar in
Washington."26 5 The centrality of trucking to the food economy became apparent as
meatpacking plants and grain elevators were forced to shut down. In Montana, where it
was estimated that half of the state's truckers were owner-operators, deliveries of
livestock to packing plants and of boxed beef to supermarkets halted almost
completely.266 Produce began rotting across the country, from Washington state
cherries, cucumbers, squash, and potatoes to North Carolina green beans and potatoes,
to California strawberries and lettuce-all foods that relied solely on owner-operator
truckers.26 7 Peach growers in Georgia halted their harvest; dairy farmers in Pennsylvania
dumped milk; and a Minnesota pork packing plant shut down.26 8 Truckers blockaded as
Stop & Shop supermarket distribution center in Connecticut, attempting to make the
problems of rural truck drivers directly apparent to consumers in New York City, New
Jersey, Connecticut, and Massachusetts.26 9 The point of these blockades, as
Independent Truckers Associations spokesman Don Swanson argued, was to show
consumers that the cost of diesel fuel translated directly into increased food costs. "We
could go ahead and pay $2 for a gallon of diesel," sated Swanson, "but people are going
to have to pay $6 for a pound of hamburger. We don't want to see that. We have to buy
"Independent Truckers Calling National Work Stoppage," NYT, Jun. 19, 1979, 18; Peter Bonventre, et al.,
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hamburger, too."2 70 Despite causing panic buying sprees in supermarkets, however, the
truckers' shutdowns and blockades proved too sporadic and unorganized to achieve a
lasting effect on food supplies.271 Without an effective means of central organization, the
1979 shutdowns ended much like the first, with the Carter Administration offering only
limited concessions to the truckers, including increased allocation of diesel fuel, a 7
percent freight surcharge, and a promise by the Department of Transportation to explore
the possibility of creating uniform truck weight and length laws.2 72
There was one major difference, however, between the results of the 1973-74
shutdowns and those of 1979. Although the 1979 strikes did not produce a "hellacious
uproar" in Washington, they did lead President Carter, along with Massachusetts
Senator Edward Kennedy, to advocate deregulation of the trucking industry.2 73
Although the price of fuel was the immediate cause of the 1979 protests, the underlying
goal was the elimination of the economic regulatory structures of the ICC. The main
group behind the event was Mike Parkhurst's Independent Truckers Association (ITA),
which he had formed in 1975 primarily to take down the ICC. "I want competition, open
and fair competition," Parkhurst told a reporter for Esquire in 1977. "I want unregulated
trucking."274 As vice president of the ITA William Scheffer stated at the height of the
shutdowns in late June 1979, the "primary aim" of the ITA-orchestrated shutdowns was
not only to get more fuel at lower prices, but "the dismantling of a giant Federal
bureaucracy that has grown to govern the trucking industry since the mid-1930's."275 As
Parkhurst and others saw it, deregulation would strike a direct blow not only at the
government bureaucracy that limited the economic freedom of the independent trucker,
but would also permanently damage the Teamsters union by allowing the unchecked rise
of small, decentralized trucking firms relying on non-union owner-operators.276 It is not
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clear whether President Carter and Senator Kennedy realized that this would be the
ultimate result of full deregulation, but as we shall see in the concluding chapter, this
was exactly what happened after the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. Truckers
who had all along sought to be independent men-free of government bureaucracy,
corporate control, and dues-demanding unions-would seem to have achieved exactly
what they wanted.
Conclusion
The connections between rural life and long-haul trucking created the conditions
for a neo-populist revolt in the 1970S that ultimately pushed the rural economy one step
closer to utter chaos. Owner-operator truck drivers, encouraged by popular culture
representations of themselves as "the last American cowboys," had become central to the
American food economy by that time, and had also imagined themselves to be the true
inheritors of the agrarian myth. That new agro-industrial myth came partly out of the
work experience of long-haul trucking, which for many farm boys provided an escape
from the tenuous business of farming in the 1930s, '40s, and '50s, yet provided a similar
sense of manly independence. Trucking provided some men with the chance to run a
small business, and it provided many more with a feeling of autonomy as they roamed
through the rural industrial landscape, controlling a giant piece of machinery that made
the marketing machinery of modern capitalism function.
When the wheels of that machinery pressed in more visibly on truckers during
the energy crises of the 1970s, however, the mythology of independence shattered,
driving thousands of men who despised mass protests to become radical protestors. The
anger emerged out of years of frustrations experienced by truckers who felt the promise
of independent manhood was threatened by large trucking firms, an increasingly
undemocratic Teamsters union, and layers of government regulations. Like the agrarian
Populist movement of a century before, the trucker shutdowns were founded on a rural
antipathy towards distant centers of economic and political power, centers of power
whose very livelihood depended on the productive labor of the rural people who fed
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them. William Jennings Bryan had famously pointed out that Eastern industrialists
could "Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and your cities will spring up again as
if by magic; but destroy our farms, and the grass will grow in the streets of every city of
the country."2 77 Truckers' statements about consumers paying $6 for a pound of
hamburger carried less rhetorical flourish, but emerged nonetheless from a similar rural
producerist mentality. William Hill, the head of the Fraternal Steel Haulers Association,
lamented the "farm background" of most of the truckers who participated in the
shutdowns of the 1970s, a background which he understood to be the cause of the fierce
individualism that prevented them from effectively organizing. "All these guys have that
American dream, man, that they're gonna work hard and they're gonna be millionaires,"
scoffed Hill. "And they'll own their own trucking company some day. Bullshit."278 But
that "farm background" was exactly what drove truckers to cultivate and believe in the
agro-industrial myth of long-haul trucking as a path to manly independence. In the
context of the postwar rural industrial landscape, however, truckers' populist protests
resulted in exactly the opposite result of the Populist revolt of the 189os. Whereas the
agrarian Populists ushered in a Progressive era in which social cohesion and state
intervention shaped the rural social and economic fabric, the trucker shutdowns of the
1970S ushered in an era in which independence came at a great social cost.
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Conclusion
The decade of the 198os was a time of crisis in rural America. Between 1979 and
1981, a series of global economic events led to a steep decline in American farm prices,
threatening family farmers with inescapable debt. Angry farmers drove in tractorcades to
Washington, DC, demanding relief, while Willie Nelson and other country musicians
held a series of "Farm Aid" concerts to help farmers facing foreclosure., The chaotic
nature of the late twentieth-century rural economy was not confined to Midwestern
family farm owners. Migrant farm workers, meatpacking employees, and retail workers
receiving minimum wages also found that rural realities did not necessarily live up to
American dreams.2 Rural truck drivers, in comparison, would seem to have fared rather
well as the inheritors of an agrarian mythology of manly independence, global energy
politics notwithstanding. But after the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980,
deregulation brought chaotic competition, remaking the entire trucking industry along
the lines forged by agricultural experts in the 1940os and 1950s intent upon solving the
farm problem.
The deregulatory impulse that led to the passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980
was well under way long before the independent trucker shutdowns of the mid- and late-
1970s. As explored in Chapter 1, agricultural and transportation economists consistently
saw the agricultural exemption in trucking as an example of an effective free-market
solution to the problem of maintaining high prices for producers while simultaneously
keeping consumer prices low. This was the essential theme of a 1970 tract by a group of
Harvard Law School students working with Ralph Nader, who attacked the Interstate
Commerce Commission for driving up consumer prices by allowing regulated truckers to
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monopolize freight transportation. 3 Presidents Nixon and Ford both supported
deregulation of trucking on the advice of the Council of Economic Advisors, but both
administrations were stymied by sustained opposition to regulatory reform from
regulated trucking firms and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Jimmy Carter
entered the White House in 1976 determined to reform trucking policy, telling an owner-
operator trucker at a town meeting in 1977 that "substantial deregulation" would level
the playing field for independent drivers, to which end Carter appointed a pro-
deregulation commissioner to the ICC. In 1978, the newly anti-monopolistic ICC defied
Congress, the Teamsters, and the American Trucking Associations by easing restrictions
on entry, routing, and rate-making in trucking-thus beginning a process of dismantling
the regulatory structure established in 1935. The process continued in January 1979
when Senator Edward M. Kennedy, seeking an issue to promote his planned presidential
candidacy, proposed a sweeping deregulation bill to embarrass Carter for failing to
deliver on his 1977 promise to owner-operator truckers. Kennedy enrolled a motley crew
of supporters in his effort, including Ralph Nader on behalf of consumers, the National
Association of Manufacturers and the Conservative Union on behalf of free-enterprise
advocates, and Mike Parkhurst representing the nation's independent truckers. In June
1979, President Carter joined with Kennedy, asking Congress "to reduce substantially
federal economic regulation over the trucking industry." Despite strong opposition from
the American Trucking Associations and the Teamsters, Carter successfully pushed
trucking deregulation through Congress in the form of the Motor Carrier Act of 198o.4
The success of trucking deregulation despite overwhelming opposition from
powerful interest groups depended upon Carter's framing of the issue as an anti-
3 Robert Fellmeth, The Interstate Commerce Omission: The Public Interest and the ICC (New York:
Grossman, 1970).
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inflationary measure that would benefit American consumers to the tune of $5 billion.5
With this, Carter essentially affirmed the arguments that agricultural policymakers had
been making since the early 193os; namely, that an atomized, highly competitive
trucking industry would reduce the cost of transporting goods, to the benefit of
producers and consumers alike. Particularly in the first decade following World War II,
when the federal government's role in the agricultural and food economy came under
sustained attack from both ends of the political spectrum, the flexibility of trucking,
especially exempt agricultural trucking, provided a convenient means of "solving" the
farm problem by pushing the politics of farm and food pricing into the hands of
industrial food processors and supermarkets. Agricultural experts had cooperated with
agribusiness industries, relying on highway transportation to reshape the economic
geography and politics of milk, beef, and frozen food production and marketing as
seemingly non-statist approaches to the problem of maintaining high prices for farmers
while keeping consumer food prices low. The success of this "free market" approach in
redefining farm and food pricing as an economic problem, rather than a political-
economic problem, appealed to the Carter Administration, which saw in deregulation of
the entire trucking industry an opportunity to defuse widespread consumer and business
unrest over the "stagflation" of the late 1970s.
The passage of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 led to a level of chaos in the
trucking industry unknown since the early 1930s. By easing the restrictions on market
entry, the Act made it possible for thousands of small trucking firms, especially
independent owner-operator truckers, to begin competing for general freight. One truck
driver wrote in a 1983 New York Times editorial that deregulation "created more gypsies
than the market can bear" by encouraging a larger number of truckers to fight for an
unchanging amount of freight.6 Owner-operator truckers who had called for
deregulation during the shutdowns of the 1970S initiated a very different kind of
shutdown in May 1982, when the Independent Truckers Unity Committee decided that
5 "Carter Proposes a Sweeping Bill Deregulating Trucking Industry," New York Times, Jun. 22, 1979, 1.
6 Timothy D. Barton, "Small Truckers' Life: Hard, Getting Harder," New York Times, Feb. 11, 1983, 27.
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"deregulation ... has caused such a drop in revenues that most owner-operators are
operating at below what it costs them [to drive]."7 Though this shutdown did not gain
widespread support, Mike Parkhurst initiated another full-scale protest in January 1983,
after President Ronald Reagan signed a bill that increased the federal fuel tax and other
fees for truckers.8 Parkhurst hoped to reverse the tax legislation by orchestrating a
nationwide shutdown of truckers who were pressed not only by fuel costs but by the
extreme competition that came in the wake of deregulation. Reagan scolded Parkhurst
for his tactics, informing the truckers that they could simply pass on the increased costs
of fuel taxes to consumers. The truckers retorted that the cut-throat competition under
deregulation prevented them from doing so; that same competitive environment also
discouraged most truckers from joining the shutdown, despite scattered violence
reminiscent of the 1970S protests, for fear of being driven entirely out of business.9
Deregulation also led to a rapid decline in the power of the Teamsters union to
gain wage and fringe benefits for company drivers. The easing of market entry
restrictions encouraged the emergence of trucking firms specializing in hauling only
truckloads of freight, thereby avoiding the need to invest in the terminal facilities
required to coordinate less-than-truckload freight movements. Most of these new
truckload firms were small and usually located in rural areas, following the pattern set
over the previous decades by the exempt agricultural trucking industry. Larger firms,
particularly J. B. Hunt, also joined in the competition for truckload freight. But whether
the new trucking companies were small or large, nearly all were non-union. By 1996, the
nation's overall freight bill had reached an all-time low when adjusted for inflation, but
at the cost of transforming big rigs into "sweatshops on wheels" as trucking companies
7 "Independent Truckers Call Strike in a Dispute over Hauling Rates," New York Times, May 1, 1982, 12.
8 "Independent Truckers Call Strike over Tax on Gasoline," New York Times, Jan. 8, 1983, 8; "Some Trucks
Halt to Protest Gas Tax," New York Times, Jan. 31, 1983, 8.
9 Ernest Holsendolph, "Violence Spreads in Trucker Strike," New York Times, Feb. 2, 1983, B20; Ernest
Holsendolph, "Truckers' Strike Delays Some Goods," New York Times, Feb. 3, 1983, 1, 16;William Serrin,
"Fear Rides in Cabs of Nonstriking Truckers," New York Times, Feb. 4, 1983, 1, 10; Ernest Holsendolph,
"President Assails Trucker Violence as Strike Goes On," New York Times, Feb. 5, 1983, 1, 28; Ruth Mari,
"Truckers Confident on Strike's Success," New York Times, Feb. 6, 1983, NJ25; Kenneth B. Noble, "11-Day
Trucker Strike Called off amid Signs Protest Had Collapsed," New York Times, Feb. 11, 1983, 13.
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slashed wages while the Teamsters became nearly irrelevant to the long-haul industry.lo
Deregulation proved to work exactly as it had been intended-to place on "independent"
truckers the brunt of the burden of satisfying both producers and consumers by driving
down the cost of the transportation that connected them. As this history of the
relationship between trucking, agriculture, and food politics has shown, such a result is
anything but surprising.
10 Cynthia Engel, "Competition Drives the Trucking Industry," Monthly Labor Review 121 (Apr. 1998): 34-
41; Marvin Schwartz, J. B. Hunt: The Long Haul to Success (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press,
1992), 30-44; Michael H. Belzer, Sweatshops on Wheels: Winners and Losers in Trucking Deregulation
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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